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Cornell University 2007 
This dissertation analyzes some of the ways in which “constitutional architecture” 
shapes jurisprudence in Canada and the United States, with a particular focus on 
appellate court decisions related to aboriginal and environmental law. The purpose of 
the comparison is to consider how the differences between parliamentary government 
and American-style “separation of powers” affect the nature of judicial power, as well 
as how differences in the language of the Canadian and American constitutionalism 
shape the direction of law in the two countries. In contrast to those political scientists 
who interpret law as being driven by political factors, this dissertation emphasizes the 
ways in which institutional structures place limits on the scope of judicial ideology 
and judicial activism. In other words, political jurisprudence takes place within the 
limits established by constitutional architecture. The project is based on an analysis of 
environmental and aboriginal law decisions decided by the Supreme Courts of Canada 
and the United States between 1985 and 2007, as well as an analysis of environmental 
policy cases decided by American and Canadian federal courts of appeal. The key 
conclusion is that constitutional differences, not ideology, explain the differing 
opportunities for the “judicialization” of environmental and aboriginal policy in 
Canada and the United States. In the USA, the separation of powers is the principal 
source of judicialization of environmental policy; in Canada, the Parliamentary system 
restrains the ability of an otherwise activist judiciary to shape the implementation of 
environmental law. In regards to aboriginal policy, in contrast, the Canadian 
constitution has provided a basis for judicial activism. The cases of environmental and 
  
aboriginal law illustrate that, in Canada and the United States, institutional constraints 
continue to determine the limits of political jurisprudence. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ABORIGINAL RIGHTS 
IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 
In the Spring of 2007, the United States Supreme Court rendered a decision in 
the case of Massachusetts v. EPA,1 in which a variety of state governments and 
environmental groups asked the court to push the national government to regulate 
“greenhouse gases” such as carbon dioxide. One might have thought that the issue of 
“global warming” would not come under the Court’s jurisdiction, for the same reason 
that one would not expect the court to develop its own foreign policy. The issue of 
global warming is, after all, a global problem. Solving this problem, or even living 
with it, depends upon the actions (and inactions) of all governments, or at least all 
major governments in the fully industrialized or developing worlds. As in the case of 
other global problems, solutions can only be reached through inter-government 
negotiation and compromise, and it is not clear whether courts can contribute much if 
anything to this process. Much like the case of foreign policy, the problem of global 
warming raises complex issues that are not readily comprehended even by those who 
have benefited from three years of law school. Yet the American Supreme Court—or 
at least a majority of its justices—argued that, due to the dictates of the Clean Air Act 
and its amendments, the court could not avoid taking a part in the debate over global 
warming. Regardless of the wisdom of having lawyers intervene into complex matters 
of science and policy, the position of the majority was not completely implausible as 
an interpretation of the law. 
                                                 
1 Massachusetts v. EPA, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 127 S. Ct. 1438; 
167 L. Ed. 2d 248; 2007. 
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The plaintiffs sought a declaration that, given the current state of scientific 
knowledge about the effects of carbon dioxide emissions on global warning, the 
Environmental Protection Agency must initiate plans to regulate green house gas 
emissions from automobiles. The courts were asked to initiate a major development in 
public policy, despite (or because of) Congress’ inability to reach conclusions on 
green house gas emissions, despite the vast impact that such regulations would have 
on America’s automobile dependent economy, and despite the international 
dimensions to the issue. What did matter was the following language of the Clean Air 
Act: 
The [EPA] [***16] Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time 
to time revise) in accordance with the provisions of this section, standards 
applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new 
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or 
contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger 
public health or welfare. . . . 
Given this statutory language, the majority argued that the EPA had not provided a 
sufficient explanation for its decision not to regulate the four green house gases 
identified by the plaintiffs. EPA had argued that its own decisions could not possibly 
affect the advance of global warming, as the increase in global temperatures was a 
consequence of developments occurring in all industrial and developing nations. In 
addition, the EPA argued that carbon dioxide is not a kind of pollutant covered by the 
Clean Air Act. Both arguments were dismissed by the Court. Relying extensively on 
its interpretation of scientific consensus, but even more extensively on the language of 
the Clean Air Act, the Supreme Court ruled that the EPA’s inaction on greenhouse gas 
regulation was unlawful. 
Environmentalists undoubtedly regard this ruling as an important victory, and 
are understandably unconcerned with the legal niceties of the case. For those more 
concerned with the proper scope of judicial power, Massachusetts v. EPA is a clear 
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example of judicial overreach. But it would be difficult, in this instance, to argue that 
the court was ignoring or creating the law. The majority of five made the plausible 
argument that the Environmental Protection Agency had in fact been given the power , 
under federal law, to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles; and if it 
had the power, circumstances dictated that it had to act. This had been the position of 
two of the EPA’s general counsels in 1998 and 1999 under the Clinton administration. 
Under the Bush administration, EPA officials came to the opposite conclusion, 
arguing that there was nothing in the Environmental Protection Act that gave the EPA 
the power to regulate “greenhouse gases.” Even if the EPA did possess the authority to 
regulate gases such as carbon dioxide, it would not have been prudent for it to do so, 
as Congress was attempting to address the very complex issues raised by global 
warming through new (though certainly not always successful) legislative initiatives. 
The majority’s position in Massachusetts v. EPA was that, as a matter of law, the 
Clinton administration had been correct. Though green house gases may not have been 
of specific concern to the legislators who created the EPA and its subsequent 
amendments, the regulation of such gases fell within the EPA’s power. This did not 
mean that the EPA would necessarily be forced by the court to issue specific 
regulations of automobile emissions. But the EPA could no longer avoid addressing 
the issue of carbon dioxide emissions from automobiles and their contribution to 
global warming. Congress had already given it the responsibility to investigate and, if 
necessary, regulate pollutants that affected the environment, and the contemporary 
scientific consensus was that green house gases were pollutants of that kind. Thus, the 
majority opinion cannot simply be dismissed as judicial law-making, or as an example 
of the “capture” of the Court by environmentalist interest groups and their allies. The 
intervention of the judiciary was enabled by the language of American environmental 
law which was written to constrain the discretion of executive officials and experts. 
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Whether it makes sense for courts to intervene into such a complicated policy arena is 
an entirely separate question. For better or worse, the American political system has 
structured environmental policy in such a way that it invites the exercise of judicial 
power. 
Reports of the “demise of environmentalism” in American law have, after 
Massachusetts v. EPA, been revealed as premature.2 While it is certainly the case that 
there is a coterie of judges opposed to the judicialization of environmental policy, the 
advocates of judicial deference in environmental policy are apparently outnumbered 
on the Supreme Court (at least in regards to some momentous issues, such as the scope 
of EPA duties). They are unlikely to gain reinforcements in the immediate political 
future, even if one of the sitting liberal justices should choose to leave the bench. 
Personnel, in Massachusetts v. EPA as in so many other cases, seemed more important 
than precedent. 
The demise of environmentalism in American law was exaggerated, at least in 
part, because some scholars overestimated the impact of judicial precedent or “stare 
decisis,” the principle that courts should generally stick to the rules laid down in 
earlier decisions. The scope of environmentalism in American law was not settled by 
precedents from the Rehnquist and Burger eras, precedents which seemed to confirm 
that courts should exercise extreme deference when evaluating the discretionary and 
scientific decisions of bureaucratic policy-makers.3 In addition, the majority in 
Massachusetts v. EPA did not conform to those precedents which established a more 
restrictive conception of legal standing, precedents which appeared to raise further 
                                                 
2 Michael Greve, The Demise of Environmentalism in American Law. Washington: AEI Press, 
1996. 
3 E.g. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 US S. Ct. 837 (1984) see also 
Cass Sunstein “Law and Administration After Chevron.” Columbia Law Review. Vol. 90, No. 8. (Dec. 
1990) pp 2071-2120. 
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hurdles against those who might wish to direct public policy through litigation.4 Those 
who thought that the heyday of environmentalism in American law was over by the 
late 1990s were, perhaps, guilty of excessive legal idealism. Environmental litigation 
continues in American courts, and it continues to succeed on occasion, despite the 
decisions of the Burger and Rehnquist courts that attempted to limit the legal bases for 
environmental litigation. 
Massachusetts v. EPA might give pleasure to environmentalists, but it is likely 
to make us more cynical about the role of courts. The Supreme Court, in this case, 
seems to simply mirror the public debate over environmentalism. Or, to use a slightly 
different metaphor, the case reveals the court to be simply another arena for 
ideological combat. The dissenting justices would argue, to the contrary, that their 
position had little or nothing to do with the science of global warming or political 
differences over environmentalism. Yet, for many observers, the political persuasion 
of the four dissenting justices cannot escape notice. Surely it is not a coincidence that 
only Justices Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito, conservatives all, found legal 
reasons to rule in favor of the Bush Administration. Massachusetts vs. EPA, in other 
words, can be seen as yet another illustration of the political character of 
contemporary law and courts. While politics may not determine all aspects of judicial 
decision-making, when momentous questions reach the courtroom—the proper 
response to global warming, say, or the selection of the President of the United 
States—partisan lines are drawn, and the meaning of law and the outcome of legal 
cases depends upon the political affiliations and preferences of judges. If we wish to 
know how the courts will resolve these major issues, then we need only to inquire into 
the ideologies or “political preferences” of judges. 
                                                 
4 E.g. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992) see also Cass Sunstein 
“What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, ‘Injuries,’and Article III.” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 
91, No. 2 (Nov. 1992) pp 163-236. 
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The connection between politics and law is important, and obvious. Less 
obvious is the way in which institutions—the structure of government, and the nature 
of law itself—place limits on the politics of jurisprudence. Particularly in the 
contemporary era, when the political and the ideological aspects of jurisprudence are 
highlighted by both scholars and journalists, it is easy to overlook or downplay the 
ways in which institutional structures constrain judicial power. The best way to remind 
us how institutions limit political jurisprudence is to compare how different kinds of 
political institutions shape the law. Comparisons between Canadian and American 
jurisprudence are particularly useful in this regard. If we compare American courts 
with courts in Canada, courts that operate in a very similar culture but in a very 
different institutional environment, it is easier to discern the ways in which judicial 
decision-making is shaped by political institutions and ultimately by the law itself. 
For instance, if we take a political perspective on courts and law, we might 
expect that environmental activism would be at least as prevalent in Canadian law as 
in American. But this is not the case. Environmentalism is a popular cause in Canada,5 
but courts have rarely become its champion. The Canadian environmental record is not 
so great that environmentalists could ask for nothing more from the courts; in fact, 
Canadian environmental protections are probably less effective, and less severe, than 
are the equivalents in the United States. Yet one searches in vain for the equivalent to 
Massachusetts v. EPA in Canadian law—that is, an example of litigation initiating 
major changes in the substance and direction of environmental policy. Even when the 
issues are not as complex and momentous as global warming, it is difficult to find 
examples of environmental interest groups winning litigation campaigns against 
government decision-makers in Canada. If legal decisions really are determined by 
                                                 
5 Judith I. McKenzie, Environmental Politics in Canada: Managing the Commons into The 21st 
Century. Oxford University Press: London, 2002. pp 91-99. 
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politics and ideology, it is somewhat curious that the left-leaning Canadian polity has 
produced a judiciary that is so hesitant to endorse or advance one of the most central 
left-leaning political causes. What accounts for this relative absence of 
environmentalism in Canadian jurisprudence? And what does this absence tell us 
about the relationship between politics and law? 
The timidity of the Canadian judiciary in environmental policy cannot be 
ascribed to a general unwillingness to intervene into political matters. The 
Constitution Act of 1982 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms introduced 
“American style” judicial activism into the Canadian political system, and in many 
instances Canadian courts have made rulings that emulate or exceed the liberal 
jurisprudence of the Warren and Burger courts. Consider, for instance, the role played 
by Canadian courts in aboriginal law. In contrast to the example of environmental 
policy, Canadian courts have transformed the relationship between “First Nations”—
aboriginal peoples—and the Canadian state. The best example of the Court’s 
transformative role in aboriginal policy is Delgamuukw v British Columbia,6 a 
complicated land claim case decided in 1997. While the case did not resolve the 
specific land claims of the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en Nations who initiated the 
litigation, the court’s opinion did elaborate a broad conception of “aboriginal title” that 
would form the basis for subsequent litigation. The implications of the expansive 
definition of aboriginal title were immediately seized upon by aboriginal leaders and 
academic commentators. According to some legal academics, the Court’s definition of 
aboriginal title confirms not only ownership rights over land, but also the existence of 
an inherent right of self-government for aboriginal people.7 A summit of First Nations 
                                                 
6 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 1997 CanLII 302 (S.C.C.). 
7 E.g. Kent McNeil “Aboriginal Rights in Canada: From Title to Land to Territorial 
Sovereignty.” Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law. Volume 5, 1998. pp 278-98 The 
idea of an inherent right of aboriginal self-government is by no means a marginal idea amongst 
aboriginal leaders and legal elites. Less than sufficient attention has been paid to the practical details 
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leaders informed the federal government that, as a consequence of the Delgamuukw 
decision, the court had confirmed aboriginal title to the whole of British Columbia, 
along with “complete authority, jurisdiction, and decision-making in our territories 
and over our resources.”8 Delgamuukw certainly did not resolve the various problems 
of aboriginal-state relations in Canada, but through this decision and others like it the 
court has shaped the options and expectations of both aboriginals and state elites. 
Unlike the case of environmental policy, Canadian courts have not been hesitant to 
play a leading role in aboriginal rights and aboriginal policy. 
The situation in American jurisprudence is different. American courts have not 
followed the Canadian example in reforming the relationship between Native 
Americans and the state. Academic commentators are not sanguine about the potential 
for a transformative aboriginal rights jurisprudence in the United States.9 The simplest 
explanation for this situation is that the litigation prospects of Native Americans have 
been hampered by the strength of conservative jurists on the court—individuals such 
as Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Antonin Scalia, joined recently by allies such 
as Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, as well as their occasional 
compatriots such as Justice Anthony Kennedy, the recently deceased Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, and the recently retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. According to this 
line of thinking, the American Supreme Court has played a limited role in the 
                                                                                                                                            
of implementing this right: “(T)he amount of attention paid by the First Nation political elite and 
scholarly supporters of their position to the search for a viable political and constitutional 
arrangement with the non-Aboriginal majority is minimal compared to the effort and advocacy 
devoted to self-determination, self-government, and a third order of government.” Alan Cairns, First 
Nations and the Canadian State. Kingston: Queen’s University, The Institute of Inter-Governmental 
Relations, 2005 p. 31. 
8 The Globe and Mail, 17 February 1998, p. A-18, quoted in Gurston Dacks, “British 
Columbia after the Delgamuukw Decision: Land Claims and Other Processes.” Canadian Public 
Policy. Volume 28, No. 2, (June, 2002) pp 239-255. 
9 Steven Paul McSloy, “The Miner’s Canary: A Bird’s Eye View of American Indian Law 
and Its Future.” New England Law Review, Volume 37, (Spring, 2003). 
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development of aboriginal rights for reasons that would also lead us to expect the 
American Supreme Court to overturn Roe v. Wade, support extraordinary acts of 
executive power in the war on terror, expand protections for property rights, and so on. 
The absence of progressive aboriginal rights jurisprudence can be explained in 
political terms. This situation could be reversed with changes in Congress and the 
Presidency, changes that would ultimately lead to more liberal appointees and thus to 
a jurisprudence more supportive of aboriginal claims. 
The problem with this political interpretation of American aboriginal rights 
jurisprudence is simple as well: the so-called “conservatives” on the American 
Supreme Court are often joined by their more “liberal” colleagues in their opinions 
that limit and circumscribe the scope of aboriginal claims. At least for the last decade 
and half, liberal justices on the American Supreme Court— Justices Stevens, Souter, 
Breyer, and Ginsburg—have refrained from developing an ambitious aboriginal rights 
jurisprudence. There is no body of dissenting aboriginal rights doctrine that merely 
awaits the appointment of Ronald Dworkin or Lawrence Tribe so as to become the law 
of the land. This explains why some of the most prominent proponents of aboriginal 
rights jurisprudence have aimed their venom at American Supreme Court justices who 
are usually seen as reliable votes for liberal political positions.10 The obstacles to 
Canadian-style judicial intervention into aboriginal policy seem to lie within American 
law itself, and not merely in the political balance of power on the court. Perhaps this is 
why some legal scholars suggest that only appeals to authorities outside of the 
American constitutional and legal tradition can lead to an American revolution in 
aboriginal rights.11 It would be premature to suggest that a revolution in aboriginal 
                                                 
10 Robert A.Williams, Like A Loaded Weapon: The Rehnquist Court, Indian Rights, and the 
legal history of racism in America. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.  
11 E.g. Note, “International Law as an Interpretive Force in Federal Indian Law.” Harvard 
Law Review, Vol. 116, No. 8, (June, 2003) pp 1751-1773. 
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rights will never occur within American law. But it would be overly simplistic to say 
that this revolution has been foreclosed solely because of the presence of conservative 
or “new right” justices on the American Supreme Court. 
The divergence between Canadian and American jurisprudence in 
environmental and aboriginal law is worthy of note, not merely because they touch 
upon two of the central issues in contemporary political life, but also because of what 
the differences tell us about the nature and limits of political jurisprudence. If courts 
are primarily driven by politics, we would expect that judges who support aboriginal 
rights would also support environmentalism, and vice versa. This is because support 
for aboriginal interests (or the interests of minority groups in general) and 
environmentalism are in many ways central, particularly in contemporary North 
America, to what it means to be politically liberal or left-leaning.12 A general 
divergence between Canadian and American jurisprudence in the last three decades 
would not be surprising for those who interpret courts in purely political terms. 
Canada has consistently elected more left-leaning governments during this era, and 
presumably this would lead to a more left- leaning judiciary. This is what makes the 
differing responses of the Canadian and American courts to environmental and 
aboriginal litigation so intriguing: it shows that the politics of jurisprudence does not 
always develop in ways we might expect, in this era where so many have become 
cynical or at least “realistic” about the dependence of law upon politics. Despite the 
undoubted significance of political ideology and preferences, constitutional structures 
and legal norms continue to place constraints on the powers of courts, and they explain 
                                                 
12 E.g. Richard Ellis, “Romancing the Oppressed: The New Left and the Left Out.” Review 
of Politics. Volume 58, Number 1, (Winter, 1996) pp 109-154. Ellis notes the strong connection 
between environmentalism and support for indigenous peoples as a defining of marker of the “new 
left” that emerged in the post-1960s era: “Among the strongest contemporary manifestations of the of 
this perennial egalitarian tendency is the radical environmental movement, whose adherents routinely 
argue that dispossessed indigenous peoples offer an authentic model of a truly ecological society.” p. 
118. 
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some of the important differences that separate the jurisprudence of Canada and the 
United States. 
1.1 Political Institutions and the Limits of Political Jurisprudence: Two Facets of 
Constitutional Architecture 
The central insight of the advocates of political interpretations of 
jurisprudence—whether mid-20th century legal realists, the advocates of the 
“attitudinal” and “rational choice” models in political science, or the proponents of 
critical legal studies—is that the language of law cannot constrain judicial discretion. I 
am not proposing that a pure legal model of judicial decision making provides a better 
explanation for the decisions made by judges. My argument is that we cannot 
understand judicial politics unless we pay attention to how institutional structures or 
“constitutional architecture” provide differing opportunities for judges to exercise their 
policy preferences. “Constitutional architecture” is not simply another term for law: 
rather, it refers to the ways in which laws are made, the ways they are enforced, and 
how these features either inhibit or enable judicial policy-making. But legal language 
is part of constitutional architecture as well, and the proponents of political 
jurisprudence often overstate the interpretive flexibility of Constitutional documents. 
By paying attention to the different rights that are provided protection by the Canadian 
and American constitutions, we can see that, in some instances, the inclusion of 
specific rights in a political institution’s constitutional architecture can shape how 
courts influence policy.  
There are two general ways in which institutions or “constitutional 
architecture” might shape the politics of jurisprudence in Canada and the United 
States: first, the structure and relationship of the law-making and policy-
implementation process, and secondly, the specific language of constitutional rights- 
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provisions. The law-making and law-enforcement process—the way in which 
legislatures create law and policy, and the relationship between the legislative branch 
and the executive branch—are of course very different in Canada and the United 
States. Differing means of law-creation and law-enforcement have the potential to 
create very different opportunities for “law interpretation.” There are at least 2 key 
ways in which the differences between the Canadian Parliamentary system and the 
American “separation of powers” system affect the scope of judicial power: 
1) Statutory language and executive discretion: The American Congress has a 
greater incentive to place restraints upon executive discretion, due to the fact that the 
executive is a separate institution not directly accountable to the legislature. In many 
instances, different political parties will control the legislative and executive branches, 
and this gives Congress an additional motive to shackle executive discretion through 
law. Two of the most common ways in which this occurs are through increasing the 
detail and specificity of law, and by allowing private groups to play a role in enforcing 
public law. 
2) The limited legitimacy of bureaucratic discretion in the American 
administrative state. 
Despite the fact that Congress has incentives to cabin executive discretion as much as 
possible, it is impossible to eliminate the discretionary character of public policy in the 
modern state. Given what the public wants the state to accomplish, Congress cannot 
possibly create all of the various rules and restrictions that govern the activities of 
individuals and organizations. Most law-making (euphemistically referred to as “rule-
making” or “policy-making”) is thus undertaken by executive branch bureaucracies. 
However, the legitimacy of bureaucratic decision-making is hampered by the 
separation of the executive and legislative branches. American courts are less inclined 
to regard administrative interpretations of American law as authoritative, because the 
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administrators are not even theoretically accountable to the legislative branch. 
American courts have an institutional justification for intervention into administrative 
politics that is not available to courts in parliamentary systems of government. Thus, 
when they decide to challenge executive discretion, American courts plausibly claim 
that they must play a central role in insuring executive fidelity to legislative intentions. 
In a parliamentary system, where the executive is directly responsible to the 
legislature, it is more difficult for courts to sustain this claim. 
The differences between the parliamentary government and the American 
separation of powers system are likely to lead to different patterns of statutory 
interpretation in Canadian and American courts. The opportunities for judicial 
intervention into environmental policy are affected by these most general features of 
government in Canada and the United States. In regards to aboriginal rights, however, 
we find a different facet of constitutional architecture: here, the Canadian Constitution 
Act of 1982 confers explicit protections for aboriginal rights, while the American 
Constitution is largely silent on the status of Indian rights and Indian treaties. My 
argument is that the recognition of aboriginal rights in the Canadian Constitution has 
provided Canadian courts with a necessary pre-text for the exercise of power in 
aboriginal policy, a pre-text that is not available in regards to environmentalism. In the 
American constitutional order, aboriginal rights have not been “constitutionalized.” 
This does not mean that judicial power and judicial politics are irrelevant in the area of 
aboriginal policy. The same tensions that promote judicial power in other areas—the 
tension between executive discretion and legislative intent, the tension between 
national and state policies—also provide opportunities for judicial power and displays 
of judicial politics in aboriginal law. But the judicial role in the development of 
aboriginal rights in the United States has been limited, because courts must operate 
under a different set of institutional limits. While the Canadian constitution allows and 
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even demands that courts determine the scope and substance of aboriginal rights, in 
American law, courts are constrained by the absence of explicit constitutional 
protections for Indian rights. 
The general absence of “environmental activism” in Canadian jurisprudence, 
and the general absence of “aboriginal rights activism” in American law, is a product 
of institutional differences between the two nations, not the political balance of power 
on the courts or the idiosyncratic policy preferences of judges. My intent in this study 
is not to deny the role of politics in judging, however. There is no doubt that political 
preferences, beliefs, ideologies, and personal experience colors the ways in which 
judges interpret the law. As there is no way to eliminate the opportunities for judicial 
discretion that emerge from gaps in the law, confusion in legal language, or conflicts 
between various laws, it is always unrealistic to expect that politics is completely 
irrelevant to judging. But it is also unrealistic to ignore the real differences that 
separate judges from other political actors. It is important to recognize the inevitability 
of judicial politics, without being overwhelmed by the inevitable role that politics 
plays in law. By paying attention to the institutional structures that variously enable or 
inhibit judicial power, we can gain a better appreciation of the limits of political 
jurisprudence. 
1.2 Outline 
In chapter two, I explain in greater detail why a comparison of Canadian and 
American aboriginal rights and environmental law decisions can help to illustrate the 
limits of political jurisprudence. Theorists of judicial politics who focus solely on the 
American polity are tempted to emphasize the political influences on courts, as they 
study courts that operate in only one institutional setting. By looking at some of the 
ways courts operate in differing political regimes, we can better appreciate the ways in 
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which institutions affect what issues become the subject of judicial power and judicial 
discretion. Those few comparativists who, in recent years, have paid attention to the 
role of courts, have tended to focus on the similarities between judges in various 
regimes, or to interpret the scope of judicial power as a consequence of social factors. 
The Canadian and American regimes are typically regarded as “converging” towards a 
single model of judicial power; differences in judicial outcomes can be explained as a 
consequence of political struggles, as opposed to institutional differences. In contrast, 
I argue that a comparison of judicial politics in Canada and the United States reveals 
that differences in constitutional architecture help explain some of the continuing 
differences between the jurisprudence of Canada and the United States. 
Chapter three deals with various aspects of Indian law in Canada and the 
United States. In this section I compare all of the cases dealing with aboriginal legal 
claims (based upon aboriginal rights, treaty rights, and statutory claims) decided by 
the Canadian and American Supreme Court between 1985 (when the Canadian 
Constitution Act of 1982 and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms went into effect) and 
2006. My central claim is that Canadian constitutional reforms have created a greater 
space for judicial activism regarding aboriginal legal claims, particularly in the area of 
aboriginal and treaty rights. However, the court’s support for aboriginal claims 
remains limited in many respects—the more expansive interpretation of aboriginal 
rights in the previous two decades is not a result of the court having been “captured” 
by aboriginal interest groups or their supporters in the legal academy. The aboriginal 
law decisions in the United States Supreme Court during this period illustrate that 
aboriginal litigants are constrained by politics and by law. Unlike the case in the 
Canadian Supreme Court, there are clearer “voting blocs” in American Indian law, 
composed of judges with distinctly different levels of support for aboriginal legal 
claims. But even amongst American judges who are most likely to support aboriginal 
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claims, there are few signs of support for anything like the Canadian revolution in 
aboriginal rights. 
In chapter four, I examine a variety of environmental law decisions in 
Canadian and American courts. My argument is that the Canadian parliamentary 
system creates fewer opportunities, and fewer justifications, for intervention into 
environmental policy-making by Canadian courts. While Canadian courts have 
adopted some legal innovations that led, in American politics, to a massive increase in 
the exercise of judicial power through statutory interpretation, those innovations have 
not had a similar effect in Canada. Canadian courts tend to adopt a deferential 
approach to government power in environmental law that follows the “centralization” 
and “governing coalition” theories of judicial decision making.13 American courts, in 
contrast, are more likely to support challenges to the environmental decisions made by 
executive bureaucracies such as the EPA. However, these decisions do not mirror the 
intense partisan differences over environmental policy that are a significant source of 
tension in American politics. Rather, the decisions show a pattern in which judges are 
motivated primarily by a desire to restrain executive discretion and insure fidelity to 
Congressional intent. The kinds of disputes that exist in environmental law decisions 
by judges do not simply reflect the partisan differences over environmental policy that 
are so evident amongst elected politicians and “issue networks.” The environmental 
law decisions of American appellate courts, for the most part, do not reveal the 
influence of either “green” or “free market” approaches to environmentalism. The 
problems of political activism emerge not because courts are imposing their own 
policy preferences, but because of the way American courts have constructed the 
scope of judicial power, the way they have conceptualized the Congressional-
                                                 
13 E.g. Martin Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1986; Robert Dahl, “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a 
National Policy-Maker.” Journal of Public Law, Vol. 6, (1957). 
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Presidential relations, and the way in which they understand the requirements of the 
rule of law. 
This comparison of environmental and aboriginal law in Canadian and 
American courts shows that differing institutional environments create different forms 
of judicial power, and differing opportunities for “rights revolutionaries.” 
Environmental law decisions in Canadian and American courts show that the political 
differences between the two nations continue to create differing opportunities for 
judicial activism. The continuing deference of Canadian courts towards environmental 
policy-makers, despite some shifts in the Court’s approach to procedural questions, 
helps to illustrate how the rise in judicial activism in Canada is in fact constrained by 
the Constitution and the Charter, and is not merely a consequence of the judicial 
usurpation of power. This is not intended to discredit critics of the Court’s Charter 
jurisprudence. However, in response to those who criticize the judicial activists for 
“making law,” I argue that the environmental law decisions of Canadian courts 
illustrates that the activism of courts seems to depend on the opportunities that have 
been given them. 
In aboriginal law, in contrast, Canadian courts have been empowered by the 
“interpretive flexibility”14 of the Constitution Act of 1982, which has empowered 
courts to transform aboriginal law (though not necessarily the conditions of aboriginal 
peoples) and encouraged aboriginal litigants to seek judicial enforcement and 
elaboration of their rights. The limited development of aboriginal rights in United 
States is a consequence of both political divisions and constitutional constraints. 
Without the kind of constitutional transformations that occurred in Canada, it is 
unlikely that the success of Native Canadian litigants could be repeated in American 
courts, even if “conservative” justices are one day replaced by “liberals.” The 
                                                 
14 Christopher Manfredi, Feminist Activism in the Supreme Court: legal mobilization and the 
Women’s Legal Education Action Fund. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004. 
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Constitution, and the legal precedents built upon it, stand in the way of an American 
aboriginal rights revolution, not only specific judges. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
THE INSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POLITICS 
The insight that courts and judges are political is not new. Perhaps it is no 
longer even shocking. Martin Shapiro’s discussion of the American judiciary as just 
another potential venue for interest group politics was, in the early 1960’s, intended to 
be impish, if not scandalous.15 Several decades of judicial activism and scholarly 
debunking of “legalism” have made his observations appear less jarring. Scholars and 
the public are accustomed to the idea that interest groups attempt to influence policy 
through the legal system. Similarly, the notion that the political beliefs and preferences 
of judges shape how they respond is common wisdom for students of judicial politics 
in the academy and in journalism. But if Shapiro’s example leads the reader to think 
about the functional similarities between the various branches of government—that is, 
the ways in which legislators, executive officials, and judges are similar insofar as 
they are makers of policy—it is also crucial to consider how the forms of government 
shape what kinds of policies can be made and by whom. Political scientists have 
focused on how courts are similar to other political institutions, and this has been a 
fruitful corrective to the ever present danger of excessive legal idealism. But it is also 
crucial to remember that courts engage not in politics simply, but in judicial politics. 
In comparison with other political actors, courts face specific constraints in regards to 
their ability to enforce their decisions, in regards to the kinds of decisions they have 
the opportunity to make, and in regards to the kinds of decisions that they are willing 
to make. No interest group will ever appeal to courts in order to declare a war, and no 
court would ever endorse a litigant who wanted a judicial order to bring a conflict to 
                                                 
15 Martin Shapiro, Law and Politics in the Supreme Court: New Approaches to Political 
Jurisprudence. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.  
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an end. The issue of foreign policy is the starkest reminder of the limits placed upon 
judicial politics, whatever the desires and preferences of judges. If we wish to 
understand what courts do, it is necessary to pay attention to how institutional 
structures create opportunities for courts to exercise power, and how, in some areas of 
politics, institutional features prevent courts from exercising much power at all. 
My comparison of American and Canadian judicial power will attempt to 
assess some of the ways institutional differences between theses two nations shape the 
exercise of judicial power. I do not claim to refute the theories that stress the 
inherently political character of Supreme Court decision-making; indeed, I accept that 
the role of political ideology is central to judicial decision making. I am even inclined 
to think that it would be politically salutary for Americans and Canadians to be more 
cognizant of the political dimensions of law-enforcement and judging. However, the 
view that courts are only determined by politics is also unconvincing, or rather, it is 
misleading to see this as a complete explanation of judicial decision making. Before 
turning to a discussion of how institutions shape judicial power, and how this can be 
illustrated through a comparison of the jurisprudence of aboriginal rights and 
environmental law in Canada and the United States, it is worthwhile to consider the 
“political” approach to judicial decision-making in more detail, in order to appreciate 
its insights and to understand its limits. 
2.1 Explaining the Politics of Jurisprudence 
Within political science, the “attitudinal model” refers to a half-century old 
research tradition which claims that the legal decisions of courts are determined by the 
policy preferences of judges. In contrast to legal scholars who emphasize the role of 
precedent and constitutional language, the attitudinalists marshaled an impressive 
array of data which suggested that jurisprudence exists, for the most part, as an 
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elaborate smoke-screen for judges who, consciously or not, make decisions based 
upon their own political preferences. 
The attitudinal model has been described as the reigning research paradigm for 
those political scientists who study law and courts.16 The idea that jurisprudence can 
be reduced to the psychology of individual judges (as manifested in their political 
preferences) is certainly not the only variety of “political” interpretations of law. Some 
political scientists suggest that Supreme Court decisions tend to track shifts in public 
opinion.17 Others focus on the connections between Supreme Court justices and the 
“governing regimes” that they are part of.18 All of these approaches are rooted in the 
idea that judicial-decision making, at least for appellate courts, is driven by 
considerations of public policy, whether idiosyncratic and personal or connected to 
shifts in the elite and public moods. 
Other political scientists have responded to the work of the attitudinalists by 
emphasizing the ways in which institutions shape and constrain judicial politics. One 
variant of the “post-attitudinal New Institutionalism” is the strategic or rational choice 
model of judicial decision-making. The rational choice approach is, in pith and 
substance, quite similar to the attitudinal model: both are based upon the premise that 
judicial decisions are rooted in political preferences. However, the proponents of the 
strategic model emphasize that judges are constrained in pursuing their preferences on 
                                                 
16 E.g. Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudianl Model 
Revisited. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
17 E.g. Herbert M. Kritzer, “Federal Judges and their Political Environment: The Influence of 
Public Opinion,” 23 American Journal of Political Science, (1979), Willima Mishler and Reginald S. 
Sheehan, “Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Model, and Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-
Analytic Perspective,” 58 Journal of Politics 169 (1996), Roy B. Flemming and B. Dan Wood, “The 
Public and the Supreme Court: Individual Justice Responsiveness to American Policy Moods,” 41 
American Journal of Political Science 468 (1997). 
18 Lucas Powe, The Warren Court and American Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2001.  
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account of institutional factors, such as the possibility of appellate review, the process 
of collegial decision making in appellate courts, and the potential for responses to 
judicial decisions by other political actors. Thus, while courts are still primarily 
political, the politics of courts is determined not only by what judges think is 
politically preferable, but also by what they think is politically possible given their 
overall political environment.19 
In light of the apparent strength of political interpretations of judicial power, 
other scholars have attempted to re-assess the ways in which law, constitutional forms, 
and legal doctrine continue to shape the ways in which courts exercise political 
power.20 The political implications of this debate are important, even though they are 
not often stressed by the scholars themselves.21 The structure of the judiciary in both 
Canada and the United States is premised on the idea that courts follow the law, as 
opposed to creating it. This is an ideal, and one that can never be fully achieved in 
practice. But the institutional structure of federal courts—in particular, the insulation 
of judges from direct democratic control after they have been appointed—is based on 
the premise that courts exercise power in a way that is distinct from other political 
actors. The fact that impeachment, “court packing,” or any other direct attempt by 
political actors to affect the courts are usually regarded by the public as illegitimate 
cannot be reconciled with a judiciary that is solely or even primarily motivated by 
                                                 
19 For a survey of the development of the “strategic model” of judicial decision-making, see 
Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, “Toward A Strategic Revolution in Judicial Politics: A Look Back, a 
Look Ahead.” Political Research Quarterly. Vol. 53, No. 3, (September, 2000) pp 625-661. 
20 E.g. Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Decline of Lochner Era 
Police Powers Jurisprudence. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993). 
21 Consider the following observation by Segal and Spaeth: “Although we live in a 
representative democracy, the extent to which either representation or democratic elections have force 
and effect depends on the will of a majority of the nine unelected, life-time serving justices...Although 
the justices conventionally claim for public consumption that they do no not make public policy... the 
truth conforms to Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes’s declaration, ‘We are under a Constitution, but 
the Constitution is what the judges say it is.’” The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited, 
pp 2-3. 
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political preferences.22 To the extent that courts are motivated purely by political 
preferences, the legitimacy of the “anti-democratic” aspects of judicial tenure are 
brought into question. 
Whether of the attitudinalist or rational choice school, the proponents of 
“political jurisprudence” have not, for the most part, emphasized the normative 
implications of their findings. Perhaps this illustrates their own rational, preference 
maximizing strategy—that is, scholars who study courts for a living, having come to 
the conclusion that the major justifications for judicial independence are ill-founded, 
have chosen not to emphasize or publicize this normative conclusion, thereby insuring 
that they do not destroy their preferred object of study. While the language of the 
attitudinalists is mostly dry or “value neutral,” and their methodology mostly 
technical, their ultimate conclusions are not so different from the more fashionable 
advocates of “Critical Legal Studies” who dress up their conclusions in Marxist and 
post-structuralist idioms and are not shy about denouncing the myth of impartial law.23 
In defense of Critical Legal Studies, one could say that its practitioners are alive to the 
de-legitimizing implications of their arguments, in contrast with the “value neutral” 
work of their more staid counterparts working in the field of political science. But it is 
far from clear whether it makes sense for political scientists to be “value neutral” in 
regards to their findings. If judicial institutions are premised on the partial separation 
of the judiciary from ordinary political conflict, and if those premises are unfounded, it 
only makes sense for political scientists to point out the need to re-arrange those 
institutions. 
                                                 
22 Terri Jennings Peretti, In Defense of a Political Court. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1999. 
23 For a discussion of the relationship between political interpretations of law (such as legal 
realism) and the eventual move towards radicalism made by the Critical Legal Studies movement, see 
G. Edward White, “The Inevitability of Critical Legal Studies.” Stanford Law Review. Volume 36, 
Number 2, pp 649-672. 
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For my own purposes, I thought that the insights of political jurisprudence 
could be usefully extended and developed by examining the expansion of judicial 
power in Canada, where the legitimacy of judicial review is at least somewhat of an 
open question. In examining aboriginal and environmental litigation in Canadian and 
American courts, I expected that the development of law could be explained as a 
consequence of successful interest group “capture” of like-minded judges; the success 
or failure of interest group lobbying of the court would ultimately be traced back to the 
ideology and preferences of judges. Against the legalistic model of judicial decision 
making, I thought it would be possible to show that both Canadian and American 
courts are interest group battle grounds, where outcomes are determined not so much 
by law as by the array of political forces. I expected to write another chapter in the 
history of political jurisprudence, though unlike the attitudinalists and their rational 
choice counterparts, I was eager to stress the unavoidable normative conclusions of 
political jurisprudence: the idea of an independent judiciary, the idea that judges 
should be insulated from political pressures, or that they somehow represent neutral 
arbiters of law and rights, is every bit as mythical as the divine right of kings. 
My anticipated conclusions turned out to be incorrect, because I 
underestimated the influence of political institutions—constitutional structure and 
constitutional language, or “constitutional architecture”—which limit and structure 
judicial power in ways that cannot be accounted for by a purely political 
understanding of jurisprudence. 
2.2 A Global Rights Revolution or a Globalized Juristocracy? Judicial Power in a 
Comparative Context 
My initial hunch was that a comparison of judicial power in Canada and the 
United States would illustrate Alexis de Toqueville’s view that democratic societies 
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are, over time, likely to become hostile to forms, that is, the particular ways of doing 
things in law, politics, and society that structure our actions, and prevent the direct 
expression of power or even desire. According to Toqueville, “men living in 
democratic ages do not readily comprehend the utility of forms; they feel an 
instinctive contempt for them.”24 He argued that, in consequence, the public in 
democratic societies would become increasingly hostile towards, or at least impatient 
with, the political, social and legal forms that placed obstacles in the path of popular 
will. The unfortunate paradox was that, as government became more powerful, society 
would both be in greater need of political and legal forms for the protection of liberty, 
and more likely to chafe at the restraints those forms imposed. 
What de Toqueville did not anticipate was the way in which courts would aid 
and abet the assault on the forms of government and law. He anticipated that the 
assault on political and legal forms would come from majorities eager to violate 
individual rights, not from courts. According to contemporary critics of judicial 
power, the key form of liberal democratic government is self-government, and it is this 
which is potentially most threatened by judicial power. Thus, while I did not think that 
“political jurisprudence” could account for the role of the judiciary in American and 
Canadian political history as a whole, it appeared that Toqueville’s ideas about the 
weakness of forms in democratic societies could help us to understand why 
jurisprudence became increasingly politicized in the 20th century. 
The politicization of courts and the judicialization of politics have expanded in 
many countries since the mid-20th century, but nowhere has this development been 
more prominent than in Canada and the United States.25 My question was whether the 
                                                 
24 Alexis de Toqueville, Democracy In America, Translated by Harvey Mansfield and Delba 
Winthrop. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2000. Book 4, p. 669. 
25 C. Neal Tate and Torbjorn Vallinder,editors. The Global Expansion of Judicial Power. New 
York: NYU Press, 1995. 
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breakdown in legal and political forms—in particular, the collapse of the distinction 
between what courts can decide and what they cannot, the distinction between political 
issues and “cases and controversies in law”—was leading to a convergence between 
Canada and the United States regarding the political power of courts. A convergence 
in the role of the judiciary might not be the same as a convergence in the outcomes in 
the court rooms of North America, due to the greater strength of left-wing liberalism 
in Canada and thus to the left-leaning character of the Canadian judiciary. However, I 
expected that the forms and developments of Canadian legal liberalism would parallel 
the high tide of American legal liberalism. In Canada, I expected to see the 
subterranean transformation of judicial power that America had experienced decades 
earlier, transformations that could not be directly connected to the language of the 
Constitution Act and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, or the intentions of those 
who created it. 
The transformation of judicial power in the United States in the late 20th 
century proceeded along four separate but related fronts. Most prominent was the 
transformation in the judiciary’s approach to enumerated and implied rights related to 
the rights of criminal suspects, freedom of speech and expression, equality rights, and 
the right to privacy.26 It is these aspects of constitutional law which have drawn the 
attention of Canadian “Charterphobes,” as the principles of the “rights revolution” 
have migrated North in the post-Charter era. Secondly, the American courts 
transformed what it means for something to be a legal case, and what it meant for 
someone to have a legal claim. In other words, they transformed the rules of 
                                                 
26 Aside from freedom of speech, these are the major areas addressed in Gerald Rosenberg’s 
assessment of the American Supreme Court’s judicial activism, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring 
About Social Change? Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991 In response to the question that is 
the sub-title of his book, Rosenberg’s answer is a no. The most plausible defense of the legitimacy of 
the Court’s new approach to enumerated and implied rights that developed over the course of the 
Warren and Burger Courts, is Bruce Ackermann’s We The People, Volume Two: Transformations. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998. 
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justiciability related to standing, adverseness, mootness, political questions, etc.27 
Third, American courts became more active through interventions in administrative 
law and statutory interpretation, largely (though not entirely) as a consequence of 
choices made by Congress.28 Finally, the courts became more willing to use their 
power not only to prevent government action that was un-Constitutional or illegal, but 
to prescribe specific policy solutions for legal violations, and to oversee the 
implementation of those solutions.29 
Other authors who have studied the growing role of courts in political life have 
tended to focus on the similarities between the development of judicial power in 
Canada and the United States.30 In fact, the similarities between the “rights revolution” 
in Canada and the United States—successful revolutions both, in contrast with the 
partial or abortive revolutions in judicial power that have occurred in Britain and 
India—was one of the central themes in Charles Epp’s aptly titled The Rights 
                                                 
27 For a good discussion of this topic and its relationship to the expanded power of the court, 
and thus the increased controversies over judicial appointments, see Mark Silverstein, Judicious 
Choices: The New Politics of Supreme Court Appointments. New York: Norton Press, 1994. 
28 Martin Shapiro Who Guards the Guardians? Judicial Control of Administration. Athens, 
Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1988, Jeremy Rabkin, Judicial Compulsions: How Public Law 
Distorts Public Policy. (New York: Basic Books, 1989; R. Shep Melnick, Between the Lines: 
Interpreting Welfare Rights. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994. 
29 E.g. Donald Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1977, Malcolm M. Feeley and Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy-Making and the Modern 
State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod, Democracy 
by Decree. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003. 
30 E.g. Ran Hirschl Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New 
Constitutionalism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004 In his comparative analysis of the rise of 
judicial power, Hirschl argues that the common thread of “judicialization” is the desire of political and 
“influential economic stakeholders” (p. 213) to shelter decisions from popular decision-making. 
Hirschl’s “hegemonic preservation thesis” does not address the way judicial power functions in 
different institutional contexts–a consequence of the fact that he only looks at parliamentary systems of 
government that have introduced judicial review in recent decades. Canadian critics of judicial power 
have also tended to focus on the ways in which judicial review in Canada has mirrored American 
constitutional developments (e.g. W.A. Bogart. Good Government? Good Citizens? Courts, Politics, 
and Markets in a Changing Canada. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005, pp 30-31). 
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Revolution.31 The similarities between the development of judicial power in Canada 
and the United States, according to Epp, are a result of the confluence of three factors: 
1) the presence, in both nations, of court-empowering constitutional 
documents; 
2) the rise of an activist, pro-rights judiciary; and 
3) the development of a legal support structure composed of activists, lawyers, 
and governments that are willing to support them. 
Thus while it is true that not all rights revolutions are the same, the rights revolutions 
that have occurred in Canada and the United States have been more similar than any 
other. They did not occur at the same time—the expansion of judicial power in Canada 
in areas such as criminal rights, abortion rights, and freedom of expression had to wait, 
according to Epp, for the introduction of the court-empowering Constitution Act of 
1982 and the introduction of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms—but they 
have followed along similar paths. 
While political scientists have in recent years paid increased attention to the 
conditions that allow for increased judicial power, the ways in which “rights 
revolutions” differ in those places where they occur has not been as thoroughly 
explored. We know that rights revolutions are occurring around the globe, but we 
know less about how different institutional and cultural contexts affect the 
revolutionary process.Even if Epp’s conditions for a “rights revolution” are fulfilled, 
we cannot be sure that the expansion of judicial power will take the same form in 
different institutional contexts. There are some reasons to anticipate a convergence of 
rights revolutions, however. The influence of the American legal academy shapes the 
consciousness of judges around the world, though its influence is particularly 
prominent in Canada; according to H.W. Arthurs, the influence of the United States is 
                                                 
31 Charles Epp, The Rights Revolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.  
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a recurring theme in the history of Canadian legal education.32 The pressure groups 
that play such a vital role in Epp’s explanation are often part of international issue 
networks.33 The circulation of information and individuals through these networks 
helps to solidify their ideological similarities and unify their programmatic goals. 
Given the fact that the legal elites who fuel the worldwide rights revolutions are so 
homogenous, it seems possible that when the conditions for a rights revolution exist, 
the “legal support structure” will push for similar kinds of changes within the 
governing regime. 
Epp’s comparative study of the development of judicial power can be read as a 
supplement to the attitudinal and rational choice models of political jurisprudence. 
While acknowledging the role of judicial ideology, The Rights Revolution stresses that 
the capacity of courts and the willingness of judges to make policy depends on both 
institutional and social pre-conditions, such as court-empowering constitutions that 
enshrine fundamental rights, and legal support structures that help to advance novel 
understandings of those rights. Epp also suggests that, in light of his analysis, concerns 
with the anti-democratic character of judicial power are exaggerated, as courts are 
only able to exercise power if other political actors take steps to empower courts. 
Thus, Epp explains not only why courts become politically active in some times and 
places but not others; he is also able to address, if not resolve, the question of the 
legitimacy of judicial power in democratic societies. 
                                                 
32 H.W. Arthurs, “The Political Economy of Canadian Legal Education.” Journal of Law and 
Society. Volume 25, Number 1, p. 15. 
33 E.g. Robert Rohrschneider and Russell Dalton, “A Global Network? Transnational 
Cooperation Amongst Environmental Groups.” The Journal of Politics. Volume 64, Number 2. May 
2002. pp 510-533. 
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The development of judicial power analyzed (and celebrated)34 by Epp has of 
course been subject to varying levels of criticism and scrutiny. In the United States, 
critics of judicial power have focused on both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of 
judicial activism, usually (though certainly not always) from the conservative end of 
the political spectrum.35 In Canada, left and right-wing “Charter-phobes” are almost 
equally prominent. Left wing critics tend to argue that the rise of judicial power has 
been part of a project to insulate elites from populist pressure on economic issues.36 
Those on the right are undoubtedly pleased that courts have not imposed a greater 
degree of socialism on Canadian citizens, but they have otherwise found little to 
applaud in the Court’s Charter jurisprudence. Conservative critics have applied the 
doctrinal criticisms developed in the United States to the jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court, and have found post-Charter Canadian jurisprudence similarly wanting in terms 
of its fidelity to the text of the Constitution, its underlying philosophical justifications, 
                                                 
34 Epp’s can be read as an attempt to address the theoretical problems with modern judicial 
activism–in particular, the claim that non-interpretivist judicial review is suspect in a democracy 
because of its counter-majoritarian character: “Constitutional rights in general, and rights revolutions in 
particular... rest on a support structure that has a broad basis in civil society.” (Epp, The Rights 
Revolution, p. 199) His argument is as follows: constitutional rights provisions unless a legal support 
structure (litigants, interest groups, public interest lawyers, academics) exists to mobilize those rights; 
such a legal support structure will be weak unless it is provided government support; government 
support for the legal support structure that makes “rights revolutions” possible undercuts the claim that 
those rights revolutions are counter-majoritarian.  
35 E.g. John Agresto, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1984, Christopher Wolfe The Rise of Modern Judicial Review: From Constitutional 
Interpretation to Judge-Made Law. Lanham, Md.: Rowan and Littlefield, 1994., Matthew Franck 
Against the Imperial Judiciary: The Supreme Court vs. The Sovereignty of the People Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1996 For examples of theoretical criticisms of judicial power from a liberal 
perspective, see Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999 Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999. 
36 E.g. Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada. 
Toronto: Thompson Press, 1994. Consider also the views of Ran Hirschl: “As long as representative 
political-decision making institutions were kept safely in the hands of the established social circles... 
parliamentary sovereignty was praised by politicians and constitutional theorists alike as the most 
sacred of democratic values....As political representatives of the established interests started to lose 
control of these institutions (at different times in different polities), they started to worry about the 
‘tyranny of the majority.’” (Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy, p. 217). 
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and its tendency to actually expand the scope of state power. The ultimate conclusion 
of right-wing Canadian critics is, in essence, that the Courts have become “captured” 
by organized interests and, perhaps most alarmingly, even captured by the legal 
academy itself.37 
Conservative Charter critics have focused on the ways in which the Canadian 
Supreme Court has been influenced by liberal American jurisprudence in areas of law 
such as criminal rights, abortion, women’s rights, and freedom of speech.38 In regards 
to some issues, such as criminal disenfranchisement and gay rights, the Canadian 
Supreme Court has endorsed liberal or progressive positions that have not received the 
same recognition in American courts.39 The proponents of the “rights revolution” have 
responded to these criticisms along two different fronts. First, there is the position of 
the “rights fundamentalists,” who argue that the Supreme Court’s Charter 
jurisprudence reflects a correct understanding of fundamental rights, in the sense that 
the framers of the Constitution Act of 1982 endorsed an evolutionary, court-centered 
approach to Constitutional law.40 A second group of scholars have argued that Charter 
critics—and the rights fundamentalists—have exaggerated the extent to which the 
                                                 
37 E.g. F.L. Morton and Troy Riddell, “Reasonable Limitations, Distinct Society, and the 
Canada Clause: Interpretive Clauses and the Competition for Constitutional Advantage.” Canadian 
Journal of Political Science. Volume 31, Number 3, (April, 1998) pp 467-493. 
38 E.g. Christopher Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter. (Toronto: McLelland and 
Stewart, 1993); F.L. Morton Pro-Choice vs. Pro-Life: Abortion and the Courts in Canada Norman, Ok: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1992; F.L. Morton and Avril Allen, “Feminists and the Courts: 
Measuring Success in Interest Group Litigation in Canada.” Canadian Journal of Political Science. 
Volume 34, Number 1, 2001 pp 55-84. 
39 Christopher Manfredi, “Judicial Review and Criminal Disenfranchisement in Canada and the 
United States.” The Review of Politics, Volume 60, Number 2, 1998 pp277-305 Jason Pierceson, 
Courts, Liberalism, and Rights: Gay Law and Politics in Canada and the United States. Philadelphia, 
Pa.: Temple University Press, 2005.  
40 E.g. David Beatty, Talking Heads and the Supremes: The Canadian Production of 
Constitutional Review. Toronto: Carswell, 1990. Lorraine Weinrib, “The Supreme Court of Canada and 
Section One of the Charter.” The Supreme Court Law Review. Volume 10, 1998 pp 469-513 and 
“Canada’s Constitutional Revolution: From Legislative to Constitutional State.” Israel Law Review. 
Volume 33, Number 1, 1999 pp 13-50.  
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Courts have undermined Parliamentary sovereignty. These scholars suggest that 
Parliament has played a more active and voluntary role in the development of rights 
policies; post-Charter jurisprudence has thus emerged through a “dialogue” between 
Courts and the elected branches of government.41 
The debate over judicial power in Canada has taken place over issues that are 
generally familiar to American students of Constitutional law and legal politics; the 
complaints of the critics ultimately turn on philosophical issues about the meaning and 
scope of rights, and thus any complaint that courts have engaged in illegitimate 
activism in regards to freedom of speech, women’s rights, or the rights of suspects 
turns into an argument over “original intentions,” living constitutionalism, and the 
source and foundations of rights. The debate over American judicial activism has often 
proved most fruitful, however, when scholars have considered how courts have 
exercised power over public policy in ways that are not clearly connected to the 
individualistic, rights-oriented issues that are the traditional domain of the courts.42 
While the attempts to assess the “policy impact” of courts end up being as 
controversial as more theoretical and doctrinal debates over the legitimacy of judicial 
activism, they have helped to illustrate the full scope of judicial power in American 
politics. It also raises the question of whether Canada, which has experienced 
something like an American rights revolution, is likely to experience all aspects of the 
American revolution in judicial power. Similarly, it is useful to consider whether the 
                                                 
41 Janet L. Hiebert, Charter Conflicts: What Is Parliament’s Role? Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2002; James B. Kelly, Governing with the Charter. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005. 
42 cf the work of Horowitz, Rabkin, Melnick, Sandler and Schoenbrod, and Feeley and Rubin. 
It is interesting to note that, in shifting to a defense of judicial activism that is entirely based on the 
politically beneficial outcomes of that activism, Feeley and Rubin argue that the theoretical criticisms 
leveled against judicial activism–that it violates principles of federalism, the separation of powers, and 
the rule of law–are correct: “the admitted divergence between the judiciary’s actions and accepted legal 
principles reveals an underlying weakness in those principles...Judicial policy-making, by virtue of its 
brute existence, thus casts doubt not only on the individual principles, but on the general image of law 
and government from which they are derived.” Judicial Policy-Making and the Modern State. p. 336. 
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textual differences between the Canadian and American constitutions limit judicial 
power in ways that cannot simply be explained by the differing ideologies or policy 
preferences of judges. In assessing these issues, we can shed light not only on the 
concerns of scholars who study the relative influence of constitutional architecture and 
political ideology in judicial decision making, but also on the legitimacy of judicial 
power. As I will explain next, environmental law and aboriginal rights provide two 
useful cases for assessing the role of “constitutional architecture” in Canadian and 
America courts. 
2.3 The Separation of Powers, Parliamentary Government and Constitutional 
Language 
The expansion of judicial power in the United States came about not merely as 
a consequence of new judicial approaches to questions of fundamental rights, but also 
as a consequence of new judicial approaches to statutory interpretation and executive 
power. Thus, it is useful to consider whether the very different institutional 
architecture of the Canadian political system presents differing obstacles (or 
opportunities) for judges engaged in interpreting statutes and evaluating executive 
law-enforcement and policy implementation. While many rights recognized by the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms paralleled those found in the American Bill 
of Rights,43 the repatriation of the Canadian Constitution in 1982 did not change the 
parliamentary form of government.44 Canadians were given American-style judicial 
                                                 
43 Christopher Manfredi, “The Use of United States Decisions by the Supreme Court of 
Canada under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.” Canadian Journal of Political Science. Volume 23, 
Number 3. 1990 pp 499-518. 
44 For a discussion of “mega-constitutional” politics in Canada, see Peter H. Russell, 
Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People? Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1992. See also Ronald L. Watts, “Canada: Three Decades of Periodic Federal Crises.” 
International Political Science Review. Vol. 17. No. 4, (Oct, 1996) pp 353-371. 
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review in 1982, but they were not given the American legislative process, or the 
American separation of powers. Thus, while authors like Epp, Manfredi, and Morton 
have focused on the overlap between American and Canadian judicial power in areas 
such as criminal and abortion rights, they represent only the tip of the legal iceberg in 
American political life. In addition, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
differs significantly from the American Bill of Rights. The latter was a product of the 
sectional and political differences amongst 18th century revolutionaries, the former a 
product of inter-provincial (and inter-ethnic) negotiations amongst late 20th century 
political and bureaucratic elites. It is worth considering whether textual differences in 
constitutional language affect the work of judges, or whether the language of 
constitutional rights is so malleable that judges are not really restrained by the 
language and intentions of constitutional framers. To what extent have these 
continuing institutional differences prevented the “rights revolutions” of North 
America—or, more accurately, the revolutions in judicial power—from converging? 
According to scholars such as Shep Melnick, there are several reasons to think 
that the American “separation of powers” system creates greater opportunities for the 
expression of judicial power. Focusing on the differences between the American and 
British practices, Melnick argues that a variety of factors allow for American courts to 
engage in judicial activism through statutory interpretation. In contrast with Britain, 
American courts are considered to have authority equal to administrators in the 
interpretation of statutory law, and whereas British courts are expected to focus on the 
ordinary meaning of words in statutes, American courts are much more likely to look 
to the history, purpose, and spirit of statutes when interpreting them.45 As a 
consequence, judges avail themselves of a wide range of diverging and contrary 
                                                 
45 Patrick Atiyah and Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law: A 
Comparative Study in Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory, and Legal Institutions. London:Clarendon Press, 
1987 pp 100-101. 
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statements made by elected and unelected officials regarding the meaning of the law 
and the intentions of Congress, which in turn become the basis for judicial challenges 
to the statutory interpretations of the executive branch.46 These contrary approaches to 
statutory interpretation are rooted in political differences between the two nations. 
Parliamentary government, by virtue of the strength of political parties, the respect 
afforded to the civil service, and the centralization of power within the cabinet, creates 
a situation which reduces judicial discretion: “Not only is legislation drafted by the 
ministries, but it is ordinarily passed in much the same form as presented. . . . The 
legislation that emerges from Parliament also tends to be more coherent and drafted 
with more care than is the legislation passed by Congress.”47 Finally, British judges 
are aware that decisions a cabinet minister regards as adverse can be readily 
overturned through corrective legislation. The American legislative process is far more 
fragmented, and this often produces statutes that are more ambiguous. While 
presidents and administrators claim the authority to resolve ambiguities, courts are just 
as willing to claim that they possess a responsibility to uphold the intentions of 
Congress. The fragmented legislative process makes it difficult for the elected 
branches to respond to judicial statutory interpretations. Finally, the complexities of 
federalism, and the power of judicial review of legislation for violations of 
Constitutional rights, provide additional avenues for the exercise of judicial power in 
statutory interpretation.48 
What are the implications of Melnick’s study of judicial statutory activism in 
the United States for a comparative study of judicial power in Canada and the United 
                                                 
46 E.g. Robert Katzmann, Institutional Disability: The Saga of Transportation Policy for the 
Disabled. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986. 
47 R. Shep Melnick, Between the Lines: Interpreting Welfare Rights. Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1994 p. 10. 
48 Ibid pp 11-13. 
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States? The most important is that the capacity for judges to exercise power depends 
upon the legal or Constitutional environment that they find themselves in. Despite the 
introduction of the court-empowering Constitution Act of 1982 (and, in particular, the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms) the power of Canadian courts is likely to be 
restricted by the parliamentary forms of government. Canadian courts have always 
played a role in adjudicating the respective spheres of federal and provincial influence, 
and thus as in the American system, Canadian federalism has long been a basis for 
judicial power.49 The introduction of the Charter has empowered courts to engage in 
review of legislation for rights violations, which has allowed Canadian courts to 
follow the American “rights revolutions” in a large numbers of areas. But the 
legislative process in Canada still remains parliamentary; in fact, the legislative 
process has become increasingly centralized in the Prime Minister’s Office in recent 
decades.50 In regards to statutory interpretation, this highly centralized legislative 
process creates less space for the assertion of judicial power, space that is created in 
American law by the tensions between the executive and the legislative branch, the 
chaotic nature of the legislative process, and the relative weakness of political parties 
and party leaders. Melnick’s institutional analysis of the sources of American statutory 
judicial activism implies that, while American and Canadian courts might converge in 
areas of enumerated rights in the post-Charter era, the two political systems still offer 
very different opportunities for the expression of judicial power in regards to statutory 
interpretation. Thus, based upon these institutional considerations, we have reasons to 
suspect that environmental policy-making by Canadian courts will be quite limited, 
                                                 
49 E.g. Peter Russell, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People? 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993 p. 42 See also Ronald L. Watts, “The American 
Constitution in Comparative Perspective: A Comparison of Federalism in Canada and the United 
States.” The Journal of American History. Vol. 74, No. 3 (December, 1987) pp 769-792. 
50 Donald Savoie, Governing from the Center: The Concentration of Power in Canadian 
Politics. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999. 
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regardless of what we might expect based upon the broader ideological predispositions 
of those judges. 
Charles Epp’s analysis in The Rights Revolution provides a necessary 
corrective to the attitudinal model by explaining the conditions under which courts 
emerge from political dormancy. Yet the role played by America’s separation of 
powers system in promoting judicial power gives us reason to suspect that not all 
rights revolutions will be the same. The institutional architecture of the American 
polity creates opportunities for judicial power that will not exist in the same form in 
the Canadian parliamentary system of government. However, the Canadian 
constitution provides some avenues for judicial power that are not present in the 
American constitution. The written constitutions of Canada and the United States 
provide protections for rights that are broadly similar, but one of the most obvious 
differences between the two can be seen in the treatment of aboriginal treaties and 
aboriginal rights. 
Stated briefly, the Canadian Constitution Act of 1982 made both aboriginal 
treaties and un-enumerated aboriginal rights part of the nation’s “higher law.” Unlike 
many of the rights protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights of Freedoms, judicial 
determinations of aboriginal rights cannot be overturned through recourse to the 
“notwithstanding clause” by provincial legislatures and the federal Parliament. Those 
who lobbied for and those who approved these protections for aboriginal rights in the 
Constitution Act were not certain what the content of those rights would be. But the 
explicit constitutional protections for aboriginal rights provided a legal basis for 
judicial intervention into aboriginal policy that is not present in the American 
constitutional order. The status and rights of American Indian tribes have always been 
uncertain. Native Americans are neither citizens in the ordinary sense, nor treated as 
separate peoples; in the famous and puzzling words of Chief Justice John Marshall, 
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the Indians in the United States are “domestic dependent nations.” American policy 
towards the Indian tribes has been characterized by a variety of different approaches 
over time: military conflict and forced expulsion in the early 19th century, 
accommodation and the promotion of assimilation in the late 19th and early 20th 
century, and recognition and support for the continuing existence of the special 
political status of Native Americans in the late 20th century. What has not changed, 
however, is the dominant role played by Congress in determining the status of Indian 
tribes. In practice, this means that the treaties and “aboriginal rights” that are part of 
Canada’s “higher law” are, in America, more akin to statutes. Treaties between the 
American government and Native American tribes can be altered and abridged by 
unilateral Congressional action. The plenary power of Congress in aboriginal policy 
leaves considerable potential for judicial influence, in the sense that courts must still 
adjudicate between conflicting claims of Congress, the executive branch, and state 
governments. The Canadian constitutional system, however, provides a much broader 
basis for judicial interventions into aboriginal policy. 
From the perspective of the “attitudinal model,” the presence or absence of 
specific constitutional provisions should matter very little, if at all. Judges who wish to 
advance or retard the legal claims of Native Americans or Canadians will have not 
trouble finding constitutional provisions upon which to hang their rhetorical hats. 
What matters is not the constitutional text, which can be interpreted in a manifold if 
not infinite number of ways, but whatever individual justices might happen to think 
about the proper scope of aboriginal legal claims.51 The claim that I will defend is that, 
at least in the context of aboriginal rights, institutional constraints rooted in 
                                                 
51 I note again the similarity, in the study of law, between the staid social scientists and their 
literary-theoretical equivalents in law schools and English departments (e.g. Stanley Fish), all of whom 
are in agreement over the radically indeterminate character of textual interpretation, and the priority of 
politics over law in judicial decision making.  
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constitutional politics place limits on political jurisprudence. The patterns of 
aboriginal rights decisions making in Canadian and American courts, as in the case of 
environmental law, cannot be accounted for without paying attention to the role played 
by institutional architecture. 
2.4 Evaluating the Limits of Political Jurisprudence: How a Cross-National 
Study of Aboriginal and Environmental Law Illustrates the Significance of 
Political Institutions 
The institutional structures that this study will consider are the differences between the 
Canadian and American constitutions, both in the sense of the specific rights 
recognized or framed by these instruments, and the ways in which the two country’s 
differing legislative processes, and differing executive-legislative relationships, create 
different spaces for judicial activism. The central argument is that the exercise of 
judicial power in Canada and United States diverges in aboriginal law and 
environmental law because of the continuing significance of constitutional differences 
between the two nations—differences that have been reduced, but not eliminated, by 
the “rights revolutions” of the late twentieth century. 
The comparison also helps to illustrate some of the limits of purely political 
interpretations of judicial decision making, because the patterns of Canadian and 
American environmental and aboriginal law do not follow the patterns that one would 
expect to see, assuming that the courts are guided primarily by their policy 
preferences. What would we expect from a purely political court? That is, what would 
we expect to from political jurisprudence, if judicial attitudes, preferences, and 
ideologies were more important than institutional and legal factors? A political court 
would reveal judges who decisions that are, by and large, ideologically consistent 
across issues. If we know that the American Supreme Court is staffed by a 
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conservative majority, we can expect that the court will tend to reach conservative 
conclusions in a broad range of controversial cases; if a liberal majority on the court 
comes to predominate, the reverse will be true. 
One might object that “conservative” and “liberal” are too broad, and too ill-
defined, to provide useful guidance in assessing the predispositions of judges. The first 
response to this objection is that the concepts of “liberal” and “conservative” 
predispositions are useful, even if they are imperfect. Political scientists should not be 
too quick to simply dismiss these popular terms of political discourse when 
considering judicial politics. Despite the imprecision of ideological classifications, 
they do capture something about the way individuals orient themselves towards 
political life. In commenting on the synergy amongst various progressive movements 
in the 1960s, Samuel Huntington observed that “an individual or group that has a 
specific concern with one particular reform also usually has a generally reformist 
weltanschauung which induces the individual or group to be favorably disposed to all 
reforms.”52 While not all supporters of labor unionism support gay marriage (to give 
but one example), ideological classifications are useful in describing political 
attitudes. 
It is not necessary to give a comprehensive definition of liberalism and 
conservatism in order to ascertain the political meaning of liberalism in relation to 
environmentalism and issues affecting native North Americans. The common sense 
answer is that “liberals” will tend to support both “green causes” and the claims of 
minority groups such as Indians; conservatives are far more likely to be suspicious of 
those causes and claims. Scholars have mostly confirmed this common sense 
                                                 
52 Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony, New York: Belnap Press, 1981 
p. 110. 
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conclusion.53 Most importantly for this study, environmentalism and aboriginal rights 
(or perhaps minority rights in general) are both “post-materialist” issues associated 
with the rise of “new politics” in the post-1960s era. Post-materialism is a concept that 
is used to explain the shift away from “class based” politics that has occurred in many 
industrial democracies. If materialist politics is based upon conflicts over how to 
expand the economic pie (and how to divide it up amongst economic classes), post-
materialist politics centers on the cultural claims or “identity politics” of groups that 
are not defined strictly by class (women, gays and lesbians, minorities) as well as the 
consequences of economic growth (such as consumer protection and 
environmentalism.) Just as we expect that broad public support for environmentalism 
would be joined with broad public support for aboriginal rights, so too would we 
expect that, if jurisprudence is determined by ideology, then courts that produce pro-
environmental decisions will also tend to support aboriginal rights claimants. So, just 
as American and Canadian politics have become (too a great extent) constituted by 
conflicts between the post-materialist left and the still materialist right, so too will 
judicial politics be characterized by the same schism. 
The first supposition of this study, then, is that support for environmentalism 
and for aboriginal rights tend to be linked. The second is that the ideological 
differences between Canada and the United States are minimal. Canada differs from 
the United States in the way that New York state differs from the United States as a 
                                                 
53 “Environmental concern” (“the degree to which people are aware of environmental problems 
and support efforts to solve them...” R.E. Dunlap and R.E. Jones, “Environmental attitudes and values.” 
in R. Fernandez-Ballesteros, editor, Encyclopedia of Psychological Assessment Volume One. Sage 
Publishers, London. p. 365) has been shown to be positively associated with left-wing or liberal 
political attitudes (e.g. J.D. Skrentny, “Concern for the Environment: A Cross-National Perspective.” 
International Journal of Public Opinion Research Volume 5, Number 4, 1993. pp 335-352). Few 
studies have found any strong relationship between occupational sector, social class, or income and 
environmental concern (e.g. Dietz T., et al. “Social structural and social psychological bases of 
environmental concern.” Environment and Behavior, 30(4) 1998. 
 50 
whole—both are more liberal, but not fundamentally different.54 So, while it is true 
that both libertarian anti-statism and religious conservatism have a greater presence in 
the American ideological spectrum, there is little reason to think that Canadian liberal 
elites have fundamentally different policy preferences than American liberals. 
The case I want to make is thus based upon certain assumptions about the 
nature of political ideology in North America. Assumption #1 is that “liberalism” 
tends to imply support for aboriginal rights and a tendency to support 
environmentalism. Assumption #2 is that the meaning of liberalism, and the 
preferences of liberals, is to a considerable extent consistent across national 
boundaries in North America. Given the patterns of judicial decision-making 
identified in this study, an attitudinal or political explanation of the patterns of 
                                                 
54 Mildred A. Schwartz, in her Party Movements in the United States and Canada( Lanham, 
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There is an emerging literature on the supposedly increasing ideological and cultural 
differences between Canada and the United States. Michael Adams, in Fire and Ice: The United States, 
Canada, and the Myth of Converging Values (Toronto: Penguin, 2003) makes the argument that the 
cultural differences between Canada and the United States have been markedly distinct in the past, and 
are not converging despite the increased similarities between the Canadian and American political 
systems that have resulted from Canada’s court-empowering Constitution Act of 1982. Phillip 
Resnick’s more scholarly The European Roots of Canadian Identity (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview 
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aboriginal and environmental law in Canada and the United States would have to be 
based upon the following claims: 
a) The greater support for aboriginal litigants, as opposed to environmental 
interests, in the Canadian Supreme Court shows that judges have an ideological pre-
disposition to support aboriginal claims, but not the goals of environmentalist groups. 
b) Liberal or moderate justices on the American Supreme Court have policy 
preferences (regarding aboriginal and environmental policy) that are the reverse of 
their liberal or moderate Canadian counterparts. 
This political interpretation, I will argue, is difficult to sustain. In regards to 
environmental law and aboriginal rights, the differences between Canadian and 
American jurisprudence can be explained only if institutional differences are taken 
into account. 
I do not claim to refute political interpretations of judicial decision-making, or 
to challenge the attitudinalist’s legitimate feeling of pride in having identified that 
ideological variables predict a great deal of judicial decision-making. However, I will 
suggest that the Canadian and American political systems afford different 
opportunities for political activism—and what this means, in substantive political 
terms, is that while Canada has experienced something like the American “rights 
revolution” in areas such as criminal law, abortion policy, and freedom of speech, it is 
unlikely to undergo the full American experience of an “imperial judiciary” that 
arbitrates a vast range of policy questions. All rights revolutions are not the same. 
Canadian courts have been empowered by Constitutional changes, and they have 
converged with American courts in some ways, but the power exercised by Canadian 
courts is still restrained by Constitutional language, and by the constitutional form of 
parliamentary government. 
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In regards to aboriginal law, the most salient aspects of “constitutional 
architecture” are those special protections for aboriginal rights that are so prominent in 
the Canadian Constitution Act of 1982, protections that are absent in the explicit 
language of the American constitution. It is this constitutional difference which 
explains the prominence of the Canadian judiciary in the development of aboriginal 
rights. Unlike the case of aboriginal law, there is no reason to think that the 
transformative effects of the Constitution Act and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
should extend to environmental law—unless we assume, as some do, that the Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms has emboldened judges to invent rights as they see fit, in 
response to interest group pressures. Judicial activism in environmental law, in 
Canada, would be a troubling development, judged from the perspective of legal or 
constitutional legitimacy. The underlying political conditions that promote judicial 
deference in statutory interpretation were not altered by the re-patriation of the 
Canadian constitution. As the Canadian constitution contains no environmental 
equivalent to the aboriginal rights specifically protected in Section 35 of the 
Constitution Act, there is no legal reason to think that Canadian environmental law 
decisions would be encompassed by Canada’s rights revolution. If the environmental 
law decisions of the Canadian courts have been revolutionized, if courts have engaged 
in an environmental rights revolution, then it would be further support for Canadian 
Charter critics and those who see the courts as engaged in an essentially political, 
policy-making role guided by their own policy preferences. It is possible that the 
Canadian Supreme Court, which has uniformly adopted an evolutionary approach to 
questions of rights, and which has transformed crucial areas of public policy in the 
post-Charter area, does not endorse the agenda of environmentalist litigants. What I 
will try to illustrate instead is that the differing levels of judicial intervention in 
Canadian and American environmental policy is connected to the continuing 
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differences between parliamentary and Presidential-Congressional governments, 
differences that have not been affected by Canada’s rights revolution in the Charter 
Era. 
The method and goals used in this project are similar in some ways to Howard 
Gilman’s The Constitution Besieged, a study of the “laissez-faire” jurisprudence in 
late 19th and early 20th century America.55 The common interpretation of this era—
repeated by progressive jurists and scholars of various stripes—is that federal courts 
were dominated by anti-statist ideologues, influenced by Social Darwinism and 
Manchester-school economics, who waged a judicial war against the development of 
the modern state. Through a careful analysis of the legal arguments used by judges, 
and the patterns of judicial decision-making, Gilman demonstrates that courts during 
this era were not motivated by any particular animus against state power as a whole. 
Instead, their decisions reflected long established legal rationales, rooted in the 
political theories of the Founding generation and developed by early 19th century 
jurists, regarding the proper form of national and state regulatory power. Courts 
invalidated government actions that attempted to confer economic benefits on some at 
the expense others. The fact that the vast majority of state and federal regulations were 
upheld when subjected to judicial challenge illustrates the limits of purely political 
interpretations. What Gilman did in The Constitution Besieged was to ask a simple 
question: “If courts are political, and if the dominant narrative about judicial ideology 
during the laissez-faire era are correct, what would we expect to see in the 
jurisprudence of this era?” The answer to this question is that we would expect to see 
courts that are inveterately opposed to statism; what Gilman found instead was a 
jurisprudence that circumscribed state power in a consistent, principled, and infrequent 
manner. 
                                                 
55 Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner-Era 
Jurisprudence. Durham: Duke University Press, 1994. 
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This study of environmental and aboriginal law in Canada and the United 
States asks a similar question, and comes to a similar conclusion: the actual pattern of 
judicial decision-making in these areas of law confound expectations based upon 
political interpretations of jurisprudence. This study challenges contemporary myths 
about judicial power, myths that have been promoted, perhaps unintentionally, by 
scholars who emphasize the political character of decision-making. Political 
preferences and ideology certainly play a role in jurisprudence, but a comparison of 
environmental and aboriginal law in Canada and the United States illustrates that 
institutional forms continue to place limits on political jurisprudence. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THE LIMITS OF ABORIGINAL LAW IN CANADA AND THE UNITED 
STATES, 1985-2007 
Canada and the United States share not only a similar liberal political culture, 
they also share a common “Machiavellian” foundation: they exist as nations because 
they displaced the various aboriginal peoples who inhabited North America prior to 
the arrival of European settlers.56 There are some differences between the colonial 
experience in Canada and the United States. The displacement of Indian tribes by the 
United States was more violent and bloody than was the case in Canada, though this 
does not give Canadians any grounds for self-righteousness. The expansion of the 
Canadian state preceded the expansion of the Canadian settlers, and this made 
“winning the west” a fairly orderly process.57 This happened only because the north of 
the continent was not particularly attractive to any settlers prior to the very late 19th 
century, if then.58 In addition, the aboriginal peoples who lived in what was to become 
Canada were much less numerous than their counterparts in the South.59 Whether 
through a process orderly or disorderly, the native peoples of the Dominion of Canada 
and the Republic of the United States found their lands diminished by the expansion of 
the settler societies. But native peoples were not simply conquered, and not simply 
                                                 
56 One commentator has described the difference between the colonization of Canada and the 
United States as follows: “An oversimplification, though not much of one, would be to say that the 
historical difference between American and Canadian handling of their native populations was that the 
United States decimated theirs by war, Canada theirs by starvation and disease.” C.E.S Franks, “Indian 
Policy: Canada and the United States Compared.” in Cook and Lindau, editors, Aboriginal Rights and 
Self-Government. McGill University Press: Montreal, 2000 p. 227. 
57 Jeanne Guillemin, “The Politics of National Integration: A Comparison of United States and 
Canadian Indian Administrations.” Social Problems, Volume 25, Number 3, (February, 1978). 
58 “Land, Labour and Capital in Pre-Confederation Canada.” pp 44-46 in Gary Teeple, 
Capitalism and the National Question in Canada. University of Toronto Press, 1972.  
59 Franks, “Indian Policy: Canada and the United States Compared.” p. 235. 
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eliminated. In both Canada and the United States, they remained both separate from 
the emerging settler societies, and subject to them; in the words of Chief Justice John 
Marshall, aboriginal peoples were “domestic dependent nations” in both Canada and 
the United States.60 
This anomalous legal arrangement—nations within a nation—created a similar 
set of legal questions and problems in Canada and the United States. How should the 
“settler states” address the displacement of peoples that accompanied the founding of 
their societies? Is this a problem that should be solved by extending equal citizenship 
to Native Americans and Native Canadians?61 Or do native communities deserve, as a 
matter of right, certain distinct privileges under the law?62 The answers to these 
questions have consequences that extend beyond aboriginal communities themselves, 
especially insofar as they touch upon question of rights to land and natural resources. 
A comparison of how Canadian and American courts deal with these issues can also 
help to illustrate the nature of judicial power and judicial politics. 
Unlike the case of environmental policy, Native Americans and Native 
Canadians can both lay claim to specific Constitutional recognition of their special 
status. The American Constitution’s commerce clause implicitly recognizes the 
existence of aboriginal communities as distinct nations, while the Canadian 
constitution is even more direct in its recognition of the special constitutional status of 
                                                 
60 This phrase was first used by Marshall to describe the status of American Indians in 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 30 U.S. 1; 8 L. Ed. 25; 
1831. 
61 Tom Flanagan, First Nations? Second Thoughts.McGill University Press: Montreal, 2000; 
Alan Cairns, Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State. UBC Press: Vancouver, 2000. 
62 E.g. Michael Murphy, “Culture and Courts: A New Direction in Canadian Jurisprudence on 
Aboriginal Rights?” Canadian Journal of Political Science. Vol. 34, Number 1 (Mar. 2001) pp 109-
129. 
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aboriginals.63 In fact, the Canadian Constitution Act of 1982 places aboriginal rights 
into a particularly privileged category of rights. Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 
which “constitutionalizes” both the treaty rights and unwritten aboriginal rights of 
Native Canadians, exempts these rights from the Section 33 “notwithstanding clause,” 
which empowers both provincial and federal governments to exempt legislation from 
challenges based upon the Charter of Rights. Thus it is not merely the case that 
aboriginal rights in Canada are recognized more explicitly than in the United States. 
Aboriginal rights are, in some ways, not subject to the lingering elements of 
parliamentary sovereignty that place potential limits on other aspects of judicial 
activism.64 
The status and rights of aboriginals and aboriginal communities raise political 
questions that are central to debates over the meaning of citizenship, multi-culturalism, 
and even the legitimacy of the modern state. The dispossession of native peoples by 
settler societies, if not the outright conquest and slaughter of those peoples, remains 
one of the bleakest episodes in the history of North America, rivaled only by the 
history of slavery and Jim Crow. Traditional justifications for conquest, dispossession, 
and genocide are no longer regarded as legitimate; we no longer trust the old stories of 
                                                 
63 The precise status of Indian tribes in American law has been fraught with ambiguities. But 
one point has been clear and relatively uncontroversial (at least from the perspective of judges and 
officials who act in the name of the American state): whatever powers that belong to Indian tribes are 
still subordinate to the power of Congress. As Justice Marshall said in regards to the anomalous position 
of Indian tribes, their “rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily 
diminished” by the establishment of sovereignty by the European powers in the New World. (Johnson 
v. M’Intosh SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 21 U.S. 543; 5 L. Ed. 681; 1823. For a 
discussion of the Marshall Court’s treatment of the legal claims of Native Americans, see Jill Norgren, 
The Cherokee Cases: two landmark decisions in the fight for sovereignty. Norman, OK: Oklahoma 
University Press, 2004. 
64 For a variety of reasons, the use of the Section 33 override clause has proven enormously 
controversial. Some commentators have suggested that a constitutional convention against the use of 
the clause has emerged (Andrew Heard, Canadian Constitutional Conventions: The Marriage of Law 
and Politics. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1991. p. 147) For a defense of and a discussion of the 
political sources of opposition to Section 33, see Christopher Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter 
Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1993 pp 188-212. 
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how the West was won. Yet it is far from clear whether or how the settler societies of 
North America should respond to historical injustices committed against Native 
Americans and Native Canadians. 
There are, broadly speaking, two ways in which the state has attempted to 
respond to the injustices of the “settler contract,” the doctrine that the property and 
lives of native North Americans were not fully deserving of protection under the 
law.65 Until very recently, the “progressive” or “liberal” position emphasized the need 
for assimilation of native communities within liberal democratic society as a whole, a 
process which would allow for the native culture to sustain itself in the same manner 
as other ethnic groups.66 The liberal assimilationist position has been attacked on the 
grounds that Indians have not in fact accepted the sovereignty of the state, and that 
there are specific legal protections for the autonomy of native communities (embodied 
                                                 
65 For a relatively sympathetic (though still critical) treatment of some of the ideological 
justifications for European colonization of the New World, see Flanagan, First Nations? Second 
Thoughts pp. 48. The idea that European colonization of North America was justified by the limited 
civilizational development of Indians has been rejected even by critics of aboriginal rights such as 
Flanagan; more theoretically interesting is the claim that many aboriginal tribes did not possess the 
attributes of sovereignty due to lack of a state or fixed territories–the doctrine of “terra nullius.” In 
practice, this doctrine has of course been applied to settled agricultural communities as well as to 
stateless peoples; in the Berlin conference of 1885, for instance, European states declared all of sub-
Saharan Africa to be “terra nullius.” Most contemporary scholars regard the doctrine of terra nullius to 
be irrelevant to the question of aboriginal rights and self-government. E.g. James Tully, “A Just 
Relationship between Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal Peoples of Canada.” in Aboriginal Rights and 
Self-Government: the Canadian and Mexican experience in North American Perspective. Montreal and 
Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000 pp 39-72. Tully argues that once the “Eurocentric 
biases” of colonialism are abandoned, it is necessary to conclude that “Aboriginal peoples should be 
recognized as equal, coexisting, and self-governing nations” (p. 43). 
66 For discussion of the early assimilationist stage of American Indian policy, see Frederick E. 
Hoxie, A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1890-1920. Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1984. Interestingly, American Indian policy retreated from the assimilationist paradigm 
well before Canada, during the New Deal Era. For this period, see Lawrence C. Kelly The Assault on 
Assimilation: John Collier and the Origins of Indian Policy Reform. Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico Press, 1983. American policy shifted towards assimilation once again by the 1950s, and this 
second period of tribal “termination” itself came to an end by the late 1960s. See Dan Russell, A 
People’s Dream. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000. pp 28-29. In Canada, the assimilationist paradigm for 
Indian policy was the mainstream or progressive position until well into the 1960s; the alternative 
tended to be neglect, benign or otherwise. See Alan C. Cairns, Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and 
the Canadian State. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000 pp 47-77. 
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in both treaties and constitutional documents) that give them the right to a distinct 
status in North American society.67 Even those who reject the doctrine of “terra 
nullius,”68 however, encounter difficulties establishing the precise scope of native 
rights. The meaning of constitutional provisions, even recently adopted provisions 
such as the Canadian Constitution Act of 1982, are ambiguous, as are many of the 
relevant treaties (some centuries old) that provide the basis for aboriginal territorial 
claims.69 
The aboriginal rights cases that raise the most significant legal and political 
stakes are those dealing with the ownership of land. From the perspective of aboriginal 
litigants, the resolution of their claims have the potential to provide some form of 
redress for the sins of colonization, as well as the potential to restore economic well-
being and perhaps even some form of political autonomy to native communities. Yet 
there are significant legal and political obstacles to these claims. It can be difficult, in 
many instances, to determine what ownership of land meant for peoples who did not 
live under a system of written law. Even if title can be established, there is the 
question of why claims of this kind are not barred by relevant statutes of limitation. 
Furthermore, and even more significantly, there is the problem of those who currently 
occupy the land. While it might seem painful and costly for governments to transfer 
                                                 
67 Patrick Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2001. 
68 The doctrine, developed in various ways, which asserted that aboriginal peoples of the “New 
World” lacked the attributes of sovereignty, and thus new world territory could be seized legitimately 
by European states. For a discussion, see Anthony Pagden, “Human Rights, Natural Rights, and 
Europe’s Imperial Legacy.” Political Theory. Vol. 31, No. 2, pp 171-199.  
69 Dan Rusell, an aboriginal lawyer, has observed that Section 35 of the Constitution Act 
provided both good news and bad news for the aboriginal peoples of Canada: “The good news what 
they were recognized within the Constitution as Aboriginal peoples, but the bad news was that they had 
no understanding of what was intended by this new stature. Although they now had their respective 
Aboriginal and treaty rights recognized and entrenched, no one knew what this meant legally or 
practically.” Dan Russell, A People’s Dream: Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada. Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2000 p. 5 The uncertainty extended to the federal and provincial governments as well. 
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public land and resources to aboriginal peoples (whether based on statutory, treaty, or 
claims to aboriginal title to land) there is at least some connection between the “legal 
personality” which committed the wrong and the legal personality being held to 
account. The sovereign that violated rights in the past is still in the relevant measure 
the same sovereign who stands before the courts today. For individual land owners, 
however, the justice of being forced to pay for the decades-old crimes of others is far 
more in doubt. 
My goal here in this chapter, however, is not to resolve the question of what 
Indian law should be. Rather, it is to consider how two sets of judicial institutions, 
sharing a similar legal and political heritage, address a similar set of problems 
regarding the status of aboriginal peoples. The central question I will consider is 
whether the differing Constitutional institutions of Canada and the United States create 
differing patterns in Supreme Court aboriginal rights decisions, or whether those 
patterns can best be explained by political divisions within the courts themselves. The 
central argument is that, particularly in regards to aboriginal rights (rights to certain 
practices, immunities from state regulation, and title to land not based upon specific 
written commitments such as treaties or statutes) and treaty rights, the Canadian courts 
have endorsed an “aboriginal rights” revolution.70 In particular, the Courts have 
adopted novel standards of evidence that make it easier for Native Canadians to 
sustain claims to aboriginal and treaty rights. In the United States, this aboriginal 
rights revolution has not taken place, and this cannot simply be explained as a 
consequence of the political composition of the court and the ideological preferences 
                                                 
70 For the official statement that nicely encompasses “aboriginal rights orthodoxy” amongst 
Canadian academic, legal, and progressive political elites, see Canada, Report of the Royal Commission 
on Aboriginal Peoples 5 vols. Ottawa: Canada Communication Publishing Group, 1996. The thrust of 
the massive report is simple: aboriginal peoples have the right to cultural and political autonomy in 
Canada. For an in-depth analysis of the report, see Cairns, Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the 
Canadian State. UBC Press: Vancouver, 2000. pp 116-152. 
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of American Supreme Court justices. This is because justices that are usually regarded 
as having left-leaning or liberal preferences in other contexts have not uniformly 
endorsed the expansion of aboriginal rights. It is not the case that the initiation of an 
American aboriginal rights revolution merely awaits the appointment of more liberal 
judges (or the “evolution” of more conservatives sitting on the court). It is true that 
there are some judges who have endorsed “revolutionary” approaches to Indian law; 
however, the willingness of judges to endorse Indian claims varies in response to legal 
factors, even when the underlying policy dimensions are the same. This is because, in 
American Indian law, aboriginal and treaty rights are ultimately subordinate to 
Congressional sovereignty—and thus the willingness of judges to endorse aboriginal 
claims will vary, depending upon the legal environment created by Congressional 
statutes and actions of the national government. This is not to deny that there are no 
“attitudinal” dimensions to American and Canadian Indian law. As I will show, the 
limits that Canadian courts in particular have placed upon the aboriginal rights 
revolution stem from a desire to balance aboriginal claims against the political 
imperatives of both provinces and national governments; the Canadian Supreme Court 
has not been “captured,” at least not completely, by the academic proponents of 
aboriginal sovereignty in Canadian law schools and philosophy departments. But the 
differences between Canadian and American Indian law must be traced to the 
differences between Canadian and American constitutionalism, not simply to 
differences in the policy preferences of judges. 
I have chosen to focus on how the Canadian and American courts have dealt 
with 3 different kinds of issues in Indian law: 
1. The status of “aboriginal rights” and “aboriginal title,” legal claims that are 
not rooted in specific Constitutional provisions, treaties, or statutes, but rather in 
judicially-crafted doctrines. 
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2. Treaty interpretation. 
3. Statutory Interpretation. 
The specific terms of the Canadian Constitution—not simply the politics of Canadian 
justices—has affected the development of Indian law in Canada, particularly in 
relation to aboriginal rights, aboriginal title, and treaty interpretation. Support for 
aboriginal claims in American Courts has, since the mid-1980s, been more limited 
than in Canada. The most obvious political explanation for these divergent 
developments is that American courts were in the process of being transformed by the 
“New Right” during this period. It is not the case, however, that votes in cases dealing 
with Indian follow clear political patterns. If we want to understand the actual patterns 
that emerge in American Indian law, we must pay attention to the ways in which the 
votes of judges are shaped by differing legal cues. Canadian courts operate in an 
environment that is much more hospitable to aboriginal legal claims, and this is not 
simply an environment that the courts have created themselves. The American 
Supreme Court’s Indian law opinions show that the court is constrained not by judicial 
political ideologies—or at least, not only by judicial ideologies—but by a 
Constitutional framework that provides much weaker support for aboriginal claims. 
3.1 Aboriginal Law Decisions in the Supreme Court of Canada and the Supreme 
Court of the United States 
Between 1985 and 2006, the first two decades of the “Charter Era” in 
Canadian politics, The Supreme Court of Canada has decided 43 cases dealing with 
the claims of aboriginal litigants (or cases in which aboriginal organizations were 
parties).71 During the same period, the United States Supreme Court decided 63 cases 
                                                 
71 See Appendix A, “Aboriginal Law Cases in the Supreme Court of Canada, 1985-2007” 
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of a similar nature.72 The cases involve disputes between aboriginal litigants and the 
national government, state or provincial governments, private parties or organizations, 
or other aboriginal individuals; the types of cases are summarized in Table 1: 
Table 1: Aboriginal Litigants in the Canadian and American Supreme Courts. 
Aboriginal litigants vs.:  National  
Government 
Provincial or State 
Government 
Private Parties or 
Organizations 
Canada 10 30 2 
United States  15 36 10 
 
In order to get a sense of the kinds of issues that have been raised in these 
cases, it is useful to divide them up into the underlying claims being made on behalf 
on aboriginal tribes and individuals (as well the legal issues at stake in those few cases 
which deal with aboriginal rights, even though the parties are not themselves 
aboriginal tribes or individuals). I have grouped both the Canadian and American 
cases into three broad categories, based upon the central legal claims raised by the 
parties: 
1. Treaty Claims. 
2. Statutory Claims. 
3. Constitutional or Aboriginal Rights Claims. 
4. Procedural Claims. 
                                                 
72 See Appendix B, “Aboriginal Law Cases in the Supreme Court of the United States, 1985-
2007.” The cases were assembled by conducting keyword searches on Lexis Nexis (for the American 
Supreme Court) and the Canadian Legal Information Institute website for the Canadian Supreme Court 
using the terms “aboriginal,” “aboriginals,” “First Nations,” “Indian,” and “Indians.” I then selected all 
of those cases in which an aboriginal tribe or individual was a party to a case, as well as those cases in 
which an issue related to the jurisdiction or rights of aboriginals was at stake even though the parties 
were not themselves aboriginal tribes.  
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Table 2 illustrates the frequency of the different kinds of claims raised in 43 cases 
decided by the Canadian Supreme Court and the 62 cases decided by the American 
Supreme Court. 
Table 2: Issues in Aboriginal Law Cases in the Supreme Court of Canada and the 
Supreme Court of the United States. 
 Treaty Statutory Aboriginal Rights 
Claims 
Procedural Constitutional  
Rights 
Canada 9 14 14 4 2 
USA 7 41 10 1 7 
 
The Canadian court resolved 46 legal issues in these cases, and it supported the 
position of aboriginal litigants or interveners on 20 of those issues.73 Aboriginals thus 
succeeded on 43% of their legal claims. In the United States, the court resolved 65 
legal questions, supporting the position of aboriginal litigants or amici on 19 of those 
issues, for a success rate of 29%. The success rate for Canadian aboriginal litigants in 
these cases is higher than the overall success rate for Charter claims in the Canadian 
Supreme Court (which is 33%74), but lower than the success rate for the major 
women’s legal advocacy group in Canada (LEAF) which had a success rate of 70% in 
the 50 legal issues which it contested before the Canadian Supreme Court between 
1985 and 2000.75 Tables 3 and 4 summarize judicial voting patterns in aboriginal law 
cases in the Canadian and American Supreme Courts between 1985 and 2007: 
                                                 
73 I have interpreted 2 of those wins as “partial,” as the Court did not entirely endorse the legal 
position of the aboriginal litigants. 
74 James B. Kelly, “The Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Re-balancing of Liberal 
Constitutionalism in Canada, 1982-1997.” Osgood Hall Law Journal, Number 37, 1999: p. 641. 
75 Christopher Manfredi, Feminist Activism in the Supreme Court: legal mobilization and the 
Women’s Legal Education Action Fund. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004. p.20. 
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Table 3: Individual Judicial Support for Aboriginal Litigants: Canada. 
Justice  Issues  
Decided 
Ruling in 
Favor of 
Aboriginal 
Litigant 
Ruling 
Against 
Aboriginal 
Litigant 
% Support 
for 
Aboriginal 
Litigants 
(+) = Liberal on 
Civil Rights; 
(-) = 
Conservativea 
Dickson 6 5 1 83% lib 
Beetz 2 1 1 50% con 
Estey 2 1 1 50% con 
McIntyre 3 2 1 66% con 
Chouinard 2 1 1 50% con 
Wilson  5 5 0 100% lib 
LeDain 1 1 0 100% con 
Lamer 24 9 15 38% lib 
LaForest 20 7 13 35% con 
L’Heureux-Dube 24 14 10 58% lib/con 
Sopinka 18 9 9 50% lib/con 
Gonthier 30 11 19 37% con 
Cory 24 10 14 42% con 
McClachlin 36 16 20 44% lib 
Stevenson 2 1 1 50% con 
Iacobucci 24 9 15 38% lib 
Major 23 7 16 30% con 
Binnie 17 10 7 59% lib 
Bastarache 14 5 9 36% con 
Arbor 7 2 5 29% lib/con 
LeBel 12 5 7 42% lib 
Deschamps 8 5 3 63% con 
Fish 7 4 3 57% lib 
Abella 5 4 1 80% lib 
Charron 5 3 2 60% lib 
Rothstein 2 1 1 50% con 
Total Votes on Issues Decided = 313 
Votes for Aboriginal Legal Position = 118 (37%) 
Votes Against Aboriginal Legal Position = 195 
a Sources: Charles Epp, The Rights Revolution, p. 169. 
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Table 4: Individual Judicial Support for Aboriginal Litigants: Supreme Court of the 
United States, 1985-2006 
Justice Issues  
Decided 
For Against Neutral % 
Support 
Ideology 
White 36 9 27  25% lib/con 
Marshall 30 20 9 1 67% lib 
Brennan 27 16 10 1 59% lib 
Burger 12 5 7  42% con 
Blackmun 38 22 15 1 58% lib 
Powell 17 8 9  48% lib/con 
Stevens 65 18 46 1 28% lib 
Rehnquist 65 10 55  15% con 
O’Connor 65 20 44 1 31% lib/con 
Scalia 54 7 47  13% con 
Kennedy 45 7 38  18% lib/con 
Souter 38 15 23  39% lib 
Thomas 35 2 33  6% con 
Ginsburg 29 10 19  35% lib 
Breyer 26 9 17  35% lib 
Roberts 1  1  0%  
Total Votes on Issues Decided = 583 
Total Votes in Favor of Aboriginal Litigants = 178 (43%) 
Total Votes Against = 405 
There are several interesting things to note about the voting and outcomes on 
these issues. First, the fact that the American court resolved fewer issues in favor of 
aboriginal litigants, despite casting a slightly higher percentage of votes for them, 
suggests that the American court is more deeply divided over aboriginal rights 
questions. Table 4 indicates that these divisions run along ideological lines, at least to 
some extent. The absolute number of victories tells us little about the overall 
significance of these cases; a more detailed look into the substance of the decisions is 
necessary to fully evaluate them. What is revealed in the comparison between the 
Canadian and American cases is that the Canadian court, because of the more explicit 
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endorsement of “aboriginal” and treaty rights in the Constitution Act, has been able to 
shape a legal regime that is more hospitable to aboriginal legal claims. We might 
expect that the more limited successes of aboriginal litigants in the United States 
Supreme Court can be explained in political terms, that is, as a consequence of the 
policy preferences of conservative majorities on the Court. This is only part of the 
story. 
3.2 Aboriginal Rights in Canada 
In the following section, I will discuss those claims made by aboriginal 
litigants which are not based upon specific treaties, statutes, but instead are based upon 
un-enumerated “aboriginal rights.”76 The first thing to note is that the development of 
the law of aboriginal rights has been more prominent in Canada, both in terms of the 
number and significance of the cases. But the court has not endorsed the full scope of 
the aboriginal rights agenda, as articulated by the litigants themselves and their 
academic supporters. Some scholars have suggested that Canadian courts have become 
“the vanguard of the intelligentsia,” and the case of aboriginal law shows both the 
strengths and limits of this criticism.77 The development of aboriginal rights in Canada 
over the past two decades is a clear case of “judicial activism,” in the sense that the 
Supreme Court influenced important areas of public policy (most particularly, 
resource development) and has crafted novel doctrines of law while doing so. But it is 
not a case of judicial “capture” by interest group litigants. 
                                                 
76 For the most thorough theoretical defense of the aboriginal rights, see Patrick Macklem, 
Indigenous difference and the Constitution of Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001. 
77 The term “vanguard of the intelligentsia” is taken from F.L. Morton and Rainer Knopff, The 
Charter Revolution and the Court Party. Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2000 p. 129 While 
Morton and Knopff are certainly correct about the tendency of the legal academy to support judicial 
activism, and the variety of ways the legal academy influences the Supreme Court, the case of 
aboriginal law shows that legal elites have only limited influence over Canadian law. For a discussion 
of the widespread support for aboriginal sovereignty in the legal academy, see Flanagan, First Nations? 
Second Thoughts. Montreal and Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000. pp 1-2. 
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Secondly, the patterns of aboriginal law decisions in the American Supreme 
Court s do not parallel Canadian developments. This is not because conservative 
majorities on the Supreme Court have prevented a more robust conception of 
aboriginal rights. Liberal justices, particularly in the past two decades, have typically 
not articulated an ambitious conception of aboriginal rights even in dissent. In fact, in 
some of the very few cases where the court has adopted novel approaches to the un-
enumerated, judicially-crafted rights of aboriginals, conservative judges can be found 
to support race-based legal privileges. The divergence between American and 
Canadian aboriginal rights jurisprudence can be traced, rather, to the differing 
Constitutional protections for aboriginal rights in the Canadian Constitution Act of 
1982. Without the more robust protections for aboriginal rights found in this recently 
adopted “higher law” of Canadian politics, it is unlikely that there would have been 
Canadian rights revolution. This is not to say that, in supporting new interpretations of 
aboriginal rights the Canadian Supreme Court has been merely “following the law.” 
The Supreme Court has been making the law, not interpreting it, because those who 
created the Constitution Act were themselves uncertain about the full scope of Section 
35.78 The law, however, provided a basis for aboriginal rights activism that is not 
available to American judges who might be politically inclined to support stronger 
versions of aboriginal rights. I turn now to that Constitutional basis of Canadian 
aboriginal rights activism: Section 35 of the Constitution Act of 1982. 
In Canada, prior to the adoption of the Constitution Act of 1982, aboriginal 
rights were subject to the normal pressures of the political process. Some judges were 
willing to extend considerable protections to aboriginal rights claims.79 But in general, 
                                                 
78 Douglas Sanders, “The Indian Lobby.” in Keith Banting and Richard Simeon, ed. Canada 
Notwithstanding: Federalism, Democracy, and the Constitution Act. Toronto: Methuen Press, 1983. Pp 
301-333. 
79 Canadian judges were already beginning to change their views on aboriginal rights before 
the Charter was born—before it was even a twinkle in Pierre Eliot Trudeau’s eye. This is shown in the 
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parliamentary sovereignty was thought to trump treaty rights in those instances where 
the federal government found it necessary or convenient to do so. The Charter 
revolutionized this political arrangement, despite the occasional attempts of Canadian 
politicians to foreclose broad readings of aboriginal rights.80 Though aboriginal rights 
were not initially a central concern of Trudeau’s constitutional repatriation campaign, 
                                                                                                                                            
case of Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145; 1973, one of the most 
important—in fact, one the only—pre-Charter cases that deal with the question of aboriginal title (the 
claim to a special kind of property right in land that is based upon traditional use and occupation of land 
by native peoples.). The importance of Calder lies not only in the influence it had on subsequent Indian-
Government relations in Canada, but also in what it tells us about the nature of judicial politics in 
Canada. 
The suit that was the basis of Calder was brought by members of the Nishga nation, which was 
comprised of four Indian bands from North Western British Columbia. The Nishga sought a declaration 
stating that their title to their ancestral land in British Columbia had never been lawfully extinguished. 
Their suit was dismissed at trial, as was their subsequent appeal to the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal. At the Supreme Court, the Nishga’s appeal was dismissed in a closely divided vote. Three of 
the justices—Juson, Martland, and Ritchie—dismissed the appeal on its merits, while three others—
Hall, Laskin, and Spence, voted to grant the Nishga their requested declaration. The deciding vote was 
cast by Justice Pigeon, who dismissed the appeal on jurisdictional grounds not directly related to 
aboriginal title.  
Though the Nishga lost in court, the divided decision in Calder pushed the federal government 
to initiate a comprehensive land claims process to settle issues of aboriginal title regarding lands that 
had not been ceded by treaty. This represented part of the Trudeau government’s retreat from its 
liberal—assimilationist aboriginal policy, articulated just four years earlier in the 1969 “White Paper.” 
In many ways, the decision started to transform elite consensus on the status of Indians. The 
“progressive” position of the Liberal party once focused on the need for cultural adaptation and 
modernization; in the aftermath of Calder, the Liberal party very quickly moved to adopt a more “multi-
cultural” perspective on aboriginal affairs, based upon the continued existence of distinct aboriginal 
communities, special aboriginal rights, and perhaps even a third-tier of government for native peoples. 
The Calder case, well before the establishment of Sec. 35 of the Canadian Charter, was able to 
influence aboriginal policy even though the decision itself was not a decisive victory for the Nishga. 
This case provides one piece of evidence in support of the “court party” thesis of scholars such 
as Morton and Knopff, insofar as it shows that judges were willing to initiate part of the “rights 
revolution” without any direct impetus from the political branches of government or, more significantly, 
without any specific constitutional provisions to base their decisions on. One might object that the 
viewpoint of the dissenting justices, though “activist” in some sense, may nevertheless have been a 
legally correct recognition of Canada’s unjust expropriation of aboriginal land, land which had been 
ceded to Indian peoples by actions of the imperial government. There was certainly some merit to the 
dissenters’ position. Yet given the complexity and ambiguity of the evidence presented, it was quite 
easy to make a plausible case either for or against the Nishga’s claim. The dissenting justices, relying 
on centuries old legal documents, laid the basis for a massive change in public policy. Bora Laskin, a 
dissenter in Calder, even suggested in his constitutional law textbook that provincial laws were not 
applicable to native communities—a position entertained by no one before him, and very few 
afterwards. The Calder case and its impact are discussed in Thomas Flanagan, First Nations? Second 
Thoughts. Montreal and Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000 and Alan Cairns, Citizens Plus: 
Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000. 
80 Sanders, “The Indian Lobby,” pp 325-33. 
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aboriginal groups exerted great pressure in order to get their concerns onto the 
constitutional agenda.81 This effort was not in vain. 
The new Charter would incorporate two sections which addressed the status of 
aboriginal peoples. The first, Section 25, is primarily defensive in character; its 
purpose is to insure that the new rights established by the Charter do not undermine 
the special status of aboriginals. Aboriginal groups had worried that the individualistic 
thrust of Charter rights might be employed against the group-based rights of aboriginal 
communities, and Section 25 was intended to allay this fear. This section has been the 
subject of little judicial commentary since its inception. Few cases have arisen in 
which individuals have challenged aboriginal practices on the basis of Charter rights 
and thus its impact has remained limited and unexplored. 
Far more significant to both aboriginals and Canadians as a whole is Section 
35 of the Constitution Act of 1982, which insulates aboriginal rights not from the 
Charter claims but from parliamentary interference. The crucial clause of Section 35 
reads as follows: “The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of 
Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.” One might question whether this clause 
created any constitutional changes at all. The Canadian government had always 
recognized aboriginal rights— but it had also maintained that it possessed the power to 
alter and amend those rights.82 The Canadian Supreme Court has chosen to interpret 
this clause as an almost complete repudiation of parliamentary sovereignty in the area 
of aboriginal rights. After the Charter, the federal government can no longer alter 
aboriginal rights at will. This fairly loose gloss of Section 35 has achieved a secure 
                                                 
81 Cairns, Citizens Plus, pp 47-53. 
82 For a challenge to the notion that Crown sovereignty vis a via aboriginal peoples existed 
prior to the Constitution Act of 1982, see Bruce Clark, Native Liberty, Crown Sovereignty: The Existing 
Aboriginal Right of Self Government in Canada. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1990.  
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status in Canadian Constitutional law, but this was only the starting point of the 
Court’s interpretive work. The question of exactly what rights are protected by Section 
35 is not answered within the Charter itself; neither does the Charter explain how the 
existence and scope of those protected rights are to be ascertained. Subsequent 
interpretations of “existing aboriginal and treaty rights” have illustrated the Supreme 
Court’s deft ability to respect the letter of the constitutional text while maximizing the 
Court’s power. 
The protections available to aboriginal rights claimants were restricted by the 
language of Section 35 to those rights that were “existing” when the Charter was 
adopted. Section 35 was not, on its face, meant to resurrect rights that had been 
extinguished by actions of the federal government since 1867. Within the context of 
this institutional constraint, the court still had the capacity to develop of vigorous 
aboriginal rights jurisprudence. To begin with, the question of whether or not a right 
had been extinguished in the pre-Charter ear was subject to controversy. The court 
eventually established a strict standard for determining if parliament had intended to 
extinguish a right. This was not particularly controversial. Few people would object to 
the principle that the government should express its intention clearly when abridging 
previous commitments. More controversial was the question of what kinds of evidence 
Indian litigants could use to prove the existence of “existing rights,” particularly when 
those rights were not traced to specific treaty commitments. 
The first major development of aboriginal rights jurisprudence in the post-
Constitution Act era was the case of R. v. Sparrow.83 In this case, an aboriginal man 
was charged with violating the conditions of the fishing license that had been granted 
to his band. Sparrow’s case was based on the claim that the regulations in question 
violated an aboriginal fishing right, a non-enumerated right that, despite not being 
                                                 
83 R.v. Sparrow 1990 CanLII 104 (S.C.C.) 
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based upon any specific treaty commitments, was nevertheless protected under Section 
35 of the Constitution Act. Section 35(1) states that “the existing aboriginal and treaty 
rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.” 
According to the trial judge, no individual could claim an aboriginal right unless it was 
supported by a “special treaty, proclamation, proclamation, contract, or other 
document,” a position that had been established in pre-Constitution Act cases by the 
British Columbia Court of appeal, in particular the case of Calder v. Attorney General 
of British Columbia (1970).84 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal took a slightly different perspective on 
Sparrow’s claim. The court ruled that Sparrow’s claim did not need to be based upon 
any specific treaty commitments, and it rejected the Crown’s argument that 
longstanding national fishing regulations had extinguished the right. However, the 
Court argued that the existence of the aboriginal right did not preclude national 
regulation. The right had not been extinguished, but Parliament’s power to regulate the 
time, place and manner of fishing, including fishing under an aboriginal right, 
remained in place. In essence, the court ruled that the right included a purpose (the 
right to fish for “food purposes,” liberally construed to allow fishing beyond 
subsistence needs) but not a right to determine how best to fish—that decision, for 
aboriginals and everyone else, would be made by the state. But, as a consequence of 
Section 35, the court ruled that aboriginal fishing rights entitle aboriginal groups to 
have priority over the interests of other groups.85 Sparrow appealed this decision to the 
Supreme Court, arguing that aboriginal fishing rights should encompass immunity 
from even those government regulations aimed at conservation. The Crown, in a 
cross-appeal, argued that the lower court had erred in holding that the aboriginal 
                                                 
84 See the discussion in R. v. Sparrow 1986 CanLII 172 (BC C.A.). 
85 R.v. Sparrow (BCCA, 1986). 
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fishing right in question had not been “extinguished” prior to the adoption of the 
Constitution Act.86 
The first question that the Supreme Court addressed was the meaning of 
“existing aboriginal rights” under Section 35 of the Constitution Act. In regards to 
fishing rights, at least, it was impossible to read Section 35 to mean that existing forms 
of regulations of rights were “frozen” in their pre-1982 forms. This would 
constitutionalize an incredibly complex patchwork of regulations, regulations that 
differ not only between but within provinces, and require constitutional amendments 
in order to adjust fishing regulations in response to changing technological and 
conservation needs.87 As to whether or not the “right” existed at all, the Court stated 
that the right was based upon the long existence of the Musqueam Indians as an 
organized society in the area of the Fraser River, and the fact that “the taking of 
salmon was an integral part of their lives, and remains so to this day.”88 As to whether 
this traditional right had been extinguished by government legislation, the central issue 
was whether or not the increasing intrusiveness of regulation since the 1870’s had 
extinguished the right despite the absence of express declaration of this intent by 
                                                 
86 The political and ideological stakes in this case were not clear cut. The national government 
(which was at this time controlled by the Progressive Conservative party) was supported not only by 
half a dozen provincial governments, but also by the British Columbia Wildlife Federation and the 
United Fisherman and Allied Workers’ Union. The interests not only of governments, but also 
environmentalist and labor groups, were at odds with the claims of Sparrow and the First Nations 
organizations which supported him. I point this out as an illustration of the problems involved in any 
studies of “judicial behavior” that purport to evaluate outcomes along a “conservative” vs. “liberal” 
axis.  
87 For a discussion of some of the complexities of Canadian fisheries policy see R. Quentin 
Grafton and Daniel E. Lane, “Canadian Fisheries Policy: Challenges and Choices” Canadian Public 
Policy. Vol. 24, No. 2 (June, 1998) pp 133-147. 
88 The significance of salmon, for the Musqueam, went beyond the “food purposes” referred to 
by the lower courts. According to Dr. Suttles, the anthropologist who provided expert evidence in the 
case, for the Musqueam people “The salmon were held to be a race of beings that had, in “myth times”, 
established a bond with human beings requiring the salmon to come each year to give their bodies to the 
humans who, in turn, treated them with respect shown by performance of the proper ritual.” The Court 
did not specify, in this case, whether the spiritual dimension of the Musqueam’s fishing practices was 
essential to the aboriginal right claim.  
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Parliament. The government’s position was that the comprehensive regulations of the 
Fisheries Act had in fact extinguished the aboriginal fishing rights claimed by 
Sparrow; the right did not “exist” in 1982, and was thus not protected under Section 
34 of the Constitution Act.89 The Court did not accept the Crown’s argument that 
regulation equaled extinguishment. The government’s position was based upon the 
traditional notion that common law rights—of which aboriginal rights were previously 
thought to be a part—were subordinate to the legislative power of parliament. Now, 
the Court argued that the extinguishment of aboriginal rights only occurred when 
Parliament directly expressed its intention to extinguish those rights. There were no 
such statements in the various iterations of the national Fisheries Act that had been in 
place since Confederation in 1867. 
Did the aboriginal right include the right to commercial fishing, as opposed to 
fishing for food and spiritual purposes? The Court recognized that this was the most 
serious question, in the sense that it was likely to have the most serious economic and 
environmental consequences. The Court did not rule directly on this broader issue, as 
Sparrow’s claim dealt only with regulations that interfered with non-commercial 
fishing. The Court noted that the aboriginal fishing right could very well extend to 
commercial fishing: 
Government regulations governing the exercise of the Musqueam right to fish, 
as described above, have only recognized the right to fish for food for over a 
hundred years. This may have reflected the existing position. However, 
historical policy on the part of the Crown is not only incapable of 
extinguishing the existing aboriginal right without clear intention, but is also 
incapable of, in itself, delineating that right. The nature of government 
regulations cannot be determinative of the content and scope of an existing 
aboriginal right. Government policy can however regulate the exercise of that 
right, but such regulation must be in keeping with s. 35(1). 
                                                 
89 St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46; Calder v. 
Attorney-General of British Columbia [1973] S.C.R. 313. 
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In other words, this issue would be decided by Courts, not by Parliament. 
One way to interpret the Court’s decision in the Sparrow case is that the Court 
used Section 35 to carve out a new, more expansive role for Canadian courts in 
Canadian aboriginal policy, an outcome that was made possible by the text of the 
Constitution Act of 1982 but not one that was mandated by that text or by the 
intentions of its framers.90 The principle of law—first announced by the American 
Supreme Court in the 19th century—that ambiguities in treaties and statutes should be 
resolved in favor of Indians was transposed into the interpretation of the Constitution 
Act. But also note that government power to regulate was not denied by the Court. 
Rather, the court argued that, once conservation needs were taken into consideration, 
aboriginals would be entitled to a special claim on natural resources. 
Proponents of aboriginal sovereignty—that is, those who argue that First 
Nations in Canada should exist as separate, self-governing nations—are, 
understandably, often critical of cases such as Sparrow. Some, such as Dan Russell, 
argue that the jurisprudence of the Canadian Supreme Court has not been affected by 
the aboriginal rights provisions of the Constitution Act. The Sparrow decision, in 
reaching the conclusion that aboriginal rights are not absolute, but are in fact still 
subject in some instances to federal and provincial regulation, treated aboriginal rights 
with less deference than other rights protected by the Charter.91 It is worth noting, 
however, that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms explicitly recommends a 
“balancing” approach to all rights contained in the Charter: “The Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to 
                                                 
90 Note the fact that the opinion makes no references to the “original understanding” of Section 
35, or debates over the meaning of Section 35 during the re-patriation process. Numerous references are 
made, however, to academic interpretations of the significance of Section 35.  
91 Russell, A People’s Dream Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada, Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2000 pp 78-79.  
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such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.”92 Thus, the approach taken by Court in Sparrow cannot be said to 
be entirely without Constitutional warrant. The fact that commentators such as Russell 
find fault with the Court’s failure to promote aboriginal sovereignty does not undercut 
my claim that the courts were engaged in judicial activism. But it does serve to remind 
us of the relative modesty of that activism. The Canadian Supreme Court has been 
forced to address the issues raised by Section 35, and it has responded by fashioning 
new legal doctrines—but those doctrines are shaped by the broader, more deferential 
principles announced in the Charter, not necessarily by the theorists of aboriginal. The 
aboriginal rights revolution initiated in Sparrow, as is befitting the actions of a 
Canadian court, was a quiet revolution. 
The case of R. v. Sparrow helped to establish a new and more expansive 
understanding of aboriginal rights in Canadian law. In order to facilitate the further 
validation of aboriginal rights claims, the Supreme Court of Canada has changed the 
evidentiary standards that must be met in order to prove the existence of aboriginal 
rights. The justification offered by the court might seem bizarre in other legal contexts. 
The judicial syllogism went as follows: in order to establish the existence of aboriginal 
rights (whether practices that are inherent to aboriginal culture—and therefore exempt 
from some aspects of government regulation—or claims to aboriginal title in land) 
evidence must often be drawn from times and cultures that did not employ written 
records. Given this fact it is extremely difficult for aboriginal rights claimants to meet 
the evidentiary standards that are found in other areas of law such as torts, contracts, 
etc. Therefore, the rules of evidence must be relaxed if aboriginal groups are to have 
any of their claims validated in court. This conclusion may seem fair. But the rules of 
                                                 
92 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Section 1. 
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evidence developed in Anglo-American law have a logic of their own. Difficulties 
ensue when courts abandon those rules, even if it is in the pursuit of social justice.93 
The role of evidentiary standards in evaluating aboriginal rights claims was 
dealt with most extensively in the case of Delgamuukw v.British Columbia, decided by 
the Supreme Court in 1997.94 This case was based upon a claim to aboriginal title over 
58,000 square kilometers in the interior of British Columbia, by the Gitskan and 
Wet’suwet’en peoples. The claim was based upon the historical use of the land by the 
Native Canadian tribes, as opposed to specific treaty commitments—it was, in other 
words, a claim to “aboriginal title.”95 The court would not come to rule on the validity 
of this specific claim of the Gitskan and Wet’suwet’en, but it would explain the 
contours of aboriginal title, and what would be necessary (and allowed) in order to 
establish claims to aboriginal title. 
Aboriginal title is described by the court and later commentators as “sui 
generis,” alone of its kind, unlike property rights as usually understood in the common 
law. The claim to aboriginal title was a claim to far more than ownership, though in 
some ways aboriginal title is encumbered in ways that fee simple title is not.96 The 
source of aboriginal title had been unclear from prior cases. In the Delgamuukw case, 
the court asserted that aboriginal title was rooted in the recognition of aboriginal title 
                                                 
93 For a discussion of the problems of evidence surrounding the practice of plea bargaining in 
the criminal process, see Hadley Arkes, Beyond the Constitution. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1990. pp 173-206. 
94 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 1997 CanLII 302 (S.C.C.). 
95 See Jennifer E. Dalton, “Aboriginal Title and Self-Government In Canada: What is the true 
scope of comprehensive land claim agreements?” Windsor Review of Legal and Social Issues. Vol. 29 
(Dec. 2006). 
96 The basic characteristics of aboriginal title, as asserted by the Court in Delgamuukw, are as 
follows: 1) It is a right to exclusive use; that use does not need to be confined to traditional aboriginal 
practices, but uses must not be incompatible with traditional aboriginal practices. 2) It is inalienable to 
anyone except the Crown 3) It is held communally For a discussion of the some of the problematic 
economic consequences of aboriginal title, see Flanagan, First Nations? Second Thought, pp 185-186. 
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found in the Royal Proclamation of 1763, the common law notion of possession and 
occupation, and “systems of aboriginal law” which pre-dated contact and British 
sovereignty. The key to this assertion was the idea that the common law—with its 
notion of occupation as proof of possession—was only one possible source of proof of 
aboriginal title; other forms of land use, not normally regarded as proof of possession 
in the common law, could be used establish claims to aboriginal title. To demonstrate 
aboriginal title, it was necessary to show that the Native group had exclusive 
occupancy of the land at the time when Crown sovereignty was first asserted. 
However, the Supreme Court had overturned the lower courts’ ruling on this question, 
on the grounds that the trial and appellate courts had rejected the use of “oral 
histories” as evidence in determining the basis for aboriginal title. 
The problem of using oral histories is similar to the problem of hearsay 
evidence. Hearsay evidence is limited in criminal cases for fairly obvious reasons. 
Such evidence is difficult to corroborate, easy to distort, and even subject to 
misrepresentation without any ill-intention on the part of the witness. Similarly, the 
use of extrinsic sources in contract disputes is supposed to be confined, as much as 
possible, to those instances where the terms of the contract are unclear. This is because 
it is almost impossible to determine which extrinsic sources are relevant. Even if the 
relevant sources can be agreed upon, the evidence they provide is likely to be 
indeterminate and contradictory. And even more important is the fact that individuals, 
businesses, and organizations sign the terms of the contract alone— they do not reach 
any agreement about the meaning and relevance of the universe of extra-contractual 
information that might possibly reveal the true meaning of their agreements. 
The use of extrinsic sources has become routine in the area of statutory 
interpretation, particularly in the United States, and here the problems involved in 
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moving beyond the text have been amply demonstrated.97 Ambiguities in legislative 
debates, conflicting statements of intent, diverging media pronouncements, and even 
outright fraud usually obstruct judicial attempts to reconstruct the true intention of 
legislators. All of these evidentiary issues— in criminal law, contract law, and 
statutory interpretation— emerge out of conflicts where the relevant individuals are 
(usually) present, the relevant documents are available (and often recently drafted), 
and the relevant actions (a crime, the drafting of a contract, the enacting of a law) have 
occurred in the relatively recent past. This is rarely the case in questions involving 
aboriginal rights, and this is what makes the relaxation of evidentiary standards in 
aboriginal rights cases so contentious. 
The Supreme Court did not actually resolve the issue— the worst possible 
outcome for all, according to some commentators.98 Instead, the Court decreed that a 
new round of litigation was required— though it also suggested that negotiation would 
be preferable— on the grounds that the trial judges had failed to properly interpret the 
oral evidence offered by the Indian tribes. The Court did not provide any detailed 
explanation of how this evidence—consisting of oral traditions, stories, and sometime 
myths about land use in Northern B.C.—should be evaluated by the Court, except to 
say that it had to be placed on equal footing with “official” records and 
documentation. By laying down this interpretive principle, however, the court 
revolutionized—at least potentially—the scope of aboriginal title claims. 
Yet despite the innovations in law introduced by the Canadian Supreme Court 
in its aboriginal rights jurisprudence, the Court has by no means endorsed the 
                                                 
97 E.g. Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.  
98 This is because property rights were left undefined in the area affected by the decision, 
making development impossible. Had the land and resource rights simply been assigned to the native 
community, this would not have been the case. See Owen Paul Lippert, Beyond the Naas Valley: 
national implications of the Supreme Court’s Delgamuukw decision. Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 2000.  
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approach to aboriginal rights agenda as articulated by legal scholars and advocates for 
aboriginal rights.99 This is important to note, because many critics of judicial activism 
in Canada have argued that the legal support structure of academics and public interest 
lawyers has become a transmission belt between the academy and the courts, which 
allows for the development of policies that would not be endorsed by elected officials. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has, on the basis of Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 
taken further steps in developing aboriginal rights than has the American Supreme 
Court. But in many ways it has still proceeded cautiously, much to the disappointment 
of the advocates of aboriginal rights. 
In developing the jurisprudence of aboriginal rights, the Canadian Supreme 
Court has placed significant limits on the scope of those rights.100 The most significant 
limit that the Court has placed upon aboriginal rights protected by Section 35 is the 
idea that those rights must be related to the traditional culture and practices of native 
peoples.101 The decision which announced this more restrictive aspect of section 35 
jurisprudence was R. v. Van der Peet,102 another case based on a challenge to the 
legitimacy of Parliamentary fishing regulations. In evaluating the rights claim in this 
case, the court reiterated the position from Sparrow that while aboriginal rights could 
no longer be extinguished, they could still be subjected to regulation. The Court went 
beyond the Sparrow decision, however, in its description of what kinds of activities 
                                                 
99 E.g Patrick Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2001; John Borrows, Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous 
Law Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2002. 
100 Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue? 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001. p. 172); L. Dufriamont, “From Regulation to Recolonization: Justifiable 
Infringement of Aboriginal Rights at the Supreme Court of Canada.” University of Toronto Faculty Law 
Review, Volume 58, Number 3, 2000. 
101 In regards to aboriginal title, land use can depart from aboriginal practices, but must not be 
incompatible with traditional practices.  
102 R. v. Van der Peet 1996 CanLII 216 (S.C.C.) 
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could be construed to be aboriginal rights: “To be an aboriginal right an activity must 
be an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the 
aboriginal group claiming the right.”103 Two judges dissented from this opinion, 
arguing that the “frozen rights” approach to aboriginal rights would unduly constrain 
the freedom of native communities to adapt to changing economic circumstances. The 
majority opinion, according the Justice L’Heureux-Dube, treated aboriginal culture as 
if it was an artifact that had be preserved and isolated from the broader culture as a 
whole, as if the only purpose of aboriginal rights was to preserve native cultures as 
museum pieces. 
There are three other aboriginal rights cases which produced dissenting 
opinions. L’Heureux Dube and McLachlin, the dissenting justices in Van Der Peet, 
also dissented in the case of R. v. NTC Smokehouse, which dealt with the validity of 
federal fishing regulations.104 The basis of their dissent was, as in Van der Peet, their 
objection to the restrictive or “frozen” conception of aboriginal rights advanced by the 
majority. In the final case in which L’Heureux Dube and McLachlin cast dissenting 
votes together, they found themselves voting against the aboriginal claimant. In R. v. 
Nikal, the majority overturned a conviction for violation of fisheries regulations on the 
grounds that the regulations violated aboriginal rights.105 L’Heureux Dube and 
McLachlin agreed that the regulations violated aboriginal rights, but they did not think 
that this gave individuals the right to refuse to apply for licenses which had many 
provisions that were perfectly valid. The dissents of L’Heureux Dube and McLachlin 
may well have been motivated by their policy preferences, but if so, those preferences 
do not reflect simple partisan divisions, or invariable preferences for certain categories 
                                                 
103 C.J. Lamer, majority opinion, R v. Van der Peet 1996 CanLII 216 (S.C.C.). 
104 R. v. NTC Smokehouse Ltd. 1996 CanLII 159 (S.C.C.). 
105 R. v. Nikal 1 996 CanLII 245 (S.C.C.). 
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of litigants. Despite their support for a very expansive, evolutionary conception of 
aboriginal rights, L’Heureux Dube and McLachlin were not led to subordinate all 
other legal considerations to the imperatives of Section 35. 
There is also some indication that L’Heureux Dube and McLachlin were 
willing to accept the Van der Peet test as the law, despite their initial opposition to its 
approach to aboriginal rights. In the case of R. v. Pamajewon, a First Nations band in 
Ontario argued that, on the basis of the aboriginal right to self-government, it should 
be exempt from Ontario gaming regulations.106 Under the Van der Peet test, this 
argument could not hold: casino gaming may be one of the most effective means of 
economic development for Indian tribes, but no anthropologist could convincingly 
demonstrate that it was an integral part of pre-contact aboriginal culture. L’Heureux 
Dube and McLachlin both joined the majority in this case, despite their initial 
rejection of the “frozen rights” approach to Section 35. 
The connection that the Court has drawn between aboriginal rights and 
traditional aboriginal practices is the most serious limitation on the aboriginal rights 
revolution in Canadian law. Thus, in many instances, the victories won by aboriginal 
litigants are ambiguous. Consider the case of R v. Bernard, decided in 2006.107 In this 
case, the Court ruled, in a unanimous decision, that Indians have the right to harvest 
wood on their traditional territory—that is, they have a right to harvest wood free from 
provincial regulation. The court has not simply immunized Native Canadians from 
resource regulations, however. Instead, the Court has displaced provincial 
governments as the overseers of natural resource policy. This is because the Court has 
empowered itself to determine whether the exercise of aboriginal rights are in fact 
compatible with traditional aboriginal culture. In R v. Bernard, the court implied that 
                                                 
106 R. v. Pamajewon 1996 CanLII 161 (S.C.C.). 
107 R. v. Bernard 2005 CanLII 43 (S.C.C.). 
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the right to harvest wood would not extend as far as the right to conduct commercial 
wood harvesting (or the power to license wood harvesting.) The right to harvest wood 
for personal uses, free from provincial regulation, is not inconsiderable; but it 
nevertheless falls fall short of the full goals of aboriginal litigants. The Court, while 
endorsing some expansive understandings of aboriginal rights, has not so much been 
captured by the aboriginal rights community as much as it has simply asserted judicial 
control over issues once left to the process of political negotiation and compromise. 
This assertion of judicial control over aboriginal affairs, through the device of 
connecting aboriginal rights claims to traditional aboriginal culture, is in some ways 
the worst of all possible outcomes, regardless of one’s general political perspective on 
aboriginal self-government. The court’s decision manages to run counter to the logic 
of both liberal multi-culturalism and classical liberal economic rationality. For the 
proponents of multi-culturalism, the notion that Courts could determine what 
traditional practices are, or that aboriginal rights should not include the power to 
develop new economic practices, are both deeply “problematic.” From the perspective 
of economic rationality, it is entirely possible that the collective interest of Canadian 
society as a whole would actually be better served in many instances by granting 
aboriginal groups more clearly defined rights over natural resources. This is because 
the benefits (e.g. employment) that come from development (e.g. mining, logging, 
etc.) exist whether the underlying resources are owned by the province or by 
aboriginal tribes. 
While cases such as R. v Sparrow indicated that the Court was willing to play a 
revolutionary role in aboriginal rights cases, and cases such as Delgamuukw suggested 
that Court was not afraid to court political controversy when dealing with the claims 
of First Nations, it would be wrong to exaggerate the scope and successes of 
aboriginal rights litigation in Canadian Courts. The program announced in Sparrow 
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was sharply curtailed by Van der Peet, and the court—usually in unanimous 
decisions—has not been willing to push forward novel understandings of aboriginal 
rights, or expand the notion of aboriginal rights to include the right to self-government 
or sovereignty. But while the development of aboriginal rights in Canada has been 
modest compared to the utopian speculations of academic theorists,108 Canadian courts 
have been more receptive to aboriginal rights claims than have American courts. 
Interestingly, this is not only a consequence of the power and influence of right-wing 
conservatives on the American court. 
3.3 Aboriginal Rights in the United States and the Limits of the Hidden Law: 
Tribal Sovereign Immunity, Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction, Taxation and 
Regulatory Powers 
There are few parallel cases from the American Supreme Court which deal 
with the question of “aboriginal rights” in the sense of un-enumerated rights and 
powers of aboriginal peoples. Yet while aboriginal litigation in the United States is 
dominated by issues of treaty and (especially) statutory interpretation, the issue of 
aboriginal rights is not entirely absent. The legal status of Indian tribes in the United 
States has always been ambiguous. The term often used for their status is “quasi-
sovereign,” (a phrase that might seem to fall into the same category as “quasi-
pregnant”). Chief Justice John Marshall in the early 19th century, used the term 
“domestic dependent nations” to designate the status of Indian tribes.109 What this 
implied regarding the powers and rights of Indian tribes has never been entirely clear. 
For the most part, American courts have asserted that the federal government has 
                                                 
108 E.g. Patrick Macklem, “First Nations Self-Government and the Borders of the Canadian 
Legal Imagination.” McGill Law Journal, Vol. 36, No. 1 pp 382-435. 
109 Jill Norgren, The Cherokee Cases. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004 pp 101-
103. 
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plenary legislative power over Indian tribes, a situation that was also the case in 
Canada prior to the adoption of the Constitution Act of 1982. However, American 
courts have also entertained the idea that Indian tribes have common law rights that, 
while ultimately subordinate to federal sovereignty, may in some circumstances help 
to determine the scope of tribal power in areas such as the jurisdiction of courts, tax 
immunity, and the taxation powers of Indian tribes.110 Thus while the American 
Constitution does not give explicit recognition to the existence of aboriginal rights, 
there are American equivalents to the Canadian cases that deal with the existence and 
scope of the “hidden law” of Indian peoples. 
In the absence of explicit Constitutional protections for this hidden law, 
however, the American Supreme Court has taken only limited steps to expand the 
scope of aboriginal rights. According to some scholars, the absence of an American 
revolution in aboriginal rights can be traced to political sources: the rise of 
conservative justices on the Supreme Court is the main, and perhaps the only, obstacle 
to a transformation in Native American that would parallel the transformations that 
have occurred in Canada and Australia.111 I will argue that the absence of an 
aboriginal rights revolution in American jurisprudence cannot be traced to the rise of 
conservative justices to prominence on the Supreme Court. While there are divisions 
amongst Supreme Court justices on the scope of aboriginal rights, those divisions do 
not follow any clear political pattern. American and Canadian Indian law has 
developed in different directions as a consequence of the differing status of aboriginal 
rights and aboriginal peoples in their written constitutions. In Canada, the few words 
contained in the text of Section 35 of the Constitution Act provided a pre-text for the 
                                                 
110 F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing, 
1982. pp 486-493. 
111 E.g. Robert A. Williams, Jr. Like a Loaded Weapon: The Rehnquist Court, Indian Rights, 
and the Legal History of Racism in America.Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005. 
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development of a robust aboriginal rights jurisprudence. The absence of an equivalent 
foundation in the American Constitution has prevented a similar aboriginal rights 
revolution from emerging in America. It is not for nothing that Native Canadians 
devoted so much time and energy to the process of Canadian constitutional 
negotiation—as opposed to simply lobbying for more sympathetic judges. The re-
patriated Canadian constitution created an expanded space for the recognition of 
aboriginal rights, one that does not exist—at least not to the same extent—within the 
American constitutional order. 
Consider the example of tribal sovereign immunity. This is a court developed 
doctrine, first articulated in the early 20th century, based upon the implications of the 
semi-sovereign status of American Indian tribes recognized by state constitutions.112 It 
is roughly analogous to the doctrine of state sovereign immunity, with the notable 
exception that tribal sovereign immunity can be altered and abridged by federal law. 
American Supreme Court cases dealing with sovereign immunity reveal some 
interesting divisions amongst the justices, divisions that do not fall along the assumed 
political fault lines that so often divide the Court. 
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies Inc.,113 decided in 
1998, is the only case in which Native Americans won a legal victory at the Supreme 
Court level on the basis of an aboriginal rights claim. In this case, the majority of the 
court (consisting of Kennedy, O’Connor, Breyer, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Souter) ruled 
that the Kiowa Tribe enjoyed sovereign immunity from breach of contract suits in 
state courts even in regards to “off reservation” business dealings. The court did not 
                                                 
112 For a discussion of tribal sovereign immunity, see Kirsten Matoy Carlson, “Towards Tribal 
Sovereignty and Judicial Efficiency: Ordering the Defenses of Tribal Sovereign Immunity and 
Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies.” Michigan Law Review. Vol. 101, No. 2 (Nov., 2002) pp 569-601. 
113 Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 523 U.S. 751; 118 S. Ct. 1700; 140 L. Ed. 2d 981; 1998. 
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deny the power of Congress to extinguish or alter the tribe’s legal immunity from suits 
in state court, but argued instead that Congress had not clearly extinguished this aspect 
of tribal sovereignty. Justice Stevens, joined by Ginsburg and Thomas in dissent, 
argued that the extension of tribal immunity had never been applied in the context of 
off-reservation activity, and the court should refrain from extending the doctrine of 
tribal sovereign immunity to such circumstances. In the one case since 1985 in which 
the Court endorsed a novel understanding of un-enumerated aboriginal rights, the 
voting of the justices does not seem to follow any clear political pattern. 
It is worthwhile to consider the substance of the arguments in Kiowa, in order 
to assess the legal sources of disagreement that created such unexpected voting 
coalition on the court. The suit emerged from disagreements between the Kiowa and 
Manufacturing Technologies over the sale of stock; the tribe, having defaulted on 
payment for the stock, was sued in an Oklahoma state court. The tribe moved to have 
the case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, but both the trial and appellate court found 
that the Kiowa did not enjoy immunity from suit for breaches of contract involving 
off-reservation commercial conduct. According to the Oklahoma Court of Appeals, 
the decision to exercise jurisdiction by Oklahoma over other sovereigns, whether 
Indian tribes or sister states, was a matter of comity; because the state holds itself open 
to breach of contract suits, it may allow its citizens to sue other sovereigns acting 
within the state. According to Kennedy, this argument was invalid because it was 
based upon the assumption that state sovereign immunity was co-extensive with the 
sovereign immunity of Indian tribes: “In Blatchford, we distinguished state sovereign 
immunity from tribal sovereign immunity, as tribes were not at the Constitutional 
Convention. They were thus not parties to the ‘mutuality of concession’ that ‘makes 
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the States’ surrender of immunity from suit by sister States plausible.”114 Thus tribal 
immunity is a matter of federal law, and is not subject to diminution by the States. 
Kennedy paused to note that there was “reason to doubt the wisdom of perpetuating 
the doctrine” of tribal sovereign immunity, as the economic activities of Native 
American tribes became more intertwined with society as a whole. However, Kennedy 
thought that this was a decision best left to Congress, which possessed the power to 
shape the court-created contours of tribal sovereign immunity. For the courts to restrict 
tribal sovereign immunity in this instance, on the basis of its own assessment of the 
role of Indian tribes in the modern American economy, would be to usurp Congress’ 
policy-making role. 
Stevens began his opinion with a forceful rejection of the majority’s premise 
that tribal sovereign immunity can exist absent specific statutory or treaty 
commitments: “There is no federal statute or treaty that provides petitioner, the Kiowa 
Tribe of Oklahoma, any immunity from the application of Oklahoma law to its off-
reservation commercial activities. Nor, in my opinion, should this Court extend the 
judge-made doctrine of sovereign immunity to pre-empt the authority of the state 
courts to decide for themselves whether to accord such immunity to Indian tribes.”115 
The courts had not merely declined to act, but had in fact extended the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity by allowing it to cover off-reservation activity—a conclusion 
even more troubling given the fact that the Court had ruled in some cases that 
sovereign immunity did not even extend to on-reservation activity.116 
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The key thing to note about the politics of the Kiowa decision is that they are 
distinctively legal politics, that is, disputes about the meaning and implications of law. 
From a political perspective, the issue turns on questions of economic rationality and 
economic fairness (for those who make contracts with Native American tribes), and 
questions about the justification for the unique status of Native American tribes in 
light of their particular historical experiences. As we will see, Justice Stevens will not 
hesitate to endorse aboriginal claims based upon statutes and treaties—cases where the 
bottom-line “policy issues” are more or less identical as in the Kiowa case. And this is 
the crucial point to note: the votes of justices, and the outcomes of Indian law cases, 
shift in response to the various ways in which Congress has recognized, restricted, or 
extinguished aboriginal rights. This is not to say that there are no political differences 
over the meaning of Native American rights in the American Supreme Court. But the 
scope of judicial politics is shaped not simply by judicial preferences regarding the 
advantages and disadvantages of Indian sovereignty. 
The court has only rarely crafted expansive understanding of tribal civil 
jurisdiction, or tribal immunity from the civil jurisdiction of state courts. Between 
1985 and 2006, the United States Supreme Court decided 8 cases which dealt with the 
civil jurisdiction of tribal courts and tribal sovereign immunity from civil claims in 
state courts. The court ruled in favor of tribal claims in 2 out of 8 of the cases. In the 
six cases in which the court ruled against tribal claims, not a single justice voted 
against the outcome of the case. 
Again, this is not to suggest that there are no political fault-lines on the court in 
regards to the scope of tribal sovereign immunity—though in some cases, those fault 
lines are only apparent in the reasoning used by various justices, not by the outcome of 
the specific questions before the court. In the case of Nevada v. Hicks, for instance, the 
court was divided not over the outcome of the case, but over the broader question of 
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tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members (including state law enforcement 
officials).117 The case dealt with a civil action against a state official, who obtained 
tribal and state search warrants in order to investigate the house of a tribe member 
suspected of off-reservation hunting violations. The tribe member brought an action in 
tribal court against Nevada games wardens for trespass, abuse of process, and 
violations of civil rights. In response, the state brought an action in the District Court, 
seeking a declaratory judgment that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction. The District 
Court granted summary judgment for the tribe member, and the decision was upheld 
on appeal to the 9th circuit court. On subsequent appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that 
the tribal court did not have jurisdiction in the case. But the five separate opinions 
written in the decision reveal some of the fissures that exist on the court regarding 
questions of tribal sovereignty. 
Justice Scalia, joined by Rehnquist, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, 
argued that the general principle in adjudicating questions of tribal jurisdiction was 
that tribes lack jurisdiction over non-members: “where non-members are concerned, 
the ‘exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of 
the tribes.”118 The crux of the matter was that the scope of tribal sovereignty was not 
connected to territory—the fact that the allegedly tortious activity took place on tribal 
lands did not necessarily establish tribal sovereignty. While Indian tribes have the 
right to create laws for tribal governance insofar as this affects the relationships 
amongst tribe members, this does not give the tribe jurisdiction over state officials 
who are acting to enforce state laws that apply to tribal members. Just as federal 
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enforcement of legitimate federal laws does not impair state governments, state 
enforcement of legitimate state laws does not impair the capacity of tribes to govern 
themselves. 
In a concurring opinion, Justices Souter, Thomas, and Kennedy laid down an 
even more restrictive interpretation of tribal civil jurisdiction, arguing that tribal civil 
jurisdiction does not extend to non-members. The justification for this narrow reading 
of tribal jurisdiction lay in both the complexity of tribal law and the questionable 
independence (in some circumstances) of tribal courts.119 Souter’s opinion went 
beyond the narrow question presented to the court—the question of tribal court 
jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law—and imposed a more stringent 
understanding of tribal court jurisdiction. Ginsberg and O’Connor thought the broader 
issue should be left undecided, while Breyer and Stevens wished to adopt a more 
lenient interpretation. Stevens had also voted in dissent in the two cases where a 
majority of the court had voted in favor of a more expansive interpretation of tribal 
sovereign immunity and civil jurisdiction, which raises a further obstacle to any purely 
political interpretation of the Court’s decision in these cases. What guided Stevens’ 
opinions in both the Hicks and Kiowa cases was a territorial conception of tribal 
sovereignty, not a preference or aversion for the interests of Indian tribes. 
The Court’s decision in Kiowa is an exception to the general rule that the 
American Supreme Court has been hesitant to expand the scope of aboriginal rights, in 
regards to court-crafted doctrines regarding tribal sovereign immunity and civil 
jurisdiction. The divergent developments of aboriginal rights jurisprudence in Canada 
and the United States seems to confirm the significance of constitutional politics. The 
debate over aboriginal rights in Canadian courts takes place on an entirely different 
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Constitutional playing field, not because of the political preferences of a majority of 
Canadian judges, but because Section 35 of the Constitution Act of 1982 provided a 
basis for a re-thinking of the relationship between aboriginal rights, the doctrine of 
extinguishment, and the power of Parliament. There has been no parallel development 
in American law, but this is not because of the triumph of “the new right” in American 
courts, as even liberal appointees have declined to develop a doctrine of aboriginal 
rights in dissent. In the few cases which advanced and developed the aboriginal right 
to sovereign immunity, conservative justices on the American Supreme Court actually 
endorsed a notion of aboriginal rights more radical in some respects than the position 
of the Canadian Supreme Court. In declining to connect tribal sovereign immunity to 
traditional aboriginal lands or traditional aboriginal practices, Scalia and Rehnquist 
endorsed a position rejected by the liberal majority on the Canadian Supreme Court. 
Table 5 summarizes the American Supreme Court cases that have addressed the state 
of tribal sovereign immunity: 
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Table 5: Tribal Jurisdiction and Sovereign Immunity in the American Supreme Court, 1985-2007. 
Case and Year Issue(s) Outcome for 
Native American 
litigants, amici 
Majority Dissent 
Iowa Mutual Insurance 
v. LaPlante et al, 1987  
i) Is a federal court required to exercise 
diversity jurisdiction, where case with 
same parties is pending in trial court? 
Win Marshall, J., Rehnquist, Brennan, 
White, Blackmun, Powell, 
O’Connor, and Scalia, JJ. 
Stevens 
Ok. Tax Commission v. 
Graham, 1989  
Has a federal question been properly 
pleaded in dispute over application of 
state taxes to Indian gaming venture? 
Loss Unanimous   
Ok. Tax Commission v. 
Citizen Band 
Potatwatomi, 1991 
1. May a state that has not asserted 
jurisdiction over Indian Land under 
Public Law 280 collect taxes for on-
reservation sales of cigarettes to non-
members?  
2. Did the tribe waive its sovereign 
immunity by filing an action for 
injunctive relief?  
1. Loss 
2. Win 
Unanimous  
Strate v. A-1 
Contractors, 1997  
Can tribe member (widow of tribe 
member) sue company that she had an 
accident with on federal highway on 
Indian reservation in tribal court?  
Loss Unanimous  
Kiowa Tribe v. 
Manufacturing 
Technologies, 1998 
Is the Kiowa tribe subject to a breach of 
contract suit in Oklahoma courts?  
Win  Kennedy, J., Rehnquist, 
O’Connor, Scalia, Souter, Breyer, 
JJ. 
Stevens, Thomas, 
Ginsburg 
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Table 5 (Continued). 
Case and Year Issue(s) Outcome for 
Native American 
litigants, amici 
Majority Dissent 
EL PASO NATURAL 
GAS COMPANY, v. 
LAURA NEZTSOSIE 
ET AL, 1999 
Does Price-Anderson Act establish 
federal court jurisdiction for torts for 
regarding nuclear waste? 
Loss Unanimous  
C & L ENTERPRISES, 
INC., v. CITIZEN 
BAND 
POTAWATOMI 
INDIAN TRIBE, 2001 
Has tribe waived sovereign immunity 
regarding contract dispute?  
Loss Unanimous  
NEVADA, ET AL. v. 
FLOYD HICKS, ET 
AL, 2001  
Does a tribal court have jurisdiction 
over civil claims against state official 
Loss Unanimous   
INYO COUNTY, 
CALIFORNIA, v. 
PAIUTE-SHOSHONE 
INDIANS, 2003 
Can a state search an Indian casino as 
part of an investigation of welfare 
fraud?  
Loss Unanimous  
Number of Cases: 8 
Number of Legal Questions Decided Regarding Tribal Sovereign Immunity and Court Jurisdiction: 9 
Number of Victories for Aboriginal Litigants: 2 (one unanimous, one with dissents by Stevens, Thomas, Ginsburg)  
Number of Losses: 6 (all unanimous) 
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3.4 Treaty Interpretation and Aboriginal Rights in the Supreme Courts of 
Canada and the United States 
Treaty interpretation in Canada, much like the interpretation of aboriginal 
rights, is an exercise in Constitutional interpretation. Treaty rights have the status of 
higher law, and cannot even be altered through recourse to the “notwithstanding 
clause” which allows both provincial and federal parliaments to limit the impact of 
Charter rights. Treaty interpretation, in the United States, is more akin to statutory 
interpretation. Any interpretation of American courts can be altered by the national 
government—though Congressional reaction to judicial statutory and treaty 
interpretation is much more complicated in the American context due to the familiar 
obstacles in the American legislative process. 
Since the adoption of the Constitution Act of 1982, The Canadian Supreme 
Court has ruled on 9 cases that deal with the interpretation of treaties between Native 
Canadians and the Crown, all 9 of which address the application of hunting, fishing, or 
logging regulations to aboriginals. The court ruled in favor of aboriginal litigants in 5 
of these cases, and all but 3 of the cases were decided unanimously. The questions that 
emerge in cases dealing with treaty rights are similar to those that deal with aboriginal 
rights, as both treaty rights and aboriginal rights are accorded constitutional 
protections under Section 35 (that is, they cannot be altered by ordinary legislation, or 
even by the legislative override of the “notwithstanding clause). However, only those 
aboriginal and treaty rights that were “existing” at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution Act are afforded the protections of Section 35. Therefore, in ruling on 
these claims, courts must determine not only what rights are at stake, but also whether 
those rights have been extinguished. 
One might imagine that determining the nature of aboriginal rights would be a 
more complex, more contested, and more subjective endeavor than determining the 
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meaning of treaty rights, as the latter are actually based upon written agreements. This 
turns out not to be the case. Just as Canadian courts re-shaped the law of evidence in 
dealing with aboriginal rights claims, so too have the courts re-shaped the law of 
evidence in dealing with treaty claims. In fleshing out the meaning of Section 35 of 
the Constitution Act, the Canadian courts have created a novel approach to treaty 
interpretation that has few parallels in American jurisprudence. 
In interpreting how Section 35 should be applied to aboriginal treaty rights in 
Canada, the court has adopted what might be called an evolutionary approach; in 
Canada, the metaphor used for this approach is often that of the “living tree.”120 Under 
this approach, the meaning of treaties cannot be understood solely in relation to the 
specific terms or understandings that were held at the time that they were signed. 
Rather, the scope of treaty rights must be evaluated in light of evolving historical 
circumstances. For instance, in the case of R. v. Sioui, the court ruled that the 
descendants of Huron Indians had the right to camp, cut trees, and make fires for 
ceremonial purposes in the provincial parks of Quebec.121 The “treaty” in this case 
was a one-paragraph “note of safe conduct” issued to a band of Hurons by an English 
General in 1760.122 
The case of R. v Marshall best exemplifies the Court’s approach to treaty 
interpretation; it is also the treaty case that has drawn the most attention, due to its 
potential for affecting the regulation of fisheries in the Maritimes.123 Marshall was 
charged with selling 463 pounds of eels without a license. The only question was 
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whether or not he possessed a treaty right to catch and sell eels, under the treaties of 
1760-61 between the Mik-Maq Indians and the British crown. The terms of the treaty 
said nothing about a right to trade, and as a consequence the trial court and the Nova 
Scotia Court of Appeal ruled against Marshall. The Supreme Court, in a 5-2 decision, 
ruled that the lower courts had erred in not taking into account extrinsic evidence in 
interpreting the terms of the treaty, in particular, the oral terms of the agreement that 
had shaped the Mik Maq people’s understanding of the agreement. As Justice Binnie 
observed in his majority opinion: 
It seems clear that the words of the March 10, 1760 document, standing in 
isolation, do not support the appellant’s argument. The question is whether the 
underlying negotiations produced a broader agreement between the British and 
the Mik Maq, memorialized only in part by the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 
that would protect the appellant’s activities that are the subject of the 
prosecution.124 
In order to interpret the scope of Mik Maq treaty rights, therefore, it was necessary not 
only to interpret the treaty, but also to interpret how the Mik Maq people had 
understood the terms of the treaty and the negotiations that lay, somehow, underneath 
the treaty. 
The lower courts had rejected the use of extrinsic evidence in treaty 
interpretation, but Justice Binnie found three reasons to object to this position. First, 
even in a modern commercial context, extrinsic evidence can be used to show that 
written contracts do not necessarily contain all of the terms of the contract.125 
Secondly, while in the commercial context, extrinsic evidence is admissible in order to 
resolve textual ambiguities in the written contract, the same rules do not apply to 
treaty interpretation, where “historical” and “cultural” context can be used “even 
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of extrinsic evidence in interpreting commercial contracts.  
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absent any ambiguity on the face of the treaty.” Finally, the treaty had been concluded 
verbally, but only afterwards written up the crown. The majority accepted the position 
of Marshall, on the basis of the extrinsic provided by academic historians, 
anthropologists, and the oral traditions and folk tales of the Mik Maq. 
In dissent, Justice McLachlin (joined by Justice Gonthier) argued that there 
was no way to read the trade clauses of the 1760-1761 treaties as conferring a general 
right to trade. The dissenting justices did not reject the “liberal” approach to treaty 
interpretation that had been the general practice in Canadian (and American) law—
they accepted that doubtful or ambiguous provisions of treaties should be interpreted 
in favor of the aboriginal signatories.126 Nor did they reject the use of extrinsic 
evidence in treaty interpretation. Yet given the fact that the specific trading clause of 
the 1760 treaties only established an obligation for the Mik Maq to trade exclusively 
with the British, it was impossible to establish a general right to trade regardless of the 
historical and cultural context. It was unlikely that the Mik Maq had failed to 
understand the terms of the treaty as written. Though the European language they were 
most fluent in was French, the British negotiators had employed French missionaries 
as translators, missionaries who had deep familiarity with the Mik Maq. What made 
the majority’s decision most difficult to understand was that the treaty involved a 
surrender by the Mik Maq of their trading autonomy. That an agreement in 1760 to 
trade only with the Crown could be converted into immunity from federal regulation 
in 1999 was difficult to accept. 
The 1999 Marshall decision showed that a majority of the Court was willing to 
creatively re-construct treaty rights in order to advance aboriginal interests. Later 
cases would illustrate that there would be limits to the evolutionary re-construction of 
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treaty rights. In 2005, in the consolidated cases of R. v. Bernard/R v. Marshall, 
individual members of the Mik Maq tribes of New Brunswick claimed that the treaties 
which conferred immunity from fishing regulations also conferred immunity from 
logging regulations.127 The Court ruled, in a unanimous opinion, that the claims to 
immunity from logging regulations were not a “logical evolution” of the traditional 
trading practices of the Mik Maq. The distinction between the claim to immunity from 
logging regulations and the claim to treaty immunity from fishing regulations was that 
the Mik Maq had not engaged in commercial timber harvesting in the 1760s. While 
the Court had been willing to transform a several hundred year old treaty agreement 
into immunity against modern fishing regulations, it still relied on a theory of treaty 
rights that limited the scope of judicial creativity. 
The Canadian Supreme Court, in interpreting aboriginal treaties, has occupied 
the middle ground between the critics and the proponents of aboriginal sovereignty. 
Critics of aboriginal sovereignty have argued against the expansive “evolutionary” 
approach to treaty rights, suggesting that this allows courts to essentially invent new 
privileges for aboriginal tribes. Conversely, the supporters of aboriginal sovereignty 
have argued that the treaties entered into by the Crown implicitly support the idea that 
tribes should be treated as separate, self-governing nations. The courts have followed 
neither the critics nor supporters of aboriginal sovereignty. For better or worse, the 
Court has been guided by the implications of Section 35 of the Constitution, and the 
broader regime change that came about as a consequence of adopting the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. While there were no clear signals from the ratifying debates 
over what the participants expected from the aboriginal rights provisions of the 
Constitution Act, those provisions had to mean something—and in the absence of any 
clear original intent, the Courts had to assume the role of creators of constitutional 
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meaning. Conservative critics of the Canadian Supreme Court may well be right that 
this is a disastrous way to make law and policy. But it is also important to remember 
that, in relation to the Court’s interpretation of aboriginal and treaty rights, the 
Canadian Supreme Court has not served as the vanguard of the aboriginal rights 
intelligentsia. The Court has clearly engaged in activism in developing its treaty 
interpretation jurisprudence, but that activism was promoted by the terms of the 
Constitution Act and the relative silence of its framers on the meaning of Section 35. 
While many of the particulars of that jurisprudence are theoretically unconvincing, it 
is difficult to argue that it is illegitimate. The Court has resisted the much broader 
claims of aboriginal rights activists, and placed reasonable limits on the scope of 
aboriginal treaty claims, and in doing so it has found a way to respect the text of the 
Constitution Act without unduly infringing on the traditional powers of Parliament 
and the Provinces. 
The central difference between treaty interpretation in Canada and the United 
States is the presence of Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution Act of 1982. Section 
35 grants Canadian courts considerable power, based upon the interpretation of treat or 
aboriginal rights, to influence the relationships between Native Canadians and 
provincial and federal governments. In the United States, treaties between Native 
American tribes and the federal government do not have the same protected status. 
Table 6 summarizes the United States Supreme Court aboriginal law cases, decided 
between 1985 and 2006, which addressed issues of treaty interpretation: 
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Table 6: Native American Treaty Interpretation Cases in the U.S. Supreme Court, 1985-2006. 
Case/Year Issue(s) Outcome for 
Aboriginal 
Litigants 
Majority Dissent 
Oregon v. Klamath, 
1985 
Were the hunting and fishing rights conferred by an 
1864 treaty extinguished by a subsequent 
agreement in 1901? 
Loss Stevens, J., Burger, 
White, Blackmun, 
Rehnquist, and 
O’Connor, JJ. 
Marshall, Brennan 
United States v. Dion, 
1985 
Does a tribal member have a treaty right not to be 
subjected to Endangered Species Act? 
Loss Unanimous  
United States v. 
Cherokee Nation of 
Oklahoma1, 987 
Does a tribe’s treaty-based right to riverbed 
deposits entitle it to be exempt from federal 
navigational servitude?  
Loss Unanimous  
South Dakota v. 
Bourland, 1993 
Does a tribe have a treaty based right to regulate 
non-members on reservation lands that had been 
acquired by the state for a dam project?  
Loss Thomas, Rehnquist 
White, Stevens, 
O’Connor, Scalia, 
Kennedy, JJ. 
Blackmun, Souter 
Oklahoma Tax 
Commission v. 
Chickasaw Nation, 1995 
Do tribal members have a treaty based right to 
exemptions from  
i) fuel sold on reservation  
ii) wages paid to members who live 
off-reservation 
i) Win 
ii) Loss 
i) Unanimous 
ii) Rehnquist, Ch. J., 
and Scalia, Kennedy, 
and Thomas, Ginsburg  
ii) Breyer, Stevens, 
O’Connor, Souter 
Minnesota v. Mille Lac 
Band of Chippewa 
Indians, 1997 
Does the tribe have usufructuary rights, based upon 
1837 treaty? 
Win O’Connor Stevens, 
Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer 
Kennedy, Thomas, 
Rehnquist, Scalia 
State of Arizona v. State 
of California, 2001 
Does a tribe have treaty rights to water from 
Colorado river? 
Win Stevens, Scalia, 
Kennedy, Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer 
Scalia, Thomas, 
O’Connor 
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The American Supreme Court decided 7 cases which raised 8 questions of 
treaty interpretation between 1985 and 2006, and the Court ruled in favor of aboriginal 
treaty claims on 3 of those issues. But there is no American equivalent to the Marshall 
case: that is, a case which established new approaches to the use of evidence such as 
oral histories to guide treaty interpretation. The key question is whether the 
Constitutional differences between Canada and the United States help account for this 
difference. The Supreme Court cases that involve interpretations of Indian treaties 
yield a somewhat mixed answer to this question. Unlike the cases dealing with tribal 
sovereign immunity and the jurisdiction of tribal courts, treaty interpretation cases 
have produced clearer ideological divisions on the American Supreme Court. But even 
so, the shifting votes of American Supreme Court justices indicate that judges are 
motivated not by the underlying policy issue—whether or not tribal power should be 
extended vis a vis state and national governments—but the legal issues that surround 
treaty interpretation: the degree of ambiguity in the terms of the treaties, and the 
question of whether Congress has acted to abrogate treaty rights. 
The central principle of Indian treaty interpretation in American law is that 
ambiguous issues should be resolved in favor of Indian tribes.128 Differences emerge 
amongst justices over what issues are in fact ambiguous. For example, in Oregon v. 
Klamath Indian Tribe,129 the Klamath tribe argued that, based upon the terms of the 
treaty that established its original reservation, it maintained the right to fish and hunt 
free from state regulations in lands that it had ceded to the United States in 1901. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens (joined by Burger, White, Blackmun, 
Rehnquist, and O’Connor) ruled that, because the 1864 treaty did not establish any 
                                                 
128 Francis Prucha, American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political Anomaly. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1994. p. 386. 
129 Oregon v. Klamath SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 473 U.S. 753; 105 S. 
Ct. 3420; 87 L. Ed. 2d 542; 1985. 
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special hunting and fishing rights outside the boundaries of the reservations, no such 
rights continued to exist in the lands that were ceded in 1901. The absence of any 
explicit discussion of hunting and fishing rights in the 1901 agreement could not be 
interpreted as a sign that the parties did not intend to extinguish hunting and fishing 
rights; the natural presumption was that, when the land was transferred, the rights were 
extinguished. The essential weakness of the Tribe’s position, according to Stevens, 
was that it assumed that hunting and fishing rights were somehow separate from the 
reservation itself. Though the court was willing to consult the historical record of 
negotiations in order to evaluate how the tribe had understood the treaty, it was not 
willing to adopt the evolutionary approach to treaty interpretation that was on display 
in Canadian cases such as R v. Sioui and R. v. Marshall.130 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall (joined by Justice Brennan) argued 
that the majority opinion, while consistent with the “boilerplate” language of the 1864 
Treaty and 1901 Agreement, discarded one of the central facets of Indian treaty cases: 
Indian treaties should be interpreted as they were likely understood by the tribe and, 
when in doubt, ambiguities in treaty law should be resolved in favor of Indians. The 
cession of land in 1901 contained no record of any negotiations regarding hunting and 
fishing rights, and thus it was reasonable to conclude, with the Klamath, that the tribe 
had not intended to surrender those rights. The central difficulty with Marshall’s 
argument is that, like the majority of the Canadian Supreme Court in Marshall case, it 
was based on the presumption that the Indian tribes in question were not capable of 
articulating and defending their interests in negotiations with governments. The 
Klamath in the early 20th century were much more likely than the Mik Maq in the late 
18th to be well apprised of their legal interests: they were English speakers, they had 
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University of California Press, 1994 p. 407. 
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long experience with the treaty process and government negotiation, and they had 
access to legal counsel (not merely French Canadian missionaries like the Mik Maq.) 
Based on the “silence” of the 1901 text regarding off-reservation hunting rights, 
Marshall wanted to read those rights into existence close to 100 hundred years after 
the initial agreement and transfer of land had taken place. But in support of his 
position, Marshall suggested that the payment received by the tribe for the land ceded 
in 1901 had to be interpreted as compensation—compensation for the failure of the 
government to prevent incursions by settlers, hunters, and trappers into land that was 
part of the initial reservation established in 1864. While the tribe accepted that it 
formally transferred title to those lands in accepting compensation, they continued to 
hunt, trap, and fish on the land free from state regulation. The actions of the Klamath 
suggested that they understood the 1901 Agreement to involve a transfer of land, but 
not an extinguishment of their hunting and fishing rights. 
Marshall’s position was not entirely unprecedented in American constitutional 
law. The court had always recognized that hunting and fishing rights—in particular, 
the right to special protections from state regulation for Indian tribes—could exist 
independently from claims to land. But in most cases, this was thought to depend upon 
specific treaty provisions, or upon specific actions by Congress. There was one 
precedent that stood for the proposition that rights could survive by implication, even 
when a reservation was fully terminated: the case of Menominee Tribe of Indians v. 
United States.131 The Menominee Tribe had been granted a reservation in the 1854 
Treaty of Wolf River, a reservation that included hunting and fishing rights. By the 
1950s, the tribe was made subject to a new round of federal termination policy, which 
was to bring to an end their traditional status (and exemption from state regulations) 
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STATES 391 U.S. 404; 88 S. Ct. 1705; 20 L. Ed. 2d 697; 1968. 
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by 1961. The question in this case was whether the termination of the reservation had 
also extinguished hunting and fishing rights that had been recognized in the 1854 
Treaty of Wolf River. The Termination Act of 1954, which had led to the creation of a 
tribal corporation to manage tribal property, as well as the creation of a new county 
government in Wisconsin that coincided with the boundaries of the reservation, also 
provided that “the laws of the several States shall apply to the tribe and its members in 
the same manner as they apply to other citizens or persons within their jurisdiction.” 
Thus the state argued that its hunting and fishing regulations should apply to tribal 
members. 
A majority of the Court argued that the Termination Act had not extinguished 
the hunting and fishing rights of the Menominee, on account of Public Law 280 which 
had been passed by the same Congress that passed the Termination Act of 1954. 
Public Law 280, which created procedures for the extension of state jurisdiction over 
Native American tribes, also stated that “Nothing in this section . . . shall deprive any 
Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community of any right, privilege, or immunity 
afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with respect to hunting, trapping, 
or fishing or the control, licensing, or regulation thereof.”132 The Court concluded that 
Public Law 280 protected the existing treaty rights to hunting and fishing, 
notwithstanding the Termination Act. The dissent of Justices Stewart and Black—
representatives, according to some, of the emerging styles of conservatism on the 
Court133—argued that express language of the Termination Act had to govern the 
Court decision. That Act had explicitly terminated the special status of the 
Menominee, including their hunting and fishing rights, and Public Law 280 was not 
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intended to qualify this expression of the government’s termination policy; Public Law 
280 was meant to deal with state jurisdiction in Indian country, while in this case the 
“Indian Country” in question was no longer in existence. 
The contrasting cases of Klamath and Menominee suggest a plausible, political 
explanation for the evolution of the American Court’s approach to treaty 
interpretation: that is, liberal justices in the Warren Era, who were willing to adopt 
expansive understandings of aboriginal treaty rights, were gradually replaced by 
Justices modeled on the likes of Frankfurter, Stewart, and Black—that is, justices who 
placed a higher premium on either deference to Congress and state governments, or 
fidelity to the explicit terms of Congressional treaties. It is important to remember, 
however, that a preference for one mode of treaty interpretation over another is still a 
legal rationale, one that cannot be reduced to a policy preference for greater Native 
American autonomy. 
The Klamath case is certainly an example of the unwillingness of the 
American Supreme Court, in marked contrast to the Canadian Supreme Court, to 
depart from the text of treaties in deference to claims regarding the intentions of those 
who made the treaties. The breakdown of voting in that case—with holdovers from the 
Warren Era opposed to the new appointees of the Rehnquist and Burger Era—suggests 
a political or “attitudinal” interpretation of the outcome. But it is important to note the 
limits that even liberal dissenters placed upon their support for aboriginal interests. 
Even justices who advocated expansive interpretations of treaty rights, such as 
Marshall and Brennan in the Klamath case, did not see fit to “constitutionalize” Indian 
treaty rights; that is, render them immune from extinguishment by federal action. The 
Court has made no move to push the boundaries of Native American sovereignty, and 
its traditional subordination to Congress. It is also the case that, even in interpreting 
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treaties, justices are not infinitely flexible in their attempts to endorse either Native 
American interests or the prerogatives of state and federal governments. 
For instance, in the case of United States v. Dion,134 Marshall authored an 
opinion, for a unanimous court, which upheld the conviction of several Native 
Americans for the killing of golden eagles, in violation of the Endangered Species Act. 
This decision overturned the ruling by the Court of Appeals that the hunting of golden 
eagles by Yankton Sioux Indians was protected by an 1858 Treaty. In another 
unanimous case, United States v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 135 the court ruled 
that the Cherokee’s treaty rights to riverbed mineral deposits did not entitle them to 
compensation for damages caused by a federal navigational improvement project. 
Theses cases illustrates some of the complexities involved in coding the outcomes of 
legal cases: who can say which is the “liberal” or “conservative” position, in a conflict 
between the cultural rights of aboriginals and the desire to protect threatened wildlife? 
Or consider the Cherokee Nation case: would an opinion that endorsed the Cherokee’s 
claim to compensation have been a “liberal” outcome, if it implied an expansive 
understanding of the protections for property rights and compensation entitlements 
under the Fifth Amendment? These cases show that interpretive principles advocated 
by Marshall and Brennan were just that—principles that were meant to guide 
approaches to treaties, not rhetoric designed to help advance a specific conception of 
“Indian policy.” 
The divisions that exist regarding treaty interpretation in the American 
Supreme Court emerge most clearly in cases dealing with the scope of tribal power to 
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tax and regulate non-members. The case of South Dakota v. Bourland,136 which dealt 
with a claim by the Sioux Tribe to regulate hunting and fishing rights on reservation 
lands that had been acquired by the federal government as part of a dam construction 
project, illustrates the division on the Court over whether tribal rights have been 
extinguished, and the question of how explicit Congress must be when it extinguishes 
Native American treaty rights. The majority ruled that the federal government’s 
acquisition of the land had implicitly extinguished any treaty-based tribal claim to 
govern those lands, while the dissenting justices argued that any abridgement of native 
sovereignty had to be expressly declared an unequivocal. The case is a departure from 
the “resolve ambiguous issues in favor of tribes” principle, an example of what some 
scholars have called the “subjectivist turn” in American Indian law. Even if this is so, 
the “subjectivist turn” has not yielded neat political divisions in the court’s approach 
to Indian treaty interpretation. 
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation,137 the Court unanimously 
agreed with the Chickasaw’s claim, based upon federal treaties, to an exemption from 
an Oklahoma motor fuels tax. The Court split 5-4 over whether the same treaties 
prohibited Oklahoma from imposing income taxes on Indians who worked but did not 
reside on reservation. The majority opinion, joined by Justices Thomas, Scalia, 
Kennedy, and Rehnquist, was written by Justice Ginsburg. On the one hand, the case 
illustrates that, contrary to some claims, the Rehnquist Era court (and Rehnquist-era 
conservatives) have not usurped the policy-making role of Congress—the court has 
simply maintained a “geographic” approach to the problem of state-tribal relations, 
tying the rights of Indian individuals to territory and place of residents, not their status 
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as Indians. This may well be the preferred policy position of the majority: neither too 
much protection from state taxation from the tribes, nor too little. But the position 
adopted by the court is not part of a crusade to eliminate the special status of the 
tribes, or to enforce assimilation and uniform citizenship rights—however attractive 
those policies might be to those of a conservative or libertarian bent. 
There are instances in which majorities on the American Supreme Court adopt 
“Canadian” approaches to treaty interpretation, in the sense that they adopt 
interpretations of treaty rights that undermine long settled legal expectations regarding 
the scope of state power and tribal sovereignty. This is not a consequence—or rather, 
only a consequence—of a desire to empower Native American tribes. The case of 
Minnesota vs. Mille Lac Band of Chippewa Indians138 illustrates that the outcome of 
treaty interpretations turn on the ambiguities of treaty language, and the ambiguities of 
federal actions and laws held to have abrogated Indian treaties. In this case, the court 
endorsed the Chippewa’s claim to possess hunting, fishing, and gathering rights in 
lands that had been ceded to the United States in an 1837 Treaty. There were three 
hurdles to the Chippewa’s claims, that is, three possible actions by the federal 
government undercut their claim to usufructuary rights on off-reservation land: an 
1850 executive order that (amongst other things) claimed to revoke those rights, and 
1855 Treaty which stated that the Chippewa relinquished “any and all right, title and 
interest, of whatsoever nature” in the land in the question, and the admission of 
Minnesota as a state. Writing for the majority, O’Connor, joined by Stevens, Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer, argued, first, that the 1850 executive order was not authorized 
by Congress or by any inherent executive authority; secondly, the history of 
negotiations surrounding the 1855 Treaty revealed that it was not intended to annul the 
rights in question; and finally, that the admission did not annul those rights, as there 
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was no explicit discussion of extinguishment of those rights in the Congressional 
enabling act, and as the rights were reconcilable with state sovereignty. 
Political divisions certainly exist in this case, but this is not because of the 
underlying policy dimensions of the case (should Native American tribes be granted 
more power or less?) but because of the constitutional issues raised in this particular 
case. At root, where the majority saw much ambiguity in the treaty of 1837, the 
dissenters saw very little. Thomas, joined by Scalia, Rehnquist, and Kennedy, argued 
that the executive order, later treaty, and admission of Minnesota into the Union all 
had the effect of extinguishing the rights claimed by the Chippewa bands of Milles 
Lac. The majority had argued that the executive order had lacked Congressional 
authorization, and thus had no effect on earlier treaty rights; Thomas did not point to 
inherent executive authority, but rather to the relevant terms of the treaty: “The 
privilege of hunting, fishing, and gathering the wild rice, upon the lands, the rivers and 
the lakes included in the territory ceded, is guarantied to the Indians, during the 
pleasure of the President of the United States.”139 Thus, the majority ignored the fact 
that treaties themselves can be the basis of Presidential power. According to Thomas, 
the faulty premise of the majority’s opinion was only the starting point; the court had 
to make further dubious interpretive moves in order to reach its final conclusion. The 
majority pushed its creative power to the limit in order to endorse the Chippewa’s 
claims, but it is in many ways the exception that proves the rule. Creative mis-reading 
in treaty interpretation is not on display in every treaty case; neither is the 
conservative-liberal split in voting that we see in this case. In this occasion, the 
majority placed a great deal of emphasis upon the split between Presidential action and 
Congressional authorization—but this is an interpretive move that is only useful, in the 
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context of treaty interpretation, when Congress has not made its intentions explicit. 
Political divisions on the court regarding the scope of Indian sovereignty can only be 
expressed in some circumstances, circumstances that are circumscribed by law. 
Treaty interpretation in the post-Constitution Act era has, in Canada, 
undergone a revolution. The necessary starting point for the revolution, as in the case 
of aboriginal rights, is Section 35 of the Constitution Act itself, which provides that 
the Canadian Courts with the power to be the arbiters of aboriginal policy, should the 
justices so choose. The privileges accorded by treaties between Parliament and Native 
Canadians are, under the Canadian Constitution, of a more exalted status than the 
rights protected by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Under the protection of 
Section 35, the Court has adopted an innovative approach to treaty interpretation, 
allowing for the use of “oral histories” to determine the content and scope of treaties. 
This has led to some important victories for First Canadian tribes, and to some serious 
policy consequences, particularly in the Maritime provinces. But the new approach to 
treaty interpretation has not led the court to endorse all aboriginal claims, even though 
the Court has been willing to make itself the final arbiters of aboriginal claims. As in 
the case of aboriginal rights, the courts have assumed the power to not only determine 
the meaning of treaties, but also to ascertain how the protections afforded by treaties 
evolve over time. As the superintendents of evolving treaty rights, the courts have not 
always served aboriginal interests; but they have consistently endorsed judicial 
supremacy in aboriginal affairs. 
In the United States, the courts have rejected judicial supremacy in treaty 
interpretation. There has been no attempt, in American Indian law, to challenge the 
basic presumptions regarding Congressional sovereignty that have governed the 
relationships between Native Americans and American society since the 18th century. 
In other words, the constitutional negotiations that led to Section 35 of the 
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Constitution Act created a different institutional environment for Canadian Courts, one 
more conducive to the advancement of aboriginal interests. The significance of 
Constitutional amendments, or failed amendments, is not obvious, and it is certainly 
not invariant.140 But in the case of aboriginal rights, the differing constitutional 
frameworks of Canada and the United States have led Canada to experience a more 
robust, court-led revolution in aboriginal treaty rights. 
3.5 Aboriginal Law and Statutory Interpretation: Land Claims, Taxation, 
Regulation 
The central hypothesis that I have advanced thus far is that the patterns of 
aboriginal rights decisions in Canada and the United States cannot be explained 
simply on the basis of the political preferences of the Court’s members. Section 35 of 
the Constitution Act of 1982 provided a textual basis for aboriginal rights activism in 
Canada that is simply not available for American judges, even for those who might be 
inclined to support the interests of aboriginal peoples.141 What this means in practice is 
that the decisions of Canadian Courts, when interpreting aboriginal and treaty rights, 
are effectively insulated from challenges by national or provincial—something which 
is not true for many of the rights protected under the Canadian Constitution. 
There are several reasons to suspect that the Canadian and American courts 
will differ in regards to statutory issues that affect aboriginals. In general, American 
courts are more capable of “statutory activism” that are courts in Parliamentary 
systems of government. Parliamentary governments have the capacity to respond to 
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adverse statutory decisions with relative ease. The American system favors inaction. 
In addition, the American legislative process is more likely to produce ambiguous 
laws, which provides another pretext for the exercise of judicial power. Thus, just as 
Canadian courts are empowered by Section 35 when interpreting aboriginal and treaty 
rights, American courts have reasons to be emboldened when engaged in statutory 
interpretation. 
There are two major points of consequence that emerge from statutory 
interpretations affecting Indian policy in the supreme courts of Canada and the United 
States. First, in the area of statutory interpretation, the American Supreme Court has 
exhibited some of the creativity that the Canadian Supreme Court has put on display in 
interpreting aboriginal rights and treaty rights. Secondly, while the Canadian Supreme 
Court has endorsed some aspects of the aboriginal rights agenda, as seen in cases such 
as Delgamuukw and Marshall, the Court has not been “captured” by aboriginal 
litigants. 
The Canadian Supreme Court decided 14 cases between 1985 and 2006 that 
dealt with statutory rights claims of aboriginal litigants; the Supreme Court of the 
United States decided 42 cases that dealt with the statutory claims by Native 
Americans. Aboriginal litigants in Canada won 4 out 14 cases, while Native 
Americans won 13 out of 42 cases. In terms of the policy consequences, the statutory 
victories for aboriginal litigants in Canada were not as significant as cases such as 
Delgamuukw and Marshall, which continue to have huge ramifications in British 
Columbia and Nova Scotia.142 The statutory victories for aboriginal litigants in Canada 
came in cases dealing with the garnishment of “on reservation” property for the non-
payment of fees, the exemption of unemployment benefits from taxation, the scope of 
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tribal taxation powers, and the fiduciary duty of the national government regarding 
transfers of native land. In contrast, many of the statutory cases addressed by the 
American Supreme Court dealt with issues of considerable importance. 
If there has been an aboriginal rights revolution in the United States, it has 
occurred in the context of statutory activism. Whereas the development of aboriginal 
rights and treaty rights in the United States has been modest—the Court has not 
adopted the framework for the use of evidence or interpretation of treaties that was 
adopted in Canada—claims based on statutory rights have in some instances led the 
American Supreme Court to adopt new approaches to several legal issues, such as the 
use of historical evidence, the problem of long-dormant legal claims, and the 
interpretation of statutes of limitation. 
In American jurisprudence, the traditional doctrine of extinguishment that was 
part of Canadian law prior to the 1980s has remained undisturbed. What this means in 
practice is that cases that raise questions of aboriginal rights are often decided on 
statutory grounds. For instance, in the case Amoco Production Co. et al v. Village of 
Gambell,143 Native American communities in Alaska challenged the Secretary of the 
Interior’s decision to sell leases for oil and gas exploration, on the grounds that these 
activities would interfere with aboriginal hunting and fishing rights. This particular 
claim was similar to the issues raised in Canadian cases such as Sparrow and 
Delgarmuukw. While the Native Americans also objected to the decision on statutory 
grounds, the Supreme Court had to address the question of whether the Alaskan 
Native Claims Settlement Act had extinguished aboriginal fishing and hunting rights. 
In the opinion of the district court judge, those rights had indeed been extinguished by 
virtue of ANCSA; the court of appeals reached a similar ruling on this question. The 
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United States Supreme Court decided this case on the narrow issue of whether the 
relevant federal environmental statutes conferred procedural rights on the native 
communities, arguing that the 9th circuit had impermissibly extended statutes that were 
meant to affect public lands in Alaska to cover the continental shelf. The lower courts 
had attempted to protect aboriginal interests in this case, but not on the basis of 
aboriginal rights. In some other instances, attempts to defend aboriginal interests 
through creative statutory interpretation would end up being successful. 
The case of County of Oneida vs. Oneida Indian Nation144 illustrates some of 
the central issues surrounding the statutory rights of aboriginals in the United States. 
In this case, the Oneida Indian Nation argued that a land transfer between the Oneida 
and the state had violated federal Indian law. The problem was that this violation was 
alleged to have occurred in the 1790s. In many ways, the case is similar to the major 
aboriginal and treaty rights cases in Canada, such as Delgamuukw and Marshall, cases 
which were significant because the courts adopted novel approaches to the use of 
evidence and treaty interpretation, and politically significant because they affected a 
broad range of economic interests. A similar dynamic was on display in the Oneida 
case. In order to endorse the claims of aboriginal litigants, the court had to adopt a 
variety of novel approaches to legal interpretation. 
The County of Oneida had appealed the initial district court decision, in which 
the court declared that the Non-Intercourse Act had been violated by the improper 
transfer of land in the 1790s. The County did not dispute this ruling, but it did suggest 
that further barriers stood in the way of the Oneida’s claim. The County argued that 
the Oneidas could not maintain a private cause of action for violations of the Non-
Intercourse Act. In addition, they continued to advance the argument that the action 
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was time-barred, that any cause of action had abated, and that the United States had 
ratified the conveyance. The County was asking the court to look past the initial 
injustice, the initial violation of statutory law, and instead to focus on the formal rules 
that were also part of the rule of law. The tribe had existed as an organized entity for 
the entire period of time, its leaders were educated and politically astute, and thus 
would have been fully capable of challenging the transfer of land had they thought it 
invalid. Even if the Non-Intercourse Act had been violated, the passage of 200 years 
should have ratified the transaction. The Second Circuit court of appeals rejected the 
County’s arguments, with one judge dissenting. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, in a decision that 
exhibited some of the usual contorted alliances of contemporary jurisprudence. The 
first issue addressed by Justice Powell in his majority opinion was whether the tribe 
could in fact bring the case at all. Lawyer’s for the County of Oneida argued that the 
Oneida were attempting to enforce a public law—the Non-Intercourse Act—which 
had pre-empted whatever federal common law rights they might have had to contest 
the conveyance of the land. The District Court and the Court of Appeals had ruled that 
the Oneida had both a federal common law “right of action” and an implied statutory 
cause of action under the Non-Intercourse Act. Powell wisely declined to address the 
second issue—the practice of creating private attorneys general had not been common 
in the 1790s. But it was not made clear why the federal common law rights of the 
Indians had not been pre-empted by the Non-Intercourse Act itself. It was this law that 
had made the transfer of land to New York illegal in the first place. Powell argued that 
the purpose of the Non-Intercourse Act was not meant to provide a comprehensive 
scheme for dealing with the transfer and sale of Indian land, on the grounds that the 
law itself contained no explicit remedial provisions. Furthermore, Powell argued that 
subsequent Congressional actions showed that the national government did not wish to 
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pre-empt suits by Indian tribes asserting their property rights: “Nothing in the statutory 
formulation of this rule suggests that the Indians’ right to pursue common-law 
remedies was thereby pre-empted.”145 What Powell left entirely unclear was the 
purpose of the statute. The government of the 1790s, apparently, had found it 
necessary to codify the procedures for purchasing Indian land, a law that presumably 
the national government would have the responsibility to enforce. In Powell’s 
argument, the statute was not necessary: “the Non-Intercourse simply put in statutory 
form what was or came to be the accepted rule—that the extinguishment of Indian title 
required the consent of the United States.”146 But by simply ignoring the fact that it 
was a public law at stake, Powell could argue that the Oneida had the right to enforce 
the requirement for consent. 
Having determined that the Oneidas had a federal common law right to bring 
their claim, Powell quickly dispensed with other objections made by the County. 
While in most situations the absence of a federal statute of limitations would lead to 
the application of an analogous state statute of limitations, Powell argued that this 
could only be done if consistent with the “underlying federal policy,” and the evidence 
in this case suggested that Congress wished to impose no limitations on Indian land 
claims. The passage of subsequent laws addressing the transfer of Indian land did not 
affect the Oneida’s claim, and subsequent national treaties had not explicitly 
recognized the unlawful 1795 transfers of land. Perhaps the most interesting claim 
made by the petitioners was that the case was non-justiciable, in the sense that 
responsibility for Indian relations was an example of “a textually demonstrable 
                                                 
145 Justice Powell, majority decision, County of Oneida vs. Oneida Indian Nation SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 470 U.S. 226; 105 S. Ct. 1245; 84 L. Ed. 2d 169; 1985. 
146 Justice Powell, majority decision, County of Oneida vs. Oneida Indian Nation SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 470 U.S. 226; 105 S. Ct. 1245; 84 L. Ed. 2d 169; 1985. 
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constitutional commitment of (an) issue to a co-ordinate political department.”147 But 
Powell rejected this claim as well. In conclusion, Powell observed, almost in surprise, 
that “one would have thought that claims dating back for more than a century and a 
half would have been barred long ago.” But there was in his opinion no insuperable 
legal barrier to the Oneida’s claim. 
The dissent, penned by Justice Stephens and joined by Burger, White, and 
Rehnquist, argued that barriers to this action either did exist, or had to be created 
immediately. The first paragraph summarizes the major objections of the dissenters: 
In 1790, the President of the United States notified Cornplanter, the Chief of 
the Senecas, that federal law would securely protect Seneca lands from 
acquisition by any State or person: “If . . . you have any just cause of complaint 
against [a purchaser] and can make satisfactory proof thereof, the federal 
courts will be open to you for redress, as to all other persons” . . . The elders of 
the Oneida Indian Nation received comparable notice of their capacity to 
maintain the federal claim that is at issue in this litigation… They made no 
attempt to assert the claim, and their successors in interest waited 175 years 
before bringing suit to avoid a 1795 conveyance that the Tribe freely made, for 
a valuable consideration. The absence of any evidence of deception, 
concealment, or interference with the Tribe’s right to assert a claim, together 
with the societal interests that always underlie statutes of repose—particularly 
when title to real property is at stake—convince me that this claim is barred by 
the extraordinary passage of time. It is worthy of emphasis that this claim arose 
when George Washington was the President of the United States.148 
The central focus of Stevens’ dissent was the majority refusal to apply any 
time bar to the Oneida’s claim, on the grounds that it would be inconsistent with 
federal policy. While the majority may have been correct in its judgment that federal 
policy aimed, on the whole, to err on the side of protecting the interests of Native 
American tribes, it failed to consider the effects that the decision would have upon the 
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broader community. If resolving legal ambiguities in favor of Indian tribes was a 
general federal policy, so too was protecting the stability and integrity of land titles. 
Given the fact that there had been no legal impediment to the tribe’s actions since 
1795, the decision of the majority appeared even more suspect. 
Stevens also argued that there was a certain degree of paternalism in the 
majority’s reasoning. Powell’s argument was based on the premise that the Oneida 
should not be held to the same standards as other peoples, despite the fact that the 
group had received formal education since the 1790s, had a sophisticated form of 
government, and had demonstrated their capacity to petition the government for their 
grievances. Given the fact that the tribe was self-governing and fully capable of 
utilizing the legal system, the delay in pursuing their claim was inexplicable. 
The Oneida’s argument that various congressional statutes (supported by 
legislative histories) since the 1950s supported their claim was rejected by the 
dissenters, on the grounds that a) the statutes only referred to actions brought by the 
United States, b) there was no indication that the statutes were meant to revive claims 
that had already been barred. Given the lack of clarity regarding Congressional intent, 
Stevens argued that it made little sense to assume that Congress wished to remove all 
limitations. Chief Justice Marshall, speaking on the same issue, argued that “it 
deserves some consideration, that in the absence of an applicable limitation, those 
actions might, in many cases, be brought at any distance of time. This would be utterly 
repugnant to the genius of our laws.”149 
In the same case, Marshall wrote that in a country where not even treason can 
be prosecuted after three year, “it could scarcely be supposed that an individual would 
remain for ever liable to a pecuniary forfeiture.”150 One could argue, along with 
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UNITED STATES 6 U.S. 336; 2 L. Ed. 297; 1805; 2 Cranch 336. 
150 Ibid.  
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theorists of multi-culturalism, that it might make sense to hold immigrant societies as 
whole responsible for historical injustices against minority groups, especially in 
regards to the Indians who conquered and the Africans who were enslaved. But it was 
not the political community that would, in this instance, be paying the costs for 
righting ancient wrongs. It would be specific landowners who would be punished for 
legal violations that had occurred centuries before their birth. In endorsing the 
aboriginal rights revolution in this case, the majority had evaded both the restraints of 
the common law and the implications of contemporary multi-cultural theory. It is, 
however, one of the very few cases in which the Supreme Court of the United States 
adopted novel approaches to the law in order to endorse the claim of Native American 
litigants. 
The Non-Intercourse Act of the 1790s was a law much honored in the breach; 
or at least, this was the opinion of a number of additional litigants after the decision of 
the Supreme Court decision in County of Oneida v. Oneida. But the outcome in 
County of Oneida was not always repeated. The willingness of the Supreme Court to 
advance an aboriginal rights agenda through “statutory activism” was limited by 
various legal factors, most notably by the impact of 20th century federal Indian 
policies. The case of South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe151 bore many 
similarities to County of Oneida. The Catawba claimed that land, which they held by 
virtue of the 1763 Treaty of Fort Augusta with the English Crown, had been 
improperly conveyed to South Carolina in 1840s, in violation of the Non-Intercourse 
Act. The tribe, in an action initiated in 1980, laid claim to a 15 mile tract of land in 
South Carolina, land that it argued still belonged to the Catawba as the federal 
government had never properly consented to the transfer of land to South Carolina. 
                                                 
151 South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
476 U.S. 498; 106 S. Ct. 2039; 90 L. Ed. 2d 490; 1986. 
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The underlying policy dimensions were essentially identical to County of Oneida: in 
both cases, an Indian tribe sought restitution for a violation of federal law, in a 
situation where rectifying that violation would involve disrupting many thousands of 
present day land owners. 
The outcome was different in this case because the validity of the Catawba’s 
claim, unlike the Oneida’s, had been altered by federal Indian policy in the 1950s and 
1960s, the “termination era” of federal Indian policy in which the national government 
attempted to normalized the relationship between Indians and state governments.152 
The Catawba Act of 1962 had revoked the tribe’s constitution, and established 
(according to the majority) that special federal services and statutory protections for 
Indians were no longer applicable to the Catawba; they would be subject to state laws 
in precisely the same manner as other citizens of South Carolina. The significance of 
this is that, if the special federal laws dealing with state-tribal relations were no longer 
applicable to the Catawba, the tribe and its members could not raise claims under the 
Non-Intercourse Act for violations that had occurred in the 19th century, as such 
claims would have been precluded by state statutes of limitation. 
The lower courts had ruled that the provisions dealing with the applicability of 
state laws applied only to the individual Catawba tribe members, not to the tribe itself. 
The majority, while accepting the general principle that ambiguous provisions in 
Indian law should be resolved in favor of Indian tribes, did not accept the lower 
court’s argument that Congressional intent or Congressional language was ambiguous 
in this case. Congress had stated that in the Catawba act its intention was to revoke 
both the tribal constitution and special protections for individual tribe members, and 
the Court could not ignore the express language of Congress in favor of a convoluted 
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grammatical construction of certain provisions of the law. As Justice Stevens wrote, 
“it would be most incongruous to preserve special protections for a tribe whose 
constitution has been revoked while withdrawing protection for individual members of 
that tribe.”153 Thus while the underlying political question was the same in the County 
of Oneida and Catawba cases—should courts act to rectify centuries-old violations of 
the Non-Intercourse Act?—the fact that the Catawba tribe has been subjected to 
federal termination policy in the 1960s placed them in a weaker legal position. At 
least, this would seem to explain the shift in votes by Justices Powell and Brennan, 
both of whom had supported the Oneida’s claim but found themselves voting against 
the claims of the Catawba. 
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall and O’Connor, authored the 
dissenting in the case. Blackmun thought that the Court’s traditional approach to 
interpreting statutes regulating Indian affairs mandated a ruling in favor of the 
Catawba. That traditional approach—resolving ambiguities in treaties and statutes in 
favor of Indian tribes—was itself justified by the fraud and abuse that had 
characterized the relationship between Indian tribes and settler societies. In the 
estimation of Blackmun, the 1959 Catawba act did not clearly foreclose the tribe’s 
claim, because it was not clear that the law applied South Carolina’s statue of 
limitations to claims that originated prior to the adoption of the Catawba Act. The 
court, in subjecting the federal law claims of the Catawba to South Carolina’s statute 
of limitations, was straining to implement an assimilationist policy that Congress had 
since rejected. 
Blackmun’s opinion in this case illustrates that to some extent, how judges 
view the significance of the early history of American-Indian relations affects their 
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decisions in cases affecting the interests of Native Americans. But as a comparison of 
the Oneida and Catawba cases illustrate, judicial interpretations of the Non-Intercourse 
Act are sensitive to the facts on the ground, not necessarily driven by the desire of 
judges to rectify the unfair deals between states and Indian tribes in the 18th and 19th 
centuries. Other cases dealing with the Non-Intercourse Act illustrate this pattern. 
The case of Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Pueblo of Santa 
Ana154 illustrates some of the complexities that emerged from the application, or non-
application, of the Non-Intercourse Act to Indian tribes; it also illustrates the shifting 
votes of some justices in cases that raise identical issues of policy. This case raised the 
question of whether not the Non-Intercourse Act applied to transactions between the 
Pueblo and private parties; what made the question complex was that, for most of the 
19th century, the Pueblo were not recognized as a Native American tribe under the 
Non-Intercourse act, and thus they were entitled to alienate their lands without the 
need for special federal supervision. The Pueblo received recognition under federal 
law as a Native American Indian tribe in the early 20th century, thus placing a cloud 
over the title of the thousands of non-Indians who had purchased parcels of land from 
them.155Congress enacted the Pueblo Lands Act of 1924 in order to address the 
problem, the stated purpose of which was to “settle the complicated questions of title 
and to secure for the Indians all of the lands to which they are equitably entitled.” In 
this case, the court had to address whether the grant of an easement for a telephone 
line, prior to the 1924 Act, had been in violation of the Non-Intercourse Act, thereby 
entitling the Pueblo to trespass damages. 
                                                 
154 Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES 472 U.S. 237; 105 S. Ct. 2587; 86 L. Ed. 2d 168; 1985. 
155 Under the New Mexico Enabling Act of 1910. 
 124 
The question turned upon whether Congress had intended to apply the Non-
Intercourse Act to the Pueblo, in which case approval of alienation of land would have 
had to come from Congress, as opposed to the Secretary of the Interior. The majority 
argued that Congress, in taking into account the peculiar history of the Pueblo, had not 
explicitly stated that the conditions of the Non-Intercourse Act applied to the Pueblo. 
The dissenting justices (Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall) argued that the canons of 
federal Indian law construction dictated a different outcome. First, the majority’s 
opinion rested on the argument that Congress wanted to create, for the Pueblo, a 
statutory arrangement that was not applied to any other Indian tribe (that is, alienation 
of unallotted Indian lands, subject only to the supervision of the Secretary of the 
Interior). While the “awkward and obscure” provisions of the Pueblo Land Act 
permitted this construction, it did not dictate it. Given the ambiguity of the statutory 
language, the dissenters argued that the Court should have assumed that Congress 
wanted to apply the same legal standards to the Pueblo which, under the Non-
Intercourse Act, it applied to all other Indian tribes. 
The Oneida, Catawba, and Pueblo cases illustrate several interesting aspects of 
American Indian law, and American judicial politics. Some of the innovative 
developments in Canadian aboriginal rights and treaty interpretation are mirrored in 
statutory interpretations of American Indian law, as shown by the Court’s treatment of 
violations of the Non-Intercourse Act. But the scope of the “statutory aboriginal 
rights” revolution has been constricted, not simply by the presence of a consistently 
“anti-aboriginal” voting bloc on the court, but rather by the differing statutory issues 
surrounding the specific cases. The policy imposed in the Oneida case—the potential 
expansion of Native American land claims—was rejected by the very same court, 
when faced with the very different circumstances created by the Pueblo Land Act of 
1924 and Congressional termination policy in the 1950s and 1960s. This is not to deny 
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the “attitudinal” dimensions to the cases. For instance, Marshall and Blackmun in 
these case consistently upheld aboriginal claims, on the grounds that ambiguities in 
federal Indian law should always be resolved in favor of Native Americans—and in 
American law, such ambiguities are not difficult to find. However, this interpretive 
principle did not dictate the votes of all liberal justices—most notably Justice Brennan, 
who joined the majority in rejecting the Native American claims in the Catawba case. 
These cases, and others dealing with the statutory rights of Native Americans, also 
illustrate an important difference between Canadian and American judicial politics: 
the way in which legislative politics in the United States creates greater opportunities 
for judicial activism. This ultimately helps to explain why the Canadian court, which 
has engaged in a transformation of aboriginal law since the adoption of the 
Constitution Act, has been unwilling to endorse the substantive claims of 
environmentalist interest groups. 
 The legal or Constitutional sources of the American Court’s Indian law 
decisions are also reflected in cases dealing with the taxation and regulatory powers of 
Indian tribes, issues that also turn for the most part on questions of statutory 
interpretation.The American Supreme Court has decided 20 cases dealing with the 
taxation and regulatory powers of Indian tribes under federal law. In 8 those cases, the 
Supreme Court granted either a complete or partial victory for the claims made by 
Native American tribes; in 10 of those cases, the claims were rejected entirely. While 
these cases are few in number, they are not lacking in significance for that reason—
they raise crucial questions about the potential for tribes to maintain and expand their 
governing powers, questions that raise clear political issues about the relative value of 
“assimilation” versus “separation and preservation” in Indian policy. The political 
dimensions of the cases, however, do not seem to have determined the votes of the 
justices. 
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The court has refused to “correct” for federal assimilationist policies that have 
reduced the scope of tribal power. The court, cases such as Cass County v. Leech Lake 
Band of Chippewa156 and the City of Sherill v. Oneida Indian Nation157 rejected the 
claims that tribal sovereignty (and thus immunity to local and state taxes) should be 
granted over parcels of land that had been part of tribal reservations in the past, but 
had been sold under in accordance with federal assimilationist strategies, only to be re-
purchased by the tribes in later years. Only one dissenting vote was cast in these cases, 
by Justice Stevens.158 The attempt by tribes to overcome the consequences of 
assimilationist policies aimed at eliminating reservations, policies that are now 
repudiated by the federal government, has thus been rebuffed by a broad coalition of 
justices. The forced allotment and assimilation policies of the national government are 
generally considered one of the more unjust acts of the federal government against 
Native American peoples, but, on this issue, the court—and the majority of its liberal 
justices—has not allowed itself to be a forum for the correction of historical injustice. 
While the American Supreme Court was unwilling to extend tax immunities of 
Indian tribes in novel situations, it has been willing to maintain more traditional 
aspects of Indian tax immunity; the shifting outcomes in these cases show that the 
decisions of the court are not guided by the underlying policy issue of whether or not 
Indian tribes should be afforded any tax immunities. The taxation and regulatory cases 
revolve around a series of related questions: do rights to tax exemptions inhere in 
Indians as individuals, or do those rights inhere in the territorial sovereignty (or, more 
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accurately, “sovereignty” or “domestic dependent nation status) of Indian tribes. A 
second set of issues address the question of how to determine the scope of Indian 
territory, and the jurisdiction of tribes and states over non-Indian individuals and 
businesses on reservations. Table 7 summarizes the Supreme Court’s taxation and 
regulatory cases. 
The obstacles to any revolution in aboriginal sovereignty can be best observed 
in the cases that the court decided unanimously. The Cass County case (as well as the 
City of Sherill case, in which Justice Stevens was the lone dissenter) limited the ability 
of Indian tribes to expand their territorial sovereignty through the re-purchase of 
previously alienated lands. The court has also, in unanimous decisions, rejected the 
following claims regarding the taxation and regulatory powers and immunities of 
Indian tribes: 
i) limited the power of Indian tribes to tax non-members within their territorial 
boundaries159 
ii) refused to extend tax exemptions to Indian-owned companies for work done 
off of their reservations160 
iii) rejected tribal claims to maintain governing authority over alienated 
lands161 
iv) rejected expansive interpretations of “Indian country” thereby limiting the 
taxation power of certain tribes162 
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v) accepted state regulation of on-reservation sales to non-members.163 
Thus some of the most promising avenues for the expansion of Native 
American sovereignty, and the privileges of Native American individuals and 
businesses, have been entirely rejected by almost all of the recent members of the 
Supreme Court, regardless of their political disposition or orientation. 
On the other hand, the court remains committed to certain core aspects of tribal 
regulatory and taxation powers and immunities, as can be seen in cases in which 
Native American claims regarding these issues have been upheld unanimously: 
i) Indian tribes can impose taxes on mineral lessees without approval of the 
Secretary of the Interior164 
ii) States cannot impose excise taxes on the sale of lands within Indian 
reservations165 
iii) An Indian does not have to live on reservation for the presumption against 
state taxation to be applied in assessing state taxes166 
iv) States cannot tax fuel sold on reservation.167 
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Table 7: Taxation and Regulatory issues in American Indian Law, the Supreme Court of the United States, 1985-2006. 
Case/Year Issue(s)  Outcome for 
Aboriginal 
Litigants 
Majority Dissent 
Kerr McGee Corp 
v. Navajo Tribe of 
Indians, 1985 
Does the Indian Mineral Leasing Act require approval by 
the Secretary of the Interior for tribal taxes on lessees? 
Win  Unanimous 
(Powell not participating) 
 
Montana et al v. 
Blackfeet Indian 
Tribe, 1985 
Can the state government impose taxes on royalties from 
tribal mineral leasing agreements?  
Win Powell, Burger, Brennan, 
Blackmun, Marshall, 
O’Connor 
Stevens, White, 
Rehnquist 
California et al v. 
Cabazon Band of 
Mission Indians, 
1987 
Are states and counties are authorized by Public Law 280 to 
impose gaming regulations on Indian tribes?  
Loss White, Rehnquist, Brennan, 
Marshall, Blackmun, Powell  
Stevens, 
O’Connor, Scalia 
Cotton Petroleum 
Corp. v. New 
Mexico, 1989 
Can New Mexico impose a severance tax on non-Indian 
gas/oil facilities on Indian reservation? 
Win Stevens, Rehnquist White, 
O’Connor, Scalia, and 
Kennedy 
Blackmun, 
Brennan, 
Marshall 
Brendale v. 
Yakima Indian 
Nation, 1989 
Do the Yakima have zoning authority over fee lands owned 
by non-members in  
i) the reservation’s “closed area” and  
ii) the reservation’s “open” area  
i) Win 
ii) Loss 
i) O’Connor, Stevens, 
Blackmun, Brennan, 
Marshall 
ii) O’Connor, Stevens, 
White, Rehnquist, Scalia 
Kennedy 
i) White, 
Rehnquist, Scalia, 
Kennedy 
ii) O’Connor, 
Stevens, 
Blackmun, 
Brennan, 
Marshall 
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Table 7 (Continued). 
Case/Year Issue(s)  Outcome for 
Aboriginal 
Litigants 
Majority Dissent 
Oklahoma Tax 
Commission v. 
Citizen Band 
Potawatomi Indian 
Tribe, 1991 
1. May a state that has not asserted jurisdiction 
over Indian Land under Public Law 280 collect taxes for on-
reservation sales of cigarettes to non-members?  
2. Did the tribe waive its sovereign immunity by 
filing an action for injunctive relief?  
1. Loss 
2. Win 
Unanimous  
County of Yakima 
v. Yakima Indian 
Nation, 1992 
Can the county impose  
i) excise tax and ii) ad valorem tax on land, sale of 
land that had been allotted under the 1887 Dawes Act?  
i) Win  
ii) Loss  
i) Scalia, J., Rehnquist 
White, Stevens, O’Connor, 
Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, 
Blackmun 
ii) Scalia, Rehnquist, White, 
Stevens, O’Connor, 
Kennedy, Souter, Thomas 
ii) Blackmun 
Oklahoma Tax 
Commission v. Sac 
and Fox Nation, 
1993 
Must an Indian live on reservation for presumption against 
state tax jurisdiction to be applied, in the context of a 
challenge to state taxation?  
Win Unanimous  
South Dakota v. 
Bourland, 1993  
Can tribes regulate hunting and fishing rights over non-
members in disputed territory?  
Loss Thomas, Rehnquist, White, 
Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, 
Kennedy 
Blackmun, Souter 
New York v. 
Milhelm Attea et 
al, 1994 
Is a New York regulatory scheme enacted to prevent non-
Indians from purchasing untaxed cigarettes an invalid 
exercise of a federal regulatory power?  
Loss Unanimous  
Alaska v. Native 
Village of Venetie, 
1998  
Are the tribe’s ANCSA land “Indian country,” therefore 
entitling the tribe to tax business conducted on the land?  
Loss Unanimous  
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Table 7 (Continued). 
Case/Year Issue(s)  Outcome for 
Aboriginal 
Litigants 
Majority Dissent 
Oklahoma Tax 
Comm’n v. 
Chickasaw Nation, 
1995 
Can the state i) tax fuel sold on reservation and ii) wages 
paid to Indians who live off of the reservation (claim rooted 
in 1837 Treaty)? 
i) Win 
ii) Loss 
i) Unanimous 
ii) Rehnquist, Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg  
ii) Breyer, 
Stevens, 
O’Connor, Souter 
Montana et al v. 
Crow Tribe of 
Indians et al, 1998  
Can Crow Tribe get restitution for state taxes imposed upon 
mining company that had leased land from the tribe?  
Loss Ginsburg, Rehnquist 
Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Breyer 
Souter, O’Connor  
Cass County v. 
Leech Lake Band 
of Chippewa 
Indians, 1998 
Is the tribe exempt from county taxation on reservation land 
that had been sold to individuals but was re-purchased by 
the tribe?  
1855 Leech band given reservation 
Loss Unanimous  
South Dakota v. 
Yankton Sioux 
Tribe et al, 1998  
Did the Yankton Sioux cede governing authority over land 
it sold in the 19th century?  
Loss Unanimous  
Arizona 
Department of 
Revenue v. Blaze 
Construction, 1999 
Does federal law pre-empt application of state tax to Indian-
owned company? 
Loss Unanimous  
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Table 7 (Continued). 
Case/Year Issue(s)  Outcome for 
Aboriginal 
Litigants 
Majority Dissent 
Atkinson Trading 
Company, Inc. v. 
Joe Shirley Jr. et al, 
2001 
Can Indian Tribe impose a hotel tax on nonmember guests 
in hotel rooms that were located on non-Indian fee land 
within exterior boundaries of tribe’s reservation?  
Loss Unanimous  
Wagnon v. Prairie 
Band Potawatomi 
Nation, 2005 
Can Kansas impose a gas tax on suppliers for Indian 
reservation?  
Loss Thomas, Roberts, Stevens, 
O’Connor, Scalia, Souter, 
Breyer 
Ginsburg, 
Kennedy  
City of Sherrill v. 
Oneida Indian 
Nation, 2005 
Does open market purchases of land that was previously 
part of Indian territory restore tax immunity privileges? 
Loss Ginsburg, 
Rehnquist, O’Connor, 
Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, 
Thomas, Breyer 
Stevens 
Number of Issues Decided: 23 
Issues Decided Unanimously: 12 
Number of Wins for Aboriginal Litigants: 7 
Number of Losses for Aboriginal Litigants: 16 
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The key thread that connects the most important of these decisions (i, ii, and 
iv) is the fact that they deal with state attempts to tax on-reservation activities without 
explicit federal approval; this is the core of aboriginal tribal sovereignty. Differences 
emerge—and clearer political divisions as well—over questions of what constitutes 
“on reservation activity,” and what constitutes federal abrogation of tribal sovereignty. 
The question is whether the resolution of more ambiguous issue surrounding 
the taxation and regulatory powers of Indian falls into clear political patterns. For 
aboriginal litigants, the unfortunate news is that conservative and moderate judges 
tend to be more uniformly opposed to expansive interpretations of tribal taxation and 
regulatory powers than their liberal counterparts are uniform in their support of 
aboriginal litigants. The following non-unanimous taxation and regulatory cases 
yielded victories for aboriginal litigants: 
i) States cannot impose royalty taxes on on-reservation mineral lessees 
(Rehnquist, Stevens, White, dissenting).168 
ii) States and counties are not authorized by Public Law 280 to impose gaming 
regulations on Indian casinos (Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia dissenting).169 
iii)The Yakima Indian tribe has zoning authority over fee land owned by non-
members in the “closed” section of their reservation (White, Rehnquist, Scalia, 
Kennedy dissenting).170 
While it is difficult to make generalizations based on these few cases, the most 
apparent thing to note about these cases is that opposition to aboriginal litigants comes 
                                                 
168 Montana v. Blackfoot Indian Tribe SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 471 
U.S. 759; 105 S. Ct. 2399; 85 L. Ed. 2d 753; 1985. 
169 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 480 U.S. 202; 107 S. Ct. 1083; 94 L. Ed. 2d 244; 1987. 
170 Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 492 
U.S. 408; 109 S. Ct. 2994; 106 L. Ed. 2d 343; 1989. 
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from conservative and moderate justices. Yet even so, the shifting votes of 
conservatives and moderates indicates that individual decisions are dictated not so 
much by the underlying policy dimensions of the case (e.g. scope of state taxation 
jurisdiction vis a vis tribes ) as by the central legal issue (whether or not national laws 
have authorized state regulations or taxation.) So, for instance, Rehnquist and 
O’Connor took opposite positions on the questions of state taxation of on-reservation 
mineral lessees (O’Connor opposed the state tax, Rehnquist supported it is dissent) 
and the application of state gaming laws to tribal casinos (Rehnquist opposed the 
application of the laws, O’Connor supported them in dissent.)Oklahoma v. Citizen 
Band Potawatomi, decided in 1991, is particularly interesting in this regards, because 
the Court unanimously upheld tribal claims regarding sovereign immunity at a time 
when many elected officials where beginning to question the wisdom of the 
doctrine.171 
The court rejected Native American claims in the following non-unanimous 
cases: 
i) New Mexico can impose a severance tax on non-Indian on oil and gas 
facilities located on reservation (Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall dissenting).172 
ii) The Yakima Indian Nation does not have zoning authority over fee lands 
owned by non-members in the “open” section of their reservation (Blackmun, 
Brennan, Marshall, dissenting).173 
                                                 
171 E.g. David E. Wilkins and K. Tsianina Lomawaima, Uneven Ground: American Indian 
Sovereignty and Federal Law. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001 pp 216-220, which 
discusses the efforts of Republican Senator Slate Gorton to limit tribal sovereign immunity on a wide 
range of issues.  
172 Cotton Petroleum Corp v. New Mexico SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
490 U.S. 163; 109 S. Ct. 1698; 104 L. Ed. 2d 209; 1989.  
173 Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 492 
U.S. 408; 109 S. Ct. 2994; 106 L. Ed. 2d 343; 1989. 
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iii) The state can impose an ad valorem tax on the sale of on-reservation land 
(Blackmun dissenting).174 
iv) Tribes cannot regulate hunting and fishing of non-members in disputed 
territory. (Blackmun and Souter dissenting).175 
v) States can impose taxes on the wages of tribe members who live off-
reservation ( Breyer, Stevens, O’Connor, Souter dissenting).176 
vi) The Crow Tribe cannot receive restitution for taxes imposed by state 
government on a mining company that had leased tribal land (Souter and O’Connor 
dissenting).177 
vii) A state government can impose taxes on a Native American tribe’s 
gasoline suppliers (Ginsburg and Kennedy, dissenting).178 
Justice Blackmun was the most consistent supporter of aboriginal claims 
during this period, voting for an expansive interpretation of tribal regulatory and 
taxation powers in all of the decisions he participated in.179 His approach to the 
questions that arose in these cases seems to have been determined either by an 
“attitudinal” preference for aboriginal interests, buttressed by the long-standing rule of 
interpretation that ambiguities in law and treaties should be resolved in favor of Native 
                                                 
174 County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 502 U.S. 251; 112 S. Ct. 683; 116 L. Ed. 2d 687; 1992. 
175 South Dakota v. Bourland SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 508 U.S. 679; 
113 S. Ct. 2309; 124 L. Ed. 2d 606; 1993. 
176 Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 515 U.S. 450; 115 S. Ct. 2214; 132 L. Ed. 2d 400; 1995. 
177 Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 524 
U.S. 968; 119 S. Ct. 5; 141 L. Ed. 2d 766; 1998. 
178 Wagnon v.Prairie Band of Potawatomi, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
546 U.S. 1072; 126 S. Ct. 826; 163 L. Ed. 2d 703; 2005. 
179 Blackmun’s support for aboriginal interests was not restricted to the specific issues of 
taxation and regulatory powers.  
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American tribes. But Blackmun’s expansive understanding of ambiguity was mostly 
expressed in dissent. The pro-Native American voting block that he formed with 
Brennan and Marshall was replaced by a cohort of liberal and moderate justices 
(Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, Kennedy, Breyer, and Ginsburg) whose support for 
Native American claims was much less consistent. This is not to say that their legal 
reasoning was inconsistent; on the contrary, it seems as if the voting of liberal and 
moderate justices in these cases is determined by a different assessment of the 
“ambiguities” in federal Indian law. It is not possible to reject the “attitudinal” 
explanation for the decreased support for Native American taxation and regulatory 
claims that developed over the course of the 1990s. But it is possible to see that the 
obstacles to an American rights revolution do not come solely from judges that are 
regarded as conservative or right-wing. Liberal and moderate justices on the American 
Supreme Court have not followed their Canadian counterparts regarding the scope of 
aboriginal sovereignty and self-government. One does not need to deny the presence 
of political considerations to agree that the different legal and Constitutional regimes 
in Canada and the United States structure the ways judges of similar ideological 
predispositions approach aboriginal legal claims. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Since the adoption of the Constitution Act and the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, the Canadian Supreme Court has emulated developments in American 
Constitutional law in areas such as criminal law, abortion rights, and the rights of 
women. In its aboriginal rights jurisprudence, the Canadian Supreme Court has upheld 
the claims of aboriginal litigants more often than has its American counterpart, and 
more importantly, the Court has handed down a few key decisions that have provided 
the basis for more expansive aboriginal claims in the future. Looked at in terms of the 
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overall number of votes for aboriginal legal claims, and the patterns of those votes on 
the Canadian and American courts, it is impossible to deny that the differences 
between Canadian and American Indian law over the past two decades is connected to 
the liberalism of Canadian justices, ultimately rooted in the liberalism of Canada’s 
governing regime. But the patterns of American Indian law, in relation to issues such 
as tribal sovereign immunity, tribal court jurisdiction, treaty interpretation, and tribal 
land claims, cannot be explained through politics alone. American Indian law 
jurisprudence remains within a framework that was developed in the 19th century, in 
which the rights of Indian tribes are ultimately subordinate to the plenary power of the 
national government; Canada’s post-modern Constitution created a process in which 
Canadian courts would become the ultimate arbiters of aboriginal legal claims, and the 
scope of aboriginal sovereignty. Under these two different legal regimes, the scope of 
legal discretion is very different, and the nature of judicial politics is very different. 
Political differences seem to emerge in American Indian law in those instances where 
the intent of Congress or the actions of the federal government are unclear. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
THE LIMITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE IN CANADA AND 
THE UNITED STATES 
4.1 Introduction 
The case of the Nuclear Energy Institute v. EPA,180 decided by the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals in 2004, dealt with the selection of the Yucca Mountains as a 
depository site for the nation’s nuclear waste. This decision involved a whole host of 
regulatory bodies working in conjunction with Congress and the President. An 
additional host of environmental groups and localities joined the state of Nevada in 
challenging the final decision to locate the depository in the Yucca Mountains. The 
environmental petitioners in the case argued that the waste storage site would lead to 
the contamination of the groundwater in nearby communities. Ed Goedhart, a member 
of Citizen Alert and Nuclear Information, was granted standing to bring the case. 
According to the court, “although radionuclides escaping from the Yucca repository 
may not reach Goedhart’s community for thousands of years, his injury is “actual or 
imminent,” for he lives adjacent to the land where the Government plans to bury 
70,000 metric tons of radioactive waste—a sufficient harm in and of itself.” This 
construal of “actual or imminent harm” was somewhat unusual. What was more 
troubling was the court’s interpretation of the EPA’s responsibilities, or rather, the 
court’s willingness to endorse Congress’ delegation of executive and legislative 
power. 
Nuclear waste remains deadly for literally millions of years. It boggles the lay 
mind to imagine how, in the present day, human engineers could aspire to design a 
                                                 
180 Nuclear Energy Institute v. EPA, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT362 U.S. App. D.C. 204; 373 F.3d 1251; 2004. 
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storage site that would remain safe over such an extended period of time. Yet that is 
the task that Congress asked executive branch agencies, including the EPA and the 
Department of Energy, to undertake in regards to the Yucca mountain project. The 
EPA established that it would attempt to construct a storage facility that could be 
anticipated to safely contain the material for 10,000 years. While the courts were 
unwilling to endorse all the various procedural objections made against the decision to 
locate the waste dump at Yucca Mountain, it did overturn the EPA’s decision to set its 
safety target at 10,000 years. Instead, the court argued that the EPA was required, by 
statute, to devise a storage site that would be safe not only 10,000 years from now, but 
into the unimaginably distant future. And that was exactly what the statute seemed to 
demand, or rather, the political process created by the statute clearly led to that 
conclusion. 
Congress did not directly make it imperative for the EPA to take a million-
year, cosmic perspective on the fate of nuclear waste in the Yucca mountains. Instead, 
Congress asked the EPA to make regulations that were “based upon and consistent” 
with the recommendations of the National Association of Scientists (NAS), which had 
been given resources to analyze the problem of long-term nuclear waste storage.181 
The EPA argued that the language of the statute did not simply turn the agency into 
the servant of the NAS, but rather was meant to allow for a certain degree of flexibility 
in interpreting the findings of the NAS experts. The decision on how to regulate 
                                                 
181 The relevant portion of the 1992 Energy Policy Act reads as follows: 
“The [EPA] Administrator shall, based upon and consistent with the findings and 
recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences, promulgate, by rule, public health and 
safety standards for protection of the public from releases from radioactive materials stored or 
disposed of in the repository at the Yucca Mountain site. Such standards shall prescribe the 
maximum annual effective dose equivalent to individual members of the public from releases 
to the accessible environment from radioactive materials stored or disposed of in the 
repository. The standards shall be promulgated not later than 1 year after the Administrator 
receives the findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences . . . and shall 
be the only such standards applicable to the Yucca Mountain site.” 
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radioactive materials raised policy questions that lay outside the specific expertise of 
the NAS scientists, and thus the EPA should be allowed considerable discretion as to 
how make their regulations “based upon” and “consistent” with the NAS 
recommendations. While the court unanimously rejected all other petitions made by 
environmental groups in this case, they were not willing to allow the EPA to depart 
from the statutory language of the Energy Policy Act. One would have to depart from 
the ordinary understanding of the English language to suggest that the EPA’s 
determination of the proper time-horizon for the Yucca mountain site was “consistent” 
with the recommendations of the NAS. 
This case reveals some of the reasons why American courts end up being 
drawn into the details of the environmental policy-process. Canadian courts and 
Canadian judges—despite their evident progressive proclivities in other areas of law—
have been remarkably hesitant to enter into the domain of environmental policy. This 
chapter will attempt to assess why this is the case, and how the differing constitutional 
architecture of the Canadian and American political systems place differing limits on 
environmental jurisprudence. 
One can better understand the significance of the differences between 
aboriginal law in Canada and the United States by comparing those decisions with 
developments in environmental law. Looked at in isolation, it is difficult to determine 
whether the divergence between Canadian and American approaches to aboriginal 
rights are a consequence of Constitutional differences, or a consequence of judicial 
ideology. The advocates of the attitudinal model of judicial behavior, for instance, 
would hypothesize that the transformation of aboriginal law in Canada can be 
understood as a consequence of changing judicial ideologies, ultimately rooted in the 
“progressive” understanding of native rights that began to take hold of Canadian elites 
during this period. There are no institutional features of the American constitutional 
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system that prevents a Canadian-style aboriginal rights revolution from developing in 
the United States; the revolution merely awaits the appointment of more sympathetic 
judges. My argument is that the limits imposed by constitutional architecture can best 
be seen by comparing aboriginal rights jurisprudence with environmental law 
jurisprudence in Canada and the United States. This comparison will not reveal the 
absence of politics in environmental jurisprudence, but it will illustrate that a 
parliamentary system of government presents very different opportunities for the 
judicialization of public policy than does a system based upon the separation of 
powers. As the attitudinal model would predict, the progressivism or liberalism that is 
evident in Canadian aboriginal rights decisions is also evident, to some extent, in 
environmental law decisions. But the very nature of the parliamentary system of 
government prevents Canadian courts from playing more than a limited role in 
environmental policy, regardless of judicial ideology. To summarize: in the USA, a 
progressive judiciary has tended and will tend to produce a pro-environment 
jurisprudence; in Canada, a “progressive” judiciary will, in matters of environmental 
policy, be much more deferential to the decisions of national policy-makers. 
Most commentators in the United States have acknowledged that courts have 
played a major role in the development of environmental policy.182 In Canada, the role 
played by judges in environmental policy has been far less prominent, though it has 
also been subject to much less study. The key to understanding the differences 
between the role of Canadian and American courts in environmental policy is to 
reflect on the difference between “judicial activism” and “judicialization.” While these 
two words have been used in a variety of different ways, I will use them to refer to two 
                                                 
182 E.g. Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act. Brookings 
Institution: Washington, 1984 pp 4, 387; Susan Rose-Ackermann. Controlling Environmental Policy: 
The Limits of Public Law in Germany and the United States. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995.; 
Bruce A. Ackerman and William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1981. 
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distinct modes of judicial power. Judicial activism occurs whenever judges trump the 
decisions of other government actors; hence, it makes sense to speak of legitimate or 
illegitimate acts of judicial activism. Judicialization refers to a narrow range of judicial 
activism, in which judges do not merely overrule government decisions based upon 
the dictates of federalism, or fundamental rights, but rather to decisions which 
override the statutory decisions and even scientific determinations of executive 
officials. Judicial activism is usually exercised to prevent governments from acting, 
“judicialization” has the potential to involve courts in the detailed control of vast 
ranges of public policy.183 My argument is that, while both Canadian and American 
courts have engaged in “judicial activism” in environmental policy (particularly in 
regards to issues of federalism) the Canadian courts have refrained from 
“judicializing” environmental policy. This chapter will consider why the Canadian 
courts, despite the general “progressive” nature of the Canadian judiciary, have not 
attempted to judicialize environmental policy by examining the constitutional and 
statutory framework of Canadian environmental policy, the question of legal standing 
in the Canadian judicial system, and the relationship between courts and 
administrators within this legal and political structure. At the same time, I will attempt 
to explain the connection, in the American system, between changes in legal doctrine 
(the law of standing), the separation of powers, and the judicialization of 
environmental policy.  
The Canadian political system has presented some crucial opportunities for 
courts to play a role in environmental policy. Canadian courts have developed a pro-
                                                 
183 For examples of judicialization in the United States, see Ross Sandler and David 
Schoenbrod, Democracy by Decree: What Happens When Courts Run Government. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2003; Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin, Judicial Policy-Making and the Modern 
State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Phillip J. Cooper, Hard Judicial Choices: federal 
district court judges and state and local officials. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1988. 
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environmentalism jurisprudence, one that mirrors the jurisprudence of liberal 
American judges, in two central ways. First, the Canadian courts have given an 
extremely broad reading of federal jurisdiction in environmental policy. Secondly, 
they have made it easier for aggrieved individuals and environmental groups to raise 
their claims in court. But the environmental revolution in Canadian law appears to 
come to an end—for the most part—with changes in jurisdiction and changes in the 
laws of justiciability. Canadian courts have played a limited role in the development of 
the substance of environmental policy, whether looked at in terms of rulings that shape 
the meaning of statutory law or decisions that determine the fate of development 
projects. Despite the court’s willingness to engage the demands of post-materialist 
litigants in other contexts, the progressivism of the Canadian Supreme Court in 
regards to environmental policy is constrained by Parliamentary constraints on 
judicialization. 
My main conclusion is that the parliamentary system inhibits judicial statutory 
activism, in contrast with the American separation of powers, because the Canadian 
judiciary cannot seriously claim to be the key effective restraint on an executive 
branch that desires to evade the law and the will of the legislative branch. Or, to put it 
differently, the problem of executive-legislative conflict does not exist as a 
constitutional problem in parliamentary governments.184 Formally, all actions by “The 
Crown” are supported by Parliament. For a court to claim that “the Crown” is not 
following Parliamentary will, it must, in a sense, accuse the governing party of false 
consciousness.185 The clear and direct link between the legislature and the government 
                                                 
184 For example, the problem of “divided government” does not play a role in parliamentary 
systems; in American politics, divided government gives Congress and incentive to constrain executive 
discretion. Epstein, David and Sharyn O’Halloran. Delegating Powers. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999. 
185 cf. S.L. Sutherland, “Responsible Government and Ministerial Responsibility: Every 
Reform its Own Problem” Canadian Journal of Political Science. Volume 24, Number 1, pp 91-120. 
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is the key to understanding the deferential approach of Canadian courts to statutory 
interpretation. The Canadian parliamentary system of government has not foreclosed 
all opportunities for judicial influence on environmental policy. Nevertheless, 
Canadian judges have retained a norm of deference towards government decision-
makers that often leads them to resist the claims of environmental rights activists. 
This chapter will begin by examining some of the similarities between 
Canadian and American environmental law jurisprudence in the areas of jurisdiction 
and justiciability. It will then proceed to examine the how their approaches to statutory 
interpretation and bureaucratic decision-making differentiate the judiciaries of Canada 
and the United States. First, it is necessary to consider some of the problems involved 
in assessing and comparing environmental law jurisprudence. 
4.2 The Problems of Comparisons in Environmental Law 
The great difficulty in analyzing environmental policy lies in assessing the 
significance of cases—though given the complexities of the issues, it is often difficult 
enough to assess who has actually won a given case. As some scholars have pointed 
out, the attempt to quantify the significance of environmental law decisions so as to 
permit statistical inference is undercut by the inherently subjective nature of any 
attempt to quantify the significance of environmental decisions.186 It is even more 
difficult to evaluate whether or not the claims of environmental groups will actually 
help to improve environmental protection. 
                                                                                                                                            
Sutherland argues that responses to the problem of bureaucratic government tend to undermine the 
capacity of cabinet ministers to control administrative discretion.  
186 R. Shep Melnick, “Environmental Litigation and Institutional Analysis: Wenner and 
Ackerman & Hassler.” American Bar Foundation Research Journal. Vol. 8, No. 3 (Summer, 1983) pp 
740-751. 
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In order to assess the relationship between Canadian and American courts in 
environmental policy, it is necessary to classify the various ways in which courts can 
affect the environmental policy process. There are three basic ways in which courts 
exercise their power in the environmental policy process: 
1. Constitutional Activism187 
Constitutional activism in Canadian and American environmental policy 
typically involves decisions regarding federalism; that is, courts can play a role in 
determining which level of government plays what kind of role in shaping 
environmental regulation. Theoretically, courts could engage in constitutional activism 
through the creation of fundamental rights related to environmental quality, though 
this is an option that has not been taken in either the USA or Canada. However, there 
are other dimensions of fundamental rights that can place limits on the scope of 
environmental policy. 
2. Legal-Procedural Activism 
Legal-Procedural activism refers not to judicial constructions of government 
powers and individual rights, but rather to the ways in which judges interpret the 
meaning of legal cases—in other words, judges exercise power in environmental 
policy by shaping doctrines of justiciability.188 In environmental law, the most crucial 
questions regarding justiciability relate to standing—that is, who can bring an 
environmental policy related claim to court, and under what circumstances. 
3. Statutory Activism 
                                                 
187 I use the term “activism” in a “value-neutral” sense; it is not meant to imply that the 
exercise of judicial power in environmental decisions are incorrect, but rather is meant to imply that, 
correct or not, courts can exercise power in environmental policy through these four modes of decision-
making.  
188 For a discussion of justiciability and its development in 20th century American law, see 
Mark Silverstein, Judicious Choices: The New Politics of Supreme Court Confirmations. New York: 
W.W. Norton and Co., 1994. 
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Statutory activism refers to judicial rulings which overturn the interpretations 
of law made by executive officials. Here, activism refers to decisions to challenge the 
interpretations of statutory law made by executive branch officials and bureaucrats. 
Differences in the constitutional architecture of the Canadian and American 
political systems create differing opportunities to exercise these forms of judicial 
activism. In the American context, environmental law decisions are more contentious, 
and judicial votes more divided, than is the case in Canada. But this is not to say that 
Canadian courts have played no role in shaping environmental policy. Canadian courts 
have shaped environmental policy primarily through constitutional and legal activism. 
Statutory activism is far more attenuated. Political structures, in other words, shape the 
ability of courts to judicialize public policy; in a Parliamentary system, the opportunity 
to judicialize environmental policy is much more attenuated than in a system based 
upon the separation of powers. 
Differences in environmental policy-making in Canada and the United States 
makes comparisons of their environmental jurisprudence somewhat complicated. The 
Canadian Supreme Court has decided relatively few cases addressing environmental 
issues. This is a result of the relative absence of national environmental laws in 
Canada. While a full exploration of the reasons for this difference is beyond the scope 
of this study, scholars have tended to argue that the combination of regionalism (and, 
the case of Quebec, nationalism and separatism)189 combined with the resource 
intensive nature of the Canadian economy, have led provinces to jealousy guard 
against national regulatory initiatives that might have disparate impacts on different 
regions. As a consequence, Canadian federal courts have had fewer opportunities to 
influence national environmental policies. Therefore, while a comparison of Canadian 
                                                 
189 Grace Skogstad and P. Kopas, “Environmental Policy in a federal system: Ottawa and the 
provinces.” In Canadian Environmental Policy: Ecosystems, politics, and process. Ed. R. Boardman. 
Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
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and American Supreme Court decisions can tell us something about how those courts 
have addressed some of the environmental and general legal issues (such as standing) 
raised by environmental law cases, it is difficult to draw conclusions because of the 
relative paucity of comparable cases. 
However, if we look at the lower federal appeals courts in the United States, 
and lower federal appeals courts and provincial courts of appeal in Canada, it is easier 
to find cases that are comparable. This is because these courts, particularly in the 
United States, deal with an immense number of cases addressing issues related to the 
environmental assessment of specific construction, development, and resource 
extraction projects. The stakes in these cases, in other words, are broadly similar. As 
we will see, however, Canadian and American courts have very different patterns of 
decision-making in these cases, patterns which I will argue cannot be explained on the 
basis of political ideology alone. 
In the body of this chapter, I will therefore provide a general assessment or 
“soft comparison” of environmental law jurisprudence in the Canadian and American 
Supreme Courts, focusing on the ways in which these decisions exhibit constitutional 
and legal activism. For the United States Supreme Court, I have collected a sample of 
environmental law decisions based upon all cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court 
between 1985 and 2007 which dealt with the following laws: the Clean Water Act, the 
Clean Air Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the National Forest 
Management Act, and the Endangered Species Act. For the Canadian Supreme Court, 
I have collected all cases decided by the Court between 1985 and 2007 dealing with 
the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act and the “Environmental Assessment and 
Review Process Guidelines Order.”  
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Michael Howlett conducted a similar study of environmental cases from the 
period 1984-1990.190 The cases in this paper are drawn from the period 1990-2007; 
unlike Howlett, I do not discuss decisions from all provincial appellate courts. The 
perspective I will offer is therefore not a direct duplication of Howlett’s earlier study, 
but I think it can nevertheless shed some light on several of his conclusions. In brief, I 
challenge Howlett’s argument that Canadian environmental policy is insulated from 
judicialization due to 1) stricter rules of standing in Canadian courts and 2) the 
unwillingness of Canadian courts to move beyond statutory interpretation into the 
realm of “hard looks” at scientific evidence. Howlett’s first conclusion has been 
proven wrong by events in the previous decade and a half. Canadian courts have in 
fact continued to revolutionize the rules of standing. As I suggested above, the 
parliamentary system itself continues to constrain courts from regularly challenging 
executive discretion. 
Determining what constitutes an “environmental policy” case is a somewhat 
subjective process, and for the most part I have simply followed the classification 
found in Canadian Federal Court reports. Basically, a case was included if a) a federal 
or provincial minister of the environment or an environmental lobby group was one of 
the parties or an intervener or b) a federal environmental statute or regulation was 
considered (e.g. the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, the environmental 
assessment review project guidelines order, the Fisheries Act, Northern Inland Waters 
Act, etc.).191 For the American Supreme Court cases, I conducted Lexis Nexis 
searches based upon a series of major federal environmental statutes. For the lower 
court cases dealing with environmental assessment of specific development projects, I 
                                                 
190 Michael Howlett, “The Judicialization of Canadian Environmental Policy, 1980-1990: A 
Test of the Canada-United States Convergence Thesis.” Canadian Journal of Political Science. Volume 
27, Number 1, 1994. pp 99-127. 
191 Appendix C contains a complete description of the cases.  
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conducted searches for cases containing “NEPA” in American federal appellate courts 
(for the years 2006 and 2007). In Canada, I included all environmental assessment 
cases decided by the Canadian federal courts of appeal between 1990 and 2007, and 
all environmental assessment cases decided by the courts of appeal in Ontario, BC, 
and Alberta between 1995 and 2007. 
4.3 Constitutional Activism in Canadian and American Environmental Law 
Both Canadian and American courts have refrained from establishing 
“environmental rights” that could act as judicial trump cards in environmental policy 
making.192 Yet judicial constructions of constitutional law, particularly in regards to 
federalism, have had a major impact on environmental policy in both nations. These 
federalism decisions can be readily interpreted through a political framework. As we 
would expect from judicial rulings in other areas of law, the more ideologically 
divided American courts are more likely to be divided about the scope of national 
government power in matters related to the environment. The more ideologically 
homogenous Canadian judiciary has, at least in recent decades, been a consistent 
supporter of national regulatory power, thereby providing a nice illustration of the 
“centralization thesis” developed by scholars such as Martin Shapiro and Andre 
Bzdera.193 who both argue that high courts tend to act as agents of the central 
governments which establish and staff them. 
                                                 
192 For a typical indication of the constitutional aspirations that accompanied the rise of the 
environmental movement in the United States, see J.Y.P. Jr., “Toward a Constitutionally Protected 
Environment.” Virginia Law Review. Vol. 56, No. 3, (April, 1970.) pp 458-486. 
193 Andre Bzdera, “Comparative Analysis of Federal High Courts: A Political Theory of 
Judicial Review.” Canadian Journal of Political Science. Volume 26, Number 3 (January, 1993) pp 3-
29, Martin Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1981.  
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The American Supreme Court initially laid the groundwork for national 
environmental regulation through its post-New Deal jurisprudence, which eased or 
eliminated previous constitutional limits on the scope of national government 
regulation. The case of Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation 
Association,194 in which a group of oil companies and landowners challenged the 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 is an example of the court’s 
typical approach to national environmental regulation in the post-war era. The court 
ruled that Congress’ determination that there was a relationship between surface 
mining and interstate commerce had to be accorded deference, and determined that the 
act was not unconstitutional on other grounds. Congress’ goal of preventing 
competition between states on the basis of environmental standards was ruled to be a 
legitimate basis for national legislation under the commerce clause. The “rational 
relationship/reasonable basis” test gave Congress almost complete jurisdiction over all 
aspects of pollution and the natural environment.195 However, this expansive 
interpretation of the commerce clause has been challenged by many conservative 
jurists.196 Environmental law decisions in the American Supreme Court often illustrate 
these continuing divisions in the American court over the scope of national power 
under the commerce clause. 
                                                 
194 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES 452 U.S. 264; 101 S. Ct. 2352; 69 L. Ed. 2d 1; 1981. 
195 For a discussion and critique of the court’s post-New Deal approach to federal jurisdiction 
over environmental issues, see Jonathan H. Adler, “Wetlands, Waterfowl, and the Menace of Mr. 
Wilson: Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation. “ 
Environmental Law, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Spring, 1999). 
196 Richard H. Fallon, Jr. “The ‘Conservative’ Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism 
Decisions.” University of Chicago Law Review. Vol. 69, No. 2 (Spring, 2002) pp 429-494. 
 151 
Rapanos v. United States (2006)197 is one of the few instances in recent 
decades in which the court has challenged a national environmental regulation on the 
grounds that it exceeded the powers of Congress under the commerce clause. The 
court ruled that, contrary to the interpretations of national regulators, certain wetlands 
located entirely within state boundaries were not subject to national regulations, as 
they were not part of inter-state commerce. Or rather, four justices (Chief Justice 
Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito) rested their decision on commerce 
clause grounds. The fifth justice in the majority, Justice Kennedy, agreed that the 
interpretation of the Clean Water Act by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in this 
case was inadequate, but he did not agree with other members of the majority 
regarding the precise scope of national regulatory power over in-state waters. The 
dissenting justices—Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg—essentially held to the 
post-New Deal line that had been established in Hodel v. Viriginia. The Rapanos 
decision reveals the deep divisions in the court between those who wish to adhere to 
the post-New Deal precedents which helped to establish a broad basis for federal 
jurisdiction over environmental issues, and those more conservative justices who wish 
to return to a more restrictive understanding of the commerce power. However, 
divisions over the precise scope of the commerce clause in regards to environmental 
issues are not always drawn along simple “liberal” and “conservative” ideological 
lines.  
In five other instances between 1985 and 2007, the court has been willing to 
use the commerce clause to limit the regulatory power of state governments. These 
cases all rested upon interpretations of the “dormant commerce clause” doctrine, 
according to which the court can invalidate state regulations that aim to restrict 
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interstate commerce by penalizing out-of-state businesses.198 In the case of Fort 
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources199 the court 
ruled that Michigan’s attempt to limit the importation of waste across state and county 
lines was in violation of the commerce clause. Unlike the Rapanos case, the political 
dimensions of the Fort Gratiot case were not so apparent in the votes of the justices. 
The majority opinion was joined by Stevens, White, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, 
Souter, and Thomas, with dissents by Rehnquist and Blackmun. The majority opinion 
focused upon the ways in which the regulations discriminated against out-of-state 
commerce, thereby traversing the lines of the “dormant commerce clause,” whereas 
the dissenters thought that the state could defend the restrictions as legitimate 
environmental safety regulations, even if they might have some impact on trade 
between the states. Similarly, in the case of Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt,200 
the court ruled that Alabama’s fees on out-of-state waster were impermissible under 
the commerce clause; Rehnquist was joined in dissent by Justice Blackmun. The case 
of Oregon Waste Systems v. Oregon,201 which raised the same issues as the Chemical 
Waste Management case, also saw Rehnquist and Blackmun join together in dissent. 
In C & A Carbone Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown202 (1994), the court dealt with a town 
ordinance which required that all non-recyclable, non-hazardous waste moving in or 
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out of the town had to be processed at a designated transfer station. Once again, the 
voting patterns in the case do not reveal any clear political divisions. The majority, 
consisting of Kennedy, Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, and joined in a concurring 
opinion by O’Connor, ruled that the town ordinance was in violation of the commerce 
clause. In dissent, Souter, Rehnquist, and Blackmun argued that the ordinance had not 
been shown to discriminate against out of state business, and that it served a clear 
public purpose. The final case dealing with dormant clause doctrine and its 
relationship with environmental regulations is United Haulers Association v. Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waster Management Authority203 (2007), in which the court ruled in 
favor of a local ordinance that directed all solid-waste generated within the county had 
to be processed at a local, public processing facility. The majority opinion, written by 
Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, Scalia, and Thomas, 
ruled that the regulation was valid as, unlike the cases discussed above, the law did not 
differentiate between in-state and out-of-state businesses, and thus could be sustained 
as a legitimate exercise of the state’s police power. In dissent, Justices Alito, Kennedy, 
and Stevens suggested that this ordinance was in violation of the dormant commerce 
clause, as it discriminated in favor of a state-owned monopoly.  
What these cases illustrate is the differing degrees of “politicization” in 
American commerce clause jurisprudence insofar as it influences environmental 
policy. Rapanos offers a clear example of the conflict between differing conceptions 
of the scope of national government power, with the justices falling into clear political 
“blocs” in their voting. The “dormant commerce clause” cases are more difficult to 
interpret, because the political dimensions are not so clear. This is because the policy 
objectives of the regulations in question are ambiguous: are the states and towns 
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aiming to promote environmental health and safety, or are they engaged in a 
protectionist racket? One could very well argue that, questions of law aside, the votes 
in each case simply illustrates whether the justices are more concerned with problems 
of environmental pollution, or more concerned with the problem of state 
protectionism. Yet there is no clear liberal or conservative position in the three cases 
dealing with state and local regulation of out-of-state waste; in terms of the question of 
the scope of national power over the environment, as in the case of many other 
federalism issues, the political divisions are clearer.204 The role played by the 
American Supreme Court in determining the scope of state and federal jurisdiction 
over environmental policy reveals that the court is divided along political lines when 
dealing with the scope of national power; in regards to the scope of state power, the 
court is both less divided, and less divided into clearly opposed ideological camps. 
Stated somewhat differently, the environmental law decisions of the American 
Supreme Court that deal with the commerce clause (whether dormant or awake) do not 
seem to revolve around judicial assessments environmentalism. Conservative justices 
who were willing to strike down national environmental regulations in one context 
(Rapanos) were willing to uphold state environmental regulations (United Haulers); 
liberal justices could be found arguing for extensive national regulatory power in the 
Rapanos’ dissent, but they could also be found arguing against state environmental 
regulations in Chemical Waste Management, Carbone, and United Haulers. The 
commerce clause decisions in environmental law do not seem to follow a political 
logic based upon underlying policy preferences; rather, the divisions seem to emerge 
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from principled legal disagreements over the scope of state and national jurisdiction 
under the commerce clause.205 
The Canadian Supreme Court in the Charter-era has, like the American Court 
in the immediate post-Ned Deal era, has been a fairly consistent supporter of the 
expansion of federal regulatory power in regards to the federal government’s 
jurisdiction over environmental policy. Since the adoption of the Constitution Act and 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canadian courts have often exercised 
power not by directly challenging provincial legislation through judicial invalidation 
based upon fundamental rights but by re-arranging the federal balance of power. This 
aspect of judicial politics is often downplayed by those who wish to exculpate 
Canadian courts from the charge of judicial activism. For instance, James Kelly has 
argued that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom has not led to an increased 
uniformity of public policy due to the exercise of judicial review, based upon its 
relatively infrequent invalidation of provincial statutes.206 Though Kelly shows that 
judicial disallowance of provincial statutes has not been as widespread as some might 
lead us to believe, he overestimates the success of his critique of the anti-centralization 
“Charterphobes.” While the Charter may not have caused “rights” to inevitably trump 
federalism, there are nevertheless many ways in which judges can exercise power 
without exercising the power of judicial review. Judges exercise power over public 
policy not simply by declaring laws invalid; in politics, as in war, full frontal assaults 
of this kind are often not the best strategy. Canadian courts can influence policy in a 
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more innocuous manner by interpreting ambiguous jurisdictional divisions and 
statutory provisions so as to achieve their desired outcomes. At the very least, the 
Canadian Constitution and Canadian environmental statutes do not foreclose modes of 
judicial policy-making that are far more circumspect than judicial review. In regards to 
environmental policy, the Canadian Supreme Court has interpreted the ambiguous 
division of powers in the Constitution Act in a manner that consistently favors the 
national government. 
On paper, environmental policy in Canada is a shared jurisdiction of the 
federal and provincial governments.207 What this means is that for a wide range of 
environmental issues, both the provinces and the federal government can make 
plausible claims to be the responsible authority. As a result, Canadian courts have had 
the opportunity to exercise a great deal of influence over environmental policy through 
their ability to decide who will decide. 
The Canadian Constitution Act makes no reference to the environment itself, 
but environmental subject matters are intertwined amidst the powers delegated to the 
federal and provincial governments. Section 92 lists various federal powers that deal 
with the environment: sea coasts and inland fisheries, navigation and shipping, and 
federally-owned land and waters all fall under federal jurisdiction. An even broader 
general power to deal with environmental issues has been discerned in the “POGG” 
clause of section 91, which grants the federal government the power to make laws for 
the “peace, order and good government of Canada.” One should note that, in contrast 
to the text of the American constitution, power over unenumerated matters in Canada 
devolves to the federal government.208 Federal authority over the environment can also 
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be asserted through the treaty making powers, at least theoretically. Thus, through the 
POGG clause, federal paramountcy, the enumerated section 92 powers, and through 
treaties, the federal government has the potential to assert authority over a broad range 
of environmental subjects.209  
Much environmental regulation occurs at the provincial level, however.210 
Section 92 of the Constitution grants provinces control over local waters and 
undertakings, property and civil rights, local and private undertakings, and provincial 
lands and resources. Section 92A grants the provinces exclusive jurisdiction over non-
renewable resources, a privilege which is jealously guarded by those provincial 
politicians who fear that national control might be used to “correct” the uneven 
distribution of natural resources through the various provinces.211 Yet while it is easy 
enough to divide up environmental jurisdiction on paper, the environment itself often 
does not conform to the legal categories of the Canadian constitution. Courts have 
ample opportunity to determine the exact boundaries of federal and provincial power: 
the POGG power is subject to practically limitless interpretation; federal treaty powers 
have a similarly broad potential to reshape constitutional divisions of power; federal 
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jurisdiction (e.g. over inland fisheries) cannot be neatly separated from provincial 
jurisdiction (e.g. natural resources) in many if not most instances.212 
In the 1980s, the Canadian Supreme Court enacted a partial revolution in 
federalism, a revolution that had occurred in American law around the time of the new 
deal. In American law, a series of cases decided by Roosevelt appointees established a 
very broad understanding of the federal government’s “commerce clause” powers; 
essentially, the court recognized the power of the federal government to regulate any 
area of national life that was connected to the economy, even if indirectly. In Canada, 
a more restrictive interpretation of the national government’s powers survived the 
Great Depression, and the courts continued to place significant limits on national 
regulatory power for several decades afterwards. For instance, the Canadian Supreme 
Court refused to uphold a national federal wage and price control act in 1976, arguing 
that such regulations were simply too broad and intermingled with traditional areas of 
provincial jurisdiction.213 While the national government had several clearly 
enumerated powers under the British North America Act that were relevant to 
environmental policy, by the 1980s it still seemed as if the scope of the Canadian 
federal government’s power to regulate the environment were constrained by 
traditional, court-enforced doctrines of federalism. 
Under that traditional understanding of federalism, the power of the federal 
government to regulate the environment was based upon the power of the national 
government to regulate trade and commerce between the states, the criminal law 
power, jurisdiction over seacoast and inland fisheries, power over navigation and 
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shipping, and its taxation powers. None of these powers had ever been interpreted by 
the Court as granting a general regulatory power over the environment. Judges in 
Canada, as well the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, had also ruled that 
international treaties, should they address matters of environmental concern or, indeed, 
any matter at all, had to respect the federal-provincial balance of power established by 
the British North America Act. One possible source of national power over the 
environment was Section 91 of the BNA Act, which gave the national government the 
power to make laws necessary for the “peace, order, and good government” of 
Canada. Prior to the 1980s, this provision was interpreted narrowly. Certain kinds of 
well defined subjects were held to meet the so-called “national dimensions test,” and 
were therefore valid under Section 91. The court also allowed Section 91 to be 
invoked on the basis of national emergencies. But neither the national dimensions test 
nor the emergency powers interpretation of the “POGG” powers conferred a general 
power to regulate the environment on the national government. At least, that was how 
the Court had interpreted Canadian Federalism prior to the late 1980s. 
The case of R. v Crown Zellerbach Canada214 initiated an important change in 
the Court’s approach to the national government’s power over environmental 
regulation. This case dealt with the applicability of the federal Ocean Dumping 
Control Act to a paper company whose operation affected provincial sea-waters. The 
Crown argued that, although water pollution associated with pulp and paper mills had 
traditionally been seen as part of provincial jurisdiction, the national dimensions of 
environmental problems justified a new, more expansive interpretation of federal 
regulatory powers under the POGG clause. A majority of four on the court, against 
vigorous protests by the governments of British Columbia and Quebec, as well as the 
dissents of all three francophone judges then sitting on the court, upheld the Ocean 
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Dumping and Control Act. In doing so, and it endorsed a “national dimensions” test 
that would have the potential to grant legitimacy to a wide range of federal 
environmental policies. 
In regards to “constitutional activism,” the key environmental law decisions 
that address issues of federalism in Canadian and American law can, in some ways, be 
interpreted as a product of political preferences. In Canada, the courts have acted to 
expand national jurisdiction in the post-Charter era, much as Roosevelt appointees on 
the American Supreme Court expanded federal jurisdiction through their re-
interpretations of the commerce clause. While it is certainly the case that the presence 
of greater ideological diversity in the American Supreme Courts leads to greater 
contention over the scope of federal jurisdiction, the court’s environmental 
law/commerce clause decisions do not produce neat political divisions in judicial 
voting. Nevertheless, one pattern is relatively consistent: liberal constitutional 
activism, in both Canada and the United States, tends to favor increased national 
regulatory power over the environment. Similarities between liberal approaches to 
environmental law in Canada and the United States also appear when we consider the 
issue of legal standing. 
4.4 The Greening of Justiciability: Expanding the Scope of Standing in Canada 
and the United States 
The development of environmental law in Canada and the United States, 
insofar as it relates to the scope of national regulatory power, can easily be interpreted 
as a political process. In Canada, the courts have been steadfast supporters of the 
expansion of national power in the post-Charter era, whereas in the States, a more 
politically divided court has produced a jurisprudence of federalism marked by more 
contention and serious divisions. A similar pattern can be seen in regards to the rules 
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of standing in Canadian and American law. Standing is an aspect of the law of 
justiciability, that part of the judicial process in which courts attempt to determine 
whether or not an “issue” or conflict is in fact a legal “case.” So, to give one example, 
an issue is not justiciable if a judicial decision cannot affect the outcome; the case is 
“moot.” Similarly, under the rules of justiciability, courts have typically demanded 
that the parties to case have a genuine conflict of interest—this is referred to as the 
doctrine of adverseness. “Standing” refers to the question of whether or not an 
individual, group, or organization has a right to assert specific legal claims. 
Historically, this has meant that, in order to have “standing” to raise a legal claim, an 
individual must have suffered (or be about to suffer) a concrete and particularized 
injury to their own rights. The doctrine of standing, in Anglo-American jurisprudence, 
was meant to limit or prevent abstract or hypothetical claims from overwhelming the 
legal system. As Maxwell Stearns has observed, the requirements of standing are 
rooted in the pragmatic recognition of the costs of litigation; given the real costs of 
litigating, it makes sense that individuals should only be able to invoke the judicial 
system to protect their own rights, to and prevent or redress real, concrete injuries.215 
In practice this means, or rather has meant, that no individual has an abstract 
right to the enforcement of law, if the enforcement or non-enforcement of law does not 
affect them. So, for instance, in the early 20th century case of Frothingham v. 
Mellon,216 the Supreme Court ruled that an individual did not have the power to 
challenge a federal spending program merely because they objected to it on 
constitutional grounds. Only if the law affected them directly would they have a “case 
or controversy” in law, and the indirect effect upon their tax bill occasioned by an 
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individual spending program was not sufficient to establish a case or controversy in 
law. The change in the courts approach to standing is best evident in the case of Flast 
v. Cohen,217 in which Earl Warren granted standing to party to challenge state 
spending that was supposedly in violation of the First Amendment. Since that time, 
Congress has taken upon itself the duty of altering the laws of standing, particularly in 
relationship to environmental laws and regulations, where it was thought that the 
participation of citizen groups as “private attorneys general” would be useful in 
supporting environmental regulation against potentially recalcitrant bureaucrats and 
executive officials.218 However, under the Rehnquist court, the rules of standing have 
once began a source of considerable controversy and conflict in American law. Many 
of those controversies have dealt with standing in the context of environmental law. 
The development of the law of standing in the American Supreme Court 
parallels the development of commerce clause jurisprudence. Just as conflicts over the 
scope of Congressional power under the commerce clause have emerged in the 
Rehnquist Court, so to have conflict emerged over the “liberalized Conservative 
justices on the Rehnquist court attempted to return to the pre-Warren Era of standing 
in cases such as Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,219 a case in which Scalia re-asserted 
the idea that, in order to challenge government actions, individuals had to suffer 
concrete and particularized harms, that harm had to be traceable to government action, 
and the harm that was suffered had to be amenable to a judicial remedy. Not 
surprisingly, this new precedent did not settle the issue. 
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Some commentators suggested that the Lujan decision had the potential to 
undermine all of the various “citizen suit” provisions that are part of most major 
national environmental statutes.220 This has not yet come to pass, though the issue of 
standing continues to be a source of conflict in federal courts. It is not necessarily the 
case that this is only a consequence of differing political preferences of federal judges. 
Since the Lujan decision, there has been no case in which the Supreme Court has 
struck down citizen suit provisions of environmental law, which indicates that while 
Lujan might potentially limit Congressional control over the law of standing, the 
“zone of interests” test is not particularly restrictive. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
decided three environmental law cases in which standing was the central issue since 
1992, and in each case the outcome was very different. In Bennet v. Spears,221 the 
court ruled unanimously that a group of land-owners had standing under the 
Endangered Species Act to challenge lake-level regulations that were intended to 
protect two varieties of endangered fish. In Chicago Steel and Pickling Co. v. Citizens 
for a Better Environment,222 another unanimous decision, the court ruled that an 
environmental group could not be granted standing, where the relief they sought was 
unrelated to any alleged injury. Environmentalists might point out that the clearest 
pattern in these few cases is the fact that environmentalist interest lost on the question 
of standing, while private land owners and state agencies were granted standing. Yet 
the Lujan decision has not led to complete administrative autonomy for national 
environmental policy-makers, though this may well be because those who might apply 
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the decision with a ruthless consistency do not yet hold a majority on the court.223 The 
expansion of standing continues to influence American environmental law and 
environmental policy, though the scope of standing is still contested. 
Within the American political system, the transformation of standing has 
greater ramifications than in the parliamentary systems of government, because the 
tensions between the separation of the executive and legislative branches invariably 
produces more occasions to claim that “the rule of law” has been violated by executive 
discretion. Insofar as American courts adopt an illegitimate role in environmental 
policy, it is because they attempt to uphold a rigid conception of the rule of law. 
Particularly within the American system of separated powers, the post-1960 
conception of standing allows legalism to trump political prudence. The traditional 
rules of standing, in contrast, allowed courts to accept the limits of abstract legalism 
without endorsing executive lawlessness. If the rules of standing are abandoned, then 
this creates the space for courts to substitute their own discretion for that of the 
executive branch, all in the name of Congressional supremacy or the “rule of law.” 
A key example of this is the case of Massachusetts v. EPA,224 heard by the DC 
Circuit court of appeals in 2005 and by the United States Supreme Court in the spring 
of 2007. In this case, an assortment of states and environmental interest groups 
petitioned the court in the hopes of forcing the EPA to adopt more stringent 
regulations of CO2 emissions from new motor vehicles. The EPA argued that it lacked 
statutory authority to regulate CO2 emissions from motor vehicles. Secondly, even if it 
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possessed this authority, it retained the discretion to not promulgate regulations in this 
specific instance, due to the uncertainties regarding the environmental effects of 
carbon dioxide and other green house gases. From the perspective of the 
environmental interest groups and state attorneys general bringing this petition, the 
EPA decision not to promulgate regulations was not only a disastrous policy choice: it 
was an illegal violation of Congressional intention as expressed in the Clear Air Act 
and its subsequent amendments. Yet before the court could consider the merits of 
EPA’s decision not address CO2 emissions, the court had to determine whether the 
objections of the petitioners constituted a “case” at all. 
The EPA’s primary defense against the challengers was that none of them 
satisfied the requirements of Article III standing: they had not suffered injuries in fact 
that could be traced to the challenged actions, injuries that were likely to be redressed 
by a favorable decision in the court.225 In anticipation of this challenge, the petitioners 
produced two volumes of various statements regarding the potential impact of the 
EPA’s failure to regulate. These volumes described the catastrophes that would occur 
from global warming, catastrophes that the EPA could help the world to avoid by 
regulating CO2 emissions. Given the particularized nature of the claim in this case—it 
dealt with CO2 standards for new motor vehicles in the USA, not global environmental 
policy—it was still unclear how a judicial decision could ameliorate these conditions. 
One climatologist answered this objection by suggesting that EPA regulations would 
set in motion a series of desirable events. The EPA regulations would provide an 
example for other countries, as the new regulations would spur the development of 
more effective CO2 control technologies, which would then be mandated around the 
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world. If the climatologist’s prognostications were correct, it was only several steps 
from granting the petitioners request to saving the world from impending doom. 
The court was faced with a difficult problem, and three different opinions 
emerged in the case. According to Judge Randolph, evaluating the case for standing 
could not easily be separated from the merits of the case. Standing could only be 
established (or rejected) through an evaluation of the science of global warming.226 In 
other words, the issues have become so complex that the Court must assume that the 
petitioners have a “case” in law. Proceeding to the merits, Randolph argued that the 
National Research Council’s report on climate change had acknowledged that the link 
between CO2 and other green house gases was not yet firmly established. In addition, 
the EPA had not determined what, if any, forms of regulation would be best able to 
address the problem of emissions. Unable to find a clear error in the EPA’s record, 
Randolph was unwilling to substitute his own assessment of global climatology and 
the frontiers of pollution control technology for the experts in the executive branch. 
He solved the problem of standing, in this case, by essentially stating that it no longer 
exists as a hurdle in the legal process. The petitioners’ standing was essentially 
incontestable, as it was based on theories of causation that were difficult if not 
impossible to evaluate. While Randolph’s inability and unwillingness to challenge 
their theory of causality allowed the petitioners to get their day in court, his 
recognition of the complexity of climate change and pollution control led him to defer 
to the EPA’s decision not to regulate CO2 emissions. Randolph deferred to the EPA 
for the same reason that led him to accept the petitioner’s claim to have standing. 
                                                 
226 This is a common source of disagreement over the meaning of standing. The question is 
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Randolph’s decision combined an extremely broad conception of standing 
(which can be had for the asking) with deference to policy decisions made by the 
executive branch. The problem is that, if one was willing to overlook the fact that the 
petitioners were not actually affected by the law and thus did not have a case under the 
traditional Article III “case and controversy” standard, their interpretation of the law 
had considerably more validity than the EPA’s. This is not to say that the petitioners 
advanced a more plausible interpretation of the state of scientific knowledge of 
climate change, or a more rational balancing of the competing costs and benefits 
involved in pollution control. However, the petitioners could easily make the case that 
the Clean Air Act required the EPA to produce CO2 regulations. If one ignored the 
fact that they did not have a “case,” the law did indeed appear to be on the petitioner’s 
side. 
It might seem odd that courts, at the instigation of interest groups, could force 
the EPA—against its own judgment—to create national regulations of a natural 
occurring gas that human beings produce every second of their existence. Presumably, 
such a massive extension of regulatory power should at least be authorized by clear 
Congressional directives. When the FDA attempted to extend its regulatory arm over a 
substance—tobacco—that had traditionally fallen outside of its ambit, the Supreme 
Court rebuffed the attempt.227 In this case, however, the dissenting judge David Tatel 
made a convincing case that, given the statutory language of the Clean Air Act, and 
given the willingness of many federal courts to allow interest groups to operate as 
private wings of the executive branch, the EPA was required to promulgate national 
CO2 emission standards for new automobiles. 
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policy issues surrounding this case, see David Kessler, A Question of Intent: A Great American Battle 
with a Deadly Industry. New York: Public Affairs, 2001. 
 168 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Tatel suggested that, however reasonable the 
EPA’s decision might appear from a policy perspective, their judgment was not related 
to the standards outlined in the CAA itself. Congress, for better or worse, had not 
given the EPA license to protect the environment as EPA official saw fit, using their 
discretion to balance the benefits of clean air against the cost of pollution 
abatement.228 There is not much doubt that Tatel’s position was heavily influenced by 
his differing appraisal of the state of climatology and environmental science. While 
Judge Randolph was unwilling to challenge the EPA’s claim that uncertainty 
regarding the causes of climate change and the lack of available control technologies 
made national regulations unwise at the current time, Judge Tatel argued that the EPA 
had in fact misinterpreted the evidence submitted to it by the National Research 
Council’s 2001 report on climate change. The EPA’s mistake lay in the fact that while 
the report acknowledged uncertainty regarding the extent to which CO2 emissions 
would affect global temperatures, there did not appear to be any doubt as to whether 
CO2 would induce global temperature changes of some kind. Even if the most 
optimistic predictions were in fact correct, the report still suggested that greenhouse-
gas induced climate change would result in drought, heat stress, rising sea levels, and 
the disruption of eco-systems. Given these claims, Judge Tatel had no trouble 
asserting that the state of Massachusetts, at least, had standing. If the reports analysis 
was correct, the failure of the EPA to regulate had the potential to disrupt the climate 
of New England and all coastal states, if not to submerge Boston beneath the Atlantic. 
Could the EPA, based upon this evidence, nevertheless conclude that the costs 
of CO2 regulation of motor vehicles still outweighed the evidence? Catastrophic 
                                                 
228 In other words, the CAA was based upon a repudiation of the New Deal model of 
legislation and administrative discretion. For a defense of the New Deal model in the context of 
environmental policy, and an explanation of how the New Deal model contrasted with the new social 
regulation of the 1970s, see Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler, Clean Air/Dirty Coal. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1981. 
 169 
environmental forecasts had been wrong—completely wrong—in the past, even when 
there had been substantial consensus amongst the community of experts.229 According 
to Tatel, the answer was clearly no, as all of the reasons provided by the EPA were 
insufficient in light of the standards provided by the Clean Air Act: 
The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe . . . standards applicable to the 
emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicle 
engines which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. 
The EPA gave four reasons for their decisions not to regulate CO2 emissions. 
First, they argued that when the relevant laws and amendments were passed in the 
1960s and 1970s, Congress had not anticipated the regulation of gases such as CO2, or 
indeed greenhouse gases as a whole, because Congress was concerned with pollutants 
that caused direct injury to human beings, not with substances that might contribute to 
global warming. Global warming was not on Congress’ radar screen when the laws 
were passed, and thus the EPA would not be justified in enacting broad national 
regulations to address the problem now. 
This led directly to the EPA’s second major argument. Given that the problem 
of global warming seemed substantially different from the original problems 
addressed by the Clean Air Act, it was necessary for Congress to address the new 
problem through the creation of a new statutory scheme. If a qualitative leap in 
regulation was required to protect the environment, then it should be a decision that 
can be directly traced to elected law-makers. In addition, EPA suggested that the fact 
that Congress had passed legislation to study the global warming indicated that 
Congress did not think that the problem had already been outsourced to the executive 
                                                 
229 For an analysis of some of the mistakes on pessimistic environmental prognostication, see 
Bjorn Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001.  
 170 
branch. Additional legislation was needed to properly deal with global warming, as the 
existing framework of environmental regulation made it difficult for the EPA to 
address greenhouse gases from automobiles. There were at least two major problems 
with the existing framework The regulation of automobile emissions created a 
potential jurisdictional conflict between the EPA and the Department of 
Transportation. More significantly, the EPA enforced the Clean Air Act through 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), which were based upon 
establishing regional goals that significantly departed from the national norms.230 The 
typical enforcement action taken by the EPA under the Clean Air Act was the 
targeting of industrial and urban regions that had unusually high levels of pollutants. 
The problem of CO2 emissions was very different, as CO2 concentration (as opposed 
to say, pollution from small particulate matter) is even throughout the entire nation. 
Regulating carbon dioxide simply raised issues that were too unusual to address under 
a statutory scheme that, according to the EPA, was meant to address very different 
problems. 
Judge Tatel argued that EPA’s interpretation of their responsibilities and 
powers was far too modest given the language of the Clean Air Act itself. We might 
say that the EPA interpreted the Clean Air Act as if it were modest, well-specified, and 
constitutional, when in fact it was extraordinarily ambitious, ambiguous, and based on 
an extremely broad delegation of Congressional responsibilities to the executive 
branch. While the assertion of EPA responsibility over green house gases was novel, it 
was not analogous to the attempt made by the FDA in the late 1990s to assert power 
over tobacco products.231 The FDA would have been required to immediately ban 
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tobacco products if they were to regulate it at all, while the EPA had considerable 
more leeway in dealing with CO2 and its ilk. But the leeway accorded to the EPA was 
not unlimited. The EPA had been granted discretion by Congress to determine what 
kinds of pollutants contributed to environmental harms, but they did not have the 
discretion to determine that regulation was not necessary or bad policy. Congress did 
not give the EPA the power to regulate the environment as it saw fit, but had instead 
mandated a specific “precautionary” approach to environmental harms that gave 
greater weight to potential harms (however remote) than to short term costs (however 
severe) According to Judge Tatel, the EPA had not explained its decision not to 
regulate in light of the explicit precautionary principles outlined in the Clean Air Act 
and its various amendments. 
Justice Randolph’s decision to accept the EPA’s determination regarding CO2 
emissions was perfectly reasonable. Yet as Judge Tatel ably demonstrated, it was not 
strictly speaking a legal decision, because it required adopting a reasonable but 
implausible interpretation of a Congressional law. Judge Tatel’s opinion represents a 
reasonable legal interpretation of a poorly drafted law. One might argue, in defense of 
Judge Randolph, that the open-ended, aspirational character of environmental laws, 
combined with the complexity of the issues raised by environmental regulation, 
requires judges to basically defer to the technical decisions made by the executive 
branch and leave it up to Congress to exercise control over executives that depart to 
radically from the evolving legislative will. The Chevron decision of the Supreme 
Court mandates this deferential approach to judicial review of administrative rule-
making.232 Yet even Chevron required the judges to respect, first and foremost, the 
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express intention of Congress, and Randolph’s deference rested on a willful blindness 
to the ambitious regulatory agenda that was clearly mandated, however unwisely, by 
the Clean Air Act. 
While Tatel’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act was superior to Randolph’s, 
his decision was nevertheless wrong. Randolph’s asserted that the executive should 
not be hampered by the courts in exercising its discretion to determine how to enforce 
or not enforce Congressional laws. But his opinion was misguided, because it forced 
him to openly acknowledge that the executive power is necessary not only to enforce 
Congressional law, but also to not enforce them when they are unwise or when they 
conflict with competing legislative goals. Because Randolph dismissed the issue of 
standing, he was forced to openly defend the proposition that the executive need not 
be bound by Congressional statutes (notwithstanding his lame attempt to explain away 
key provisions of the Clean Air Act.) Judge Tatel’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act 
is superior to Judge Randolph’s, but it is undercut by the mistaken view that he was 
dealing with a legal case, as opposed to an airing of political grievances—however 
serious those grievances might be.  
Judge Sentelle, who concurred with Randolph in regards to the outcome of the 
case, was able to defer to the EPA—or rather, to kick this political football back into 
the political arena where it properly belongs—without having to ignore or distort the 
language of the EPA in order to reach the pragmatic conclusion. His position was 
simple: the problem of global warming is global in scope, and the petitioners are 
arguing this case on behalf of humanity as a whole. Broad claims of this kind simply 
are not amenable to resolution by the courts; the claims they raise to do not constitute 
legal cases or controversies. 
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Many political scientists would argue that there really is no substantial 
difference between the opinions of Judge Randolph and Judge Sentelle in this case. 
The only serious divisions are between the “anti-environment” bloc and the dissenting 
“pro-environmental” Justice Tatel. My suggestion is that the pattern of judicial 
decisions at the appellate level regarding environmental policy do not support the 
conclusion that partisanship and policy-preferences are determine the rulings of 
judges. There is simply too much agreement amongst judges over a broad range of 
complex statutory questions, judges appointed by differing Presidents and with 
presumably different political orientations. The problem with opinions such as Tatel’s 
dissent in Massachusetts v. EPA is not that they are excessively political. The problem 
is that, by abandoning the standards of standing, they allow strict legality to take an 
unwarranted prominence in the policy-making process. 
The case of Massachusetts v. EPA illustrates how, once the rules of standing 
have been revised, it is very difficult for courts to avoid intervening into complex 
policy questions, thereby wresting control of policy from elected officials. Of course, 
from a different perspective, the liberalization of the rules of standing allow for the 
rule of law to triumph, at least potentially, in contrast to executive tyranny. The 
liberalization of the law of standing has been one of the major goals of the Canadian 
environment movement, who have long envied the ability of American 
environmentalists to play a role in the enforcement of environmental law.233 
Americans have had long experience with “private attorneys general,” and advocates 
of increased environmental regulation in Canada have, unsurprisingly, regarded this 
policy device as key to environmental protection in Canada.234 For some 
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commentators, as long as only the government is responsible for enforcing 
environmental law, environmental law will never be enforced responsibly. Thus it is 
not merely an academic exercise to consider whether the Canadian polity is showing a 
tendency to emulate the American system of private attorneys general. 
In his 1994 article on environmental litigation in Canada, Michael Howlett 
argued that Canadian courts have not, for the most part, followed the lead of their 
American counterparts in regards to questions of legal standing.235 Howlett reasoned 
that the constitutional transformations of the 1980s had simply not given the court any 
mandate to rearrange to processes of Canadian environmental law and policy. The 
Constitution Act and the Charter itself did not address the law of standing in regards to 
environmental matters. Furthermore, Canadian courts have been unwilling to read 
Section 7 of the Charter as if it contained an implied right to a clean environment. The 
courts have also ruled that the Charter only applies to relations between citizens and 
government (i.e. it does not apply to the relations between citizens and, say, a 
polluting company).236 Despite the negligible impact of the Charter, over the past three 
decades Canadian citizens have expanded their ability to raise public or quasi-public 
claims through the courts. The general rule for civil cases involving the public interest 
was that individuals could only pursue a case relating to a public grievance if they 
were “exceptionally prejudiced by the wrongful act.” In 1986, the Supreme Court of 
Canada offered further clarification regarding the prerequisites for private individuals 
to raise public interest claims in the courts: the issue must be “justiciable” (that is, it 
must be amenable to a court’s decision), it must not be “trivial” or “speculative,” the 
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individual must have either a strong personal interest in the case or a strong interest 
based on involvement in the policy process, and there must be no other reasonable 
means by which the action could be brought before the courts.237 As Howlett observes, 
these rules leave judges a great deal of discretion as to whether they will grant 
standing or withhold it. However, he interprets the discretionary aspects of the 
Canadian law of standing as an indication that environmental policy is less 
judicialized in Canada than in America, where litigants are often empowered by broad 
statutory provisions for standing.238 The real question, however, is whether Canadian 
judges have used their discretion so as to emulate the American law of standing. And 
here, Howlett’s conclusion does not seem accurate, especially if we consider Canadian 
judicial practice over the course of the 1990s. 
In environmental law decisions during the 1990s, Canadian courts enacted a 
veritable revolution in the law of standing. Despite the fact that the Canadian 
parliament has not attached specific “citizen suit” provisions to environmental 
legislation, in contrast to the practice of the American Congress, Canadian courts have 
been quite willing to allow private groups to contest government action. Out of the 71 
reported environmental policy cases decided by federal trial and appeal courts between 
1990 and 1999, there is not a single instance in which judges denied standing to a 
public interest group.239 The Supreme Court of Canada has consistently adhered to 
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broad understanding of the scope of standing in the post-Charter era.240 Thus while 
Howlett argued that the existence of judicial discretion regarding legal standing 
illustrates that Canadian environmental policy is less judicialized than its American 
counter-part, Canadian courts have liberalized standing laws to such an extent that 
there are essentially no substantive barriers to standing for Canadian environmental 
interest groups. Instead of being forced to stake claims on the basis of concrete 
violations of rights, Canadian environmental groups are more or less free to contest 
the legal interpretations and policy decisions of bureaucrats and cabinet ministers. 
Liberalized standing cannot simply be attributed to executive-legislative conflict 
within the American presidential system of government. Canadian courts have 
knocked down the barriers of standing without any direct pressure from parliament, 
and without any clear statutory directives to proceed in this manner. In regards to 
environmental policy, Canadian judges have decided, more or less on their own, that 
private attorneys general are a good thing. This is not to say that they are any more 
likely to endorse the ultimate goals of environmentalist litigants, however. 
One might object that the fact that federal courts tend overwhelmingly to grant 
standing to public interest groups in environmental policy does not necessarily mean 
that the rules of standing have been liberalized in Canada. Perhaps dozens of potential 
public litigants are dissuaded from even attempting to have their day in court by rigid 
rules of standing, rules which insure that only those with a concrete right at stake will 
be able to challenge the decisions of elected officials and expert bureaucrats. 
According to some researchers, for instance, Canadian environmental groups devote 
most of their resources towards non-litigation based political strategies, such as public 
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education.241 Perhaps this indicates that the law of standing is less lax than it first 
appears. 
A few examples will illustrate that this is probably not the case. The bar for 
standing in Canadian environmental law has been set very low. Even the most abstract 
claims made against administrative agencies have an excellent chance of being heard 
by the Canadian courts. A litigant need not face the threat of having her farmland 
covered by an artificial lake in order to contest dam-building permits; she need only 
show an authentic sense of aesthetic disapproval for dams; it might help if she can 
show that there was a minor procedural error in the permit-granting process. The 
crucial point is that Canadian courts are willing to hear cases on the basis of policy 
objections. These policy objections need to be cloaked in the rhetoric of “rights talk,” 
or based on semi-plausible readings of obscure statutory passages; but these are of 
course simple operations for any moderately skilled practitioner of the legal arts. 
The case of Canadian Environmental Law Association v. Canada-Minister of 
Environment,242 is probably the most interesting example of the complete erosion of 
the rules of standing, at least insofar as those rules relate to environmental policy. In 
this case, CELA raised a challenge to a half-dozen federal-provincial environmental 
policy agreements. CELA wanted the courts to declare these agreements invalid, due 
to the fact that they seemed to place restrictions on the discretionary power of federal 
ministers in several areas related to environmental policy. It is important to note that 
CELA was challenging agreements in this case. No actual actions had been taken on 
the basis of those agreements. CELA’s case for the illegality of the agreements was 
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based on an assortment of hypothetical scenarios. It is also crucial to remember that 
the Canadian Constitution makes federal-provincial agreements of this kind a practical 
necessity, due to that document’s imprecise delimitation of environmental 
jurisdiction.243 
In essence, CELA’s case was based on nothing more than its distaste for the 
particular modus vivendi that had emerged from the process of federal-provincial 
diplomacy. Given the absence of any clearly relevant constitutional right, and given 
the absence of any actual government actions, why should CELA have been allowed 
to voice its objections in a federal court? The federal-provincial agreements seemed to 
be no business of CELA. Were its members apprehensive about the possible 
consequences of such agreements, they could of course vote against federal politicians 
who foolishly deign to compromise and cooperate with their provincial counterparts. 
The trial judge in this case was unmoved, if not unaware, of any possible 
objections of this sort. Judge Reed simply assumed that the business of Canada is 
CELA’s business as well, and proceeded to address the substantive issues of the case 
(e.g. did the federal minister of the environment fetter her own discretion and the 
discretion of other ministers in an unconstitutional manner?) The fact that the issue of 
standing was studiously ignored does not mean that everything would go CELA’s 
way. In fact, CELA was not able convince the judge to overturn the agreements or 
declare sections of them unconstitutional. As is often the case in Canadian 
environmental law, litigants with no concrete stake in a case are granted standing only 
to have their application dismissed. 
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I will use one more example—Friends of the Island (FOTI) v. Canada244 in 
order to illustrate my point that the total absence of denials of standing in Canadian 
environmental law cases is because the rules of standing have been gutted. FOTI v. 
Canada is an amusing example, as it contains a peculiar application of “strict textual 
interpretation.” The Canadian government, in conjunction with the government of 
Prince Edward Island, intended to construct a bridge connecting PEI with mainland 
Canada. According to the then-existing rule dealing with environmental issues related 
to federally approved projects—the Environmental Assessment and Review Process 
Guidelines Order (EARPGO)—the Minister of Public Works had to assess 
environmental impact when approving a bridge of this kind.245 Due to the high level of 
public concern, the Minister of Public Works asked the Minister of the Environment to 
refer the details of the project to an environmental assessment panel. The panel 
concluded that the possible environmental damage caused by the bridge was too great 
to allow for construction to continue, though it was willing to consider the 
development of an underground tunnel. The Minister of the Environment, presumably 
after considering the relative costs of tunnels and bridges, felt that it would be possible 
for the final bridge plan to mitigate the environmental problems addressed by the 
panel. By January of 1993, eight years after the initial plan for the bridge had begun, 
Strait Crossing Incorporated was given the construction contract. 
FOTI challenged the decision to move forward on bridge construction on two 
grounds: first, that the EARPGO had not been fully complied with in the project 
review and assessment stage, and secondly, that the decision to replace the PEI ferry 
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with a bridge constituted a violation of the Prince Edward Island terms of Union. The 
PEI Terms of Union state that the Dominion Government (Canada) is required to 
maintain an “an efficient steam service” between PEI and mainland Canada. And as 
the Canadian Federal Court reporter helpfully points out, “A bridge is not an efficient 
steam service.” Clearly, a legal violation of considerable magnitude was at stake. 
One might well wonder whether a right to ferry service is so fundamental as to 
deserve judicial protection, especially in an era of “progressive” constitutionalism. 
The government’s lawyers certainly did their best to argue for a flexible interpretation 
of the terms of union. Yet even if the Judge Reed felt compelled to adopt Protestant 
interpretative principles in this case,246 he was still faced with a problem: the right to 
ferry service had not yet been abridged. True, the government had shown a clear 
intention to neglect its traditional responsibility for efficient steam service. The people 
of PEI (or at least their self-chosen spokespersons), ever jealous of incursions on their 
sacred liberties, were not about to ignore the federal government’s “settled design” on 
their constitutionally protected three-hour boat rides. Yet as the government lawyers 
also observed, there was no way to show how FOTI had an interest in the case, an 
interest that might distinguish them from the general public. The PEI terms of 
agreement actually specified that it was the right of the provincial government to 
challenge violations of the agreement in court. 
The trial court judge was not impressed by these considerations. FOTI were 
granted standing, despite the fact that no right had been violated, and despite the fact 
that they were not the most likely possessor of the relevant rights. Unlike the case of 
CELA v. Canada, FOTI was granted more than standing; the judge granted them a stay 
against the permit for bridge construction, thereby insuring that FOTI’s private 
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preference for ferry trips would be respected for just a little while longer. But once 
again, though the Friends of the Island were allowed their day in court, the 
Confederation Bridge project was not ultimately derailed. 
Canadian courts have adopted a liberalized interpretation of the rules of 
standing. Unlike the case in the United States, there are no judges in Canadian courts 
who have articulated the rationale behind the traditional understanding of standing. As 
in the case with questions of federal jurisdiction over the environment, Canadian 
courts have adopted a “progressive” position when evaluating issues of standing. The 
limits of environmentalism in Canadian law only become apparent through an 
examination of how Canadian courts deal with disputes over the interpretation of 
environmental law. 
4.5 Divergent Paths: Statutory Interpretation and Administrative Discretion in 
Canadian and American Environmental Law 
The “rights revolutions” in Canada and the United States have followed similar 
trajectories, at least in regards to the novel rights to challenge government that have 
emerged through the revolutionary re-thinking of the concept of legal standing.247 The 
expansion of standing, therefore, does not appear dependent upon any factors or 
motives that emerge from the specific political arrangements in the United States or in 
Canada. We would nevertheless expect that the judicialization of American 
environmental policy, or at least the scope of political-legal conflict over 
environmental policy, to be far more prominent, for two central reasons: the separation 
of powers, and the greater degree of ideological diversity in the American political 
system. There are two features of the separation of powers which would seem to make 
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the judicialization of public policy more likely, or more extensive, in the American 
system than in a parliamentary system: 
1) The legislature is more likely to either be opposed to an executive from an 
opposing party, or to anticipate being in such a situation. This kind of tension and 
distrust between the executive and the legislature typically does not exist in 
parliamentary systems. As a consequence, members of Congress have an incentive to 
expand the scope for judicial oversight of the executive branch, as well as an incentive 
to increase the capacity of interest groups to use the courts to challenge executive 
decision-making.248 In contrast, there has been an ever increasing tendency within 
Parliamentary governments, especially Canadian governments, to vest increasing 
powers in the cabinet, the federal civil service, and the Prime Minister’s office.249 
2) The fact that the government does not depend upon the support of the 
legislature in American politics has reduced the need for party discipline, and the 
policy-making process is affected by this comparative weakness of American 
parties.250 In some circumstances, weak parties produce legislators who are more 
prone to create ambiguous laws.251 This is because ambiguous policy proposals are 
more likely to survive the legislative process in Congress than laws which set clear 
policy goals. This feature of American law-making is not omnipresent. Particularly 
after the sub-committee revolution of the 1970s, and perhaps in response to criticisms 
of Congressional delegation of law-making power, American legislators increased 
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their capacity to insert detailed regulatory provisions into law.252 Yet nevertheless, 
American laws in the modern administrative state have exacerbated problems that are 
inherent in the attempt to rule through law: the failure to anticipate all of the 
circumstances in which the law has to be applied, and the failure to reconcile 
conflicting legal requirements or policy programs. Modern law has the additional 
problem of often stating aspirations instead of establishing principles. This is a 
problem for law-makers in parliamentary systems of government as well. But in 
parliamentary systems there is no separation between the legislature and the executive, 
no formal separation between those who make and those who enforce it. When 
Parliamentary governments offer interpretations of ambitious or poorly specified laws, 
it is difficult for courts to argue that the government is departing from the will of the 
legislature; the government serves at the will of the legislature. In the United States, 
the situation is very different. While the President has always played a role in the 
legislative process, whether through the exercise of traditional powers or through the 
expanded institutions and practices of the modern “legislative” or “plebiscitary” 
Presidency,253 the specific enforcement actions of the Presidency and the executive 
branch cannot necessarily claim to have the support of the legislature in the same way 
that Prime Ministerial actions can claim support from the Commons. 
The American system is thus ripe for conflict between the legislature and the 
executive in the arena of environmental policy. The key difference between the 
Congressional and Parliamentary system lies in the fact that the executive in the 
Parliamentary system exists by virtue of legislative support. A Canadian court that 
challenges a government decision does not merely challenge an executive (who may 
                                                 
252 R. Shep Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act. Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1983 pp 5-9. 
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or may not have Congressional support regarding the interpretation of law) but the 
majority of representatives of the national government. The President’s institutional 
independence from Congress is, in contrast, a source of weakness when confronting 
the courts. A cabinet minister in Canada, when interpreting ambiguous provisions in 
law, can claim that their interpretations are implicitly supported by the very people 
who are responsible for either making or maintaining the laws. The President, lacking 
that institutional connection to the legislature, is a more fitting target for judicial 
suspicion. Given all of these factors, we would expect environmental policy to be 
more “judicialized” in the United States than in Canada.254  
While conflict over environmental jurisdiction created by the Canadian 
Constitution provides opportunities to adjudicate disputes between the federal and 
provincial governments, federal environmental statutes are often strewn with the kind 
of ambitious yet ambiguous statements which practically beg for judicial resolution. 
Consider the following statement from the preamble to the 1999 Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act: 
Whereas the Government of Canada is committed to implementing the 
precautionary principle that, where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. 
Statutory language of this kind has the potential to be a valuable resource for 
public-interest litigants. The precautionary principle is an environmentalist version of 
Pascal’s wager, in which “complete ecological catastrophe” is equivalent to the 
existence of God and “economic development” equivalent to the delights of free-
wheeling atheism. However, arguments supporting the impending possibility of 
ecological catastrophe are at least as uncertain as those in favor of the existence of 
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God. Perhaps this is why the impending ecological damage must be “serious” or 
“irreversible,” and why the preventive measures must be “cost-effective.” Yet all of 
these terms depend upon scientific assessments of environmental impact, as well as 
economic calculations of the relative benefits of regulation versus development. This 
clause, like many others that proliferate in Canadian environmental statutes, seem to 
incorporate both a desire to privilege the post-materialist claims of environmental 
movements and a desire not to overly restrict the discretion of federal administrators. 
In practice, the courts are forced to determine whether post-material aspirations or 
governmental flexibility will predominate.255 
The vague language used by lawmakers in this instance causes statutory 
interpretation to be a potential vehicle for the judicialization of environmental policy. 
Thus, just as Kelly may underestimate the centralization of policy by focusing on 
disallowance as opposed to jurisdictional issues, one can easily underestimate the 
extent of judicial power if one neglects to consider that judges have the potential to 
exercise power through the mundane task of statutory interpretation. 
Yet despite the ambiguities in law that seem to provide opportunities for the 
exercise of judicial power, Parliamentary governments constrain the opportunities for 
the “judicialization” of environmental policies in at least two general ways. First, 
parliamentary governments are usually well-positioned to reverse judicial decisions 
that hamper executive discretion,256 and secondly, parliamentary governments are less 
likely to constrain executive discretion through detailed statutes that impose non-
discretionary duties on administrators. Perhaps paradoxically, American courts have 
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the potential to intervene into environmental policy whether Congress writes laws that 
are broad and vague, or detailed and wonkish. In Canada, courts are constrained 
because Lilliputian legislators have fewer incentives to constrain executive Gullivers; 
and if the courts act to restrain executive discretion, legislators have the incentive and 
the capacity to challenge and reverse those judicial decisions. 
In order to assess the ways in which differing institutional environments place 
limits on judicial policy-making, it is useful to consider one of the major aspects of 
environmental policy in Canada and the United States: environmental impact 
assessment. Environmental assessment refers to the process through which 
governments evaluate the impact that development projects have upon various aspects 
of the environment, such as the effect of development upon human health, the 
potential for pollution, the disruption of eco-systems, the threat to endangered species, 
and so on. By looking at the statutes that govern environmental assessment in the 
United States and Canada, we can see how American political institutions create a far 
greater scope for judicial intervention into environmental policy. 
The principal environmental assessment law in the United States is the 
National Environmental Policy Act, or NEPA. The key element of NEPA reads as 
follows: 
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible . . . all 
agencies of the federal government shall include, in every recommendation or 
report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the 
responsible official on the environmental impact of the proposed action. 
As other scholars have noted, there are no provisions for enforcement of this 
law other than through recourse to litigation—no special boards or tribunals were 
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established to oversee the environmental assessment process. Thus, the courts have 
played a key role in implementing NEPA from the very beginning.257 
In Canada, similarly, environmental assessment involves identifying and 
reviewing federal projects that are likely to have an environmental impact. “Federal 
projects” are those projects initiated by federal departments and agencies, using 
federal funds, or involving federal funds or federal jurisdiction. What is most 
interesting about the judicial role in environmental assessment policy is the way in 
which Parliament has circumscribed the role played by judges. Canadian judges have 
shown some inclination to “judicialize” environmental policy, but here, limits on 
political jurisprudence have been successfully imposed by political actors. Even while 
Canadian courts were clearly moved by environmental values in their attempt to insert 
non-discretionary duties into the Canadian environmental assessment process, the 
capacity of the courts to do this was limited by their institutional environment. All of 
this is fully consistent with a purely political interpretation of judicial decision-
making. What is not consistent is the way in which the generally progressive Canadian 
judiciary comes to accept that “environmental values”—if accompanied by American-
style environmental litigation—cannot be imposed through judicial decisions. After 
being rebuked by elected legislators, the Canadian judiciary does not carry on 
institutional warfare with Parliament. In contrast to what we might expect based upon 
the general trends of Canadian jurisprudence in other areas, Canadian judges come to 
accept that, for the most part, Canadian courts should not attempt to emulate the role 
played by American courts in environmental policy. 
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The Canadian version of environmental assessment began to take shape in the 
early 1970s, as the desire for development in Canada’s resource-dependent economy 
began to be qualified by concerns with environmental degradation. Environmental 
assessment of federal projects, as in the U.S.A., was meant to help the national 
government take into account the “externalities” created by economic development. 
Yet the concern with environmentalism in Canada took place in the shadow of NEPA, 
which had already been revealed as heavily dependent upon litigation, with its 
attendant costs and lack of predictability.258 As a result, Canadian policy-makers 
approached environmental assessment in a cautious, Canadian fashion. In contrast to 
the USA, where environmental assessment laws were created without an 
accompanying bureaucratic apparatus, the Trudeau government in Canada created a 
bureaucracy without an accompanying law to enforce. The Canadian Federal 
Environmental Assessment Review Office was established by cabinet decision in 
1973. From this beginning point, the Canadian analogue to NEPA—the 
Environmental Assessment and Review Process, or EARP—would evolve over the 
next several decades. But the role of the courts in this process would not be analogous 
to the American case. 
In order to compare the role played by Canadian and American courts in the 
environmental assessment process, I have assembled a sample of 50 American and 35 
Canadian environmental cases. The American cases are drawn from Federal Appeals 
Court cases decided in 2006-2007; the Canadian cases are composed of all 
environmental assessment cases decided by the Canadian Federal Court of Appeals 
between 1990 and 2007, as well as all environmental assessment cases decided by the 
British Columbia, Alberta, and Ontario courts of appeal between 2000 and 2007.259 
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The decisions of executive branch officials were overturned, in whole or in part, in 21 
out of 51 cases in the American federal appellate courts. In the Canadian federal 
appellate courts and the courts of appeal in Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario, 
decisions by government officials were overturned in whole or in part in 7 out of 35 
cases. It is interesting to note that in 3 of the 7 cases where Canadian appellate courts 
overturned government decisions, the courts acted in favor of business or development 
interests. Judging by these environmental assessment cases, the Canadian appellate 
courts are no haven for environmentalist interest groups. The revolution in the law of 
standing has done little to give environmentalist litigants any purchase over 
environmental policy through the Canadian court system. 
Another way to consider the scope of politicization in American and Canadian 
environmental assessment jurisprudence is to consider the level of unanimity in 
appellate court decisions. In the 50 NEPA cases decided by American appellate courts 
which I examined, there were dissenting votes in 10 of the cases; there were only 2 
dissenting votes in the 35 environmental assessment cases decided by Canadian 
appellate courts. This indicates that the moderate, deferential approach to government 
decision-makers in environmental policy is not a particular matter of controversy at 
the appellate court level. There is no struggle in Canadian jurisprudence between those 
who wish to incorporate “green” values into their decision-making, and those who 
wish to respect the generally pro-development inclinations of government and 
business. The unwillingness of Canadian appellate courts to intervene into 
environmental policy, and the low levels of dissent in environmental assessment cases, 
is a good indicator of the ways in which the parliamentary system places political 
restraints on even the most progressive judiciaries. 
Does this mean that the American environmental law decisions are simply 
political, not different in kind from the struggles over environmental policy that occur 
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in other forums? The answer, I believe, is that there is less contention and less 
politicization in American environmental law than we might expect, even if American 
courts are more interventionist and more divided than their Canadian counterparts. In 
order to examine the scope of politicization in American environmental law, I 
conducted a Lexis Nexis search of federal appellate court cases, using the following 
environmental policy-related statutes as keywords: Clean Water Act (CWA), National 
Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), National Forest Management Act (NFMA), 
the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the Clean Air Act (CAA). I selected over 100 
cases, based upon whether or not at least one environmental interest group was 
opposing a position taken by the national government, or by state governments who 
were participating in a nationally mandated policy. 
In analyzing the cases, I divided the cases into the following categories: 
1) Cases in which environmentalist petitioners succeeded on at least one of 
their claims 
2) Cases in which environmentalist petitioners were completely rebuffed by 
the courts 
3) Cases in which “anti-environmentalist” (typically, businesses or business 
associations) petitioners succeeded on at least one of their claims 
4) Cases in which “anti-environmentalist” groups lost on all of their claims 
Table 8 summarizes the outcomes in these cases. 
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Table 8: Environmental Law Cases in U.S. Courts of Appeal.* 
 N = 100 Cases with  
Dissenting Votes 
Court Maj. 
Dem. 
Court Maj. 
GOP 
1. Environmentalist 
Petitioner Wins 
39 4 19 20 
2. Environmentalist 
Petitioner Loses 
43 3 17 26 
3. Anti-Environmentalist 
Petitioner Wins  
5 2 3 2 
4. Anti-Environmentalist 
Petitioner Loses  
13 0 4 9 
* See Appendix F for a full list of cases. 
What is of most interest in the outcomes of these cases is the absence of any clear 
partisan divisions on the court. 93 out of 100 of these cases were decided 
unanimously, despite the fact that most of the cases (86) featured appeals court panels 
with judges appointed by both parties. Success for environmental interest groups does 
not seem to depend on facing Democratic appointees on the bench. These decisions 
show that the appeals courts are not overly hesitant to take the side of environmentalist 
interest groups, but the courts are not especially fractured by deep partisan divisions. 
Without detailed knowledge of the specific political preferences of the 126 judges who 
participated in these cases, it is impossible to reject with certainty that the judges are 
not simply voting their policy preferences. Still, when one considers the increased 
attention that both parties have paid to the appointment process in recent decades,260 
the increase of partisan differences amongst political elites,261 and the intensity of 
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public conflict over environmental issues,262 it is interesting that the battles over 
environmental policy that occupy the public, the pundits, and the politicians have not, 
for the most part, spilled over into the judicial branch. The question of whether judges 
are “really” on the basis of their policy preferences in these cases is in some ways 
politically irrelevant, if the policy preferences of Democratic and Republican 
appointees converge (for the most part) when dealing with highly contentious issues 
such as environmental regulation. 
At the Supreme Court level, comparisons are more difficult to make due to the 
paucity of environmental law decisions in the Canadian Supreme Court, and the even 
greater paucity of cases dealing with highly significant environmental issues. The 
Canadian Supreme Court has, in the post-charter era, decided only 18 cases dealing 
with environmental law and regulation.263 Evidence of statutory activism is slim to 
non-existent. In the case of The Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada,264 the 
court ruled that the federal EARPGO process was mandatory, and had to be applied to 
an Alberta dam that had undergone construction. The federal government underwent 
the review process, but this had no impact upon the construction of the dam. The court 
did play a role in halting the James Bay Hydro Electric Project by enjoining the 
federal government to conduct an environmental review. Yet, while the case certainly 
pitted the court against the Quebec provincial government, it is far from clear whether 
the federal government was averse to conducting a federal environmental assessment 
over the project.265 So, while the court did force the federal to act in this case, judicial 
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intervention did not really supplant the preferred political options of national decision 
makers. As in the case of R. v. Crown Zellerbach, the court has intervened into 
environmental policy as a supporter of national jurisdiction and national 
policymaking. This is judicial activism of a sort, but it difficult to construe it as anti-
democratic or counter-majoritarian judicial activism.266 
The American Supreme Court has been more willing, in general, to rule 
against national, state, and local governments based upon statutory interpretation. This 
can be seen by looking at decisions addressing one of the central national 
environmental regulatory statutes, the Clean Air Act. The Court ruled on 8 cases 
dealing interpretation of the Clean Air Act; it directly overturned or challenged the 
statutory interpretations of national policy-makers in two of those cases. One of those 
defeats for the national government, the case of Massachusetts v. EPA discussed 
above, saw a clear division of the court into “liberal” and “conservative” wings; in the 
other case, discussed below, the Court ruled unanimously in favor of the trucking 
industry’s challenge to the regulatory power of the EPA. The court has also made 
several rulings against state governments, though here the issues were not as 
momentous; rather than dealing with the implementation of nation-wide rules, the only 
loss for state governments in the Clean Air Act cases dealt with awards for attorney’s 
fees. The key thing to note is that the political divisions on display in Massachusetts v. 
EPA are not necessarily reflected in all of the cases dealing with the Clean Air Act; if 
the judges are voting simply on the basis of policy preferences in these cases, or at 
least, their preferences cannot be determined by their general ideological orientations. 
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The court ruled in favor of the national government in 6 cases. In these cases, 
there is little indication that the willingness of individual judges to defer to the 
government shifts depending upon whether they prefer a more or less active approach 
to government regulation. In one instance, liberal judges argued in dissent that the 
power of the national government to enforce environmental policy had to be restrained 
by the criminal law provisions of the Bill of Rights—a clear case of legal 
commitments trumping presumed policy preferences.267 One unanimous decision 
upheld government regulatory power over the legalistic objections of General 
Motors,268 another more recent case (with Souter in lone dissent) held that federal law 
pre-empted some of California’s more rigorous clean air regulations.269 Similarly, in 
2004, the Court ruled unanimously against the claim that the EPA must be required to 
exercise its authority over cross-border transportation operations between Mexico and 
the United States.270 These unanimous (or near unanimous) decisions indicate that, 
while the American political system provides considerable opportunity for judicial 
intervention into environmental policy, the ways in which judges choose to challenge 
(or not challenge) government decisions is not determined by their individual 
assessment of environmental regulation alone. A closer look at several examples of 
American appeals court decisions that address the Clean Air Act will help to illustrate 
how the division of powers in American politics and the nature of statutory law-
making affect the role of courts in the environmental policy process. 
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4.5.i Statutory Interpretation and the Clean Air Act: Whitman v. American 
Trucking Association (United States Supreme Court, 2001), New York et al 
v. EPA (D.C. Circuit), 
The Clean Air Act and its various amendments has been one of the most highly 
litigated aspects of American Environmental policy, and courts have played a major 
role in shaping the implementation of the act since its inception.271 Table 9 
summarizes the cases decided by the United States Supreme Court between 1985 and 
2007 which addressed various aspects of the Clean Air Act. 
What is interesting about the patterns of decisions regarding the Clean Air Act 
is the general absence of the kinds of clear political divisions that are apparent in other 
controversial areas of law, such as the Supreme Court’s abortion decision. This is not 
to say that political divisions are absent. The case of Massachusetts v. EPA, discussed 
earlier in regards to the question of standing, is one example of a clear “liberal vs. 
conservative” split over the scope of the EPA’s duties under the Clean Air Act. A 
similar division is apparent in Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. 
EPA, in which a majority on the court endorsed the EPA’s determination to enforce a 
more rigorous air protection policy on the government of Alaska.272 But liberal 
justices have not maintained anything like a general endorsement of environmentalist 
claims in regards to this law. This can be seen by looking at one of the court’s 
unanimous Clean Air Act decisions from the past decade: Whitman v. American 
Trucking Association.273 The case reveals some of the distinctly legal factors that 
shape how American courts resolve environmental policy questions. 
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Table 9: Clean Air Act Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1985-2007. 
Case and Year Description  Outcome Majority Dissent 
Pennsylvania v. Delaware 
Valley Citizens Council for 
Clean Air et al, 1986 
Government Actor: Penn. 
Law: Clean Air Act 
Issue: attorney’s fees 
Ruling: Award of attorneys’ fees for 1) work in administrative 
proceedings held authorized by Clean Air Act (42 USCS 
7604(d)), but held to have been 2) improperly increased for 
superior quality of work. 
1) Pro-env,  
Anti-state gov 
2) Anti-env, Pro-
state 
1) Unanimous 
2) White, 
Burger, Powell, 
Rehnquist, 
Stevens, 
O’Connor 
2) Blackmun, 
Marshall, 
Brennan  
Pennsylvania v. Delaware 
Valley Citizens Council for 
Clean Air et al, 1987 
Government Actor: Pennsylvania, USA 
Law: Clean Air Act 
Issue: dispute over attorney’s fees for consent decree  
Ruling: Enhancement of reasonable lodestar amount for risk of 
loss when awarding attorneys’ fees to prevailing party pursuant to 
fee-shifting provision of Clean Air Act (42 USCS 7604(d)) held 
improper. 
Pro-state gov 
Anti-env  
White, 
Rehnquist, 
Powell, Scalia, 
O’Connor  
Blackmun, 
Brennan, 
Marshall, 
Stevens  
General Motors 
Corporation v. United 
States, 1990 
Government Actor: EPA 
Law: Clean Air Act  
Issue: review of State implementation plan (SIP) 
Ruling: Clean Air Act held not to (1) require review of state 
implementation plan (SIP) revision within 4 months, or (2) 
prevent enforcement of existing SIP, where SIP revision is not 
timely reviewed. 
Pro-env  
Pro-federal gov 
Unanimous   
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Table 9 (Continued). 
Case and Year Description  Outcome Majority Dissent 
Whitman v. American 
Trucking Association, 2001 
Government Actor: EPA 
Law: Clean Air Act  
Issues: 1) Did the Clean Air Act delegate legislative power to the 
administrator of the EPA? 
2) Can the administrator consider the costs of implementation?  
3) Do courts have jurisdiction with respect to revising ozone 
NAAQS? 
4) If so, was the EPA’s interpretation permissible?  
Ruling: CAA provisions do not unconstitutionally delegate 
legislative power; they do not permit consideration costs of 
implementation  
Anti-gov 
Anti-env 
Unanimous re. 
result 
 
Engine Manufacturers 
Association/Western States 
Petroleum Association v. 
South Coast Air Quality 
Management District, 2004 
Government Actor: SCAQMD (California) 
Laws: Clean Air Act, state regulation 
Issue: Is the state regulation pre-empted by CAA? 
Ruling: Yes. California subdivision’s rules, imposing emission 
requirements on motor vehicles purchased or leased by public and 
private fleet operators, held not to escape pre-emption under § 
209(a) of Clean Air Act (42 USCS § 7543(a)). 
Pro-fed 
Anti-env 
Scalia, J., 
Rehnquist, Ch. 
J., and Stevens, 
O’Connor, 
Kennedy, 
Thomas, 
Ginsburg, and 
Breyer,  
Souter 
Alaska Department of 
Environmental 
Conservation v. EPA, 2004 
Government Actor: EPA, Alaska Department of Environmental 
conservation 
Law: CAA 
Issue: Can EPA rule on reasonableness of best available control 
technology decisions by state permitting agencies re. polluting 
facilities? Did EPA properly block construction?  
Ruling: EPA can make the ruling, and properly blocked 
construction 
Pro-fed 
Pro-env 
Ginsburg, 
Stevens, 
O’Connor, 
Souter, and 
Breyer 
Kennedy, 
Rehnquist, 
Scalia, 
Thomas 
  
198
Table 9 (Continued). 
Case and Year Description  Outcome Majority Dissent 
DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, et 
al., Petitioners v. PUBLIC 
CITIZEN et al, 2004 
 
Government Actor: DOT, EPA 
Law: NEPA and CAA 
Issue: Does National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 
USCS §§ 4321 et seq.) and Clean Air Act (42 USCS §§ 7401 et 
seq.) require Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration to 
evaluate environmental effects of some cross-border operations 
by Mexican-domiciled carriers? 
Ruling: Government decision upheld  
Pro-gov 
Anti-env 
unanimous  
Massachusetts v. EPA, 
2007 
Government Actor: EPA 
Laws: CAA, APA 
Issue: Does the CAA has the authority to regulate green house 
gases such as carbon dioxide? 
Ruling: Case remanded to EPA, which must provide reasons for 
decision not to regulate green house gases that do not run afoul of 
APA arbitrary and capricious standards  
Anti-fed gov 
Pro-env 
Stevens, 
Kennedy, Souter, 
Ginsburg, Breyer 
Roberts, 
Thomas, 
Alito, Scalia  
Environmental Defense, et 
al., Petitioners v. Duke 
Energy Corporation, et al. 
Government Actor: Federal government joined by environmental 
petitioners 
Laws: CAA 
Issue: Are re-designed coal fired electric generating units “major 
modifications” under CAA? Must “modification” be interpreted 
identically under all CAA implementing regulations?  
Ruling: lower court overturned; no need for identical 
interpretation of terms 
Pro-gov 
Pro-env 
Souter 
Roberts 
Scalia 
Breyer 
Ginsburg 
Alito 
Stevens 
Kennedy 
Thomas (in part)  
Thomas (in 
part) 
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Whitman v. American Trucking Association dealt with the Clean Air Act’s 
directive to establish National Ambient Air Quality Standards.274 These standards 
establish the maximum amount of pollutants allowable in the air, standards that are 
developed and enforced by the EPA. The interpretation and implementation of 
NAAQS has been a central problem in environmental law, because a great deal of 
uncertainty has been built into the relevant statutory framework.275 As a consequence, 
this aspect of American environmental policy has been subjected to considerable 
judicial scrutiny. 
In the case of Whitman v. American Trucking Association, the Supreme Court 
faced a direct challenge to the statutory framework of the EPA. Specifically, the 
American Trucking Association and the other parties to the case claimed that the 
Clean Air Act unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the EPA administrator. 
To challenge the delegation of legislative power to the executive is in many ways to 
challenge the basis of the post-New Deal administrative state.276 According to some 
liberal commentators, the attempt to resuscitate the non-delegation doctrine is part of 
the larger project that aims to return the “Constitution in Exile,” the jurisprudential 
regime that once placed significant limits not only on the ability of Congress to blur 
the lines between creating law and enforcing it, but also limited the scope and 
ambitions of the national government as a whole.277 Thus, the various industries 
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Public Administration Review. Vol. 60, No. 1 (Jan. 2000) pp 39-46. 
277 For an overview of the debate over the New Deal’s relationship to the Constitutional order, 
see William Forbath, “The New Deal Constitution in Exile.” Duke Law Journal. Vol. 51, No.1 (Oct., 
2001) pp 165-222. 
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involved in this case were not merely challenging the EPA, but were raising some 
basic constitutional challenges to the political status quo, which in many ways is based 
upon the demise of the non-delegation doctrine.278  
The non-delegation doctrine, in its traditional form, was based on the premise 
that the powers given to branches of government could not be given to other 
individuals, groups, organizations, or (most relevant here) other branches of 
government. The rule made a good deal of sense—after all, legislators are elected to 
create laws, not to create new legislatures, however much this might help them focus 
on more pleasing tasks such as campaign fund raising and interest-group funded 
junkets. In eras where the responsibilities of government were rather limited, as in the 
19th century United States, the non-delegation was rarely employed by courts because 
legislators rarely attempted to delegate power. When the problem of delegation of 
power was raised, (for instance, in relation to tariff setting decisions that could not be 
easily made on a case-by-case basis by Congress as a whole), courts usually required 
that Congress had only to determine a practical principle that could guide executive 
decision making. Under this standard, the court upheld some fairly amorphous laws. 
Over the course of the late 19th and early 20th century, the modern administrative state 
(whether executive branch agencies or independent regulatory commissions) would 
raise questions not only about whether the substantive goals but also whether the 
means employed by progressive reformers were compatible with traditional standards 
of legality and American constitutionalism. Yet by the end of the 1930s, the court had 
shown that it was willing to be more deferential when reviewing Congressional 
delegations of power to the executive branch.279 
                                                 
278 David Schoenbrod, Power without Responsibility: How Congress abuses the people 
through delegation. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993.  
279 See David Schoenbrod, “The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give it Substance?” 
Michigan Law Review. Vol. 98, No. 2 (April, 1985) pp 1223-1290. 
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The non-delegation doctrine has re-emerged in recent years, after an almost 
century-long hiatus. In the case of Whitman v. American Trucking Association, the 
circuit court for the District of Columbia used the non-delegation doctrine, or at least a 
version of it, to challenge the ways in which the EPA had interpreted its responsibility 
to establish air quality standards. Under the Clean Air Act, Congress gave the EPA the 
responsibility to set standards for ozone and particulate matter “requisite to protect the 
public health” and with an “adequate margin of safety.” In is 1997 revisions of the 
“national ambient air quality standards” (NAAQS) for ozone, the EPA decided to 
reduce the allowable “parts per million” (ppm) from 0.08 to 0.07. In American law, 
litigation has sprung from things even smaller than one-one hundredth of a part per 
million of ozone. 
In an opinion by Judge Williams, joined by Judge Ginsburg and in part by 
Judge David Tatel, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the EPA had not 
provided an intelligible principle for reducing the allowable ppm’s.280 Section 109 of 
the Clean Air Act states that the standards must be set at a level “requisite to protect 
the public health” with and “adequate margin of safety.” The EPA had determined that 
ozone was definitely a “non-threshold” pollutant—that is, a pollutant that has adverse 
health impacts at any level. Given this fact, it was necessary for the EPA to provide an 
explanation of their decision to reduce the ppm level. As Judge Williams put it, “here 
it is as though Congress commanded the EPA to select ‘big guys,’ and the EPA 
announced that it would evaluate candidates based on height and weight, but revealed 
no cut-off point. The reasonable person responds ‘how tall? how heavy?’” Yet a 
reasonable person might also question whether Williams’ critique falls under the 
category of the non-delegation doctrine. 
                                                 
280 American Trucking Association v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1053-55 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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What was unusual about the use of the “non-delegation doctrine” in this case 
was that it was used to question an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute, 
not to challenge the way Congress had delimited the responsibilities of the agency. 
Under this new guise, the non-delegation doctrine was used not to constrain or prevent 
delegations of power by Congress, but rather to prevent “unprincipled” or arbitrary 
decisions made by administrative agencies. In effect, the court was telling the agency 
that the violation of the non-delegation doctrine could be avoided if the agency 
adopted the principles that Congress had failed to provide it. In order to be 
“principled,” however, the agency would have to explain to the court why it had 
adopted the 0.07ppm standard as opposed to 0.08, or 0.09, or “0,” or “killer fog” levels 
of pollution. As reasonable as this demand for reasons might seem, it appeared to be 
the rejected “hard-look” doctrine in “non-delegation” clothing.  
The decision of the D.C. Circuit court was in many ways typical of a certain 
strain of modern judicial conservatism that aims to restrict aspects of the modern state 
without returning to the standards of pre-New Deal jurisprudence. The non-delegation 
doctrine was not resurrected in its pre-New Deal form in this case. Instead the courts 
adopted a somewhat curious approach: the law was not an unconstitutional delegation 
of legislative power in itself, but was only un-Constitutional as interpreted by the 
EPA. Of course, had the court adopted a more strict approach281 to the non-delegation 
doctrine, the implications would have been far more severe. If courts were to require 
Congress to do all of the rule-making currently undertaken by federal agencies, then 
the entire structure of the modern administrative state would (potentially) be thrown 
                                                 
281 Admittedly, it is not entirely clear that there was a consensus approach to the non-
delegation doctrine even prior to the new deal. Nevertheless, some of the earliest decisions by the 
Supreme Court that struck down aspects of the New Deal (such as ALA Schecter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 295 U.S. 495; (1935) were 
unanimous, and not merely a consequence of Four Horsemen of Laissez-Faire standing in the path of 
progress. The Schecter case involved the delegation of legislative power to private groups, however, not 
the executive branch, which might have explained the outcome in this case.  
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into disarray.282 By interpreting the non-delegation doctrine as simply a demand for 
“principles” in the rule-making process, the circuit court must have hoped to place 
restrictions on the scope of administrative discretion and arbitrariness without 
initiating a Constitutional counter-revolution.283 
The appeals court concluded that the EPA had to assume the responsibilities of 
a legislature; that is, the court required that the executive establish its own principles 
for action that Congress had neglected to provide. Some would conclude that this 
decision can easily be explained under “attiditudinalist” model of judicial making. 
This may be the case, but the most relevant attitude or preference in this case is not the 
judge’s views of environmental policy, but rather his view on the form that law and 
policy should take: the law should be principled, and if the legislature will not make 
laws that reveal principles, then executive agencies must take this burden upon 
themselves. 
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court issued a ruling that reveals the “Congress-
centered” character of American jurisprudence. The Court upheld Congress’ 
delegation of legislative power to the EPA, while at the same time challenging the 
discretion of the EPA to consider the costs of environmental regulation; essentially, 
the Court held that Congress can absolve itself from the responsibility of considering 
the costs of environmental legislation, and in doing so it can ALSO prevent the 
executive branch from assuming that responsibility. The opinion upholding this 
peculiar policy arrangement, in which it is made certain that neither the legislature nor 
                                                 
282 See John F. Manning, “The Non-Delegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance.” The 
Supreme Court Review, Vol. 2000, (2000) pp 223-277. 
283 The decision is therefore similar to the Supreme Court’s recent federalism decisions, which 
place some restraints on national power (particularly in regards to Congressional power over state 
government) without returning to the pre-New Deal understanding of the commerce clause. United 
States v. Lopez SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 514 U.S. 549; 115 S. Ct. 1624; 131 L. 
Ed. 2d 626; 1995), United States v. Morrison SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 529 
U.S. 598; 120 S. Ct. 1740; 146 L. Ed. 2d 658; 2000.  
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the executive should consider the costs of a national policy, was penned by Antonin 
Scalia. Scalia’s opinion (joined by Rehnquist and Thomas, in addition to Ginsburg, 
Kennedy, O’Connor, and Breyer) is best interpreted not as a consequence of his 
support for the particular policy, but rather as a result of his attempt to determine 
Congressional intent.284 Whether or not the policy arrangement is constitutional is a 
question that perhaps should have detained Justice Scalia longer. Whether the 
arrangement was politically wise is an easier to question to answer, at least for a 
conservative. 
Is it possible for Congress to make a law that prevents the executive from 
making a decisions based on the costs of policy, while at the same time declining to 
make that calculation itself? The Court’s opinion in Whitman suggests that this 
somewhat irrational outcome is constitutionally legitimate. In order to meet the 
Constitutional requirements of Article I, which vests the legislative power in 
Congress, Scalia suggests that Congress must carefully circumscribe executive 
discretion—in this case, by eliminating the discretion of the EPA to consider the costs 
of national regulation. The problem with this view is that placing restraints on the 
executive branch is not equivalent to making a decision about the substance of policy. 
The majority’s opinion is based on the fiction that Congress has not delegated 
legislative power in establishing the National Ambient Air Quality Standards policy. It 
is not surprising that the court was unwilling in this case to apply an expansive 
understanding of the non-delegation doctrine—though it is a sign that the prophecies 
about the return of the Constitution in Exile are surely exaggerated.285 Yet it might be 
                                                 
284 Scalia’s best argument against the administration’s “spirited” attempt to rationalized 
environmental decision-making was that Congress, in other pieces of environmental regulation, had left 
no doubt when it wanted to grant executive agencies the power to take costs into account. 
285 Thomas Keck, The Most Activist Supreme Court in History? The Road to Modern 
Constitutional Conservatism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.  
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surprising to some that the “conservative wing” of the 2001 court showed no 
inclination to revisit the specter of Schecter. Or rather, the conservative wing of the 
court signed onto the fiction that Schecter had never been abandoned, that there was 
no delegation of legislative power in this case, because the Court had rubber-stamped 
much vaguer laws in other circumstances. Justices Stevens and Souter, in a concurring 
opinion, argued that the Court should stop pretending that agencies like the EPA have 
not been delegated “legislative power”: 
The Court has two choices. We could choose to articulate our ultimate 
disposition of this issue by frankly acknowledging that the power delegated to 
the EPA is “legislative” but nevertheless conclude that the delegation is 
constitutional because adequately limited by the terms of the authorizing 
statute. Alternatively, we could pretend, as the Court does, that the authority 
delegated to the EPA is somehow not “legislative power.” Despite the fact that 
there is language in our opinions that supports the Court’s articulation of our 
holding, I am persuaded that it would be both wiser and more faithful to what 
we have actually done in delegation cases to admit that agency rulemaking 
authority is “legislative power.”286 
It is true that theoretical differences lie beneath the surface of the concurring 
opinions in this case. Stevens and Souter, for instance, argue that even though the 
Constitution lodges the “legislative power” in Congress, there is no explicit 
prohibition on the delegation of that power. Therefore, Congress can delegate that 
power to the executive branch (or, presumably, to private business associations, 
management consulting firms, etc.) as long as it provides “intelligible principles.” 
Justice Thomas, while apparently accepting the fiction that no delegation of power has 
occurred in the case, was clearly uncomfortable with the courts broad deference to 
Congressional delegations of power. But despite their clear theoretical differences, 
Stevens, Souter and Thomas ultimately agreed to support a policy whose “rationale” is 
                                                 
286 Justice Stevens, concurring opinion, Whitman v. United States Trucking Association, 
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that policy is best made with only minimal attention to cost and context. It is not even 
clear that non-conservatives could support such a policy. Yet in the context of legal 
decision-making—or rather, within the context of a legal tradition that combines 
deference to Congressional regulatory decisions, suspicion of executive discretion, and 
general indifference to the logic of the non-delegation doctrine—the decision was 
entirely predictable. 
Ultimately, this kind of decision reflects a distrust of executive power that is 
produced by the structure of American institutions—the decision cannot be understood 
if looked at simply as a dispute over “preferences” in environmental policy. Distrust of 
executive discretion is much less evident in Canadian courts, because the government 
is always the head of the legislature, the source of law. Paradoxically, the American 
President, directly elected by the people, is subjected to more scrutiny because he is 
not directly connected to law-makers. The form of judicial politics revealed in this 
case is a product not simply of the politics of the judges involved, but is instead a 
consequence of the institutional setting in which they operate. The preferences of the 
court are best characterized as a desire for “lawfulness” combined with deference to 
Congress’ determination not to provide the principles necessary for the rule of law. 
The complicated case of New York et al v. EPA,287 decided by the D.C. circuit 
in 2005, provides a further example of how judicial decisions are hampered by an 
excess of legality—as opposed to an excess of partisan politics. In this case, the EPA’s 
2002 interpretation of “new source review” (NSR) provisions in the Clean Air Act and 
its amendments was challenged by a variety of state governments, environmental 
interest groups, and industry representatives.288 The NSR provisions in the CAA are 
                                                 
287 New York et al v. EPA, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT 
OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 367 U.S. App. D.C. 3; 413 F.3d. 
288 For a discussion of the NSR provisions of the Clean Air Act, see Todd B. Adams, “New 
Source Review Under the Clean Air Act: Time for More Market-Based Incentives?” Buffalo 
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meant to address the problems that emerge from the attempt to balance environmental 
improvements and economic efficiency. Under the CAA, the EPA can impose 
environmental standards on the construction of new plants, but it does not necessarily 
require existing plants to be retrofitted or scrapped if they fail to meet those standards. 
However, in order to limit the capacity of older sources of pollution to be maintained 
for extensive periods of time, the NSR provisions require that modifications to 
existing plants have to be subjected to review by the EPA if those modifications lead 
to an increase in pollution. Interpreting and implementing these provisions is 
complicated, for the simple reason that Congress never defined “modification” or 
“increase in pollution.” Congress has used these terms in different and even 
contradictory ways. As a consequence, the EPA has been forced to defend its 
interpretation of NSR against challenges from industries, states, and environmental 
groups. 
In New York v. EPA, there were several sources of controversy over the EPA’s 
2002 interpretations of NSR. First, the EPA introduced new standards for interpreting 
both the “baseline” of emissions from a source. In order to determine whether or not 
modifications of existing plants leads to increased pollution, the EPA must evaluate 
the amount of pollution that the source or plant currently emits. The CAA assumes 
that this is a relatively straightforward process, but in practice it is extremely 
complicated to find a useful standard for evaluating the pollution emitted during the 
production process. 
On the one hand, it is possible to determine how much pollution is emitted 
during the production of any given unit of widget X. But the production of an 
individual unit cannot be the starting point for measuring increases in pollution, as 
differing plants will have differing levels of overall production—some will operate 
around the clock, some will sit dormant for long periods of time, etc. A temporal 
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element has to be introduced to accurately measure the amount of overall pollution 
produced by the source. It isn’t clear, however, what temporal frame should be used to 
evaluate the amount of pollution released by a production process, as patterns of 
production will vary from day to day, week to week, and year to year. In order to 
establish baseline standards for evaluating increases in pollution, in 2002 the EPA 
promulgated a rule which allowed firms to select any continuous 24 month period 
from the previous ten year period. 
The EPA also changed the ways in which it measured increases in emissions. 
Once a baseline of emissions has been established, it is necessary to determine the 
amount by which proposed changes will increase emissions (if at all) in the production 
process. Based upon 1980 rule, the EPA had come to the conclusion that increases 
should be measured by the potential annual emission rate of the source, compared 
against the “baseline” period discussed above. In response, industry petitioners argued 
that this “actual to potential” test was invalid, as the 1980 regulation provided that an 
“increase” in emissions occurs only if the maximum hourly emissions rate goes up as 
a result of the physical or operational change. The practical difference between the 
two interpretations was that, if the industry position was adopted, a plant might adopt 
technology that could produce the same amount of widgets while reducing emissions, 
but the overall emission rate might nevertheless increase (due to increased overall 
production). 
The EPA rule was upheld in court. But by 1992, the EPA wanted to introduce 
more flexibility into the regulatory process by abandoning the “actual to potential.” 
Instead, increases would be measured on the basis of projected emissions. More 
importantly, changes in emissions that resulted from demand-related increases in 
production would not be counted as “increases” in terms of NSR requirements. At 
first, the actual to projected test and the “demand growth exclusion” were applied only 
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to utilities. By 2002, the “actual to projected test” and “demand growth exclusion” was 
adopted for all sources. Obviously, the expansion of these rules was very much in line 
with long-term commitment of the GOP to regulatory flexibility. From the perspective 
of many states and environmental groups it represented yet another example of the 
Bush Administration’s indifference to the “rule of law.”289 
In addition to changing the standards for measuring past emissions and 
universalizing the actual to projected test and demand growth exclusion, the EPA also 
adopted several new exemptions to the NSR policy. In situations where changes were 
not anticipated to have any real possibility of increasing emissions, firms were 
exempted from certain onerous record keeping requirements. In addition, the EPA 
adopted several programs that, if followed, would exempt firms from NSR: the 
Plantwide Applicability Limitations (“PAL”) program, the Clean Unit option, and the 
Pollution Control Project (“PCP”) exemption. 
As is usual in American politics, the new rules provoked lamentations and 
gnashing of teeth from all sides of the political spectrum. The outcome in the case 
does not reveal any obvious partisan or political influence, however. What the case 
does reveal is that the structure of American law-making creates a situation in which 
judges are more likely to challenge executive discretion, not on the basis of their own 
policy preferences, but on the basis of their understanding of Congressional law. This 
is, in its own way, just as troubling as an overtly “politicized” court. The court denied 
all of the petitions made by the industry, state government, and environmentalist 
petitioners, vacating only those provisions adopted by EPA in relation to the “Clean 
Unit Rule,” “Pollution Control Projects,” and record-keeping requirements. A closer 
look at the judges’ reasoning in relation to these specific provisions reveal how 
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legalism, not politicization, becomes a problem once judges have adopted a flexible 
conception of standing to sue. 
The Clean Unit Rule was adopted by the EPA in order to prevent NSR from 
creating disincentives against the adoption of the “best available control technology.” 
The rule stated that, if a firm has adopted BACT as part of plant modifications, then 
additional collateral emissions will not necessarily trigger NSR. Pollution Control 
Projects would be treated in a similar manner. The problem with these policies was 
that exemptions of this kind were not authorized by the Clean Air Act itself. As a 
consequence, the court ruled that even if it seemed irrational to conclude that the CAA 
mandated perverse incentives with anti-environmental consequences, the precise 
words of the statute were controlling. If those words mandated a policy approach that 
was manifestly irrational in the context of the broader goal of environmental 
protection, then the EPA was forced to accept an irrational policy. 
In regards to other aspects of the law where the political stakes were much 
more apparent, such as the EPA’s new interpretation of baseline emissions or the 
expansion of the “demand growth exclusion,” the court found statutory justification 
for deference to the EPA’s policy judgments. But the statute could not be stretched so 
as to endorse the new exemptions proposed by the EPA, for the very simple reason 
that there were no discussions of exemptions in the CAA and its amendments. The 
court even seemed to endorse the policy-judgments made by the EPA regarding the 
perverse incentives of the CAA, in the very act of striking down those policies. While 
this is very much an example of “judicial activism,” in the sense that the court 
invalidated the decisions of another branch of government, it is very difficult to say 
that this decision was motivated by the policy preferences of the judges. The most 
pressing policy issues were left untouched by the court. The outcome of the decision is 
better explained as an attempt by the court to enforce a strict conception of legality. 
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And therein lies the problem. What we see here is not a politicized court, but a court 
that is committed to an abstract conception of the “rule of law,” a strictness that does 
not take into account the limits of legality. 
The kind of legality defended by the court is curiously one-sided. Judges 
approach the terms of Congressional law with an almost Talmudic reverence, and are 
eager to constrain executive discretion within the terms of statutory language. In terms 
of evaluating environmental statutes, judges (regardless of their political affiliations) 
overwhelming appear to be committed textualists; there is no evidence of either 
environmentalist ideology or libertarian economics leading judges to ignore the 
explicit language of law. But just as judges have, for the most part, been unwilling to 
adhere to the formal limits on judicial power contained in the Article III “case and 
controversy” requirements, courts have been unwilling to place formal limits on the 
scope of congressional power. Thus while environmental law decisions show that 
judges have not been co-opted by either environmentalism or free-market anti-
environmentalism, they have been swept into the legislative vortex. 
The cases I have discussed in this section—Whitman v. American Truckers 
Association and New York .v EPA—reveal federal courts caught in a struggle not over 
policy, but a struggle over the role of the courts in the modern political state. While 
clearly political in some sense, it is also distinctively judicial politics, not simply 
partisan politics in robes. The key problem for the courts is determining the scope of 
judicial power. In cases such as New York v. EPA, Democratic and Republican 
appointees reached agreement over a broad range of complicated statutory issues. A 
similar dynamic is apparent in the unanimous Supreme Court decision in Whitman. 
What these cases illustrate is that the greater judicialization of American 
environmental law is more than a product of the greater ideological tensions in the 
 212 
American political system. The American political system itself—rooted in the 
separation of powers—has come to be a major source of judicialization. 
4.5.ii The Judicialization of Environmental Policy in Canada: A Delayed 
Revolution? 
There are many reasons to think that the role played by American courts in 
overseeing the details of environmental policy will not be replicated in Canada. Yet as 
we have also seen, Michael Howlett’s prediction that Canadian courts would be 
unlikely to endorse American-style “private attorneys general” has proven to be 
incorrect. With little or no help from parliamentary enabling legislation, Canadian 
courts have created a broad potential for citizens groups to challenge the details of 
environmental policy. But the opportunity to challenge policy should obviously not be 
equated with success in the courtroom. Howlett argued that even if the rules of 
standing were to be liberalized in Canada, it would not necessarily lead to the 
complete “judicialization” of environmental policy; that is, he suggested that 
environmentalists might not get the desired results from judges, even if they were 
granted their day in court. 
His reasoning was based primarily on the institutional differences between the 
Canadian and American regimes. In the United States, a combination of fragmented 
parties and separation of the legislative and executive branches creates a number of 
conditions which can promote judicial power. Legislators often have an incentive to 
enlist courts in their struggles with the executive branch, and it is often extremely 
difficult for legislators to respond to judicial statutory interpretations which they find 
uncongenial.290 In Canada, there is no institutional separation between the executive 
and legislative branches; furthermore, the disciplined nature of the Canadian party 
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system often makes it easier for legislators to respond to the statutory interpretations 
of judges. These institutional differences could probably be supplemented by cultural 
and historical factors, such as the United States’ longer experience with judicial 
activism, the prevalence of “rights consciousness” and anti-statist libertarianism in 
America, etc. Yet if the rules of standing have proven so malleable, it is worthwhile to 
question whether institutional and cultural differences will be able to support the 
traditional deference of Canadian courts. 
Judging by the cases which I have examined for this chapter, it seems clear that 
Canadian judges are still far less active challengers of administrative discretion that 
are their American counterparts. There are perhaps some reasons to suspect that 
judicialization in Canada is in fact beginning to follow the American model, albeit at a 
slow pace, and despite the remaining institutional and cultural differences between the 
two countries. Ted Morton, who has studied the development of judicial activism in 
Canada across a broad range of issues, argued that there was likely to be a spillover 
effect into environmental policy as well; judicial “values,” not constitutional structure 
or constitutional language, would determine the role played by Canadian courts in 
governing the environment.291 But, as we have seen by looking at the Supreme Court 
decisions dealing with environmental issues and lower appeals court cases dealing 
with environmental assessment, there are few signs that Canadian courts are playing, 
or are likely to play, a key role in the development of environmental policy. The courts 
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have pursued a revolution in the ability of groups to participate in Canadian 
environmental policy, but judicialization has not led to many substantive challenges to 
the discretionary power of government in environmental policy.292 
If we consider the actual successes of environmental interest groups, it is clear 
that the judicialization of Canadian environmental policy is proceeding at a glacial 
pace, if at all. We should not be surprised by the slow progression. In the United 
States, the judicialization of public policy through administrative law did not emerge 
all at once, fully formed like Athena from the head of Zeus. The starting point was the 
advent of the New Deal, which from a Constitutional perspective introduced the 
following changes: courts appeared to abandon their traditional solicitude for 
“economic rights,”293 they endorsed a “looser” understanding of the scope of national 
regulatory power under the commerce clause,294 and they endorsed a broader role for 
the executive branch in policy-making, based upon the delegation of Congress’ 
legislative powers.295 
Courts did not simply wash their hands of administrative law and regulatory 
policy, however. Starting sometime in the 1960s—perhaps in response to the specter 
of “iron triangles” and “private governments” and their influence upon federal policy 
making296—judges began to open up access to the courts (i.e. they liberalized the rules 
of standing.) Shapiro refers to this as a shift from a “deferential” to a “pluralist” or 
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“polyarchical” model of judicial decision-making.297 Gaining access to the courts 
meant little if the applicants were unable to raise meaningful challenges to 
administrative decisions. For the process of administrative rule-making to be truly 
polyarchical, all power and information could not reside with the administrators. So 
judges started to spread power and information around. 
In order to facilitate the polyarchical litigation process, courts began to expand 
upon the simple procedural rules found in the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. 
Federal agencies were forced to not only notify the public of their intention to 
promulgate a new rule of regulation, but also to provide increased information 
regarding the need for the rule, and the grounds upon which they based their decision 
regarding the rule’s content. Similarly, courts gradually became more willing to 
demand that agencies not merely receive comments from interested parties, but also 
provide responses to those comments. These judicially invented rules—what Shapiro 
refers to as “dialogue requirements”—still fit within a polyarchical model. The next 
stage of judicial decision-making emerged when courts began agencies to not simply 
provide responses, but to provide fully adequate, rationally justified responses. The 
next two steps moved beyond polyarchalism. First, courts began to demand that 
agencies respond not to all significant issues that were raised, but to all significant 
issues. Secondly, courts began to demand that the agencies prove that they reached the 
correct or most rational regulatory decision. Shapiro refers to this final stage as 
“synoptic rationalism.” 
There are some sign that Canadian federal courts are starting to march down 
the path towards “synoptic rationalism” in regards to environmental policy. Two sorts 
of evidence support this claim. First, Canadian judges appear increasingly willing to 
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challenge the statutory interpretations of administrative decision makers. Secondly, 
there are indications that Canadian judges are becoming more willing to challenge the 
scientific or factual bases of administrative decision makers as well, in emulation of 
the “hard look” doctrine propagated by American courts. Examples of these two 
modes of judicialization are relatively sparse. There is some reason to suspect, 
however, that Canadian courts have begun to follow the American path in the 
development of administrative law. The groundwork has been laid for Canadian courts 
to move from a “polyarchical” to a “synoptic-rationalist” model of decision-making. It 
is true that the Canadian Parliament will usually have more capacity to respond to 
judicial statutory constructions that finds uncongenial, especially in comparison with 
its American counterparts. This is true as well in regards to Constitutional law, where 
the “notwithstanding clause” gives national and provincials governments to insulate 
laws from many Charter provisions. However, the use of the notwithstanding clause 
has become a sort of political taboo in Canadian politics.298 Judicial decrees on 
Constitutional controversies are, for practical purposes, the final word on those 
controversies. 
Some Canadian judges are developing the legal tools necessary to expand the 
power of courts to intervene into environmental policy. One crucial theme in the 
federal court’s environmental law cases from the 1990s is the absence of any clear 
distinction between “judicial review based upon statutory interpretation” and “judicial 
review based upon ‘hard looks’ at facts/scientific evidence.” Canadian judges almost 
never directly challenge the scientific bases of administrative decisions. Though courts 
immerse themselves in the minutiae of environmental assessments, such open 
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exercises in policy analysis are usually resolved in favor of the government. However, 
it is often quite easy for judges to re-interpret factual disputes as disagreements over 
the meaning of statutes. While judges seem to doubt their capacity to examine 
scientific findings, they are more confident in their ability to interpret the law. 
A good example of how factual disputes are transformed into statutory disputes 
can be seen in the Federal Trial Court decision in Friends of the Oldman River Society 
v. Canada.299 Even more importantly, this case illustrates that judicialization does not 
occur simply when judges challenge scientific evidence. The collapse of the rules of 
standing permit judges to exercise an illegitimate control over the discretion of 
administrative officials, despite the fact that judges need not go far beyond the letter of 
the law to do this. 
Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada dealt with final federal 
authorization of a dam construction project in Alberta, the planning for which had 
begun in the 1950s. By May of 1987, the federal government had reached an 
agreement with the province not to make any claims of jurisdiction over the dam 
project, thereby avoiding federal duplication of the already extensive environmental 
review process. By March of 1989, the dam was 40% complete. In April of that year, 
the Friends of the Oldman River Society filed a motion for certiorari quashing the 
Minister of Transportation’s approval of the project, on the grounds that the minister 
had failed to comply with the environmental assessment and review process guidelines 
order (EARPGO). The Friends of the Oldman River were basically claiming that the 
federal decision to abstain from conducting further environmental assessments was 
illegal. 
This case illustrates that the problem of judicialization is often not the result of 
judges moving beyond the letter of the law, but is instead the result of strict adherence 
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to statutory constraints in regards to policy decisions that do not affect private rights, 
what I will call “legalism.” Before judges can use legalism to hamper executive 
discretion, they need to allow the rules to standing to erode so that they no longer pose 
a significant barrier to access. Once this has occurred, judges are well-positioned to 
impose strict legality upon government actions. In enforcing legalism, judges are 
supported several crucial myths. The first is the myth that all executive action must be 
in strict accordance with the letter of “the law,” regardless of whether or not the 
departure from law affects individual rights. The second myth is that “the law” 
provides clear indications of the scope of executive discretion. The third myth is that 
public-interest groups are entitled to enjoin enforcement of the law, even when there 
are no private rights at stake. 
In Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada, the trial judge could have 
dismissed the application on the grounds that the applicant was simply moving a 
policy dispute into a legal arena. No individual or property rights were at stake; the 
Friends of the Oldman River were simply perturbed that the government of Canada 
was not exercising the full scope of its own powers. Instead, the trial judge simply 
assumed that the applicants had standing; there is literally no discussion of the issue at 
all in the decision. In the end, the judge dismissed the application of Friends of the 
Oldman River society, yet his reasoning was far from water-tight. Indeed, if one 
accepts that public-interest groups have the right to enforce strict legalism upon 
government decision-makers, one would probably have to accept that the trial judge 
erred in this case. 
Simplifying for the sake of brevity, the trial judge concluded that the EARPGO 
was not applicable to the decision to approve the dam. Alberta’s application for 
approval was made under section 5(1) of the NWPA, an act which made no reference 
to environmental assessments; the judge concluded that the minister of transportation 
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was therefore only required to take navigation issues into account when assessing the 
dam project. A further legal issue was whether or not the Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans had to undertake an environmental assessment in relation to this project, given 
the fact that it was not an “initiating department” faced with a “project” (i.e. the 
project was being undertaken by the Alberta government, not the government of 
Canada.) Essentially, the trial judge gave an extremely narrow reading of the 
EARPGO, a reading which caused this statute to be subordinated to other statutes such 
as the Navigable Waters Protection Act, a reading which implied that only a fairly 
narrow range of ministerial decisions should be subject to the environmental 
assessment process. 
This narrow reading of the EARPGO was frankly implausible. The statute 
clearly is meant to be of broad application: all decisions and authorizations made by 
federal ministers should be able to trigger the environmental assessment process, not 
merely a decision to directly engage in the construction of dams. Secondly, the 
EARPGO would have been meaningless if it could only come into effect when 
directly incorporated in other statutes. The appeals court—which upheld the 
application of the Friends of the Oldman River Society—gave a much more plausible 
reading of the scope and intention of the EARPGO. Their reasoning was fairly 
straightforward. EARPGO is triggered whenever a federal minister makes a decision 
which is likely to have a significant impact upon an area of federal jurisdiction; the 
dam is likely to affect fisheries, Indians, and Indian lands; thus, the Ministry of 
Fisheries and Oceans and the Minister of Transportation must conduct a federal 
environmental assessment.  
This plausible statutory reading hides the fact that the court’s decision still 
rested on contestable interpretations of the facts. The appeals court had many 
opportunities to defer to the federal authorities. The simplest way would have been to 
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accept the federal government’s contention that the dam posed no significant threat to 
an area of federal jurisdiction. This decision of the federal ministers to accept the 
validity of the provincial environmental assessment process, a process that had been 
going on for years if not decades, was certainly not beyond the bounds of rationality. 
Once the court had asserted its own version of the facts—i.e. the potential impact upon 
fisheries, Indians, and Indian lands—it was quite easy for the appeals court to maintain 
that they were simply enforcing the letter of the law when they demanded the federal 
government to conduct another environmental assessment. 
There were several other opportunities that the court could have taken in order 
to rule in the government’s favor. The application of the 1984 EARPGO legislation to 
a dam project initiated decades earlier was a retroactive application of the law. The 
extremely late filing date of the motion (recall that the dam was almost half 
completed) would under most circumstances have been regarded as a reasonable 
grounds for dismissal. What cases of this kind illustrate is that the image of a 
deferential Canadian federal court is radically incomplete, not least due to the fact that 
judges can judicialize public policy without appearing to move beyond their traditional 
focus upon statutory interpretation into the realm of “hard looks” at scientific 
evidence. The appeals court did not have to engage in a wild deconstructive reading of 
federal statutes in order to rule in favour of the Friends of the Oldman River. In this 
case, the judges had in some ways a plausible legal basis for intervening into a highly 
complex area of federal-provincial negotiations. But such intervention is only 
legitimate if we assume that old rules of standing are no longer legitimate, an 
assumption that is dubious despite being widely accepted. 
The rules of standing were meant to prevent abstract legal claims from 
trumping political prudence; they gave frank acknowledgment to the fact that “the rule 
of law” does not require us to ignore the theoretical and practical difficulties of 
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legalism. Though it may seem that the courts are simply following the law in this case, 
we should consider whether attention to legalism is of any value when it is divorced 
from any concern with concrete private rights. The rules of standing were meant to 
insure (amongst other things) that the discretion of government officials would be 
restrained only when its actions affect individuals, their rights, and their property. The 
reason that the ultimate responsibility for the execution of laws is entrusted to elected 
officials is that the execution of public policy cannot and should not be a mechanical 
process. General laws can never anticipate the multiplicity of particular situations in 
which they must be applied, and cabinet officials are entrusted to adjust the laws to 
those circumstances, provided that they do not infringe upon individual rights. The 
practical judgment of elected officials is needlessly hampered, however, once groups 
are able to dispute those judgments not because their rights have been violated, but 
because they hold a different (and often idiosyncratic) vision of the public good. Thus 
Michael Howlett was wrong when he asserted that liberalized rules of standing would 
be unlikely to judicialize Canadian environmental policy. Liberalized rules of standing 
allow judges to illegitimately wrest control of public policy from responsible officials, 
despite the fact that judges claim they are only following the law when doing so. 
Judicialization can occur even when judges refrain from imposing “new rights,” even 
when judges refrain from conducting “hard looks” at scientific evidence that they are 
typically not qualified to evaluate. Once the rules of standing have been liberalized, 
judges can judicialize public policy simply by applying the black letter of the law. 
This will seem desirable only to those who regard legalism as the supreme political 
value. 
In addition to using statutory interpretation as a vehicle for asserting control 
over public policy, Canadian federal courts have shown that they are prepared to adopt 
some version of the American “hard look” doctrine. As mentioned in the previously 
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discussed case, disputes over facts can sometimes be disguised as disputes over the 
meaning of statutes. Federal judges also indulge in direct, ad-hoc analyses of scientific 
evidence on some occasions. Such analyses do not often lead judges to overturn 
administrative decisions, but we can presume that a familiarity with factual analysis 
will eventually yield more confident judicial edicts on the meaning of those facts. At 
any rate, it is no longer true that Canadian judges restrict themselves to questions of 
law in cases that deal with environmental policy. 
A few examples will suffice to illustrate how Canadian courts are moving 
beyond legal interpretation into the realm of factual analysis. The Friends of the West 
Country Association v. Canada300 dealt with an authorization, granted by the Minister 
of Transportation, for the Sunpine Logging Company to construct bridges over two 
waterways in rural Alberta. After an initial screening process, ministry officials 
concluded that there was no risk of environmental harm from the project. FOWC 
disagreed. In their application, they contended that the initial screening process was 
conducted in an unlawful manner. The government argued, as we might expect, that 
the group was simply contesting the factual evidence and professional judgments of 
ministry of transport officials, and really had no legal right to contest the 
authorization. 
The trial court judge, in ruling for the FOWC, argued that the Ministry of 
Transportation had failed to take into account the full range of possible environmental 
effects that might result from bridge construction. The idea that the effects of this 
proposal should be assessed in a broad manner was extracted by the trial judge from 
something called the “independent utility principle.” According to this principle, if a 
given project (e.g. a bridge) has no worth (“independent utility”) in itself, except as a 
means for accomplishing another project (e.g. logging) then the effects of the latter 
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project should be considered in the assessment process. Of course, this principle was 
never actually enshrined in any parliamentary legislation. Guided by an esoteric 
reading of a single paragraph from a Supreme Court decision, as well as a pamphlet 
from the Canadian Environmental Assessment Administration, Judge Gibson felt 
confident in asserting that the independent utility principle was applicable in this case. 
It would be difficult to imagine a more explicit example of judicial law-making, or a 
more worrying sign of the decline of deference amongst Canadian judges. 
Though I have focused on some of the most prominent examples of judicial 
activism in Canadian environmental policy, I should stress once more that the 
conclusions of this chapter are meant to be very modest. “Post-materialist” 
environmentalism has not supplanted the Canadian judiciary’s traditional patterns of 
deference towards the federal government. Michael Howlett’s thesis—that 
environmental policy is unlikely to be judicialized in Canada due to institutional 
constraints—and the Shapiro-Bzdera thesis—that federal courts tend to partisans of 
centralized government—find considerable support from the pattern of environmental 
law decisions in the Canadian federal courts between 1990 and 1999, and the 
environmental law decisions decided by the Canadian Supreme Court between 1985 
and 2007. The activism that the Court has shown in other areas of law has not been 
apparent in environmental policy. 
Yet those same cases also show that there is a certain amount of flux in the 
Canadian court. Rules of standing have collapsed, which has allowed courts to 
exercise control over the execution of environmental policy without having to move 
beyond statutory interpretation. These cases also reveal that the primary battle lines in 
environmental policy are not between federal and provincial governments, but are 
instead between governments and interest groups, such as “green” lobbyists and 
Indian bands. Courts are rarely given the opportunity to favor the federal government 
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over the provincial government, and when such conflicts arise, the federal government 
is not the invariable winner. The willingness of federal courts to respect federal-
provincial bargaining in regards to environmental policy may be wavering, however. 
The collapse of the rules of standing, and the combination of ambiguous legislative 
standards and utopian legislative aspirations, provides fertile ground for the further 
cultivation of judicialization. 
The transformation of the laws of standing in relation to Canadian 
environmental policy reveals that institutions do not fully determine the nature of 
judicial power. It is also interesting to consider why the Canadian Government itself 
continues to accept the judicially-created policy of private attorneys general. What 
does not the government gain from not only accepting liberalized rules of standing, 
but also from funding the very groups who use those rules to pester the government 
with lawsuits? Perhaps the government accepts a mild level of judicialization in order 
to create a façade of participation in governmental decision making. No elected 
official would echo my argument against the legitimacy of “public interest” litigation; 
it would seem authoritarian, despite the fact that it is implicit in the very structure of 
responsible government. Yet in the long run it is a dangerous for governments to rely 
on the public’s firm belief in the mystique of law and courts. If Canadian courts 
increase their interference with the details of environmental policy, the federal 
government will find it very difficult to challenge the legitimacy of judicial decision 
making, even if those decisions have moved beyond the law. But thus far, the 
influence of the Supreme Court, so prominent in Canadian aboriginal policy, has not 
been extended to environmental policy. Canadian judges have given environmentalists 
their day in court, but in terms of ultimate outcomes in environmental policy, 
Canadian courts have not directly challenged the authority of elected governments. 
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In contrast with the United States, the Canadian judiciary has had little 
influence over the development of environmental policy. The absence of 
environmentalism activism in Canada—in particular, the absence of detailed judicial 
oversight over the interpretation of environmental laws—is one of the clearest signs of 
the ways in which institutions shape the limits of political jurisprudence. In the United 
States, the tensions between Congress and the Presidency have produced a system of 
environmental policy that, due to a combination of statutory inflexibility and distrust 
of executive power, remains a paradigmatic case of “judicialization.” Despite the 
recognition of the problems of “judicialized” environmental policy, it has proven very 
difficult for American political leaders to craft an alternative. While the Canadian 
political system is unlikely to create a judicialized form of environmental policy, the 
American political system often seems unable to escape it.301 This has little to do with 
the political proclivities of judges. The opportunities available to judges to influence 
environmental policy is shaped much more decisively by the constitutional 
architecture of the two nations. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
CONCLUSION 
This study has attempted to assess the constraints imposed on judicial power 
by constitutional language and institutional differences—what I have called 
“constitutional architecture.” The central conclusion is that the constitutional and 
institutional differences between Canada and the United States, not merely the 
political differences between the Canadian and American judiciary, continue to 
impose limits on “political jurisprudence.” This is not to revert to a purely legalistic 
interpretation of judicial decision-making; rather, my argument is that differences in 
constitutional architecture create differing opportunities for political jurisprudence. 
In Canada, the adoption of the Constitution Act of 1982 paved the way for a 
court-led revolution in aboriginal rights, as the document included new and expansive 
protections for aboriginal rights without clarifying the content of those rights. The 
specific intentions of the framers were unclear, but the desire to “judicialize” this area 
of public policy was not. The United States has not experienced any similar 
constitutional modifications in the area of aboriginal rights, and as a consequence, 
judicial decisions in aboriginal law move within a nineteenth century framework that 
accords fewer possibilities for aboriginal rights activists. Within this framework, there 
are some clear differences between conservative and liberal justices on the American 
Supreme Court. But on the whole, both liberal and conservative justices on the 
American Supreme Court have adopted a more constrained conception on the scope of 
aboriginal rights and aboriginal sovereignty. 
This is not to say that the development of Canadian aboriginal law in the post-
Charter era was determined by the Constitution Act, or that the courts have been 
following the “framer=s intentions” in any direct sense. It is be difficult to determine if 
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the framers of the Constitution Act even had a specific understanding of exactly how 
Section 35 of the Constitution Act would affect the relationship between aboriginals 
and the provincial and federal governments of Canada. The intentions of constitutional 
framers can be obscure, even when the framing has occurred in living memory. It is 
undeniable, however, that the language of Section 35 limits the power of the national 
and provincial governments to alter and abridge aboriginal rights and treaty rights, and 
in their aboriginal law jurisprudence, the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada 
have made the plausible claim that they fulfill a role that has been assigned to them by 
the Constitution. This is not to say that the decisions of the court have been wise, 
necessarily. But the Court’s activism in this area is a product of constitutional, not 
judicial, supremacy. 
The activism of the Canadian court in aboriginal law does not necessarily 
support the “Court party” thesis, advanced by Canadian critics of judicial power which 
suggests that the jurisprudence of the court has been shaped largely by interest-group 
pressure, and the influence of the left-leaning Canadian legal academy. The court has 
used Section 35 to advance the interests of aboriginal litigants in many important 
cases, but it has not endorsed the visions of aboriginal sovereignty that command near 
unanimous support amongst academics, aboriginal leaders, and even government 
experts who deal most closely with aboriginal affairs.302 This suggests that connection 
between the Court and the national government—the “centralization thesis”—plays a 
considerable role in limiting judicial activism. Or, alternatively, it may provide further 
evidence in support of Hirschl’s “juristocracy” thesis: courts are willing to transform 
policy in regards to many social issues, but they are unlikely promote those aspects of 
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the progressive agenda that threaten the interest of economic and political elites.303 It 
is important not to miss the forest for the trees, however. The Canadian Supreme 
Court has not re-defined the relationship between aboriginal tribes and the Canadian 
polity as a relationship between separate sovereigns. But it has transformed the 
meaning and scope of aboriginal and treaty rights, by adopting both an “evolutionary” 
understanding of treaty agreements, and through novel approaches to the use of 
evidence that expand the opportunities for aboriginal litigants. This judicially managed 
transformation of aboriginal law was not dictated by the Constitution Act of 1982, but 
for, better or worse, Section 35 of the Constitution Act authorized this transformation 
by judicializing this area of public policy. The more limited success of aboriginal 
litigants in the American Supreme Court is a consequence of the more limited 
protections for aboriginal rights in the Constitution of 1787—not simply a result of the 
more conservative character of American justices. 
In contrast, the differences between parliamentary and Presidential-
Congressional government help to explain the contrasting approach to environmental 
law adopted by Canadian and American courts. Canadian courts have transformed 
many of the procedural aspects of environmental decision-making, particularly in 
regards to the law of standing. But Canadian courts have typically refrained from 
challenging the statutory interpretations and scientific conclusions of environmental 
policy makers. Thus, while the values of what might be called legal pluralism or even 
participatory democracy have opened Canadian courts to environmentalist claimants, 
Canadian courts have rejected substantive environmentalist claims. In the United 
States, the transformation of procedure in environmental law has more often lead to a 
transformation in the substance of environmental policy. This is because the differing 
institutions of the American political system, particularly the separation of powers, 
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create greater space for judicial intervention into environmental policy. When 
American courts adjudicate environmental policy, they typically encounter not “the 
government” but rather a conflict within government, conflicts between the often 
vaguely-expressed intentions of Congress and the decisions of the executive branch. 
Despite the impact of the Chevron decision, American courts are still more likely than 
Canadian courts to justify intervention into environmental policy-making based upon 
the tension between legislative intent and executive decision-making. 
The absence of environmental activism by the Canadian court is an anomaly 
for those scholars who view judicial decision-making through a political lens. Judged 
by its decisions in aboriginal law but also in areas related to gay right, women’s rights, 
and criminal rights, the Canadian court has been liberal or left-leaning in the post-
Charter era.304 Why has this liberal trend not been extended to environmental law 
decisions? It is difficult to believe that this is simply because of the idiosyncratic 
policy preferences of the judges—particularly when a broad number of Canadian trial 
and appellate courts judges have all rejected the substantive claims of environmentalist 
litigants. The simplest explanation is that the legal and institutional conditions for 
judicial activism in environmental law do not exist in the Canadian political system; in 
particular, the institutional dependence of “the government” on “the legislature” in a 
parliamentary system makes it difficult for courts to claim that executive branch 
decisions have departed from “legislative intent.” Canada’s constitutional 
transformations have increased the power of the courts to protect certain spheres of 
individual rights, but judging by the case of environmental policy, the capacity and 
willingness of courts to make policy through statutory activism remains largely 
unchanged. I have also suggested that a purely political perspective cannot fully 
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account for the pattern of environmental law decisions in American appellate courts, 
though this claim is not central to my overall argument. What is central is the fact that 
American judges, in contrast with their Canadian counter-parts, are more likely to 
intervene into the details and substance of environmental policy-making. 
The conclusions of this study have important implications for those scholars 
who are primarily interested in what courts do and how they make their decisions, and 
for those citizens and scholars who are primarily interested in what courts should (or 
should not) be doing. The contrasting roles of Canadian and American courts in 
aboriginal and environmental law challenges the views of those who regard the court 
decisions as being largely a consequence of the ideological preferences of justices. 
Environmentalist litigation has limited success in Canada, and aboriginal litigation has 
had considerable success, not simply because of the values and preferences of 
Canadian judges, but because of the constitutional and institutional features of the 
Canadian regime. The contrasting experience of environmentalist and aboriginal 
litigants in the United States provides support for this claim. For the remainder of this 
conclusion, I will assess how these findings relate to other comparisons of judicial 
power in Canada and the United, and consider some possible implications and areas 
for future research. I will also explain how attention to the constitutional and 
institutional limits on judicial power might help to shape political debate over the 
legitimacy of political jurisprudence and judicial activism. 
The case of gay rights appears to provide support for those who regard judicial 
ideology and cultural differences as the primary causes of disparate outcomes in 
Canadian and American jurisprudence; this contrasts with this study of aboriginal and 
environmental law, which has stressed the importance of legal and institutional 
differences. Over the last decade, Canada has experienced a judicial transformation in 
gay rights related to matters such as employment and marriage. Gay rights decisions in 
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American courts have not gone as far in endorsing gay rights, and they have elicited 
far more political and legal opposition. James Pierceson explains the contrasting 
development of gay rights in Canada and the United States as a consequence of 
cultural differences between the two nations, emphasizing in particular the “richer” 
liberalism that has come to dominate Canadian political culture, a liberalism that 
endorses a broader notion of equality than the negative liberalism that predominates in 
the United States.305 Despite these differences, Pierceson suggests that the case of gay 
rights illustrates a new dynamic in North American constitutional law. While 
influence in constitutional doctrine has traditional flown south to north, Pierceson 
argues that American courts and American legal culture is likely to follow Canadian 
developments areas such as same-sex marriage, spousal benefits, adoption rights, and 
so forth. 
Pierceson’s analysis contrasts with the analysis of environmental and 
aboriginal law presented here because it explains different legal outcomes as a 
consequence of cultural differences. Furthermore, he argues that those legal 
differences are likely to decline as a consequence of cultural convergence. According 
to his argument, the “Canadianization” of gay rights litigation in the United States is 
driven by broader cultural changes, and depends primarily on the changing ideology of 
judges. Pierceson does not extend his analysis beyond the issue of gay rights, and does 
not consider whether or in what way the “convergence” of Canadian and American 
jurisprudence in gay rights is a sign of a broader trend. If, as I have argued, Canadian 
and American jurisprudence is not converging in environmental and aboriginal law, 
and if this is not likely to be affected by the general ideological predispositions of 
judges, what accounts for the case of gay rights jurisprudence? 
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One hypothesis is that the convergence of Canadian and American 
jurisprudence is most likely to occur in areas of law and policy that are most readily 
cognizable under the rubric of individual rights. In many instances, the kinds of 
questions that must be addressed by Canadian and American courts when dealing with 
individual rights (e.g. whether a given act is “speech,” whether a classification is a 
violation of equality rights) are identical.306 Environmental law cases in Canada differ 
from those in the United States because of tensions between executive action and 
legislative intent that emerge in the American context. Section 25 of the Charter and 
Section 35 of the Constitution Act cast a shadow over aboriginal law in Canada, one 
that is not present in American law. In the case of issues related to gay rights, the 
institutional or legal environment is essentially the same—both nations have 
provisions that guarantee equal protection of the law, and courts in both countries 
must consider in what instances legislatively-drawn categories violate equal 
protection. In regards to some equal protection issues, the debate in Canadian courts 
has been less contentious, not only because of the greater ideological unity of 
Canadian judges but also because the framers of the Constitution insulated affirmative 
action programs from “equal protection” challenges. But in both Canada and the 
United States, the meaning of equal protection of the law raises identical issues; the 
uncertainty over the meaning of equal protection creates the space for ideological 
divisions amongst judges.307 The ultimate outcome of these judicial conflicts depends 
very much on the political forces which influence the court, whether in terms of public 
opinion, the “evolution” or development of individual justices, or—most 
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importantly—the appointment process. Aboriginal law in the United States is not 
susceptible to political forces and ideology in the same way or to the same degree, and 
this is also true regarding environmental law in Canada. 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s gay rights jurisprudence raises questions 
about the legitimacy of judicial power. This contrasts with the role of Canadian courts 
in aboriginal and environmental law. The Constitution Act empowers the Courts to 
intervene into aboriginal issues, and the court has done so; the Constitution Act 
changes nothing in regards to Canadian environmental policy, and Canadian courts 
have remained deferential to the environmental policy decisions of governments 
(especially the national government). Environmentalist litigants have achieved some 
successes regarding the procedures involved in environmental policy, but courts in 
Canada have not gone as far as have American courts in challenging the substance and 
details of environmental policy. In endorsing the idea that gays and lesbians form a 
“suspect class,” the Court cannot rely on the specific intentions of the framers or the 
specific words of the Constitution Act and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
Instead, they act as Philosopher-Kings, constitutional prophets, and comparative 
anthropologists, assaying the development of the world-spirit in order to push the 
Canadian polity along the path to enlightenment and true freedom; or at least, that is 
how conservative critics of the court would view it. And here they would be correct—
to some extent. The court has certainly acted as the “vanguard of the intelligentsia” in 
endorsing gay rights, as have their liberal counterparts in certain American states. The 
intelligentsia, however, may well be leading the Canadian people. The gay rights 
decisions of the Court have not sparked public outcry, and the Court remains the 
political institution with the highest degree of public approval. The gay rights 
decisions of the Canadian Supreme Court rest on thin legal justifications, but it is 
difficult to say that the cases raise a “counter-majoritarian” problem. 
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Canadian gay rights jurisprudence nevertheless illustrates well the “Court 
Party” thesis of Morton and Knopfy, the idea that the judicial power is directed by 
judges and interest groups, not by the text of the Charter or the intentions of its 
framers. In the case of gay rights, the similarities between Canadian judges and their 
liberal counterparts in the American judiciary also suggests that a political 
interpretation, rooted in individual policy preferences of judges, is more useful in 
explaining this aspect of law than in the case of aboriginal and environmental 
jurisprudence. Is this a sign that there is an emerging liberal, North American 
jurisprudence of individual rights? This is a possibility. Though gay rights decisions, 
and even to some extent decisions dealing with women=s rights, raise acute cultural 
and religious controversies, they are in some ways less controversial from a legal 
perspective than many aboriginal and environmental rights claims, in which private 
groups attempt to direct public policy, place limits on the sovereignty of the state, 
assign access to natural resources based upon ethnicity, etc. Gay rights decisions deal 
with momentous moral questions, but from a legal perspective the claims are not so 
strange: they deal with individuals and their relationship to the state, in particular, the 
claims of individuals to have been denied a benefit, due to an arbitrary classification 
by the state. In dealing with controversies of this kind, differing judicial decisions are 
based upon differing assessments of what classifications are arbitrary. Those 
differences will not be affected by the institutional differences between Canada and 
the United States, but will instead be shaped by judicial ideology. 
However, the evidence for the convergence of Canadian and (liberal) 
American jurisprudence in other aspects of individual rights is incomplete. Part of the 
problem is that the rights provisions of the Canadian and American constitutions do 
differ in some significant ways. Ronald Krotoszynski, in his comparative study of free 
speech jurisprudence, argues that the Canadian Supreme Court has occupied a middle 
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ground between the libertarian “market place of ideas” model that dominates in 
American law, and post-war German jurisprudence in which freedom of speech has 
been subordinated to other values such as human dignity.308 In his attempt to explain 
the Canadian Court=s willingness to accept government limitation on free speech, 
Krotoszynski emphasizes the limits that have been built into the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms itself—not so much the dead letter Section 33 “notwithstanding clause,” but 
rather the Section 1 “reasonable limitations” clause, which allows the court to uphold 
limits on the rights of free speech, as long as those limits are “reasonable” in a “free 
and democratic society.”309 Through Section 1, the Canadian Constitution endorses 
Felix Frankfurter=s approach to freedom of speech, not the First Amendment 
absolutism of Hugo Black. As a consequence, the Canadian Court has given 
government considerable leeway to enact restrictions on speech such as hate crime and 
anti-obscenity laws. 
The issue which Krotoszynski does not fully address is whether the 
“reasonable limits” clause leads to outcomes in Canadian jurisprudence that cannot be 
explained on the basis of ideology alone. Is the Canadian Supreme Court’s perception 
of what constitutes a “reasonable limit” on free speech determined by party affiliation 
and ideological predispositions? Based on the limited range of cases addressed in The 
First Amendment in Cross-Cultural Perspective, the answer would seem to be no. 
However, one problem with evaluating the ideological aspects of free speech cases is 
that they raise issues that are not easily mapped onto a liberal-conservative continuum. 
For instance, in endorsing government prosecution of a prominent Native Canadian 
leader for anti-semitic ravings that violated hate crime laws, was the Court adopting a 
                                                 
308 Krotoszynski, The First Amendment in Cross-Cultural Perspective. New York: New York 
University Press, 2006. 
309 Janet Hiebert, Limiting Rights: The Dilemma of Judicial Review. Montreal-Buffalo: 
McGill-Queen=s University Press, 1996. 
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progressive or conservative agenda? What about the willingness of Canadian Courts to 
uphold anti-obscenity laws? Krotoszynski makes the case that the court’s free speech 
jurisprudence tends to have conservative consequences. In accepting hate crime laws, 
the Court has also accepted the government’s highly selective approach to hate crime 
enforcement: expressions of racial hatred made by marginal groups leads to 
prosecution, while equally inflammatory statements from government officials 
(particularly in Quebec) are left un-prosecuted. In accepting anti-obscenity laws, the 
Court has also accepted the disparate treatment that gay and lesbian publications 
receive from Canadian customs officials. We might be inclined to interpret the 
Canadian Supreme Court’s willingness to uphold hate-crime and anti-pornography 
laws as part of a general “progressive project,” one that is fully consistent with the 
Court=s gay rights jurisprudence. But the ideological issues are blurred. As is well 
known, conservative legal scholars have long argued against the expansive 
interpretations of First Amendment rights—perhaps less well known is the fact that 
conservative legal scholars are not only concerned with the ways in which First 
Amendment jurisprudence has been used as a shield for pornography and obscenity. 
Hadley Arkes, for instance, has argued that freedom of speech should not be extended 
to include group defamation, including the defamation of racial groups.310 
Krotosyznski has raised some interesting hypotheses about the consequences of 
Canadian free-speech cases, but further investigation—and a broader range of cases—
is necessary to evaluate the ideological and political dimensions of free speech 
jurisprudence in Canada. 
Such an investigation would have to focus on whether the “judicial balancing” 
promoted by Section One of the Canadian Charter has led Canadian courts to defer to 
                                                 
310 Hadley Arkes, The Philosopher in the City: The Moral Dimensions of Urban Politics 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980) pp 23-56. 
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government in a consistent and deferential way, or whether the deference shown by 
the court varies depending upon the political goals of speech regulations, or the 
characteristics of those whose speech is being regulated. Further comparative analysis 
of Canadian and American free speech jurisprudence is still necessary as well, as 
Krotozynski is too quick to accept the claim that American courts have accepted the 
Holmesian “marketplace of ideas” metaphor as their guide to free speech. American 
judges—at least, many of them—accept restrictions on freedom of speech in relation 
to political expression that are every bit as draconian as those imposed by the 
Canadian state. Furthermore, it may be the case that the “attitudinal model” may be 
particularly apt in explaining the hypocrisy of American free speech jurisprudence, in 
which liberal judges have endorsed restrictions on peaceful abortion protesters and 
conservatives endorse restrictions on political pamphleteering in supposedly private 
spaces such as shopping malls and housing developments.311 It is still an open 
question whether Section One of the Charter, in allowing for “reasonable limits” on 
free speech rights, encourages a consistently deferential approach by Canadian Courts 
or whether it allows them to favor some groups over others. 
Other studies have attempted to show how, much like in the case of freedom of 
speech, the specific features of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms have 
shaped post-Charter jurisprudence, thereby undermining the claims of those who argue 
that Canadian Courts have asserted “judicial supremacy” in the post-Charter era. 
James Kelly has argued that the Canadian Supreme Court, in supervising police 
conduct and the criminal process, has not simply aped the “due process” model of 
American jurisprudence developed during the Warren Era, but has instead maintained 
                                                 
311 Margaret Kohn, Brave New Neighborhoods: The Privatization of Public Space. New York: 
Routledge, 2004. 
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many aspects of the “crime control” model of criminal rights.312 So, for instance, the 
court has adopted a version of the exclusionary rule that, in contrast with the general 
approach of American courts, is less likely to lead to the exclusion of evidence as a 
remedy for procedural errors committed by police officers. 
Canadian jurisprudence in the area of criminal rights is best characterized, 
according to Kelly, as being moderately activist, in that it recognizes, perhaps more 
adequately than American criminal rights jurisprudence, the need to balance the 
imperatives of crime control and due process when overseeing the actions of police 
and prosecutors. The liberalism on display in the Canadian Supreme Court’s gay rights 
jurisprudence has been more qualified in the area of criminal rights. Similarly, and 
perhaps most surprisingly, the Canadian court has engaged in what might be called 
conservative or even libertarian activism in cases dealing with Canadian health policy. 
The differences between Canada’s state-monopolized health care regime and 
America’s mixed government-private system are great enough that a comparison of 
health care litigation is very difficult. The significance of the Court’s conservative 
activism in health care policy is worth considering, however, because it seems to 
contrast with the findings of this study in the area of environmental policy. The health 
care decisions of the court are an anomaly, because health care law seems to be more 
similar to environmental law than issues in gay law, aboriginal law, and criminal law, 
in that the Constitution Act and Charter did not create any specific rights related to 
health care. More specifically, and unlike the case of criminal rights discussed by 
Kelly, there are no indications that the framers of the Charter and Constitution Act 
thought that their constitutional innovations would affect the health care policy status 
quo. Why have Canadian courts challenged the statism of Canadian health care, in a 
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way that promotes greater individual freedom and even threatens to undermine the 
state monopoly on health care, when it has refrained from endorsing the substantive 
goals of environmental litigants? 
The answer may lie in the fact that, while the framers of the Constitution Act 
and Charter did not specifically consider the question of how these documents would 
affect health care policy, courts found it reasonable to extend enumerated rights to 
cover health policy related claims. That Canadian courts have not, for the most part, 
found the Constitution Act and Charter sufficiently flexible so as to encompass 
environmental rights is a good sign that the judiciary has not been captured by liberal 
litigants. In the case of Waldman v. Medical Services of British Columbia313 the 
Supreme Court of British Columbia found that the province’s attempt to control the 
geographic dispersion of physicians in the province violated the equality and mobility 
rights protected by the Charter.314 Similarly, in the case of Chaolli v. Quebec315 the 
Supreme Court of Canada struck down two provincial statutes in Quebec that limited 
access to private health care, on the grounds that long waiting lists for medical 
treatment violated Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. The latter case is 
particularly interesting, in terms of the ideological dimensions of the case, because it is 
one of the few examples of judicial elaboration of the Charter in a way that protects 
economic rights from arbitrary government action. According to one of the Quebec 
Appeal’s court judges who rejected Chaolli’s claims, the Charter was not intended to 
protect “economic rights” of any kind—an interpretation that is probably correct, 
though one that also reveals the severe limits of the Charter as a statement of human 
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rights. Chaolli’s challenge to the government health care monopoly may indicate an 
unexpected potential of Canadian jurisprudence to serve as a limit on Canadian 
statism. That this decision was reached by many of the same justices who endorsed 
expansive readings of aboriginal, criminal, and gay rights is yet another indication 
that, even if the court is driven by policy preferences, those preferences are not 
narrowly partisan or merely “post-materialist.” 
A closer reading of the Chaolli decision reveals that libertarians should not 
hold their breath in anticipation of a Canadian economic rights revolution, however. 
The Court did not provide a principled justification for overturning the state health 
care monopoly—the kind of consideration that, in reflecting on the problem of state 
monopolies and restrictions on economic freedom in general, would have had 
implications for many other areas of public policy. Instead of reasoning on the basis of 
principles and rights, the Court engaged in a sort of ad hoc comparative policy 
analysis: because most other countries with public health care do not forbid private 
insurance and private provision of health care, and because this does not appear to 
have a deleterious effect on public health systems, the Quebec government is not 
justified in maintaining a health care monopoly which imposes long waiting times on 
patients. The “arbitrariness” of law is measured by the state of international public 
opinion and international public policy, not by the logic of individual rights. The three 
dissenting justices argued, hysterically, that the Chaolli decision was a northern 
version of the discredited, even demonic Lochner v. New York, a decision that would 
threaten “Canadian values” (presumably, envy, resentment, and lousy health care for 
the very ill). But the decision was hermetically sealed off from principled reasoning, 
and thus its effects are likely to be felt only in the area of health care access. Those 
effects have already started to be felt, however: regardless of the decision’s 
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philosophical merits, it shows that the court is willing to challenge and even re-
structure the most significant area of public policy in Canadian politics. 
The pattern of Canadian jurisprudence in gay rights, criminal law, and health 
care litigation does not reveal a consistent ideological pattern—just as the court’s 
activist aboriginal rights jurisprudence contrasts with its reticence in environmental 
law. The recent health care decisions undermine the “centralization thesis,” the idea 
that courts tend to reflect the political interests of the established regime. In addition, 
those decisions challenge the idea that Canadian jurisprudence is shaped solely by the 
supposedly collectivist and statist values of Canadian society. It is possible, of course, 
that the patterns of judicial decision making—bracketed by the liberal activism of the 
gay rights decisions, and the conservative activism of the health care decisions—
reflect the idiosyncratic policy preferences of the Supreme Court, even if they do not 
reflect (at least not entirely) a partisan agenda. Is there any unifying theme to the 
activism of Canadian courts, if partisan ideology and “capture” by “the court party” 
fail to account for the various forms of activism and deference in Canadian 
jurisprudence? This is a possible area for future exploration, and one possible answer 
may lie in the way the views of judges are shaped, not by partisanship, but by their 
professional experiences as lawyers, and as member of international legal elites. 
My central claim, however, is that whatever the role or sources of ideology and 
“political preferences,” the policy-making of courts is limited by constitutional 
language and institutional arrangements. Institutional differences explain why Canada 
has not had the experience of the judicialization of public policy through “statutory 
activism.” The convergence of judicial power in Canada and the United States has 
occurred in areas of law that deal with constitutionally protected individual rights, and 
this convergence requires both similarity between legal elites, and similarities in 
constitutional language. The differences that remain are most likely explained as 
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consequence of the array of political forces in Canadian and American society that 
shape the ideological predispositions of Canadian and American Courts. 
The debate over the legitimacy of judicial activism is enhanced by paying 
attention to the limits placed upon judicial power by legal and political institutions. 
Proponents of judicial power have come perilously close to suggesting that judges 
should not hesitate to impose their own conceptions of public policy, notwithstanding 
the evidence of the limits of judicial effectiveness in shaping significant social change. 
Critics of judicial power, particularly in Canada, have emphasized that the courts are 
already politicized, and are dominated by ideologies that are systematically biased in a 
liberal or left-leaning direction. The response of judges, for the most part, is that their 
decisions are guided by the law, not by their personal politics, and that those who 
object to judicial-policymaking actually object to constitutionalism. This is only a 
half-truth, but it is still a half-truth. The deference of Canadian courts in environmental 
policy illustrates that the courts do not simply march lock-step with the “post-
materialist” intelligentsia. Environmental law decisions in the United States are more 
political in character (though, as I suggest, they are less political or at least less 
partisan than one might expect). But the more activist character of American 
environmental law jurisprudence is a consequence of the institutional features of the 
American regime, most prominently, the endless tension between executive discretion 
and congressional intent. In aboriginal law, the claim that Canadian judges are guided 
by constitutional imperatives is not simply boilerplate. The Framers of the 
Constitution Act did not specify what policies they wanted to inaugurate in the area of 
aboriginal rights, but they clearly wanted—or at least agreed—to judicialize aboriginal 
rights and aboriginal treaties. In the absence of a similar constitutional imperative, 
American courts—and to a great extent, liberal American judges—have adopted a 
deferential approach to government decisions regarding aboriginal policy. Political 
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jurisprudence will always exist, and the dream of a completely impartial judiciary will 
always be a dream. But political jurisprudence exists within legal and institutional 
limits, limits that are created by constitutional architecture, limits that have not been 
erased by judicial ideology. 
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Case/Year Law-Subject Position of Aboriginal  
Tribe/ 
Organization/ 
Individual  
Outcome for Aboriginal 
Tribe/Organization/ 
Individual 
1. Simon v. The Queen, 1985 Are Indian hunting rights in Nova Scotia 
protected by 1752 treaty?  
No Win 
2. Dick v. the Queen, 1985 Are hunting regulations applicable to 
Indians?  
No Loss 
3. R. v. Horse, 1988 Do Indians have hunting rights on private 
lands, whether under the  
i) Wildlife Act, or by virtue of  
ii) treaty or  
iii) aboriginal rights? (Custom/usage) 
Yes i-iii Loss 
4. R. v. Sparrow, 1990  Did the Fisheries Act extinguish aboriginal 
rights prior to the adoption of Section 35 of 
the Constitution Act? 
No Win (but aboriginal fishing rights 
still subject to reasonable limits)  
5. R. v. Sioui, 1990  Do provincial logging regulations violate 
treaty rights protected by Section 35? 
Yes Win 
6. Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, 
1990 
Is personal property of Indians on 
reservation subject to garnishment for non-
payment of fees? 
No Win 
7. R v. Horseman, 1990 Are Indians subject to Alberta Wildlife Act 
regs re. sale of animal skins?  
No Loss 
8. Ontario v. Bear Island Foundation, 
1991  
Do the Temagami Indians have aboriginal 
title to various tracts of land in Ontario? 
Yes Loss 
9. Williams v. Canada, 1992 Are unemployment benefits exempt from 
taxation? 
Yes Partial win 
 
Benefits are exempt, but there must 
be a tie to a reserve  
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Case/Year Law-Subject Position of Aboriginal  
Tribe/ 
Organization/ 
Individual  
Outcome for Aboriginal 
Tribe/Organization/ 
Individual 
10. R. v. Howard, 1994 Were fishing rights extinguished by 1923 
treaty?  
No Loss 
11. Native Women=s Association v. 
Canada, 1994 
Is the government under any obligation to 
provide equal funding for aboriginal 
women=s groups? 
Yes (petitioner) Loss 
12. Blueberry River Indian Band v. 
Canada (DIAND), 1995 
Did the government owe fiduciary duty to 
the Blueberry River Indian Band regarding 
the transfer of reserves and mineral rights 
that occurred in the 1940s?  
Yes Win 
13. Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui 
Indian Band, 1995  
Do Indian tribunals have jurisdiction to 
determine if rail lines are on reserves, for 
purposes of tax assessment?  
Yes Loss 
14. R. v. Vanderpeet, 1996  Do fisheries regulations infringe upon 
aboriginal right to sell fish?  
No Loss 
15. R. v. Cote, 1996 Are Indian fishing rights dependent upon 
aboriginal title, or can they be free standing 
rights 
No Win 
16. R. v. Pamajewon, 1996 Can an Indian tribe refuse to submit to 
casino licensing regulation, based upon right 
to self-government 
Yes Loss 
17. R. v. Gladstone, 1996 Challenge to BC fishing regulations; have 
commercial fishing rights been 
extinguished?  
No Win 
18. R. v. NTC Smokehouse, 1996 Is there an aboriginal right to commercial 
fishing?  
Yes Loss  
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Case/Year Law-Subject Position of Aboriginal  
Tribe/ 
Organization/ 
Individual  
Outcome for Aboriginal 
Tribe/Organization/ 
Individual 
19. R. v. Lewis, 1996 Can fishing regulations be extended to 
reserves? 
No Loss  
 
(Fishing area not part of the reserve 
20. Nikal v. the Queen, 1996 Can an Indian fish on a reserve without a 
license?  
No Win/Loss  
 
The province can impose regulations, 
but there are several particular 
regulations which are not justified  
21. R. v. Badger, 1996 Can Indians hunt on privately owned 
property within land that was ceded by 
treaty?  
Yes Loss 
22. Delgamuukw v. British 
Columbia, 1997 
Do the Indian bands have aboriginal title 
over thousands of square miles of British 
Columbia? 
Yes Win (on evidentiary issues; ultimate 
issue not decided) 
23. St. Mary=s Indian Band v. 
Cranbrook, 1997 
Does the inclusion of rider mean that 
surrender of land (for airport) not absolute, 
therefore designated land, therefore subject 
to tribal taxation?  
Yes Loss 
24. Opetchesaht Indian Band v. 
Canada, 1997 
Can BC maintain an easement on tribal land 
that does not appear to have any termination 
date?  
No.  Loss 
25. Union of New Brunswick Indians 
v. New Brunswick (Minister of 
Finance), 1998 
Can provincial government tax consumption 
items purchased off reserve? 
No Loss 
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Case/Year Law-Subject Position of Aboriginal  
Tribe/ 
Organization/ 
Individual  
Outcome for Aboriginal 
Tribe/Organization/ 
Individual 
26. R. v. Sundown, 1999 Can Indian cut down trees, in violation of 
provincial regulations, when the trees are 
used for shelter during hunting (a protected 
aboriginal right in this instance)?  
Yes Win 
27. R. v. Marshall I, 1999 Do treaty rights (1770s) confer exemptions 
from fishing regulations for Indians, based 
on “oral terms” of the treaty? 
Yes Win 
28. R. v. Marshall II, 1999 Scope of government power to regulate 
treaty right—Whether judgment should be 
stayed pending disposition of rehearing if so 
ordered? 
No Win 
29. R. v. Gladue, 1999 In a trial for manslaughter, did the 
sentencing judge take proper account of the 
aboriginal background of the defendant, in 
regards to sentencing 
No Loss 
30. R. v. Wells, 2000 Criminal rights case; did sentencing judge 
fail to consider aboriginal background when 
applying custodial sentence? 
No Loss 
31. Osoyoos Indian Band v. Oliver, 
2001 
Are land taken by province still “within the 
reserve” for purposes of taxation by the 
Indian tribe?  
Yes Win 
32. Mitchell v. M.N.R., 2001  Do the Mohawks of Akwesane have the 
right to trade cross-border without paying 
customs duties?  
Yes Loss 
33. Wewaykum Indian Band v. 
Canada, [2002]  
2 bands claim each other’s reserves as their 
own; has this been precluded by the statute 
of limitations? 
-- The claims have been precluded by 
the relevant statute of limitations  
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Case/Year Law-Subject Position of Aboriginal  
Tribe/ 
Organization/ 
Individual  
Outcome for Aboriginal 
Tribe/Organization/ 
Individual 
34. Ross River Dena Council Band v. 
Canada, 2002  
Do lands which had been “set aside” in the 
1950s have reserve status?  
Yes Loss 
35. Kitkatla Band v. British 
Columbia (Minister of Small 
Business, Tourism), 2002 
Is the power to make exceptions to heritage 
preservation laws intra vires, in regards to 
the alteration and destruction of native 
cultural objects? 
Yes Loss 
36. Paul v. British Columbia (Forest 
Appeals Commission), [2003]  
Can Province constitutionally confer on an 
administrative tribunal the power to 
determine questions of aboriginal rights and 
title as they arise in course of tribunal’s 
duties  
No Loss 
37. R. v. Powley, 2003  i) Do Metis have aboriginal right to hunt in 
Sault Ste. Marie environs?  
 
ii) If so, are licensing limitations justified? 
i) Yes 
 
ii) No 
i) Win 
 
ii) Win 
38. Haida Nation v. BC Minister of 
Forests, 2004 
i) Does the Crown have a duty to consult 
and accommodate Aboriginal peoples prior 
to making decisions that might adversely 
affect their as yet unproven Aboriginal 
rights and title claims? 
 
ii) Does this duty extend to third parties? 
Yes i) Win 
 
ii) Loss 
39. R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, 
2005 
Can Indians harvest logs for commercial 
purposes, without provincial licenses, as a 
result of treaty rights or aboriginal title?  
Yes Loss 
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Tribe/ 
Organization/ 
Individual  
Outcome for Aboriginal 
Tribe/Organization/ 
Individual 
40. Mikisew Cree First Nation v. 
Canada (Minister of Canadian 
Heritage), 2005  
Does the Crown have a duty to consult 
Indian tribes regarding the construction of 
road on crown land, in which Indians retain 
aboriginal hunting rights? 
Yes Win 
41. R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray, 2006  Do two Indian tribes have the right to 
harvest wood on traditional territory? 
Application of Van der Peet Test: is wood 
harvesting part of the distinctive culture of 
the Indian tribes?  
Yes Win 
42. R. v. Morris, 2006 Does treaty right to hunt include right to 
hunt at night with illuminating device? 
Yes Win 
43. God’s Lake Band v. McDiarmid 
Lumber, 2006  
Indian Act 
 
Are band funds exempt from seizure in 
commercial dispute?  
Yes Loss 
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Case Issue Position of Aboriginal  
Tribe/Organization/ 
Individual  
Outcome 
1. UNITED STATES v. DANN ET AL., 
1985 
Has the tribe’s aboriginal title to the land been 
extinguished by an earlier monetary award by the 
Indian Claims Commission? 
No Loss 
2. COUNTY OF ONEIDA, NEW YORK, 
ET AL. v. ONEIDA INDIAN NATION 
OF NEW YORK STATE ET AL., 1985 
Can the Oneida sue for damages over 18th century 
transfer of land that occurred in violation of Non-
Intercourse Act of 1793? 
Yes Win 
3. KERR-MCGEE CORP. v. NAVAJO 
TRIBE OF INDIANS ET AL., 1985 
Are two tribal ordinances imposing taxes on business 
activities conducted on the tribe’s land invalid because 
they had not been approved by the Secretary of the 
Interior? 
No Win 
4. NATIONAL FARMERS UNION 
INSURANCE COS. ET AL. v. CROW 
TRIBE OF INDIANS ET AL., 1985 
Does the a tribal court have jurisdiction over a 
personal injury suit between tribe member and school 
district, when school land located on reservation but 
owned by the state?  
Yes  Partial Win: tribal 
court must be 
granted the 
opportunity to 
determine its own 
jurisdiction  
5. MONTANA ET AL. v. BLACKFEET 
TRIBE OF INDIANS, 1985 
Are state taxes applied to tribal royalty interest in oil 
and gas production authorized by Indian Mineral 
Leasing Act?  
No  Win 
6. MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE & 
TELEGRAPH CO. v. PUEBLO OF 
SANTA ANA, 1985 
Was an easement granted by the Pueblo to a telephone 
company invalid under the Non-Intercourse Act and 
the Pueblo land Act? 
No  Loss 
7. OREGON DEPARTMENT OF FISH 
AND WILDLIFE ET AL. v. KLAMATH 
INDIAN TRIBE, 1985 
Did later agreements ceding land extinguish hunting 
and fishing rights of Klamath Indian tribe, thus 
subjecting them to state regulation?  
No  Loss 
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Case Issue Position of Aboriginal  
Tribe/Organization/ 
Individual  
Outcome 
8. SOUTH CAROLINA ET AL. v. 
CATAWBA INDIAN TRIBE, INC., 1986 
Was a tribal claim that 1840 transfer of land to South 
Carolina invalid under the Non Intercourse itself 
invalid, due the termination of the tribe’s existence in 
the 1950’s?  
No Loss 
9.UNITED STATES v. MOTTAZ, 1986 Was a claim for damages regarding an invalid sale of 
Indian land time barred? 
No Loss 
10. UNITED STATES v. DION, 1986 Do tribal members have a treaty right to exemptions 
from the Endangered Species Act?  
Yes  Loss 
11. BOWEN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL. v. 
ROY ET AL., 1986 
Is an American Indian entitled to receive AFDC 
despite refusal to obtain social security number, due to 
religious beliefs?  
Yes Loss 
12. THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES OF 
THE FORT BERTHOLD 
RESERVATION v. WOLD 
ENGINEERING, P. C., ET AL., 1986 
Is a state statute that requires Indian tribes to consent 
to suit in all civil actions unduly intrusive on the 
Indian’s common law sovereign immunity? 
Yes Win 
13. IOWA MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. 
v. LaPLANTE ET AL., 1987 
i) Is a federal court required to exercise diversity 
jurisdiction, where case with same parties is pending 
in trial court? 
Yes  Win 
14. CALIFORNIA ET AL. v. CABAZON 
BAND OF MISSION INDIANS ET AL., 
1987 
Must federally approved Indian bingo games comply 
with state regulations?  
No Win 
15. AMOCO PRODUCTION CO. ET AL. 
v. VILLAGE OF GAMBELL ET AL., 
1987 
Did sale of leases for oil and gas exploration adversely 
affect aboriginal hunting and fishing rights? Did the 
Secretary of the Interior fail to comply with the Alaska 
National Interest Lands Conservation Act? 
I) Yes  
 
II) Yes  
Loss 
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Case Issue Position of Aboriginal  
Tribe/Organization/ 
Individual  
Outcome 
16. UNITED STATES v. CHEROKEE 
NATION OF OKLAHOMA, 1987 
Did a federal navigation project that affected the 
riverbed interests of Indian require just compensation 
to be paid by the federal government, under the fifth 
amendment? 
Yes  Loss 
17. HODEL, SECRETARY OF THE 
INTERIOR v. IRVING ET AL., 1987 
Does Indian Land Consolidation Act, which allows 
individual land allotments to escheat to tribe rather 
than descend by intestacy or devise, violate the Fifth 
Amendment by taking private property for public use 
without just compensation?  
No (Native American 
organizations as amici 
curiae) 
Loss. 
18. Richard E. Lyng, Secretary of 
Agriculture, et al., Petitioners v. Northwest 
Indian Cemetery Protective Association et 
al., 1988 
Can federal government authorize timber harvest near 
areas used by Indians for religious ceremonies?  
No Loss 
19. EMPLOYMENT DIVISION, 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
RESOURCES OF THE STATE OF 
OREGON, ET AL. v. SMITH, 1988 
Does dismissal for drug use (drugs part of Indian 
religious ritual) constitute unjustified infringement on 
free exercise of religion?  
Yes Loss 
20. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. 
Graham, 1989 
Has a federal question been properly pleaded in 
dispute over application of state taxes to Indian 
gaming venture? 
Yes Loss 
21. MISSISSIPPI BAND OF CHOCTAW 
INDIANS v. HOLYFIELD ET AL., 1989 
Are Indian children born outside reservation 
“domiciled” within the reservation for purposes of 
adoption proceedings?  
Yes Win 
22. COTTON PETROLEUM CORP. ET 
AL. v. NEW MEXICO ET AL., 1989 
Can New Mexico impose a severance tax on non-
Indian gas/oil facilities on Indian reservation? 
No Loss 
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Case Issue Position of Aboriginal  
Tribe/Organization/ 
Individual  
Outcome 
23. Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation, 
1989 
Do the Yakima have zoning authority over fee lands 
owned by non-members in  
i) the reservation’s “closed area” and  
ii) the reservation’s “open” area  
i) and ii) Yes  i) Win 
 
ii) Loss 
24. EMPLOYMENT DIVISION, 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
RESOURCES OF OREGON, et al. v. 
SMITH et al., 1990 
Can Oregon prohibit the use of Peyote in Native 
American religious ceremonies?  
No Loss 
25. Duro v. Reina, 1990 Can a non-member Indian be subject to tribal criminal 
jurisdiction, when a non-Indian would not be subject 
to tribal jurisdiction?  
Yes (Native American 
amici) 
Loss 
26. EDGAR BLATCHFORD, 
COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMUNITY AND REGIONAL 
AFFAIRS OF ALASKA, PETITIONER v. 
NATIVE VILLAGE OF NOATAK AND 
CIRCLE VILLAGE, 1991 
Does the 11th Amendment bar suits by Indian Tribes 
against states without their consent? 
No Loss 
27. OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION v. 
CITIZEN BAND POTAWATOMI 
INDIAN TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA, 1991 
1. May a state that has not asserted jurisdiction over 
Indian Land under Public Law 280 collect taxes for 
on-reservation sales of cigarettes to non-members?  
 
2. Did the tribe waive its sovereign immunity by filing 
an action for injunctive relief?  
No and no  1. Loss 
 
2. Win 
28. COUNTY OF YAKIMA v. Yakima 
Indian Nation, 1992 
Can the county impose  
i) excise tax and 
ii) ad valorem tax  
 
on land, sale of land that had been alloted under the 
1887 Dawes Act? 
No and no  i) Win  
 
ii) Loss  
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Case Issue Position of Aboriginal  
Tribe/Organization/ 
Individual  
Outcome 
29. Lincoln v. Vigil, 1993 Did the Indian Health Service violate the 
Administrative Procedure Act when it discontinued a 
program for handicapped children?  
Yes Loss 
30. South Dakota v. Bourland, 1993  Can tribes regulate hunting and fishing rights over 
non-members in disputed territory?  
Yes Loss 
31. EMERY L. NEGONSOTT, 
PETITIONER v. HAROLD SAMUELS, 
WARDEN, ET AL., 1993 
Does the Federal government have jurisdiction 
regarding Indian on Indian, on reservation crime?  
Yes Loss 
32. OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION, 
PETITIONER v. SAC AND FOX 
NATION, 1993 
Must an Indian live on reservation for presumption 
against state tax jurisdiction to be applied, in the 
context of a challenge to state taxation?  
No Win 
33. NEW YORK, ET AL v. MILHELM 
ATTEA & BROS., INC., ETC., ET AL., 
1994 
Is a New York regulatory scheme enacted to prevent 
non-Indians from purchasing untaxed cigarettes an 
invalid exercise of a federal regulatory power?  
Yes Loss. 
34. Hagen v. Utah (1994) Does crime fall under state jurisdiction, when the 
crime has taken place in Indian lands that have been 
opened to settlement by non-Indians? 
No Loss 
35. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw 
Nation (1995) 
Can the state  
i) tax fuel sold on reservation and ii) wages paid to 
Indians who live off of the reservation (claim rooted 
in 1837 Treaty)? 
No i) Win 
 
ii) Loss 
36. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, et 
al., 1996 
Can Seminole Tribe sue the state of Florida for 
violation of duty to negotiate in good faith regarding 
gaming industry? 
Yes Loss 
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Case Issue Position of Aboriginal  
Tribe/Organization/ 
Individual  
Outcome 
37. BRUCE BABBITT, SECRETARY OF 
THE INTERIOR, ET AL., PETITIONERS 
v. MARVIN K. YOUPEE, SR., ET AL., 
1997 
Does Indian land consolidation act violate property 
rights?  
No (amici) Loss 
38. Strate v. A-1 CONTRACTORS AND 
LYLE STOCKERT, 1997 
Can tribe member (widow of tribe member) sue 
company that she had an accident with on federal 
highway on Indian reservation in tribal court?  
Yes Loss 
39. IDAHO, ET AL v. COEUR d’ALENE 
TRIBE OF IDAHO, ETC., ET AL., 1997 
 Does a tribe have title to banks/beds of a navigable 
water course, and thus rights to exclusive use and 
exemption from state regulation, based on 1873 
executive order? 
Yes Loss 
40. MONTANA, ET AL., PETITIONERS 
v. CROW TRIBE OF INDIANS ET AL., 
1998 
Can Crow Tribe get restitution for state taxes imposed 
upon mining company that had leased land from the 
tribe?  
Yes Loss 
41. CASS COUNTY, MINNESOTA, ET 
AL. v. LEECH LAKE BAND OF 
CHIPPEWA INDIANS, 1998 
Is the tribe exempt from county taxation on 
reservation land that had been sold to individuals but 
was re-purchased by the tribe? 1855 Leech band given 
reservation 
Yes Loss 
42. ALASKA, v. NATIVE VILLAGE OF 
VENETIE TRIBAL GOVERNMENT ET 
AL., 1998 
Are the tribe’s ANCSA land “Indian country,” 
therefore entitling the tribe to tax business conducted 
on the land?  
Yes Loss 
43. KIOWA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA v. 
MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGIES, 
INC., 1998 
Is the Kiowa tribe subject to a breach of contract suit 
in Oklahoma courts?  
No Win  
44. SOUTH DAKOTA, PETITIONER v. 
YANKTON SIOUX TRIBE ET AL., 1998 
Did the Yankton Sioux cede governing authority over 
land it sold in the 19th century?  
No Loss 
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Case Issue Position of Aboriginal  
Tribe/Organization/ 
Individual  
Outcome 
45. ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF 
REVENUE, PETITIONER v. BLAZE 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC, 
1999 
Does federal law pre-empt application of state tax to 
Indian-owned company? 
Yes Loss 
46. EL PASO NATURAL GAS 
COMPANY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
LAURA NEZTSOSIE ET AL., 1999 
Does Price-Anderson Act establish federal court 
jurisdiction for torts for regarding nuclear waste? 
No  Loss 
47. MINNESOTA, ET AL., 
PETITIONERS v. MILLE LACS BAND 
OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS ET, 1999 
Did 1850 executive order extinguish tribes 
usufructuary rights established in1837 Treaty? 
No  Win 
48. AMOCO PRODUCTION COMPANY, 
v. SOUTHERN UTE INDIAN TRIBE ET 
AL., 1999 
Does a tribe that has been given rights to coal deposits 
also have rights to coalbed methane gas (alternative 
energy source)?  
Yes Loss 
49. HAROLD F. RICE, v. BENJAMIN J. 
CAYETANO, GOVERNOR OF HAWAII, 
2000 
Does a Hawaii statute permitting only “Hawaiians”—
that is, descendants of aboriginal peoples inhabiting 
Hawaiian Islands in 1778—to vote for trustees of state 
agency violate the Federal Constitution’s Fifteenth 
Amendment. 
No Loss 
50. C & L ENTERPRISES, INC., v. 
CITIZEN BAND POTAWATOMI 
INDIAN TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA, 2001 
Has tribe waived sovereign immunity regarding 
contract dispute?  
No Loss 
51. ATKINSON TRADING COMPANY, 
INC. v. JOE SHIRLEY, JR., ET AL., 2001 
Can Indian Tribe impose a hotel tax on nonmember 
guests in hotel rooms that were located on non-Indian 
fee land within exterior boundaries of tribe’s 
reservation?  
Yes Loss 
52.Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 
2001 
Tax question regarding exemptions; do Indian tribes 
receive identical exemptions as do state governments?  
Yes Loss 
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Case Issue Position of Aboriginal  
Tribe/Organization/ 
Individual  
Outcome 
53 NEVADA, ET AL. v. FLOYD HICKS, 
ET AL., 2001 
Does a tribal court have jurisdiction over civil claims 
against state official 
Yes Loss 
54. STATE OF ARIZONA v. STATE OF 
CALIFORNIA, ET AL., 2001 
Are water rights claims of Indian tribe precluded by 
claims commission decision? 
No Win 
55. United States v. Navajo Nation, 2003 Did payment rate for private company which has 
licensed to mine coal on federal Indian land violate the 
federal government’s fiduciary duty to the Navajo? 
Yes Loss 
56. INYO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, et v. 
PAIUTE-SHOSHONE INDIANS OF THE 
BISHOP COMMUNITY OF THE 
BISHOP COLONY et al., 2003 
Can a state search an Indian casino as part of an 
investigation of welfare fraud? 
No  Loss 
57. UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. 
WHITE MOUNTAIN APACHE TRIBE, 
2003 
Does the US gov’t have a fiduciary duty regarding 
military base on Native American land? Must the 
government pay monetary compensation for decay of 
fort?  
Yes Win 
58. UNITED STATES v. BILLY JO 
LARA, 2004 
Does trial by Indian court and subsequent trial by 
federal court violate double jeopardy clause?  
No (amici) Win 
59. CITY OF SHERRILL, NEW YORK, 
v. ONEIDA INDIAN NATION OF NEW 
YORK, et al., 2005 
Does open market purchase of land that was 
previously part of Indian territory restore tax 
immunity privileges? 
Yes Loss 
60. JOAN WAGNON, SECRETARY, 
KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF 
REVENUE, PETITIONER v. PRAIRIE 
BAND POTAWATOMI NATION, 2005 
Can Kansas impose a gas tax on suppliers for Indian 
reservation? 
No Loss 
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Case Issue Position of Aboriginal  
Tribe/Organization/ 
Individual  
Outcome 
61. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. 
Leavitt, 2005 
Under the Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act (ISDEAA) (25 USCS §§ 450 et seq.) 
which authorized the Federal Government and Indian 
tribes to enter into contracts in which the tribes 
promised to supply some federally funded services 
that a government agency would otherwise provide, 
there is a provision which) specified that the 
government had to pay a tribe’s “contract support 
costs,” which included some indirect administrative 
costs; is this a legally enforceable contract?  
Yes Win 
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Decision: Government loses to pro-environment challenger (n=16) 
Case/Year Court Issue and Outcome Vote/Dissent 
Canadian Wildlife Federation v. 
Canada, 1990 
Trial  Challenge to environmental assessment process; Federal minister required to 
comply with EARPGO 
 
Friends of the Oldman River 
Society v. Canada, 1990 
Appeal Must federal government assert jurisdiction and complete EARPGO review 
process; Federal government must apply the process to this project 
3-0 
Edmonton Friends of the North 
Society v. Canada, 1991 
Appeal Appeal from order adding appellants as party subject to restrictions; proceedings 
seek to quash federal decisions regarding the approval of pulp and paper mill; 
the appeals court ruled that the trial court imposed improper conditions which 
“reduced appellants role almost to that of an intervenor rather than a full party.”  
3-0 
Carrer-Sekani Tribal Council v. 
Canada, 1991 
Trial Application to quash federal-provincial agreement re. ALCAN project; 
application for mandamus requiring respondents to comply with EARPGO 
granted  
 
Cree Regional Authority v. 
Canada, 1991 
Trial Application for mandamus ordering respondent to conduct environmental 
assessment of Great Whale River Hydro Electric Project  
 
Cree Regional Authority v. 
Canada, 1992 
Trial  Application for mandamus to compel federal government to carry out federal 
environment and social impact assessment; the federal and provincial 
government cannot simply agree to conduct ONLY a provincial level process 
 
Eastmain Indian Band v. Canada, 
1992 
Trial Application for mandamus ordering federal administrator to carry out federal 
environmental assessment with public input, as per EARPGO  
 
Tetzlaff v. Canada , 1992 Trial Application for a series of order concerning the conduct of environmental 
assessment process  
 
Friends of the Island v. Canada, 
1992 
Trial Application for EARPGO review of PEI-New Brunswick bridge, also challenge 
in light of the PEI Terms of Union.  
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Case/Year Court Issue and Outcome Vote/Dissent 
Union of Nova Scotia Indians v. 
Canada, 1997 
Trial Application for judicial review of Minister of Fisheries/Oceans and Minister of 
Environment decision to accept CEAA report  
 
Friends of the West Country 
Association v. Canada, 1997 
Trial Motion to compel respondents to produce documents related to Sunshine 
Village Corp. project  
 
Alberta Wilderness Association v. 
Canada, 1998  
Trial Can a newly formed Indian association represent numerous Indian entities under 
CEAA review process? Yes; they can be added as intervenors 
 
Friends of the West County 
Association v. Canada, 1998  
Trial  Application for review of environmental assessment; applicants argued that a 
proposed bridge was integrally related to forestry operations, and the effects of 
forestry operations should be taken into account when reviewing the application 
for the bridge  
 
Societ Pour Vaincre la Pollution v. 
Canada, 1998 
Trial  Application to stay minister=s decision to continue salvage of Irving Whale 
barge pending final disposition of application for judicial review  
 
Alberta Wilderness Association v. 
Canada, 1999 
Appeal Appeal from trial division dismissal of application for review of coal project 
report; application allowed; CEAA mandates full environmental assessment in 
this case 
3-0 
Alberta Wilderness Association v. 
Cardinal River Coal, 1999 
Trial  Application for review of Department of Fisheries and Oceans authorization of 
coal mines; did the joint federal/provincial review panel comply with CEAA? 
Did it conduct the hearing in accordance with procedural fairness? Application 
allowed; the panel failed to properly consider all information that had been 
submitted to it.  
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Decision: Government wins in pro environment challenge (n=40) 
Case/Year Court Issue and Outcome Vote/Dissent 
Friends of the Oldman River Society v. 
Canada, 1990  
Trial Challenge to federal decision not to assert jurisdiction over dam approval 
process  
 
Walpole Island Indian Band v. Canada, 
1990 
Trial  Motion for injunction against dredging of St. Clair river due to failure to comply 
with EARPGO 
 
Angus v. Canada, 1990 Appeal Is EARPGO applicable to Order in Council re. VIA rail reduction of passenger 
rail servicees? Application dismissed due to delay in filing  
 
International Wildlife Coalition v. 
Canada, 1990 
Trial Application to restrain aquarium from capturing and transporting beluga whales; 
application to require minister to comply with EARPGO; standing granted, 
application dismissed  
 
Lifeforce Foundation v. Canada, 1990  Trial Application to quash beluga whale catching license; application dismissed, no 
evidence that federal minister failed to take public concerns into account  
 
Naskapi-Montegnais Innu Association 
v. Canada, 1990 
Trial Application for order stopping low-flying military air operations; must project be 
halted during EARPGO assessment? No.  
 
Canadian Wildlife Federation v. 
Canada, 1991  
Appeal Minister does not have to withhold license prior to completion of environmental 
assessment, vis a vis Rafferty-Alameda dam construction project  
 
Teztlaff v. Canada, 1991 Trial Application for order to enforce compliance with mandamus requiring 
appointment of environmental review panel  
 
Cantwell v. Canada, 1991 Trial Application to quash minister=s proposal to construct coal fired generating 
station; challenge to validity of environmental assessment  
 
Cantwell v. Canada, 1991 Appeal   
Carrrier-Sekani Tribal Council v. 
Canda, 1992  
Appeal Does EARPGO apply to federal-provincial authorization of water project? 
Application dismissed. 
3-0 
Vancouver Island Peace Society v. 
Canada, 1992 
Trial Application to quash approval of visit by American nuclear vessels to Canadian 
port, as approvals were made without EARPGO compliance; application 
dismissed 
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Case/Year Court Issue and Outcome Vote/Dissent 
Friends of the Oldman River Society v. 
Canada, 1993 
Trial Application seeking mandamu requiring Minister of Transportation to implement 
recommendations of environmental assessment panel; application dismissed  
 
Friends of the Island Inc. v. Canada, 
1993 
Trial Application seeking mandamus regarding decisions to build bridge between PEI 
and mainland; bridge in violation of terms of Union; improper EARPGO process 
 
Application dismissed; no rights violation until ferry service actually 
discontinued  
 
Eastmain Band v. Canada, 1993 Appeal Appeal by Quebec and Canada against order requiring the Eastmain Hydro-
electric project to be subject to public environmental review process; application 
allowed; EARPGO does not apply to this project  
 
Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society 
v. Canada, 1994 
Trial Application for interim order setting aside decision to issue timber cutting 
permit; application dismissed; Parks Canada can assess individual components 
of long-range planning separately from other components 
 
Vancouver Island Peace Society v. 
Canada, 1994 
Trial  Applications for mandamus quashing approval of nuclear vessel visits in 
Canadian ports due to failure to comply with EARPGO; application dismissed  
 
Friends of the Oak Hammock Marsh v. 
Canada, 1994  
Trial Application to quash federal approval of “Ducks Unlimited Educational Center” 
in Oaks Hammock Marsh; application dismissed 
 
Pulp, Paper, and Woodworkers Local 8 
v. Canada, 1995 
Appeal Appeal from trial division decision quashing ministerial decision to register 
pesticide Busan; application allowed; trial division judge engaged in 
unwarranted analysis of Agriculture Canada evidence  
 
Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society 
v. Canada, 1996 
Trial  Application for declaration that Westmin Resources Ltd. is required to obtain 
land use permit prior to exploratory mining; permit to move bulldozers only took 
environmental effects of movement into account, not the activities at the 
company=s site; application dismissed; adequacy of review Asomewhat moot@ as 
bulldozers had completed work and were removed from the site 
 
Friends of the Island Incorporated v. 
Canada, 1996 
Appeal Appeal from trial divisions decision re. fixed link bridge; principal issue= 
adequacy of EARPGO process; application dismissed  
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Case/Year Court Issue and Outcome Vote/Dissent 
Alberta Wilderness Association v. 
Express Pipeline Ltd. 1996 
Appeal Application for leave to appeal NEB approval of pipeline project; application 
dismissed; applicants fail to raise questions of law, and simply attack the quality 
of evidence and conclusions of NEB 
 
Societe Pour Vaincre la Pollution v. 
Canada, 1996 
Trial Application for declaration that respondents have not complied with 
environmental assessment law; dispute is over whether PCBs should be pumped 
before a sunk barge is removed from a river; application removed  
 
Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society 
v. Canada, 1997 
Appeal Appeal from trial division dismissal of application for judicial review of 
construction permit with Sunshine Village Corp.; also appeal of decision to 
refuse to order Minister of Parks to subject long-range development plan to 
EARPGO; application dismissed; Ministers retain residual powers to engage in 
assessments  
2-1 
 
Dissent: 1992 
approval 
cannot be 
subjected to 
subsequent 
reviews  
Ghali v. Canada, 1997 Trial  Motion for Mandamus ordering Minister of Transport to proceed under CEAA 
with environmental assessment of newly liberalized international flight schedule; 
application dismissed  
 
Innu Nation v. Canada, 1997 Trial  Application to set aside decision authorizing provision of funds for Ptarmigan 
Trail in Labrador; application dismissed  
 
Community before Cars Coalition v. 
National Capital Commission, 1997 
Trial  Application for review of decision to widen bridge; issues = jurisdiction of 
commission, conflict of interest, interpretation of EARPGO; application 
dismissed  
 
Nanoose Conversion Campaign v. 
Canada, 1998 
Trial  Application for judicial review of decision not to require ocean dumping permit 
in relation to naval operations (i.e. torpedoes are being “dumped”) application 
dismissed; “The Court presumes that the reference to nuclear warheads is not a 
reference to reality...” The minister is free to determine that torpedoes are not a 
significant environmental threat  
 
Alberta Wilderness Association v. 
Canada, 1998  
Trial Application seeking declaration that environmental assessment of coal project 
failed to comply with CEAA; application dismissed  
 
  
267
Case/Year Court Issue and Outcome Vote/Dissent 
Alberta Wilderness Association v. 
Canada, 1998  
Trial Application for judicial review of report regarding coal project; application 
dismissed  
 
Lake Petticodiac Preservation 
Association v. Canada, 1998 
Trial Application for interim relief pending disposition of judicial review application; 
applicants seek declaration that screening report decisions re. Lake management 
project null and void; application dismissed  
 
Tsawassen Indian Band v. Canada, 1998 Trial  Application for review of port construction authorization; effects on Indian Band 
not properly assessed; application dismissed; the port is not a project within the 
meaning of the CEAA 
 
Qikiqtami Inuit Association v. Canada, 
1999 
Trial  Review of Nunavut Water Board decision to renew water license on Nanisivik 
Mines; challenged due to failure to take all evidence into account; application 
dismissed  
 
Lavoie v. Canada, 1999 Trial  Application for interim relief in context of application for judicial review of 
decision to issue construction permits for hydro facilities; application dismissed  
 
Citizens’ Mining Council of 
Newfoundland v. Canada, 1999 
Trial  Application challenging environmental assessment of nickel mining project, 
arguing that two projects should be assessed separately; application dismissed  
 
Lavoie v. Canada, 1999 Trial  Application alleging that Ministry of Fisheries and Oceans authorization is 
unlawful because not all relevant documents were made public; application 
dismissed  
 
Canadian Environmental Law 
Association v. Canada, 1999 
Trial  Application for declaration that Minister of Environment exceeded her 
jurisdiction in signing four federal-provincial environmental policy agreements; 
application dismissed  
 
Animal Alliance of Canada v. Canada Trial  Application for review of decision to create a special hunting season for over-
abundant snow geese; applicants allege violations of 1916 Migratory Birds Act, 
unlawful sub-delegation, erroneous findings of fact; application dismissed  
 
Bow Valley Naturalists v. Canada, 1999 Trial Challenge to decision to allow development of meeting facility at Chateau Lake 
Louise in Banff National Park; application dismissed  
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Case/Year Court Issue and Outcome Vote/Dissent 
Manitoba’s Future Forest Alliance v. 
Canada, 1999 
Trial Application to set aside bridge construction permit; challenge to “scoping” of the 
project; application dismissed; note rejection of broad interpretation of CEAA 
“independent utility” principle  
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Decision: Government loses to anti-environment challenger (n=4) 
Case/Year Court Issue and Outcome Vote/Dissent 
Quebec v. Canada, 1991 Appeal National Energy Board does not have authority to impose production 
conditions (e.g. EARPGO review) on Hydro Quebec as condition for 
granting of export license  
3-0 
Sunshine Village Corp. v. 
Canada, 1995 
Trial Application for review of refusal to grant a previously approved logging 
permit; EARPGO does not permit reassessment of license in light of new 
public concerns, once the permit has been granted  
 
Bowen v. Canada, 1997  Trial Application for CEAA review of decisions to close airstrips in Banff 
National Park  
 
B.C. Hydro and Power 
Authority v. Canada, 1998  
Trial Application for review of federal water control order under the Fisheries 
Act 
 
Application allowed; Minister did not provide B.C. Hydro with proper 
notice/opportunity to respond 
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Decision: Federal government wins in anti-environment challenge (N=9) 
Case and Year Court Issue Vote 
Provirotect Inc. v. Canada, 1990  Trial Application against ministerial decision not to create board of review regarding PCB 
regulations 
 
Provirotect v. Canada, 1991 Trial Application for injunction exempting plaintiffs from PCB export regulations; action for 
declaration that regulation is ultra vires  
 
Alberta v. Canada, 1991 Trial Application by Alberta to halt environmental assessment review; province questioned 
whether federal government could provide for review of environmental and socio-
economic concerns that fall within areas of provincial jurisdiction  
 
Cominco Ltd. v. North West 
Territories Water Board, 1991 
Appeal Appeal from NWTWB dismissal of application to increase percentage of zinc and lead 
in mine effluent; appellant argued that the board lacked jurisdiction to impose 
conditions on the license  
3-0 
Curragh Resources v. Canada, 1992 Trial Application to determine whether the Crown has the authority to impose mitigation 
measures re. Vanguard mining project  
 
International Mineral and Chemicals 
Corp. v. Canada, 1993 
Trial Company applied for declaration that a creek = navigable water, in order to insure that 
the federal government would be responsible for the conduct of an environmental 
assessment prior to the grant of mining licenses; application dismissed  
 
Sunshine Village Corp. v. Canada, 
1995 
Trial Motion to strike respondent status for members of environmental assessment panel in 
judicial review of proceedings regarding review of long-range development plan; 
motion dismissed  
 
Sunshine Village Corporation v. 
Canada, 1996 
Trial Application for review challenging appointment of review panel by minister of 
Environment under CEAA; Sunshine argued it had received full approval in 1992; 
application dismissed; approval in 1992 did not preclude future assessments of 
individual components of the project  
 
Sunshine Village Corp. v. Canada, 
1999 
Trial  Application for review of Minister of Canadian Heritage’s decision to retain federal 
environmental assessment panel; application dismissed  
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Note cases which were excluded: rulings do not involve interpretation of CEAA (e.g. ruling on exclusion of evidence, cases based 
upon treaties with Indian tribes) 
 
Rulings against Government: 7 
Rulings for Government: 28  
Number of Cases with Dissenting Votes: 2 
 
Pro-gov/ anti-gov = decision in favor of/ against government 
Pro-env/ anti-env = decision in favor of/ against environmentalist group or claimant 
Case and Year Court Description  Outcome Majority  Dissent 
Eastmain Band v. 
Canada, 1992 
FCA Government Actor: Attorney General, Hydro Quebec 
Project: James Bay Hydro Electric Dam 
Law: EARPGO  
Issue: Is there a duty for the federal government to conduct an 
environmental assessment, once irrevocable steps towards the 
completion of the Project have been taken? 
Judicial Actions: In regards to EARPGO claims, a “Project” is no 
longer in the “Project” stage once irrevocable steps have been taken 
to complete the Project. EARPGO review only applies to “Projects” 
in the planning stage.  
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
Marceau, 
Decary and 
Letourneau 
JJ.A. 
 
Curragh Resources Inc. 
v. Canada, 1993 
FCA Government Actor: Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs, 
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans 
Project: water license for mining company  
Law: EARPGO 
Issue: Do the ministers have the authority under EARPGO to 
impose additional conditions for water license?  
Judicial Actions: Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs had the 
authority to impose conditions  
Partial Pro-
gov  
 
Pro-env 
Isaac, Stone, 
Craig 
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Case and Year Court Description  Outcome Majority  Dissent 
Sea to Sea Greenbelt 
Society v. Greater 
Victoria Water District, 
1996 
BCCA Government Actor: Ministry of the Environment/GVWD 
Project: expansion of reservoir capacity 
Law: BC environmental assessment act  
Issue: does the BC EAA apply to this Project?  
Judicial Action: appeal dismissed, lower court upheld  
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
Williams, 
McEachern, 
Goldie 
 
Canadian Parks and 
Wilderness Society v. 
Superintendent of 
Banff National Park, 
1996 
FCA Government Actor: Parks Canada 
Project: ski resort  
Law: EARPGO, CEAA 
Issue: do developments fall under the EARPGO and CEAA? Had 
Project received valid final approval, or was it subject to ongoing 
environmental review? 
Judicial Action: Project subject to ongoing environmental review  
Pro-gov 
 
Pro-env 
Stone, 
Desjardins 
McDonald  
Vuntut Gwitchin First 
Nation v. Canada 
(Attorney General) 
1998 
FCA Government Actor: DIAND 
Project: well-testing 
Law: CEAA 
Issue: challenge to permit decision 
Judicial Action: application denied; lower court affirmed  
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
Stone, 
Denault and 
Decary  
 
Alberta Wilderness 
Association v. Canada, 
1998 
FCA Government Actor: Department of Fisheries and Oceans  
Project: open pit coal mine in Jasper national park  
Law: CEAA 
Issue: failure to complete EA prior to issuing authorizations  
Judicial Action: application allowed; environmental assessment 
must be conducted; lower court overturned  
Anti-gov 
 
Pro-env 
Strayer, 
Robertson 
and Sexton 
JJ.A. 
 
Algonquin Wildlands 
League v. Ontario 
(Minister of Natural 
Resources), 1998 
CanLII 5756 (ON 
C.A.) 
ONCA Government Actor: Minister of Natural Resources 
Project: Forest management plans 
Law: Crown Forest Sustainability Act 
Issue: Did the plans comply with the act? 
Judicial Action: Statutory requirements are mandatory, not directory 
Anti-gov 
 
Pro-env 
CARTHY, 
MOLDAVE
R and 
FELDMAN 
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Friends of the West 
Country Association v. 
Canada (Minister of 
Fisheries and Oceans) 
1999 
FCA Government Actor: Coast Guard 
Project: bridge  
Law: CEAA 
Issue: Scoping, application of independent utility principle (Projects 
cannot be separated for purpose of EA if they have no independent 
utility)  
Judicial Action: appeal dismissed; Coast Guard decision re. scoping 
of Project invalid  
Pro-env 
 
Anti-gov  
Linden, 
Rothstein, 
McDonald  
 
Sharp v. Canada 
(Transportation 
Agency) 1999 
FCA Government Actor: Transportation Agency 
Project: railway line construction  
Law: CEAA, Canadian Transportation Act 
Issue: Does law require that new the need for new rail line 
constructions be demonstrated? 
Judicial Action: application dismissed  
Pro-gov  
 
Anti-env 
Isaac, 
Decary, 
Rothstein 
 
Alberta Cement 
Corporation v. Alberta 
Environmental 
Protection, 1999 
ABCA 212 (CanLII) 
ABCA Government Actor: Alberta Environmental Protection 
Project: quarry 
Law: Land Surface Conservation and Reclamation Act  
Issue: Validity of request for environmental impact assessment 
Judicial Action: appeal dismissed  
Pro-gov 
 
Pro-env 
Cote, 
McFayden, 
Hunt  
 
Taku River Tlingit First 
Nation v. Tulsequah 
Chief Mine Project, 
2000 
BCCA Government Actor: Minister of Environment, Mines, Northern 
Development 
Project: mine 
Law: BC environmental assessment act  
Issue: can government decision maker pursue an appeal of a 
decision by a lower court, when the lower court has remitted the 
issue to the decision maker? 
Judicial Action:  
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Canada (Minister of 
Environment) v. 
Hamilton Wentworth 
(Municipality), 2001 
FCA 347 (CanLII) 
FCA Government Actors: Environment Canada vs. municipal government
Project: highway construction  
Law: CEAA 
Issue: Does the CEAA apply to a Project that had been initially 
approved in the early 1980s? 
Judicial Actions: CEAA not applicable to 45 year old highway 
Project now nearing completion; lower court decision favoring 
federal position overturned  
Anti-fed gov 
 
Anti-env 
Richard, 
Linden, 
Evans  
 
Bow Valley Naturalists 
Society v. Canada 
(Minister of Canadian 
Heritage) (C.A.), 2001 
FCA Government Actor: Parks Canada 
Project: construction of meeting facility in Banff National Park  
Law: CEAA 
Issue: scoping of Project, cumulative environmental effects 
assessment 
Court Action: application dismissed 
Pro-gov  
 
Anti-env  
Linden, 
Isaac, 
Sharlow  
 
Inverhuron & District 
Ratepayers Ass. v. 
Canada (Minister of 
The Environment), 
2001 FCA 203 
(CanLII) 
FCA Government Actor: Environment Canada  
Project: Nuclear Waste Storage Facility  
Law: CEAA 
Issue: adequacy of review  
Judicial Actions: application denied; lower court decision upheld  
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
Stone, 
Strayer, 
Sexton  
 
Tsawwassen Indian 
Band v. Canada 
(Minister of 
Enviornment), 2001 
FCA 57 (CanLII) 
FCA Government Actor: Ministry of the Environment  
Project: ocean dumping 
Law: CEAA, Ocean Dumping Control Act  
Issue: do the actions constitute a “Project” under CEAA? 
Judicial Actions: application denied; CEAA only applies to 
Proposed Projects 
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
Strayer, 
Linden, 
Sexton 
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Cook v. Alberta 
(Environmental 
Protection), 2001 
ABCA 276 (CanLII) 
ABCA Government Actor: Minister of Environmental Protection 
Project: wilderness camping facility  
Law: Public Lands Act  
Issue: Could the Minister reject lease application 
Judicial Actions: Minister must reconsider application, Provide 
reason for decisions 
Anti-gov 
 
Anti-env 
Hunt, 
McFayden, 
Berger 
 
Athabasca Chipewyan 
First Nation v. British 
Columbia Hydro and 
Power Authority 
(C.A.), 2001 FCA 62 
(CanLII 
FCA Government Actor: National Energy Board 
Project: export of hydro-electric energy  
Law: National Energy Board Act 
Issue: adequacy of review Process 
Judicial Actions: appeal allowed, Board’s decision quashed 
Anti-gov 
 
Pro-env 
Rothstein 
SharlowMal
one 
 
Lavoie v. Canada 
(Minister of the 
Environment), 2002 
FCA 268 (CanLII) 
FCA Government Actor: Minister of the Environment, Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans  
Project: hydroelectric Project  
Law: CEAA 
Issue: Did Project approval comply with environmental assessment 
Process? 
Judicial Actions: application dismissed; ministerial decision upheld 
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
Richard 
Evans 
Malone 
 
Fenske v. Alberta 
(Minister of 
Environment), 2002 
ABCA 135 (CanLII) 
ABCA Government Actor: Minister of the Environment  
Project: landfill expansion 
Law: Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act  
Issue: Ministerial decision to approve expansion of the Project, 
against recommendations of environmental review board  
Judicial Actions: lower court decision overturned  
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
Costigan, 
Beger, 
Paperny 
 
Taku River Tlingit First 
Nation v. Ringstad, 
2002  
BCCA Government Actor: Environmental Assessment Office et al  
Project: mining Project  
Law: BC EAA 
Issue: adequacy of environmental review Process  
Judicial Action: as a matter of administrative law (BC EAA) the 
certificates authorizing the Project were valid  
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
Rowles, 
Huddart 
Southin  
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Canadian Parks and 
Wilderness Society v. 
Minister of Canadian 
Heritage, 2003 
FCA Government Actor: Minister of Canadian Heritage 
Project: wilderness road  
Law: Canadian National Parks Act 
Issue: Can the Minister approve road construction for non-park 
related purposes? Did the minister breach her duty to uphold the 
ecological integrity of the park? Were road permits issued for the 
purpose of park management?  
Judicial Action: application dismissed  
Pro-gov  
 
Anti-env  
JA Evans, 
Rothstein, 
Malone  
 
Society Promoting 
Environmental 
Conservation v. Canada 
(Attorney General) 
(C.A.), 2003 
FCA Government Actor: A.G., Ministry of Defense 
Project: Expropriation of seabed and foreshore for torpedo testing 
Law: Expropriation Act 
Issue: Did the hearings officer Properly notify the public, Properly 
inform the minister of the nature of the objections  
Judicial Action: application rejected, lower court overturned 
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
Strayer, 
Evans, 
Malone 
 
Western Canada 
Wilderness Committee 
v. British Columbia 
(Ministry of Forests, 
South Island Forest 
District), 2003 
BCCA Government Actor: Ministry of Forests  
Project: four logging cutblocks 
Law: Forest Practices Code of B.C. 
Issue: Did the decision to approve a logging Project adequately take 
into account dangers to the spotted owl? 
Judicial Action: application dismissed; lower court decision upheld 
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
 
ProwseRyan 
Huddart 
 
Inter-Church Uranium 
Committee Educational 
Co-operative v. Canada 
(Atomic Energy 
Control Board) 
(F.C.A.), 2004 FCA 
218 (CanLII) 
FCA Government Actor: Atomic Energy Control Board 
Project: licensing for component of uranium mine 
Law: CEAA  
Issue: retroactive applicability of CEAA  
Judicial Action: lower court decision overturned, application of 
ICUCEC rejected 
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
Richard, 
Rothstein, 
Sharlow 
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Lone Pine (Committee) 
v. Alberta (Natural 
Resources 
Conservation Board), 
2004 ABCA 404 
ABCA Government Actor: Natural Resources Conservation Board 
Project: expansion of cattle feedlot 
Law: Agricultural Operations Practices Act  
Issue: Did the Board err in application of the transitional Provisions 
of the act? 
Judicial Action: decision of the board quashed 
Anti-gov 
 
Pro-env 
  
Sutcliffe v. Ontario 
(Minister of the 
Environment), 2004 
CanLII 31687 (ON 
C.A.) 
ONCA Government Actor: Ministry of the Environment  
Project: landfill site 
Law: Environmental Assessment Act  
Issue: Can the minister approve an assessment that is tailored for a 
specific Project? 
Judicial Action: appeal allowed; ministerial decision re-instated 
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
Charron, 
Laskin, 
MacPherson 
 
Canada (Minister of the 
Environment) v. 
Bennett Environmental 
Inc., 2005 FCA 261 
(CanLII) 
FCA Government actor: Environment Canada 
Project: High Temperature Thermal Oxidizer  
Law: CEAA 
Issue: challenge to federal decision to refer facility to a review 
panel; facility was largely complete at the point when the federal 
review Process began; was the facility still a “Project” subject to 
review?  
Judicial Action: lower court decision that the facility was not a 
“Project” at this stage was correct 
Anti-env 
 
Anti-gov 
Sharlow 
Linden, 
Sexton 
 
Sumas Energy 2 Inc. v. 
Canada (National 
Energy Board), 2005 
FCA 377 (CanLII) 
FCA Government actor: National Energy Board 
Project: international power line  
Law: National Energy Board Act, Canadian environmental 
assessment act 
Issue: can the board consider the environmental impact of an 
international Project? 
Judicial Action: application for review of Board’s decision rejected  
Pro-gov  
 
Pro-env  
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Castle-Crown 
Wilderness Coalition v. 
Alberta (Director of 
Regulatory Assurance 
Division, Alberta 
Environment), 2005 
ABCA 283 (CanLII 
ABCA Government Actor: Director of Regulatory Assurance, Ministry of 
the Environment 
Project: ski facility  
Law: Alberta Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act 
Issue: Was an EIA (environmental impact assessment) necessary for 
all aspects of the development? 
Judicial Action: appeal allowed, lower court overturned 
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
Ritter, 
McFayden, 
O’Leary 
 
South Etobicoke 
Residents & 
Ratepayers Association 
Inc. v. Ontario Realty 
Corp., 2005 CanLII 
19654 (ON C.A.) 
ONCA Government Actor: Ontario Realty Corp, Ministry of the 
Environment 
Project: crematorium  
Law: Ontario Environmental Protection Act  
Issue: challenge to adequacy of environmental assessment  
Judicial Action: application denied; lower court upheld 
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env  
Borins, 
Blar, 
LaForme 
 
Eagleridge Bluffs & 
Wetlands Preservation 
Society v. 
H.M.T.Q.,2006 BCCA 
334 
BC Government Actor:  
Project: highway construction  
Law: B.C. environmental assessment act  
Issue: have those responsible for the construction Project complied 
with environmental assessment certificate?  
Judicial Action: application dismissed; lower court decision upheld  
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
HallMcKen
zie Levine 
 
Do Rav Right Coalition 
v. Hagen,2006 BCCA 
571 
BCCA Government Actor: 
Project: RAV rapid transit line 
Law: BC environmental assessment act  
Issue: consultation on Project was inadequate due to recent changes 
in construction method  
Judicial Action: application dismissed, lower court decision upheld 
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
 Newbury, 
Hall, 
Kirkpatrick 
 
Prairie Acid Rain 
Coalition v. Canada 
(Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans) 2006 
FCA Government Actor: Department of Fisheries and Oceans 
Project: Oil sands Project  
Law: CEAA 
Issue: scoping of oil sands Project, delegation of aspects of 
environmental assessment to Alberta 
Court Action: application for review dismissed, lower court upheld  
Pro-gov  
 
Anti-env 
Rothstein, 
Noel, 
Malone 
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R.K. Heli-Ski 
Panorama Inc. v. 
Glassman, 
BCCA Government Actor: Environmental Assessment Office, Minister of 
Sustainable Resource Management, etc 
Project: ski resort  
Law: BC environmental assessment act  
Issue: Procedural unfairness and bias in assessment Process  
Judicial Action: appeal dismissed  
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
Smith, 
Saunders, 
Levine  
 
Tsawwassen Residents 
Against Higher Voltage 
Overhead Lines 
Society v. British 
Columbia (Utilities 
Commission), 2007 
BCCA 211 (CanLII) 
BCCA Government Actor: BC Utilities Commission  
Project: construction of overhead electrical power lines 
Law: Utilities Commission Act  
Issue: Must the government rely on the “precautionary principle” 
when undertaking environmental assessment 
Judicial Action: appeal dismissed 
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
Thackray, 
Lowry, 
Chiasson 
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Rulings for Government: 21 
Rulings against Government: 30 
Cases with Dissenting Votes: 10  
 
Case and Year Circuit Issue Outcome Majority Dissent 
Lands Council v. 
McNair, 2007 
9th Government Actor: USFS 
Project: logging in National Forest  
Law: NFMA, NEPA  
Issue: Is project approval invalid because USFS failed to 
include a full discussion of scientific uncertainty 
surrounding its strategy for improving wildlife habitat? 
Judicial Action: Appeal allowed; EIS is insufficient  
Pro-env 
 
Anti-gov 
Warren J. Ferguson, 
Stephen Reinhardt, 
and Milan D. Smith, 
Jr.,  
 
City of Dania Beach v. 
FAA, 2007 
DC Government Actor: Federal Aviation Administration 
Project: Change to runway procedures at Florida airport 
Law: NEPA 
Issue: Has the FAA followed the proper NEPA review 
process? 
Judicial Action: petition for review granted 
Pro-env 
 
Anti-gov 
Sentelle, Tatel, Brown  
Environmental 
Protection Info Center 
v. United States Forest 
Service 
9th  Government Actor: USFS 
Project: forest thinning project 
Law: NEPA 
Issue: Has USFS met NEPA requirements in its EIS 
Judicial Action: petition for review granted 
Anti-gov 
 
Pro-env 
Nelson, Gould, Callahan 
Citizens for Alternative 
v. United States DOE 
10th Government Actor: Department of Energy 
Project: Nuclear Waster Repository 
Law: NEPA 
Issue: Did DOE rely on faulty data in its environmental 
review?  
Judicial Action: request for injunction denied  
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
MURPHY, BRORBY, 
and TYMKOVICH, 
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Utah Environmental 
Congress v. Richmond, 
2007 
10th Government Actor: USFS 
Project: timber sale 
Law: NEPA, NFMA 
Issue:  
Judicial Action: petition for review granted  
Pro-env 
 
Anti-gov 
KELLY, EBEL, 
Circuit Judges and, 
MURGUIA *, District 
Judge. 
 
Consejo De Desarrollo 
Economico De 
Mexicali, A.C. v. 
United States, 2007 
9th Government Actor: Bureau of Reclamation 
Project: Concrete-lined canal 
Law: NEPA and APA 
Issue: Failure to prepare supplementary environmental 
impact statement 
Judicial Action: environmental and statutory claims are 
moot 
Pro-gov  
 
Anti-env 
NOONAN, 
TASHIMA, and 
THOMAS 
 
Utah Environmental 
Congress v. Troyer, 
2007 
10th Government Actor: United States Forest Service 
Project: six separate logging projects  
Law: NEPA 
Issue: approval process  
Judicial Action: 3 project approvals affirmed, 3 reversed 
Partial Pro-
env 
 
Anti-gov 
BRISCOE, 
HOLLOWAY,  
McCONNE
LL 
Navajo Nation v. 
United States Forest 
Service, 2007 
 Government Actor: USFS 
Project: expansion of ski resort 
Law: Religious Freedom Restoration Act, NEPA 
Issue: Did FEIS comply with NEPA? 
Judicial Action: challenge to USFS allowed 
Pro-env 
 
Anti-gov 
William A. Fletcher 
Rawlinson, Thelton E. 
Henderson, * District 
Judge.  
 
Lands Council v. 
Martin, 2007 
9th Government Actor: US Forest Service 
Project: post-fire logging sales  
Outcome: NEPA claim denied, NFMA claim accepted 
Court Action: Preliminary injunction halting logging 
operations to allow for consideration on merits  
Pro-env 
 
Anti-gov  
Graber, Paez, Bea  
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Forest Guardians v. 
Forsgren, 2007 
10th Government Actor: US Forest Service 
Project: Forest Management Plan that may threaten 
Canadian Lynz 
Laws: ESA (not NEPA) action more broadly defined 
Outcome: action dismissed, lower court affirmed 
Court Action:  
Anti-env 
 
Pro-gov 
MURPHY, 
BALDOCK, and 
McCONNELL 
 
Hale v. Norton, 2007 9th  Government Actor: National Park Service 
Project: moving large vehicles through park for home 
construction  
Laws: NEPA; Hale’s claim that moving vehicles does not 
constitute a federal project; challenge to NPS decision to 
submit decision to NEPA analysis 
Court Action: appeal rejected  
Pro-env 
 
Pro-gov 
Goodwin, Melvin 
Brunetti, and William 
A. Fletcher, Circuit 
Judges.  
 
Karst Environmental 
Education and 
Protection v. EPA2007 
D.C.  Government Actor: EPA, TVA, HUD 
Project: Transit Park development  
Laws: NEPA 
Court Action: appeal rejected  
Anti-env 
 
Pro-gov 
ROGERS and 
TATEL, Circuit 
Judges, and 
WILLIAMS 
 
O’Reilly v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, 
2007 
5th Government Actor: US Army Corps of Engineers 
Project: dredging of wetlands for housing project  
Laws: NEPA  
Court action: inadequate EA upheld; district courts 
reversed  
Partial Pro-
env 
Davis, Dennis  
18. Siskiyou Reg’l 
Educ. Project v. 
Goodman 
9th Government Actor: United States Forest Service  
Project: salvage of dead wood from fire 
Laws: NEPA 
Court Action: lower court upheld, injunction denied  
Anti-env 
 
Pro-gov  
REAVLEY, **, and 
CALLAHAN 
* 
PREGERS
ON 
Mayo Foundation vs. 
Surface Transportation 
Board 
8th Government Actor: surface transportation board 
Project: railway construction  
Laws: NEPA 
Court Action: petition denied 
Anti-env 
 
Pro-gov 
Bye, Arnold, Riley  
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Environmental Law 
and Policy Center v. 
NRC, 2006 
7th Government Actor: Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Project: permit for nuclear power facility  
Laws: NEPA 
Court action: injunction denied  
Anti-env 
 
Pro-gov  
Flaum, Evans, 
Williams 
 
Or. Natural Res. 
Council v. United 
States BLM,  
9th Government Actor: Bureau of Land Management  
Project: logging project  
Laws: NEPA 
Court action: injunction granted, insufficient 
environmental analysis  
Anti-gov 
 
Pro-env 
Goodwin, Graber Tashima 
Wildwest Institute v. 
Bull, 2006 
9th Government Actor: United States Forest Service  
Project: Forest fuel reduction project  
Laws: NEPA (service committed resources prior to full 
EIS)  
Court action: lower court affirmed, preliminary injunction 
denied  
Anti-env 
 
Pro-gov 
GOODWIN, 
O’SCANNLAIN, and 
FISHER 
 
Pit River Tribe v. 
United States Forest 
Service, 2006 
 Government Actor: US Forest Service 
Project: geothermal plant  
Laws: NEPA 
Court action: permit overturned  
Pro-env 
 
Anti-gov 
Clifford Wallace, 
Sidney R. Thomas, 
and Kim McLane 
Wardlaw, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
Klamath Siskiyou 
Wildlands Ctr. v. 
Boody2006 
9th Government Actor: Bureau of Land Management  
Project: timber sales Law: Federal Land Policy & 
Management Act (“FLPMA”) and NEPA 
Court Action: lower court overturned, injunction against 
timber sales entered  
Pro-env 
 
Anti-gov 
Dorothy W. Nelson, 
David R. Thompson, 
and Richard A. Paez, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
  
286
Case and Year Circuit Issue Outcome Majority Dissent 
Tri Valley Cares v. 
DOE, 2006 
9th Government Actor: Department of Energy  
Project: proposed construction of biological weapons 
research lab  
Law: NEPA 
Court Action: DOE must consider the effects of a terrorist 
attack on the project vis a vis the environment, and 
conduct EIS accordingly  
Pro-env 
 
Anti-gov 
SCHROEDER, Chief 
Judge, GRABER, 
Circuit Judge, and 
HOLLAND, ** Senior 
District Judge.** The 
Honorable H. Russel 
Holland, United States 
District Judge for the 
District of Alaska, 
sitting by designation. 
 
Islander East Pipeline 
Co. V. Conn. Dept. Of 
Environmental 
Protection, 2006 
 Government Actors: FERC, Conn. Dept of Environmental 
Protection 
Project: natural gas pipeline between Conn. and NY; 
Conn. denied approval permits 
Law: Natural Gas Act, NEPA 
Court Action: Conn. Dept. Forced to reverse decision 
The state argued that the Natural Gas Act violated the 11th 
Amendment note issues regarding 11th Amendment, 
retroactivity  
Anti-env 
 
Anti-state 
gov 
Raggi, Restani 
(Restani = court of 
international trade) 
Kearse 
Forest Conservation 
Council v. United 
States Forest Service 
9th Government Actor: US Forest Service 
Project: four timber sales from four national forests; 
failure to “monetize” non-timber resources  
Law: NEPA 
Court Action: lower court’s summary judgment in favor 
of US affirmed  
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
SCHROEDER, Chief 
Circuit Judge, 
KLEINFELD and 
BEA, Circuit 
Judges.OPINION 
 
‘Ilio’Ulaokalani 
Coalition v. Rumsfeld, 
9th Government Actor: US Army 
Project: Expansion of army base in Hawaii 
Law: NEPA  
Court Action: Army has not fully considered alternatives 
Anti-gov 
 
Pro-env  
Fletcher, Thompson,  Bea 
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Utah Shared Access 
Alliance v. Carpenter, 
10th Government Actor: Bureau of Land Management  
Project: limitation of off road vehicle use in Utah  
Law: NEPA, FLPMA 
Court Action: lower court affirmed BLM’s decision 
upheld  
Pro-gov 
 
Pro-env  
Tacha, McWilliams, 
O’Brien  
 
Coliseum Square Ass’n 
v. Jackson 
5th Government Actor: HUD 
Project: Federal funding for housing redevelopment 
project  
Law: NEPA 
Court Action: HUD actions upheld  
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
  
Ouachita Watch 
League v. Jacobs, 
11th Government Actor: US Forest Service 
Project: change to forest management plans in the 
southern region of USA; standing 
Law: NEPA 
Court action: lower court ruling overturned; standing of 
environmental groups upheld 
Pro-env 
 
Anti-gov 
(standing)  
ANDERSON, 
BARKETT and 
CUDAHY *, Circuit 
[**2] Judges.* 
Honorable Richard D. 
Cudahy, Circuit Court 
Judge for the Seventh 
Circuit, sitting by 
designation. 
 
La. Crawfish Producers 
Ass’n v. Rowan 
5th Government Actor: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
Project: restoration of swampland 
Law: NEPA  
Court Action: lower court affirmed; government action 
upheld 
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
  
Northwest Envtl. 
Advocates v. Nat’l 
Marine Fisheries Serv., 
2006 
9th Government Actor: Fisheries Service, Army Corp of 
Engineers 
Project: Deepening of Columbia River navigation channel 
Law: NEPA 
Court Action: lower court affirmed; Corp did take hard 
look at the evidence  
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
Silverman, Gould Fletcher 
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THE FUND FOR 
ANIMALS, INC., ET 
AL., APPELLANTS v. 
U.S. BUREAU OF 
LAND 
MANAGEMENT, ET 
AL., APPELLEES 
D.C. Government Actor: Bureau of Land Management 
Project: regulations re. Wild Horse and Burros  
Law: NEPA, Wild Horses and Burros Act  
Court Action: The Fund does not challenge any justiciable 
agency actions  
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
Henderson, Randolph Griffith 
Nevada v. EPA, 2006 D.C. Government Actor: Department of Energy 
Project: transportation of nuclear waster to Yucca 
Law: NEPA  
Court Action: petition for review denied  
Pro-fed gov 
 
Anti-env? 
Henderson, Randolph, 
Edwards  
 
Highway J Citizens 
Group v. DOT 
7th Government Actor: DOT 
Project: Highway expansion  
Law: NEPA, APA, CWA 
Court Action: lower court affirmed, claims barred  
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
Bauer, Ripple, 
Williams  
 
Great Basin Mine 
Watch v. Hankins, 
2006 
9th Government Actor: Department of Interior, Bureau of 
Land Management  
Project: gold mining project  
Law: NEPA, APA, CWA—particularly the “scoping of 
the project”  
Court Action: some aspects of EIS insufficient  
Partial Pro-
env 
 
Anti-gov 
Wallace, Hawkins Thomas 
(pro-env) 
Northwoods 
Wilderness Recovery, 
Inc. v. USDA Forest 
Serv. 
6th Government Actor: US Forest Service  
Project: Timber sales  
Law: NEPA  
Court action: lower court upheld, petition of Northwoods 
denied  
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
RYAN, COOK, 
GWIN, District Judge. 
** The Honorable 
James S. Gwin, United 
States District Judge 
for the Northern 
District of Ohio, 
sitting by designation. 
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North Alaska 
Environmental Center 
v. Kempthorne,  
9th Government Actor: Bureau of Land Management, Fish 
and Wildlife Service, DOI 
Project: leasing for oil drilling  
Law: NEPA 
Court action: summary judgment for government affirmed  
Progov 
 
Anti-env 
Schroeder, Chief 
Judge, Arthur L. 
Alarcon and Andrew J. 
Kleinfeld 
 
Nuclear Information 
and Resource Service 
v. NRC 
 Government Actor: Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Project: exemption standards for transportation of nuclear 
material 
Law: NEPA  
Court action: petition for review dismissed  
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env  
Rhymer, Wardlaw, 
Selna (Central District 
of California)  
 
California Sportfishing 
Protection Alliance v. 
FERC 
9th Government actor: FERC 
Project: hydroelectric project  
Law: NEPA 
Court action: petition for review dismissed  
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
Schroeder, Trott, 
Kleinfeld  
 
Idaho Rivers United v. 
FERC, 2006 
9th Government Actor: FERC 
Project: 5 hydro-electric projects 
Law: NEPA 
Court Action: petition for review denied  
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
Thompson, Tashima, 
Callahan  
 
Ecology Center v. 
United States Forest 
Service  
10th Government Actor: US Forest Service 
Project: Logging  
Law: NFMA, NEPA 
Court: affirm in part, reverse in part, remand NEPA claim 
rejected claim sustained under national forest management 
act  
Partial Pro-
env victory 
HENRY, EBEL, and 
TYMKOVICH 
 
Environmental 
Protection Info Center 
v. U.S. Forest Service, 
2006 
9th Government Actor: US Forest Service  
Project: timber sale  
Law: NEPA, NFMA 
Court: petition denied, lower court affirmed  
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
Wallace, Hawkins, 
Thomas 
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Gulf Restoration 
Network v. DOT, 2006 
5th Government Actor: DOT 
Project: license for liquefied natural gas facility  
Law: NEPA  
Court Action: Petition for review denied 
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
HIGGINBOTHAM, 
DAVIS and 
STEWART 
 
San Luis Obispo 
Mothers for Peace v. 
NRC, 2006 
9th Government Actor: Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Project: nuclear facility  
Law: NEPA; must a terrorist attack be taken into account? 
Court action: petition of San Luis Obispo granted in part 
NEPA claim upheld  
Partial Pro-
env 
 
Anti-gov  
Stephen Reinhardt and 
Sidney R. Thomas, 
Circuit Judges, and 
Jane A. Restani,* 
Chief Judge, United 
States Court of 
International Trade 
 
Cherokee Forest 
Voices v. United States 
Forest Service 
6th Government Actor: United States Forest Service 
Project: logging projects  
Law: NFMA, NEPA  
Court Action : Cherokee Forest Voices wins on NFMA 
claim, but lower court upheld on NEPA claim  
Partial Pro-
env 
 
Anti-gov 
RYAN and COOK, 
Circuit Judges; GWIN, 
District Judge.** The 
Honorable James S. 
Gwin, United States 
District Judge for the 
Northern District of 
Ohio, sitting by 
designation. 
 
Utah Environmental 
Congress v. Bosworth, 
2006 
10th Government Actor: United States Forest Service  
Project: Forest thinning  
Law: NEPA  
Court Action: USFS plan upheld 
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
Henry, Ebel, 
Tymkovich 
 
Sierra Club v. US 
Army Corps of 
Engineers, 2006 
8th Government Actor: US Army Corps of Engineers  
Project: levee 
Law: NEPA, FEMA 
Court Action: lower court reversed; NEPA claims of 
Sierra Club upheld; environmental assessment insufficient  
Pro-env 
 
Anti-gov 
Loken, Lay, Benton   
  
291
Case and Year Circuit Issue Outcome Majority Dissent 
Wyoming v. United 
States DOI 
10th Government Actor: Department of the Interior  
Project: failure to de-list gray wolves from endangered 
species list 
Law: ESA, NEPA 
Court Action: standing denied  
Pro-env 
 
Pro-gov 
Tacha, Ebel, Cassell   
Earth Island Institute v. 
United States Forest 
Service, 2006 
9th Government Actor: US Forest Service  
Project: post-fire restoration projects  
Law: NEPA 
Court Action: Preliminary injunctions against Forest 
Service granted  
Pro-env 
 
Anti-gov  
Noonan, Tashima, 
Fletcher 
 
Ripplin Shoals Land 
Co. v. US Army Corps 
of Engineers, 2006 
8th Government Actor: US Army Corps of Engineers  
Project: bridge construction as part of development 
project Law: NEPA 
Court Action: US Army Corps of Engineers ordered to 
reconsider application  
Anti-gov 
 
Anti-env 
Beam, Smith Bye 
Utah Environmental 
Congress v. Bosworth, 
2006 
10th Government Actor: USFS 
Project: timber harvesting project  
Law: National Environmental Policy Act, NFMA 
Issue: Did the USFS properly monitor Management 
Indicator Species? Did it properly analyze alternatives? 
Court Action: USFS did not properly monitor 
Management Indicator Species, but it did properly 
consider NEPA alternatives; USFS project approval 
vacated  
Anti-gov 
 
Anti-env 
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Case and Year Circuit Issue Outcome Majority Dissent 
Turtle Island 
Restoration Network v. 
United States DOC, 
2006 
9th Government Actor: Department of Commerce, National 
Marine Fisheries Service  
Project: re-opening swordfish fisheries 
Law: NEPA, Migratory Bird Treaty Act, Endangered 
Species Act, APA, Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act 
Issue: compliance with multiple statutory requirements 
Court Action: action is time-barred  
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env  
Hawkins, McKeown, 
Clifton  
 
Sierra Nev. Forest Prot. 
Campaign v. United 
States Forest Service, 
2006 
9th Government Actor: United States Forest Service 
Project: Meadow Valley Defensible Fuel Profile Zone 
Law: NEPA 
Issue: Was an EA/ FONSI appropriate, or was an EIS 
required to approve this project?  
Court Action: EA was appropriate; USFS decision upheld  
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env 
Fletcher, Thompson 
Bea 
 
Colorado Wild v. 
United States Forest 
Service, 2006 
10th Government Actor: United States Forest Service 
Project: salvage of dead trees 
Law: NEPA 
Issue: Can dead trees be salvaged without EA?  
Court Action: All claims by conservation groups rejected  
Pro-gov 
 
Anti-env  
Kelly, Porfilio, 
Tymkovich  
 
Silverton Snowmobile 
Club v. United States 
Forest Serv., 2006 
10th Government Actor: United States Forest Service 
Project: Changes in access to Molas Pass recreational area 
Law: NEPA, NFMA 
Issue: failure to take “hard look” at proposed actions 
Court Action: USFS decision upheld  
Pro-gov 
 
Pro-env 
Henry, Anderson, 
O’Brien  
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CAA = Clean Air Act 
CWA = Clean Water Act 
EnPA = Energy Policy Act 
NEPA = National Environmental Policy Act 
NFMA = National Forest Management Act 
ESA = Endangered Species Act 
HMTA = Highways Management and Transportation Act  
Dem = judges appointed by Democratic President 
GOP = judges appointed by Republican President 
 
Decision: Government loses to pro-environmentalist challenger 
Case Year/ 
Circuit 
Law Dem. GOP Vote Dissent 
1. New York v. EPA  2005, DC CAA ii i 3-0  
2. Sierra Club v. EPA 2002, DC CAA i ii 3-0  
3. Friends of the Earth v. EPA  2006, DC CWA i ii 3-0  
4. Sierra Club and Missouri Coalition for the Env. V. EPA 2002, DC CAA i ii 3-0  
5. Nuclear Energy Institute v. EPA 2002 DC EnPA i ii 3-0  
6. Environmental Integrity Project v. EPA 2005, DC CAA i ii 3-0  
7. Mossville Environmental Action Now v. EPA 2004, DC CAA i ii 3-0  
8. Sierra Club/NYPIRG v. EPA 2003, DC CAA ii i 3-0  
9. NRDC v. Musynski 2001, 2nd CWA i ii 3-0  
10. NRDC v. Department of Energy 2004, 2nd EnPA i i 2-0  
11. Catskill Trouts Unlimited v. NYC Dept of Env protection 2006, 2nd CWA i ii 3-0  
12. National Audubon Society v. Dept. of Navy 2005, 4th NEPA i ii 3-0  
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Case Year/ 
Circuit 
Law Dem. GOP Vote Dissent 
13. Sierra Club v. EPA 2002, 5th CAA ii i 3-0  
14. La. Environmental Action Network v. EPA, 2004 2004, 5th CAA i ii 3-0  
15. Cherokee Forest Voices v. US Forest Service, 2006 2006, 6th NFMA and 
NEPA 
i ii 3-0  
16. Sierra Club/Missouri Coalition for the Environment vs. EPA 2002, 7th CAA iii  3-0  
17.Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness/ Sierra Club v. US 
Forest Service 
2006, 8th CWA ii i 3-0  
18. Environmental Defense Center et al. v. EPA, 2003 2003, 9th CWA iii  3-0  
19. Earth Island Institute v. US Forest Service , 2006 2006, 9th NFMA/ NEPA ii i 3-0  
20. Ecology Center vs. US Forest Service 2005, 9th NFMA, NEPA iii  2-1 Dem 
21. Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Service  2006, 9th ESA iii  3-0  
22. Public Citizen v. Department of Transportation, 2003 2003, 9th CAA/NEPA ii i 3-0  
23. San Luis Obispo v. Nuclear Regulatory Com. 2006, 9th NEPA, 
Atomic 
Energy Act 
ii i 3-0  
24. Sierra Club, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Georgia 
Forestwatch versus Georgia Power Company, 2006  
2006, 11th CAA ii i 3-0  
25. Sierra Club v. Leavitt 2004, 11th CAA ii i 3-0  
26. Sierra Club v. Hankinson 2003, 11th CWA ii i 3-0  
27. Sierra Club v. EPA (Oglethorpe Power case), 2004, 11th CAA ii i 3-0  
28. Ecology Center vs. US Forest Service 2006, 10th NEPA/ 
NFMA 
i ii 3-0  
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Case Year/ 
Circuit 
Law Dem. GOP Vote Dissent 
29. Sierra Club v. US Corp of Engineers 2006, 8th NEPA i ii 3-0  
30. SIERRA CLUB, et al, Intervenor, v. EPA 2003, 9th CAA ii i 3-0  
31. SOUTHERN UTAH WILDERNESS ALLIANCE, v. BUREAU OF 
LAND MANAGEMENT, et al 
2005, 10th FLPMA i ii 3-0  
32. Utah Environmental Congress v. US Forest Service  2003, 10th ESA i ii 3-0  
33 Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. United States Forest Service,  2003, 9th NEPA i ii 2-1 GOP 
34. Center for Biological Diversity v. US Forest Service  2003, 9th NEPA ii i 3-0  
35. Earth Island Institute v. US Forest Service  2003, 9th NEPA i ii 2-1 DEM 
36. Stewart Park and Reserve Coalition v. US Dept. Of transport 2003 2003, 2nd NEPA i ii 2-1 GOP 
37. The Wilderness Society v. US Fish and Wildlife  2003, 9th NEPA ix i 10-0  
38. Sierra Club v. US Army Corp of Engineers 2006, 8th NEPA i ii 3-0  
39. Sierra Club and Engine Manufacturers association v. EPA  2002, DC CAA ii i 3-0  
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Decision: Government wins against pro-environment petitioner 
Case Year/Circuit Law Dem. GOP Vote Dissent  
1. Massachusetts v. EPA 2004, DC CAA i ii 1-1-1 1 GOP, 1 DEM 
2. Olmstead Falls v. FAA 2002, DC CAA i ii 3-0  
3. National Wildlife Federation v. EPA 2002, DC CWA i ii 3-0  
4. Massachusetts v. EPA 2004, DC CAA i ii 1-1-1 1 GOP, 1 DEM 
5. Grassroots Recycling Network v. EPA 2005, DC  NEPA  iii 3-0  
6. Bluewater Network v. EPA 2004, DC  CAA  iii 3-0  
7. NRDC v. EPA 2006, DC  CAA i ii 3-0  
8. Mass. v. EPA 2005, DC  CAA ii vi 6-2 2 Dem 
9. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA 2003, DC CAA ii i 3-0  
10. City of Waukesha v. EPA 2003, DC  CWA ii i 3-0  
11. Sierra Club v. EPA 2004, DC CAA i ii 3-0  
12. Lafleur v. Whitman 2002, 2nd CAA ii i 3-0  
13. Environmental Defense v. EPA 2004, 2nd CAA ii i 3-0  
14. BCCA v. EPA 2004, 5th CAA i Ii 3-0  
15. Gulf Restoration Network v. US Dept of Transportation 2006, 5th NEPA i Ii 3-0  
16. Save our Cumberland Forests/Sierra Club v. Dept. of the 
Interior 
2006, 6th NEPA I ii 3-0  
17. Transportation Solutions Defense et al v. EPA 2002, 7th CAA i ii 3-0  
18. Saint Theresa Action Group v. Environmental Appeals 
Board, EPA 
2002, 9th CAA ii i 3-0  
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Case Year/Circuit Law Dem. GOP Vote Dissent  
19. Sierra Club v. EPA (St. Louis ozone case) 2004, 7th CAA  iii 3-0  
20. Arkansas Wildlife Federation v. Army Corps of Engineers 2005, 8th NEPA i ii 3-0  
21. Association to Protect Hammersley v. Taylor Resources 2002, 9th CWA iii  3-0  
22. Hall v. EPA 2002, 9th CAA i ii 3-0  
23. Association of Irritated Residents v. EPA 2005, 9th  CAA ii i 3-0  
24. Cascadia Wildlands Project v. Conroy 2005, 9th  NFMA/ 
NEPA 
i ii 3-0  
25. Center for Biological Diversity vs. US Fish and Wildlife, 
stickleback case 
2006, 9th  ESA i ii 3-0  
26. Environmental Info Protection Center v. US Forest Service,  2006, 9th  NFMA ii i 3-0  
27. IDAHO RIVERS UNITED et al, v. FEDERAL ENERGY 
REGULATORY COMMISSION 
2006, 9th  Federal 
Power Act 
iI ii 3-0  
28. Native Eco-systems council v. US Forest Service  2005, 9th NFMA/ 
NEPA 
Iii  3-0  
29. Nuclear Information et al v. US Dept. Of Transportation  2005, 9th  HMTA i ii 3-0  
30. Nuclear Information v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
2006 
2005, 9th  NEPA i ii 3-0  
31. TVA v. EPA 2002, 11th  CAA ii i 3-0  
32. Center for Biological Diversity v. US F and W 2006, 11th  ESA  iii 3-0  
33. American Canoe Association/Sierra Club v. City of Attalla 2004, 11th  CWA Ii I 3-0  
34. La. Crawfish Producers v. US Army Corp of Engineers 2006, 5th  NEPA  iii 3-0  
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Case Year/Circuit Law Dem. GOP Vote Dissent  
35. Northern Alaska Environmental Center v. US Bureau of 
Land Management et al  
2006, 9th NEPA ii i 3-0  
36. Allegheny Defense Project v. US Forest Service 2005, 3rd NFMA i ii 3-0  
37. Wilderness Society v. Norton 2005, DC NEPA/ APA ii i 3-0  
38. Turtle Island Restoration Network v. US Dept. Com. 2005, 9th Fishery 
Conservation 
and 
Management 
Act  
Ii i 3-0  
39. Utah Environmental Congress v. US Forest Service 2006, 10th ESA i ii 3-0  
40. Western Watersheds Project v. US Forest Service  2005, 9th ESA ii i 3-0  
41. Spiller v. Mineta  2003, 5th NEPA  iii 3-0  
42. The Ocean Conservancy v. US Fish and Wildlife  2003, 9th NEPA iii  3-0  
43. Highway J Citizens Group v. Mineta 2003, 7th NEPA i ii 3-0  
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Decision: Government wins against anti-environment petitioner 
Case Year/Circuit Law Dem. GOP Vote Dissent  
1. Independent Equipment Dealers Association v. EPA 2004, DC CAA ii i 3-0  
2. American Forest and Paper Association v. EPA DC CAA i ii 3-0  
3. National Petrochemical Association v. EPA  2002, DC CAA i ii 3-0  
4. National Association of Homebuilders v. Norton,  2005, DC ESA i ii 3-0  
5. Independent Equipment Dealers Association v. EPA 2004, DC CAA ii i 3-0  
6. Pennsylvania v. EPA 2005, DC CAA ii i 3-0  
7. West Virginia v. EPA 2004, DC CAA i ii 3-0  
8.Crete Carrier Corporation v. EPA 2004, DC CAA  iii 3-0  
9. USA v. Eric Kung-Shou Ho 2002, 5th CAA  iii 3-0  
10. Acker v. EPA 2002, 7th  CAA i ii 3-0  
11. USA v. Price,  2002, 9th  CAA ii i 3-0  
12. Engine Manufacturers Assoc. V. S Coast Air Quality 
Management District 
2002, 9th CAA i ii 3-0  
13. State of Alaska v. EPA  2004, 9th  CAA  iii 3-0  
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Decision: Government loses to anti-environment petitioner 
Case Year/Circuit Law Dem. GOP Vote Dissent  
1. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA 2002, DC CAA ii i 3-0  
2. American Corn Growers Association v. EPA 2002, DC CAA ii i 2-1 Dem 
3. Center for Energy and Economic Development v. EPA 2005, DC CAA i ii 3-0  
4. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., 
PETITIONER v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY, RESPONDENT ATOFINA CHEMICALS, 
INC., INTERVENOR 
2004, DC CAA i ii 2-1 Dem. (Note: dissent is 
over proper remedy, 
not substance of claim) 
5. Arteva Specialties v. EPA  2003, DC CAA ii i 3-0  
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Mixed/consolidated cases: Petitioners represent both environmentalist and business groups 
Case Year/Circuit Law Dem. GOP Outcome Vote Dissent  
1. American Trucking Association v. EPA  2002, DC CAA i ii Deference, anti-env, anti-bus 3-0  
2. Sierra Club and Engine Manufacturers 
association v. EPA  
2002, DC CAA ii i Remand on basis of one env. 
group petition 
3-0  
3.California Sportfishing Alliance v. FEC 2006, 9th ESA i Ii All petitions for review of dam 
permit denied  
3-0  
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Case, Year, Law Issue Outcome Majority  Dissent  
1. R. v. Crown Zellerbach 
Canada Ltd., 1988,  
Ocean Dumping Control Act 
Is ocean dumping a matter of national 
concern falling within Parliament=s power to 
legislate?  
Pro-env 
Pro-federal 
government 
Dickson C.J. and 
McIntyre, Wilson and Le 
Dain 
Bee Beetz, Lamer and 
La Forest JJ. dissenting 
2. Gauthier v. Quebec 
(Commission de protection du 
territoire agricole), 1989 
Act to Preserve Agricultural 
Land 
Issue: Does Gauthier have a right to use 
formerly agricultural land for non-
agricultural purposes?  
Ruling: No such statutory or Charter right 
exists  
Pro-env 
Pro-gov 
Beetz, Lamer, Wilson, Le 
Dain* and La Forest JJ. 
 
3. Friends of the Oldman River 
v. Canada, 1992  
EARPGO Navigable Waters 
Protection Act 
Issue: Is the federal government required to 
conduct an environmental assessment of an 
almost completed dam project?  
Ruling: EARPGO is mandatory in this 
instance  
Anti-gov 
Pro-env  
Lamer C.J. La Forest, 
L’Heureux-Dubé, Sopinka, 
Gonthier, Cory, 
McLachlin, Iacobucci JJ.  
 
4. Quebec (Attorney General) v. 
Canada (National Energy 
Board), 1994 
National Energy Board Act 
EARPGO 
Issues: Conflict between federal board and 
provincial government over license to export 
hydro electric power over scope and fairness 
of board=s cost-benefit review, compliance 
with EARPGO.  
Ruling: lower court overruled, ruling of 
board restored 
Pro-fed gov 
Pro-env 
Lamer C.J., La Forest, 
L’Heureux-Dubé, Sopinka, 
Gonthier, Cory, 
McLachlin, Iacobucci, 
Major JJ. 
 
5. Ontario v. Canadian Pacific 
Ltd., 1995 
Ontario Environmental 
Protection Act  
Issues: Was Ontario Environmental 
Protection act unconstitutionally vague?  
Ruling: No 
Pro-env 
Pro-gov  
Lamer C.J., La Forest, 
L’Heureux-Dube, Sopinka, 
Gonthier, Cory, 
McLachlin, Iacobucci 
Major  
 
6. MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. 
Simpson, [1996] 
Criminal Code 
Issue: Validity of injunction barring 
protesters from blocking roads used as part 
of logging operation 
Ruling: injunction was valid  
Anti-env Lamer C.J. and La Forest, 
L=Heureux-Dubé, Sopinka, 
Gonthier, Cory, 
McLachlin, Iacobucci and 
Major JJ.  
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Case, Year, Law Issue Outcome Majority  Dissent  
7. R. v. Hydro-Québec, 1997 
CEPA 
Issue: Are federal regulation of toxic 
substances ultra vires? 
Ruling: Federal regulation is not ultra vires  
Pro-gov 
Pro-env 
Lamer C.J. and La Forest, 
L’Heureux-Dubé, Sopinka, 
Gonthier, Cory, 
McLachlin, Iacobucci and 
Major JJ. 
 
8. R. v. Consolidated Maybrun 
Mines Ltd., 1998  
Ontario Environmental 
Protection Act  
Issue: Was order to conduct remedial 
measures on contaminated site valid? 
Ruling: orders were valid  
Pro-gov 
Pro-env 
Lamer C.J. and 
L’Heureux-Dubé, 
Gonthier, Cory, 
McLachlin, Iacobucci and 
Bastarache JJ.  
 
9. CanadianOxy Chemicals Ltd. 
v. Canada (Attorney General), 
[1999] 
Fisheries Act Waste 
Management Act Criminal Code 
Issue: Did the government violate criminal 
procedure rights during the investigation of 
an environmental accident? 
Ruling: Warrants and searches were valid  
Pro-gov 
Pro-env 
Lamer C.J. and 
L=Heureux-Dubé, 
Gonthier, Cory, Iacobucci, 
Major and Binnie JJ.  
 
10. Berendsen v. Ontario, 2001) 
Public Authorities Protection 
Act Limitations Act 
Issue: Is an environmental pollution related 
claim precluded by the statute of 
limitations? 
Ruling: appeal allowed; longer limitation 
period applies 
Anti-gov 
Pro-env 
L=Heureux-Dubé, 
Iacobucci, Major, 
Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour 
and LeBel JJ.  
 
11. 114957 Canada Ltée 
(Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) 
v. Hudson (Town), 2001 
Quebec Cities and Towns Act 
Federal Pest Control Products 
Act  
Issue: Is local pesticide by-law ultra vires? 
Ruling: by-law is valid 
Pro-env 
Pro-gov 
McLachlin C.J. and 
Gonthier, Iacobucci, 
Major, Bastarache, Binnie, 
Arbour, LeBel and 
Deschamps JJ. 
 
Ho 12. Hollick v. Toronto 
(City), 2001 
Ontario Class Proceedings Act  
Issue: Class certification regarding noise and 
physical pollution complaints 
Ruling: Certification upheld 
Pro-env 
Anti-gov 
McLachlin C.J. and 
Gonthier, Iacobucci, 
Major, Bastarache, Binnie 
and Arbour JJ.  
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Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada 
(Minister of Finance), 2002 
CEAA Federal Court Rules 
Issue: validity of federal financial assistance 
to crown corporation for construction and 
sale of CANDU reactors to China; does 
authorization of aid require environmental 
assessment? Crown corporation seeks 
confidentiality order regarding certain 
documents related to the sale  
Ruling: The appeal should be allowed and 
the confidentiality order granted on the 
terms requested by AECL.  
Pro-gov 
Anti-env 
McLachlin C.J. and 
Gonthier, Iacobucci, 
Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour 
and LeBel JJ. 
 
Harvard College v. Canada, 
2002 
Patent Act  
Issue: can a life form be patented 
Ruling: Higher life form cannot be patented 
Pro-gov 
Pro-env 
Per L=Heureux-Dubé, 
Gonthier, Iacobucci, 
Bastarache anLeBel JJ.: 
(McLachlin C.J. and 
Major, Binnie and 
Arbour JJ. dissenting 
Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Quebec 
(Minister of the Environment), 
2003 
Environmental Quality Act  
Issue: Did Minister fulfill duty of 
impartiality in issuing “characterization 
order” against oil company? Ruling: 
Minister=s decision upheld  
Pro-gov 
Pro-env 
McLachlin C.J. Gonthier, 
Iacobucci, Major, 
Bastarache, Binnie, 
Arbour, LeBel Deschamps 
JJ. 
 
British Columbia v. Canadian 
Forest Products Ltd., 2004 
Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act 
BC Forest Act  
Issue: Can the Crown make claims for 
damages against Canfor for burn in 
timberlands 
Ruling: The Crown cannot make this claim  
Pro-Anti-gov McLachlin C.J. Iacobucci, 
Major, Binnie, Arbour 
Deschamps JJ. 
Bastarache, LeBel and 
Fish JJ.  
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CAA= Clean Air Act  
CWA= Clean Water Act  
ESA= Endangered Species Act 
FLPMA= Federal Land Policy Management Act  
RCRA= Resource Conservation and Recovery Act  
CERCLA= Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
FIFRA= Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
NEPA= National Environmental Policy Act  
 
Case and Year Description Ruling Majority Dissent 
1. MANUFACTURERS 
ASSOCIATION ET AL. 
v. NATURAL 
RESOURCES 
DEFENSE COUNCIL, 
INC., ET AL., 1985 
Government Actor: EPA 
Law: CWA 
Issue: Can the EPA issue “fundamentally different factor” variances 
under the CWA? 
Ruling: the variances can be issued 
Pro-gov 
Anti-env 
White, Burger, 
Brennan, Powell, 
Rehnquist  
Marshall, 
Blackmun, 
Stevens, 
O’Connor 
2. THOMAS, 
ADMINISTRATOR, 
UNITED STATES 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 
AGENCY v. UNION 
CARBIDE 
AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS CO. ET 
AL., 1985 
Government Actor: EPA 
Law: FIFRA 
Issue: Does arbitration scheme of FIFRA violate Art. III of Federal 
Constitution? 
Ruling: Arbitration scheme of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (7 USCS 136 et seq.) held not violative of Article III 
of the Federal Constitution. 
Pro-gov 
Pro-env 
O’Connor, 
Burger, White, 
Powell, Brennan, 
Marshall, 
Blackmun, 
Stevens, 
Rehnquist 
 
3. UNITED STATES v. 
RIVERSIDE 
BAYVIEW HOMES, 
INC., ET AL., 1985 
Government Actor: EPA 
Law: CWA 
Issue: Is property “wetland” under CWA? 
Ruling: Property is wetland, subject to CWA permitting process 
Pro-fed  
Pro-env 
Unanimous   
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Case and Year Description Ruling Majority Dissent 
4. EXXON CORP. ET 
AL. v. HUNT, 
ADMINISTRATOR OF 
NEW JERSEY SPILL 
COMPENSATION 
FUND, ET AL., 1985 
Government Actor: New Jersey 
Law: CERCLA, state tax 
Issue: Is the state tax pre-empted by CERCLA? 
Ruling: State statute imposing tax to fund prevention and cleanup of 
oil spills and leaks of hazardous chemicals held pre-empted in part by 
federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act. 
Mixed 
victory for 
state govt’/ 
Pro-env 
Marshall, Berger, 
Brennan, White, 
Blackmun, 
Rehnquist, 
O’Connor,  
Stevens (pro-
env = no pre-
emption on any 
grounds.  
5. DOW CHEMICAL 
CO. v. UNITED 
STATES, BY AND 
THROUGH 
ADMINISTRATOR, 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 
AGENCY, 1986 
Government Actor: EPA 
Law: Clean Air Act, Fourth Amendment 
Issue: use of aerial photography as part of investigation 
Ruling: Aerial photography of industrial complex by Environmental 
Protection Agency held not to exceed Agency’s investigative authority 
under 42 USCS 7414 nor to violate Fourth Amendment. 
Pro-gov 
Pro-env  
1. Statutory 
authority 
2. 4th 
Amendment 
limits 
1. Unanimous 
2. Burger, White, 
Rehnquist, 
Stevens, 
O’Connor 
2. Brennan, 
Marshall, 
Blackmun, 
Powell 
6. PENNSYLVANIA 
ET AL. v. DELAWARE 
VALLEY CITIZENS’ 
COUNCIL FOR 
CLEAN AIR ET AL., 
1986 
Government Actor: Penn. 
Law: Clean Air Act 
Issue: attorney’s fees 
Ruling: Award of attorneys’ fees for 1) work in administrative 
proceedings held authorized by Clean Air Act (42 USCS 7604(d)), but 
held to have been 2) improperly increased for superior quality of work. 
1) Pro-env, 
Anti-state 
gov 
2) Anti-env, 
Pro-state 
1. Unanimous 
2. White, Burger, 
Powell, 
Rehnquist, 
Stevens, 
O’Connor 
2. Blackmun, 
Marshall, 
Brennan  
  
310
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7. INTERNATIONAL 
PAPER CO. v. 
OUELLETTE ET AL., 
1987 
Government Actor:  
Law: Clean Water Act 
Issue: pre-emption of private suits under clean water act  
Ruling: 
1) Clean Water Act held to pre-empt private suit under Vermont 
common law, but not 2) suit in Vermont Federal District Court under 
New York law, where New York water pollution allegedly caused 
Vermont injury. 
 
USA supported affirmance . . . strange 
 
Application of out of state law to pollution source  
 
1) Pro-fed 
gov, Anti-
env 
 
2) Anti-fed 
gov, Pro-
env 
1) Powell, J., 
Rehnquist, Ch. J., 
and White, 
O’Connor,  
 
2) Unanimous 
1) Brennan, 
Marshall, 
Blackmun 
8. Tull v. USA, 1987 Government Actor: US A.G. 
Law: Clean Water Act, 7th Amendment 
Issue: jury trial for injunctions and civil penalties under Clean Water 
Act 
Ruling: Seventh Amendment held to guarantee jury trial as to 
determination of liability in Government’s action for injunction and 
civil penalties under Clean Water Act (33 USCS 1319(b), (d)), but not 
as to assessment of amount of civil penalties. 
1. Anti-gov 
Anti-env 
 
2. Pro-gov 
 
+/- 
1. Brennan, 
Rehnquist, 
White, Marshall, 
Blackmun, 
Powell, 
O’Connor, 
Scalia, Stevens 
 
2. Brennan 
Rehnquist, 
White, Marshall, 
Blackmun, 
Powell, 
O’Connor 
2. Scalia, 
Stevens 
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9. PENNSYLVANIA 
ET AL. v. DELAWARE 
VALLEY CITIZENS’ 
COUNCIL FOR 
CLEAN AIR ET AL., 
1987 
Government Actor: Pennsylvania, USA 
Law: Clean Air Act 
Issue: dispute over attorney’s fees for consent decree  
Ruling: Enhancement of reasonable lodestar amount for risk of loss 
when awarding attorneys’ fees to prevailing party pursuant to 
fee-shifting provision of Clean Air Act (42 USCS 7604(d)) held 
improper. 
Pro-state 
gov 
Anti-env  
White, 
Rehnquist, 
Powell, Scalia, 
O’Connor  
Blackmun, 
Brennan, 
Marshall, 
Stevens  
10. GWALTNEY OF 
SMITHFIELD, LTD. v. 
CHESAPEAKE BAY 
FOUNDATION, INC., 
ET AL., 1987 
Government Actor: -- 
Law: CLEAN WATER ACT 
Issue: validity of citizen suits 
Ruling: Federal jurisdiction over citizen suits for wholly past 
violations held not to be conferred by 505(a) of Clean Water Act, but 
good-faith allegations of ongoing violation held to be actionable. 
Pro-env MarshallRehnqui
stBrennanWhite
BlackmunSteven
sO’ConnorScalia
in part re. 
Judgment 
Scalia, Stevens, 
O’Connor 
11. ROBERTSON, 
CHIEF OF THE 
FOREST SERVICE, ET 
AL. v. METHOW 
VALLEY CITIZENS 
COUNCIL ET AL., 
1988 
Government Actor: USFS 
Law: NEPA 
Issue: validity of environmental impact statement  
Ruling: Forest Service’s environmental impact statement as to ski 
resort held not to require fully developed plan to mitigate 
environmental harm or “worst case analysis” of potential 
environmental harm. 
Pro-gov 
Anti-env 
Unanimous  
12. MARSH, 
SECRETARY OF THE 
ARMY, ET AL. v. 
OREGON NATURAL 
RESOURCES 
COUNCIL ET AL., 
1988 
Government Actor: Army Corps of Engineers 
Law: NEPA 
Issue: validity of environmental impact statement  
Ruling: Army Corps of Engineers’ decision that environmental impact 
statement supplement was not required before construction of Elk 
Creek Dam proceeded held not “arbitrary and capricious.” 
Pro-gov 
Anti-env 
Unanimous  
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13. PENNSYLVANIA 
v. UNION GAS CO., 
1989 
Government Actor: state government  
Law: CERCLA 
Issue: Is CERCLA suit against state government barred by 11th 
Amendment? 
Ruling: Federal environmental “superfund” statute held (1) to permit 
suit for money damages against state in federal court, and (2) in so 
doing, to be within Congress’ authority under commerce clause. 
Pro-fed gov Brennan, 
Marshall, 
Stevens, 
Blackmun 
White, Scalia, 
Rehnquist, 
O’Connor 
(Separate 
dissents) 
14. HALLSTROM, ET 
UX., PETITIONERS v. 
TILLAMOOK 
COUNTY, 1989 
Government Actor: local government 
Law: RCRA 
Issue: Validity of citizen suit under RCRA 
Ruling: Dismissal of citizen suit under Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act provision, 42 USCS 6972, held required where plaintiffs 
did not meet notice and 60-day-delay requirements of 6972(b)(1). 
Pro-gov 
Anti-env 
 O’Connor, J., 
joined by 
Rehnquist, Ch. J., 
and White, 
Blackmun, 
Stevens, Scalia, 
and Kennedy 
Marshall, 
Brennan  
15. Lujan v. National 
Wildlife Federation, 
1990 
Government Actor: DOI 
Law: FLPMA, NEPA 
Issue: reclassification of public lands in 17 states 
Ruling: reclassification upheld  
Pro-gov 
Anti-env  
Scalia, 
Rehnquist, 
White, 
O’Connor, 
Kennedy 
Blackmun, 
Brennan, 
Marshall, 
Stevens 
16. GENERAL 
MOTORS 
CORPORATION, 
PETITIONER v. 
UNITED STATES, 
1990 
Government Actor: EPA 
Law: Clean Air Act  
Issue: review of State implementation plan (SIP) 
Ruling: Clean Air Act held not to (1) require review of state 
implementation plan (SIP) revision within 4 months, or (2) prevent 
enforcement of existing SIP, where SIP revision is not timely 
reviewed. 
Pro-env  
Pro-federal 
gov 
 unanimous   
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17. WISCONSIN 
PUBLIC 
INTERVENOR, ET 
AL., PETITIONERS v. 
RALPH MORTIER, ET 
AL., 1991 
Government Actor: Wisconsin Public Intervenor (assistant attorney 
general, Wisconsin) 
Law: local ordinance, FIFRA 
Issue: Is local ordinance pre-empted by FIFRA? 
Ruling: Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (7 USCS 
136-136y) held not to pre-empt regulation of pesticides by local 
governments. 
Pro-local 
gov 
Anti-fed 
Pro-env 
White, 
Rehnquist, Ch. J., 
and Marshall, 
Blackmun, 
Stevens, 
O’Connor, 
Kennedy, and 
Souter, Scalia 
(concurring in 
result) 
 
18. Arkansas, et al., 
Petitioners v. Oklahoma, 
et al.,; and 
Environmental 
Protection Agency, 
Petitioner v. Oklahoma, 
et al. 
Government Actor: Arkansas, Oklahoma, EPA 
Law: CLEAN WATER ACT 
Issue: validity of discharge permit 
Ruling: EPA’s issuance of discharge permit to sewage plant, based on 
finding that discharges would not cause detectable violation of 
downstream state’s water quality standards, held authorized by Clean 
Water Act. 
Pro-fed 
Anti-env  
Pro-gov 
Stevens for 
unanimous court  
 
19. UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF 
ENERGY, 
PETITIONER v. OHIO, 
ET AL.; AND OHIO, 
ET AL., PETITIONERS 
v. UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF 
ENERGY 
Government Actor: DOE, Ohio  
Laws: Clean Water Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
Issue: Has federal government waived sovereign immunity under 
RCRA 
Ruling: Federal sovereign immunity held not waived as to 
state-imposed punitive fines under Clean Water Act (33 USCS 1251 et 
seq.) and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (42 USCS 6901 et 
seq.). 
Anti-state 
gov 
Pro-fed gov 
Anti-env 
Souter, Scalia, 
Kennedy, 
Thomas, 
Rehnquist. 
O’Connor  
White, 
Blackmun, 
Stevens (in 
part) 
20. New York v. United 
States, 1992 
Government Actor:  
Law: Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments 
Issue: Do the take-title provisions of the law violate the 10th 
Amendment?  
Ruling: Do take-title provisions violate the 10th Amendment?  
Pro-state 
Anti-env 
Rehnquist, 
Scalia, Kennedy, 
Souter, Thomas, 
O’Connor 
White, 
Blackmun, 
Stevens  
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21. City of Burlington v. 
Dague, 1992 
Government Actor: city government  
Laws: CWA 
Issue: enhancement of attorney’s fees 
Ruling: enhancement of attorney’s fees reversed  
Pro-gov 
Anti-env 
Scalia, 
Rehnquist, 
White, Kennedy, 
Souter, Thomas 
Blackmun, 
Stevens 
22. CHEMICAL 
WASTE 
MANAGEMENT, INC., 
PETITIONER v. GUY 
HUNT, GOVERNOR 
OF ALABAMA ET 
AL., 1992 
Government Actor: Alabama 
Law: State waste disposal law, commerce clause  
Issue: validity of law under commerce clause 
Ruling: Disposal fee imposed by Alabama on hazardous waste 
generated out of state, but not on waste generated in state, held to 
violate Federal Constitution’s commerce clause (Art I, 8, cl 3). 
Anti-state 
Anti-env 
White, joined by 
Blackmun, 
Stevens, 
O’Connor, 
Scalia, Kennedy, 
Souter, and 
Thomas, JJ. 
Rehnquist  
23. DALE 
ROBERTSON, CHIEF, 
UNITED STATES 
FOREST SERVICE, 
ET. AL., Petitioners v. 
SEATTLE AUDUBON 
SOCIETY ET AL., 1992 
Government Actor: United States Forest Service 
Law: Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations 
Act, 1990 
Issue: Did Congressional response to court ruling violate Article III of 
the Constitution? 
Ruling: Provision that statute meets requirements of earlier statutes on 
which specified pending cases involving logging and endangered 
spotted owl are based, held not to violate Federal Constitution’s 
Article III. 
(Five different statutes) 
Anti-env 
Pro-gov 
Unanimous  
24. MANUEL LUJAN, 
JR., SECRETARY OF 
THE INTERIOR, 
PETITIONER v. 
DEFENDERS OF 
WILDLIFE, ET AL., 
1992 
Government Actor: DOI 
Law: Endangered Species Act  
Issue: Standing to challenge actions taken in foreign nations  
Environmental groups held to lack standing to challenge regulation 
interpreting 7(a)(2) of Endangered Species Act (16 USCS 1536(a)(2)) 
not to apply to actions taken in foreign nations. 
Anti-env 
Pro-gov 
Scalia, J., joined 
by Rehnquist, 
Ch. J., and 
White, Kennedy, 
Souter, and 
Thomas, JJ. 
Blackmun, 
O’Connor  
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25. FORT GRATIOT 
SANITARY 
LANDFILL, INC., 
PETITIONER v. 
MICHIGAN 
DEPARTMENT OF 
NATURAL 
RESOURCES ET AL. 
Government Actor: Michigan Dept. Of Natural Resources 
Law: state regulation, commerce clause  
Issue: validity of state regulation under commerce clause 
Ruling: Michigan statute barring private landfill owner from accepting 
solid waste originating outside county in which landfill was located 
held to violate Federal Constitution’s commerce clause (Art I, 8, cl 3). 
Anti-state 
govt 
 
Anti-env 
regulation 
Stevens, J., 
joined by White, 
O’Connor, 
Scalia, Kennedy, 
Souter, and 
Thomas, JJ.,  
Rehnquist, 
Blackmun  
26. OREGON WASTE 
SYSTEMS, INC., ET 
AL., v. DEPARTMENT 
OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY OF THE 
STATE OF OREGON 
ET AL.  
Government Actor: Oregon Dept. Of Environmental Quality  
Law: state regulation, Commerce clause 
Issue: validity of state regulation under commerce clause 
Ruling: Surcharge imposed by Oregon on in-state disposal of solid 
waste generated in other states held to violate Federal Constitution’s 
commerce clause (Art I, 8, cl 3). 
Anti-state 
govt 
 
Anti-env 
Thomas, J., 
joined by 
Stevens, 
O’Connor, 
Scalia, Kennedy, 
Souter, and 
Ginsburg, JJ. 
Blackmun 
27. OF CHICAGO, ET 
AL., PETITIONERS v. 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
DEFENSE FUND ET 
AL., 1994 
Government Actor: EPA, local government 
Law: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
Issue: exemptions under RCRA 
Ruling: Ash generated by resource recovery facility’s incineration of 
municipal solid waste held not exempt, pursuant to 42 USCS 6921(i), 
from regulation as hazardous waste under 42 USCS 6921-6934. 
Pro-env 
Anti-city 
gov 
Scalia, J., joined 
by Rehnquist, 
Ch. J., and 
Blackmun, 
Kennedy, Souter, 
Thomas, and 
Ginsburg 
Stevens, 
O’Connor  
28. C& A CARBONE, 
INC., ET AL., 
PETITIONERS v. 
TOWN OF 
CLARKSTOWN, NEW 
YORK 
Government Actor: local government 
Law: town ordinance, Commerce Clause 
Issue: Does ordinance violate commerce clause? 
Ruling: Town ordinance requiring that all nonrecyclable nonhazardous 
solid waste within town be deposited at designated transfer station held 
to violate Federal Constitution’s commerce clause 
Anti-env 
Anti-local 
govt 
Kennedy, J., 
joined by 
Stevens, Scalia, 
Thomas, and 
Ginsburg, 
JJ.O’Connor  
Souter, 
Rehnquist, 
Blackmun 
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29. PUD NO. 1 OF 
JEFFERSON COUNTY 
AND CITY OF 
TACOMA, 
PETITIONERS v. 
WASHINGTON 
DEPARTMENT OF 
ECOLOGY, ET AL., 
1994 
Government Actors: state and local government 
Law: Clean Water Act 
Issue: Permissibility of state requirements under CWA 
Ruling: State’s minimum stream flow requirement held to be 
permissible condition of certification under 33 USCS 1341 to build 
hydroelectric project. 
Pro state 
govt 
 
Anti-local 
gov 
pro-env 
O’Connor, J., 
joined by 
Rehnquist, Ch. J., 
and Blackmun, 
Stevens, 
Kennedy, Souter, 
and Ginsburg, JJ. 
Thomas, Scalia  
30. KEY TRONIC 
CORPORATION, 
PETITIONER v. 
UNITED STATES ET 
AL. 
Government Actor: EPA 
Law: CERCLA 
Issue:  
Ruling: Private litigant’s attorneys’ fees associated with bringing 
action under 42 USCS 9607(a)(4)(B) to recover share of landfill 
cleanup costs held not recoverable. 
Partial Anti-
gov, Anti-
env 
by Stevens, J., 
joined by 
Rehnquist, Ch. J., 
and O’Connor, 
Kennedy, Souter, 
and Ginsburg, JJ. 
Blackmun, 
Thomas, Scalia 
31. ALAN MEGHRIG, 
ET AL., PETITIONERS 
v. KFC WESTERN, 
INC., 1994 
Government Actor: 
Law: RCRA 
Issue: private cause of action under RCRA 
Ruling: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act provision (42 USCS 
6972) held not to authorize private cause of action to recover prior cost 
of cleaning up toxic waste that does not endanger health or 
environment at time of suit. 
Anti-env 
Pro-gov 
(based upon 
USA brief) 
Unanimous  
32. BENNETT, ET AL., 
PETITIONERS v. 
MICHAEL SPEAR, ET 
AL. 
Government Actor: DOI, Fish and Wildlife Service 
Law: ESA, APA 
Issue: Standing 
Ruling: Parties challenging federal agency’s lake-level restrictions 
imposed to protect endangered species held to have standing under 
Endangered Species Act (16 USCS 1540(g)(1)) and Administrative 
Procedure Act (5 USCS 701 et seq.) 
Anti-gov 
Anti-env  
Unanimous  
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STEEL COMPANY, 
AKA CHICAGO 
STEEL AND 
PICKLING 
COMPANY, 
PETITIONER v. 
CITIZENS FOR A 
BETTER 
ENVIRONMENT 
Government Actor: -- 
Law: EPCRA 
Issue: Standing, citizen suits for wholly past violations 
Ruling: Environmental organization held to lack standing to maintain 
suit under Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act 
provision (42 USCS 11046(a)(1)), where no relief sought was likely to 
remedy organization’s alleged injury. 
Pro-gov 
Anti-env  
Unanimous in 
result 
 
33. UNITED STATES 
v. BESTFOODS, ET 
AL. 
Government Actor: US A.G. 
Law: CERCLA 
Issue: Liability Parent corporation held (1) not subject to derivative 
liability for environmental cleanup costs as to subsidiary’s operations 
unless corporate veil is pierced, but (2) subject to direct liability for 
such costs as to parent’s own operations. 
Anti-gov  
Anti-env 
Unanimous   
34. OHIO FORESTRY 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
PETITIONER v. 
SIERRA CLUB, ET 
AL., 1998 
Government Actor: USFS 
Law: National Forest Management Act  
Issue: validity of logging provisions in land and resource management 
plan  
Ruling: Federal suit by environmental organizations who challenged 
logging provisions of United States Forest Service’s land and resource 
management plan for national forest held not justiciable. 
Pro-gov  
Anti-env 
Unanimous  
35. Friends of the Earth 
Incorporated v. Laidlaw 
Environmental Services, 
2000 
Government Actor:-- 
Law: Clean Water Act  
Issue: Was claim for civil penalties mooted by compliance? 
Ruling: Environmental group’s claim for civil penalties not necessarily 
mooted by owner’s compliance 
Pro-gov 
Pro-env 
Ginsburg, 
Rehnquist, 
Stevens, 
O’Connor, 
Kennedy, Souter, 
Breyer 
Thomas, Scalia 
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36. SOLID WASTE 
AGENCY OF 
NORTHERN COOK 
COUNTY v. UNITED 
STATES ARMY 
CORPS OF 
ENGINEERS, ET AL. 
Government Actor: local government, US Army Corps of Engineers 
Law: Clean Water Act 
Issue: Does Clean Water Act extend to intrastate waters (in this case, 
seasonal ponds in isolated gravel pit that may be used by migrating 
birds)  
Ruling: CWA does not extend to this body of water  
Anti-gov 
 
Anti-env 
Rehnquist, 
O’Connor, 
Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas 
Stevens, Souter, 
Ginsburg, 
Breyer 
37. Whitman v. 
American Trucking 
Association, 2001 
Government Actor: EPA 
Law: Clean Air Act  
Issues:1) Did the Clean Air Act delegate legislative power to the 
administrator of the EPA? 
2) Can the administrator consider the costs of implementation?  
3) Do courts have jurisdiction with respect to revising ozone NAAQS? 
4.) If so, was the EPA’s interpretation permissible?  
 
Ruling: CAA provisions do not unconstitutionally delegate legislative 
power; they do not permit consideration costs of implementation  
Anti-gov 
 
Anti-env 
Unanimous re. 
result 
 
38. Tahoe Sierra 
Preservation Council v. 
Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency  
Government Actor: Tahoe Regional Planning Agency 
Law: moratoria imposed (as part of land use planning), 5th Amendment  
Issues: Do moratoria on developments constitute takings?  
Ruling: Moratoria do not constitute takings  
Pro-gov 
Pro-env 
Stevens, Souter, 
Ginsburg, 
O’Connor, 
Kennedy, Breyer 
Rehnquist, 
Thomas, Scalia 
39. SOUTH FLORIDA 
WATER 
MANAGEMENT 
DISTRICT, Petitioner v. 
MICCOSUKEE TRIBE 
OF INDIANS et al., 
2004 
Government Actor: 
Law: Clean Water Act 
Issue: Is a permit required to pump already polluted water from a canal 
to a reservoir? 
Ruling: For purposes of Clean Water Act requirement of permit for 
discharge of pollutant into nation’s waters, such discharges held to 
include point sources that did not themselves generate pollutants. 
Pro-env 
Anti-gov 
Unanimous Scalia, II-C 
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40. Engine 
Manufacturers 
Association/ Western 
States Petroleum 
Association v. South 
Coast Air Quality 
Management District, 
2004 
Government Actor: SCAQMD (California) 
Laws: Clean Air Act, state regulation 
Issue: Is the state regulation pre-empted by CAA? 
Ruling: Yes. California subdivision’s rules, imposing emission 
requirements on motor vehicles purchased or leased by public and 
private fleet operators, held not to escape pre-emption under § 209(a) 
of Clean Air Act (42 USCS § 7543(a)). 
Pro-fed  
Anti-env 
Scalia, J., 
Rehnquist, Ch. J., 
and Stevens, 
O’Connor, 
Kennedy, 
Thomas, 
Ginsburg, and 
Breyer 
Souter 
41. COOPER 
INDUSTRIES, INC., 
Petitioner v. AVIALL 
SERVICES, INC., 2004 
Government Actor:-- 
Law: CERCLA 
Issue: liability under CERCLA 
Ruling: Private party, potentially liable for cleaning up property 
contaminated by hazardous substances, that had not been sued under § 
106 or § 107 of Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), held unable to obtain 
contribution under § 113(f)(1) of CERCLA from another allegedly 
liable party. 
Anti-env Thomas, J., 
Rehnquist, Ch. J., 
and O’Connor, 
Scalia, Kennedy, 
Souter, and 
Breyer, JJ. 
Ginsburg, 
Stevens  
42. Alaska Department 
of Environmental 
Conservation v. EPA, 
2004 
Government Actor: EPA, Alaska Department of Environmental 
conservation 
Law: CAA 
Issue: Can EPA rule on reasonableness of best available control 
technology decisions by state permitting agencies re. polluting 
facilities? Did EPA properly block construction?  
Ruling: EPA can make the ruling, and properly blocked construction 
Pro-feds 
 
Pro-env 
Ginsburg, 
Stevens, 
O’Connor, 
Souter, and 
Breyer 
Kennedy, 
Rehnquist, 
Scalia, Thomas 
43. GALE NORTON, 
SECRETARY OF THE 
INTERIOR, et al., 
Petitioners v. 
SOUTHERN UTAH 
WILDERNESS 
ALLIANCE et al. 
Government Actor: DOI, Bureau of Land Management  
Law: FLPMA, NEPA 
Issue: challenge to BLM decision to allow off-road vehicle use in 
certain wilderness areas 
Ruling: challenge dismissed  
Pro-fed 
Anti-env 
Unanimous  
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44. DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
et al., Petitioners v. 
PUBLIC CITIZEN et 
al., 2004 
Government Actor: DOT, EPA 
Law: NEPA and CAA 
Issue: Does National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 USCS §§ 
4321 et seq.) and Clean Air Act (42 USCS §§ 7401 et seq.) require 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration to evaluate 
environmental effects of some cross-border operations by 
Mexican-domiciled carriers? 
Ruling: Government decision upheld  
Pro-gov 
Anti-env 
Unanimous  
45. DENNIS BATES, et 
al., Petitioners v. DOW 
AGROSCIENCES LLC, 
2005 
Government Actor: EPA  
Laws: FIFRA 
Issue: Does FIFRA pre-empt state law claims regarding damages 
caused by pesticides  
Ruling: FIFRA does not pre-empt all claims 
Pro-env 
 
Stevens, J., 
Rehnquist, Ch. J., 
O’Connor, 
Kennedy, Souter, 
Ginsburg, 
Breyer, 
Thomas, Scalia  
46. UNITED 
HAULERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
ET AL. v. 
ONEIDA-HERKIMER 
SOLID WASTE 
MANAGEMENT 
AUTHORITY ET AL., 
2007 
Government Actor: Local government 
Laws: local waste ordinance, Commerce Clause  
Issue: Can a municipality enact a flow control ordinance that directs 
all solid waste generated in its jurisdiction to a public facility without 
offending the commerce clause?  
Ruling: Ordinances do no violate commerce clause 
Pro-gov 
Pro-env 
Roberts, Thomas, 
Souter, Ginsburg, 
Breyer, Scalia 
(except II-D) 
Alito, Stevens, 
Kennedy 
47. S. D. WARREN 
COMPANY, v. MAINE 
BOARD OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION et al., 
2006 
Government Actor: Maine Board of Environmental Protection, FERC, 
EPA 
Law: CWA 
Issue: Does Federal licensing of hydroelectric dams require state 
certification? 
Ruling: state certification is required  
Pro-gov  
 
Pro-env 
Souter, J., 
Roberts, C. J., 
Stevens, 
Kennedy, 
Thomas, 
Ginsburg, 
Breyer, Alito, 
Scalia, J.,  
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48. JOHN A. 
RAPANOS ET UX., v. 
UNITED STATES. 
JUNE CARABELL, ET 
AL., PETITIONERS v. 
UNITED STATES 
ARMY CORPS OF 
ENGINEERS, ET AL., 
2007 
Government Actor: US Army Corps of Engineers 
Laws: CWA 
Issue: Is the CWA applicable to intrastate waters? 
Ruling: CWA cannot be applied to these waters, either because a) not 
connected to interstate commerce or b) insufficient nexus between 
waters and interstate commerce 
Anti-gov 
 
Anti-env 
 
Scalia, Roberts, 
Thomas, 
Kennedy, Alito  
STEVENS, 
SOUTER, 
GINSBURG, 
and BREYER 
49. NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF 
HOME BUILDERS, ET 
AL., PETITIONERS v. 
DEFENDERS OF 
WILDLIFE ET AL.; 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 
AGENCY, 
PETITIONER v. 
DEFENDERS OF 
WILDLIFE ET AL., 
2007 
Government Actor: EPA 
Laws: CWA and ESA 
Issue: Were proper criteria met for transferring administrative power 
to Arizona under the ESA? 
Ruling: EPA decision upheld, 9th circuit overturned 
CLEAN WATER ACT and ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT  
Pro-gov 
Anti-env 
Alito, Roberts, 
Scalia, Thomas, 
Kennedy 
Steven, Breyer, 
Souter, 
Ginsburg 
50. Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 2007 
Government Actor: EPA 
Laws: CAA, APA 
Issue: Does the CAA have the authority to regulate green house gases 
such as carbon dioxide? 
Ruling: Case remanded to EPA, which must provide reasons for 
decision not to regulate green house gases that do not run afoul of 
APA arbitrary and capricious standards  
Anti-fed 
gov 
 
Pro env 
Stevens, 
Kennedy, Souter, 
Ginsburg, Breyer 
Roberts, 
Thomas, Alito, 
Scalia  
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51. United States v. 
Atlantic Research 
Corporation, 2007 
Government Actor: USA 
Laws: CERCLA  
Issue: suit to recover costs for clean up 
Ruling: Atlantic Research has a cause of action 
Anti-fed 
gov 
Unanimous  
52. Environmental 
Defense, et al., 
Petitioners v. Duke 
Energy Corporation, et 
al. 
Government Actor: Federal government joined by environmental 
petitioners 
Laws: CAA 
Issue: Are re-designed coal fired electric generating units “major 
modifications” under CAA? Must “modification” be interpreted 
identically under all CAA implementing regulations?  
Ruling: lower court overturned; no need for identical interpretation of 
terms 
Pro-gov 
Pro-env 
Souter, Roberts, 
Scalia, Breyer, 
Ginsburg, Alito, 
Stevens, 
Kennedy, 
Thomas (in part)  
Thomas (in 
part) 
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